I first took up Matthew Arnold's essays as a dissertation writer circa 2008. Although I had not read much of Arnold's prose beyond the commonly anthologized pieces (“The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” “The Study of Poetry,” bits of Culture and Anarchy), he was a figure very much out of favor, and I brought to the table a strong preconception of his polemic. Arnold, I had learned, was a kind of cultural nationalist trying to fight class divisions within Britain by prescribing a narrow canon of books that could shore up a common language for his compatriots. His main claim was that there was a singular tradition of great books called “culture” that embodied “the best that is known and thought in the world.”Footnote 1 Everyone in Britain needed to keep reading these books if the nation were to retain a shared identity and not fall into chaos. Furthermore, as I understood it, Arnold thought that to experience culture you needed to remain “disinterested” and “aloof from what is called ‘the practical view of things’” (5:252). Arnold was a Victorian Mortimer Adler who sought to defend the authority of traditional literary canons as well as a Victorian Wimsatt-and-Beardsley who upheld disinterested close reading against hyperpolitical Theory.Footnote 2
As I made my way through R. H. Super's standard edition of Arnold's prose, however, I found a different figure, one who was somewhat more sympathetic than I had anticipated. For one thing, I discovered, Arnoldian disinterestedness did not have the precise political edge so often ascribed to it. Rather than an attempt to depoliticize literary criticism, it was an attempt to untether critical thought from the evangelical and Utilitarian demand for immediate moral or practical application—“deliverables,” as we say today. Along similar lines, Arnold's concept of culture turned out to be an ideal of reading more and not less. Instead of heckling readers to retrench around a nationalistic vision of English culture, Arnold was asking them to get beyond the myopic idea (and here he quotes the Liberal politician Charles Adderley) that “the race we ourselves represent, the men and women, the old Anglo-Saxon race, are the best breed in the whole world” (3:262) by reading more widely among the literatures of modern Europe, classical Greece and Rome, and Asian antiquity.Footnote 3 This is an admittedly dated vision of world literature, but it was not the centripetal canon I had been led to expect. And the best way to achieve all this, for Arnold, was to create mixing institutions: public schools, literary academies, even the Established Church, that could bring people into contact with ideas and individuals from outside of their class milieu. Although he aligned himself with the Liberal Party, and insisted that “the Tories have not the secret of life and of the future for us” (9:139), he also worried that Gladstone's Liberals had committed themselves to an overly narrow philosophy of limited government and laissez-faire competition.Footnote 4 As liberalism slowly became the dominant power in Britain, it needed to develop a more expansive imagination that was willing to use “the alliance of democracy with a powerful State-action” to empower both middle- and working-class subjects (2:16). If Britain wanted to “facilitate for all members of her society full and free expansion” (2:11), it could not simply trust the sorting forces of the marketplace but had to create an institutional framework that would make it happen.
In a strict sense, none of this was news.Footnote 5 It had been obscured, though, by the outsized role that Arnold had assumed amid the academic culture wars of the 1980s and ’90s. During those seminal debates over college curricula and literary theory, both left and right had recruited Arnold to stand for a set of positions about which everyone could agree to disagree. Conservatives interpreted him as a champion of the twin pillars of Cold War humanism: a canon of Western “great books” and a style of apolitical close reading, as against anticolonial multiculturalism and Marxist literary theory, respectively. The Baby Boomer left, in turn, read Arnold as an apologist for all those Foucauldian subject-forming institutions, from the state to the school, that it was trying to subvert. Having as their main frame of reference the America of the Eisenhower liberal consensus, with its array of disciplinary institutions (the FBI, the CIA, the big state university) and its various normativities (hetero, patriarchal), critics like D. A. Miller trained their eye upon the synergy between political hegemony, disciplinary institutions, and literary practice. Arnold, with his envy of the very European statism that Foucault would later critique, made a perfect villain for this moment. In Culture and the State (1998), for instance, David Lloyd and Paul Thomas wrote that “from the time of Friedrich Schiller to that of Matthew Arnold . . . conceptions of culture . . . inform a nineteenth-century consensus on the formation of the proper subject for the state.”Footnote 6
To an American graduate student who had grown up during the Clinton years and was beginning a dissertation on the eve of the Great Recession, however, Arnold's polemics took on a somewhat different resonance. For even as many academic critics continued to rail against the Cold War state, Eisenhower-era liberalism was being eclipsed by a “neo” liberalism that sought to render that state obsolete. First spearheaded by Reagan and Thatcher, and then expanded by Clinton and Blair, this version of liberalism, which wanted to defund institutions like the university and shift more public goods into the private marketplace, bore an unmistakable resemblance to the Victorian liberalism that Arnold had critiqued in texts like Culture and Anarchy (1869). The politicians and journalists whom Arnold skewered frequently spoke a language that I recognized. There were the cost-cutting mantras of Liberal MP Robert Lowe, who promised that “popular education, if not efficient, should at least be cheap, and if not cheap, should be efficient” (11:226), or Edward Miall's pledge that, under Lowe's oversight, “the penny will become a halfpenny, the halfpenny will become a farthing, and the farthing nothing at all” (2:214). I knew that Thatcher had called for a return to “Victorian values,” but reading such sentiments alongside contemporary op-eds about how higher education needed to become more “nimble” in response to technological change made the connection click in a dreadful way. Then there was the fact that what Arnold disparagingly called Philistinism, a middle-class ethos that yoked laissez-faire capitalism to Protestant fundamentalism via a general mistrust of government, basically described the Republican coalition of the post-Carter years. English Dissent, Arnold writes in St. Paul and Protestantism (1870), is “a machinery of covenants, conditions, bargains, and parties-contractors, such as could have proceeded from no one but the born Anglo-Saxon man of business, British or American” (6:14).
In short, I was learning by experience that old books look very different depending on the context in which you read them. Having come of age in an America that was dramatically trimming its public sector, I saw in Arnold not a defender of the old Cold War state but rather a critic of market-driven policy and an articulator of the role that government institutions could play in creating public goods.Footnote 7 This Arnold was harder for me to dislike—especially when he turned his attentions to the issue of state education. As of the 1850s, Great Britain possessed no system of national public schools; both upper and middle classes mistrusted such a project, the former because it infringed upon their traditional privileges, and the latter because of their well-earned fear of government discrimination. (John Stuart Mill, for example, worried that publicly funded education would be used to marginalize minority opinions.)Footnote 8 In 1858, however, the Newcastle Commission was established “to consider and report what Measures, if any, are required for the Extension of sound and cheap elementary Instruction to all Classes of the People” (2:327–38). Ten assistant commissioners were dispatched to report on current practices in England, while two, including Arnold, were sent to observe practices on the continent (2:328). After reporting his findings to Parliament, Arnold published them in a volume entitled The Popular Education of France (1861). The book opens with an essay called “Democracy” that seeks to account for the ascendant Liberal Party's mistrust of public education as a project (2:4). At some level, Arnold argues, it bespeaks the Liberals’ misguided conviction that good things must emerge from a competitive system. Liberals love to tell stories about extraordinary individuals who rise above their peers through hard work and genius; “the question,” however, “is not about individuals. The question is about the common bulk of mankind, persons without extraordinary gifts of exceptional energy, and who will ever require, in order to make the best of themselves, encouragement and directly favoring circumstances” (2:8–9). Liberalism loves “grand prizes . . . to be won only by distancing competitions,” but what most people need, and what society as a whole needs, are “middling goods”: accessible, equitable things instead of exceptional and exclusive things (2:13). And this is what democratic action can legitimately hope to create. “Democracy is a force in which the concert of a great number of men makes up for the weakness of each man taken by himself; democracy accepts a certain relative rise in their condition, obtainable by this concert for a great number, as something desirable in itself” (2:13).
This trade-off, Arnold argues, has successfully been made in the schools of France. In a follow-up essay entitled “A French Eton” (1863–64), which shifts to the question of secondary education, he argues that English critics who condemn French lycées as being inferior to Eton or Harrow are missing the very gambit of public goods. In England, it takes a huge amount of private money to churn out a handful of Eton graduates. In France, a smaller amount of public money-per-pupil ends up accomplishing much more for society overall:
“Your French Etons,” I am told, “are no Etons at all; there is nothing like an Eton in France.” I know that. Very likely France is to be pitied for having no Etons, but I want to call attention to the substitute, the compensation. The English public school produces the finest boys in the world. . . . But there are only some five or six schools in England to produce this specimen-boy; and they cannot produce him cheap. . . . But for the common wear and tear of middling life, and at rates tolerable for middling people, what do we produce? What do we produce at 30l. a year? What is the character of the schools which undertake for us this humbler, but far more widely-interesting production? Are they as good as the Toulouse Lyceum and the Sorèze College? That is the question. (2:279–80)
The general quality of the lycées confounds the race-to-the top model on which the English pride themselves. Instead of letting a small number of schools become extraordinarily good by fighting for resources and prestige, you have a system that “has undoubtedly given to the lower classes, to the body of the common people, a self-respect, an enlargement of spirit, a consciousness of counting for something in their country's action” (2:9–10).
To attack the English hostility toward such redistributive goods, Arnold argues, you ultimately have to dispel the idea that the state is someone else meddling in your business. Gladstonian Liberals say, “Here is really your State; would you accept the action of these men as your own representative action?” (2:27). But this way of thinking, Arnold counters, misses the reality that the state is merely “the nation in its collective and corporate character” and is therefore no more than what we ourselves make it (2:26). In the “French Eton” essay, Arnold observes that
People talk of Government interference, Government control, as if State-action were necessarily something imposed upon them from without; something despotic and self-originated; something which took no account of their will, and left no freedom to their activity. . . . [But] can any one really suppose that, in a country like this, State-action—in education, for instance—can ever be that, unless we choose to make it so? We can give it what form we will. We can make it our agent, not our master. . . . By really agreeing to deal in our collective and corporate character with education . . . we can make State-action . . . the faithful but potent expression of our own activity. (2:309)
Government is less a parent than a partner, and it is hardly humiliating to receive state aid if that aid is being dispersed around the commons rather than handed down paternalistically (2:394). The person who receives “help to which his own money, as a tax-payer, contributes . . . as a result of the joint energy and intelligence of the whole community” is “no more humiliated than when he crosses London Bridge or walks down the King's Road, or visits the British Museum” (2:300–301).
A corollary to this argument is Arnold's claim that a public good like education cannot necessarily be improved by injecting a competitive logic into its funding structure. In an 1862 essay entitled “The Twice-Revised Code,” Arnold criticized Robert Lowe's proposal to allocate government funds to schools based on test results. Lowe's proposal, Arnold writes, is little more than a cost-cutting scheme in disguise, since it is anticipated to reduce the already tiny government expenditure on primary schools by two-fifths (2:218–19). Not only will it punish schools that serve disadvantaged populations, but its Utilitarian emphasis on testable skills will ignore the larger cultural leg-up that public education can give to such students. Much as many American educators worried that George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind program would narrow curriculum to a logic of teaching to the test, Arnold fears that Lowe's Revised Code will “reduce the schools to cramming, and . . . involve the abandonment of any aspiration to shape the young more fully.”Footnote 9 “Confining [working-class students] to reading lessons” and “striking out lessons on geography or history from the course of our elementary schools” will do nothing to further “the advance of them, and their class in civilization” (2:223).
Arnold would make two further research trips to Europe, ultimately yielding his longest ever volume, Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868). But he would also expand upon his educational polemic to mount a broader defense of the positive role played by public institutions in civic life. In an 1864 essay entitled “The Literary Influence of Academies,” for instance, Arnold responds to a long-standing tradition of English contempt for the French Academy. English cultural boosters, he writes, love to insist that England has been able to produce geniuses like Shakespeare and Newton because they developed sui generis in an unstandardized intellectual environment. In response, Arnold asks what England might have to gain from institutions that normalize a kind of official literary culture. I think of the essay as a sort of paradefense of the specialized research institution: why create a stable, protected space for the cultivation and dissemination of knowledge instead of leaving it up to the marketplace of ideas? Arnold grants that while “independence of all authority, prescription, and routine” can facilitate the emergence of genius, genius itself is mercurial and requires an institutional framework in order to propagate (3:239). Thus, despite the periodic appearance of a Shakespeare or a Bacon, modern English intellectual history has been marked by a pattern of discontinuity in which such figures are never quite able to build legacies:
Shakespeare and our great Elizabethan group were certainly more gifted writers than Corneille and his group; but what was the sequel to this great literature, this literature of genius, as we may call it, stretching from Marlowe to Milton? What did it lead up to in English literature? To our provincial and second-rate literature of the eighteenth century. What, on the other hand, was the sequel to the literature of the French “great century” . . . what did it lead up to? To the French literature of the eighteenth century . . . the greatest European force of the eighteenth century. In science, again, we had Newton, a genius of the very highest order, a type of genius in science if ever there was one. On the continent, as a sort of counterpart to Newton, there was Leibnitz; a man, it seems to me (though on these matters I speak under correction), of much less creative energy of genius, much less power of divination than Newton, but rather a man of admirable intelligence, a type of intelligence in science if ever there was one. Well, and what did they each directly lead up to in science? What was the intellectual generation that sprang from each of them? . . . The man of genius was continued by the English analysts of the eighteenth century, comparatively powerless and obscure followers of the renowned master. The man of intelligence was continued by successors like Bernoulli, Euler, Lagrange, and Laplace, the greatest names in modern mathematics. (3:240)
Equally important for Arnold is the fact that institutions like the French Academy help circulate current knowledge where it can be accessed by those who have neither genius nor privilege supporting them. Despite his ongoing popularity among defenders of the Great Man curriculum, Arnold here is far less concerned with the fortunes of epochal geniuses than with what he calls “the journeyman-work of literature”: the production of popular editions and public-intellectual work designed to introduce laypersons to the fruits of modern scholarship (3:241). In England, intellectual expertise is “isolated” and “form[s] no powerful body of opinion,” a fact that gives “ignorance and charlatanism” an easy time “cry[ing] down criticism as the voice of an insignificant, over-fastidious minority” and foisting discredited and cranky theories upon the public (3:242). In France, an ordinary reader interested in the history of Islam can pick up an accessible volume that digests the latest Western academic knowledge on the subject, while in England, as recently as 1829, Charles Forster could publish to wide acclaim a volume arguing “that Mahomet was the little horn of the he-goat that figures in the eighth chapter of Daniel, and that the Pope was the great horn” (2:243).
Arnold's defense of public goods was not limited to the educational and cultural realms but also countenanced the larger question of economic redistribution. In an essay entitled “Equality” (1878), which would be paired with 1861's “Democracy” in his late collection of Mixed Essays (1879), Arnold defends the Real Estates Intestacy Bill, a measure that would tax inheritances of a certain size. Gladstone's Liberals warn that it will impinge upon the right of private property, and this is because, Arnold observes, of a wider English tendency to frame social inequality as the necessary consequence of economic liberty. “Equality before the law we all take as a matter of course,” but when it comes to “social equality . . . everybody in England has a hard word” (8:278). Gladstone, for instance, writes that “the love of freedom itself is hardly stronger in England than the love of aristocracy”; the latter is “the shadow which the love of freedom casts,” and represents “an active, living, and life giving power . . . an inseparable essential element in our political habits of mind” (8:279). Instead of disputing this point, Arnold turns it around: if social equality inevitably costs you some “freedom,” what does it get you in return? He notes that many former French conquests—Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, the Rhine-adjacent regions of Germany—have retained their old Napoleonic bequest law, which “forbids entails altogether, and leaves a man free to dispose of but one-fourth of his property, of whatever land, if he have three children or more, of one-third if he have two children, of one-half if he have but one child” (8:280). What benefits do they perceive in such a law that the English do not? Here Arnold defers to the Belgian economist Laveleye: “France, being the country of Europe where the soil is more divided than anywhere else except in Switzerland and Norway, is at the same time the country where material well-being is the most widely spread” (8:290). Economic redistribution has both increased “the comfort and progress of the working classes” and generated a public-spiritedness largely unknown in England (8:290). Arnold's ultimate claim in “Equality” is that the English Liberal focus on rights has distracted them from a more constructive emphasis on government's role in creating collective goods. Liberals like to claim that the poor have no “natural right to work” or “natural right to have food,” but by the same logic “kings and nobles have none” to their estates (8:284). The reality is that all these things require civil society for their existence and preservation:
If it is the sound English doctrine that all rights are created by law and are based on expediency, and are alterable as the public advantage may require, certainly that orthodox doctrine is mine. Property is created and maintained by law. It would disappear in that state of private war and scramble which legal society supersedes. Legal society creates, for the common good, the right of property; and for the common good that right is by legal society limitable. That property should exist, and that it should be held with a sense of security and with a power of disposal, may be taken, by us here at any rate, as a settled matter of expediency. With these conditions a good deal of inequality is inevitable. But that the power of disposal should be practically unlimited, that the inequality should be enormous, or that the degree of inequality admitted at one time should be admitted always,—this is by no means so certain. (8:285)
In lieu of arguing about what is or isn't a natural right, Arnold argues, it is more useful to ask: What do we want our society to look like, and what laws and institutions can we create to make it so?
In another essay penned that same year, Arnold lamented the fact that, nearly two decades after his first tour of continental schools, Gladstone's Liberal Party platform contained “not a word of middle-class education” (8:348). “A satisfactory system of public secondary schools nobody calls for. It finds, as we have seen, no place among the twenty-two engagements of the Liberal party. The newspapers never touch the subject. Both upper and middle class appear content that their schools should stay as they are” (8:353). Not long after Arnold's death in 1888, though, this situation started to change. Britain's Liberal Party began to pivot toward what is sometimes called the New Liberalism, as figures like T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, and J. A. Hobson abandoned laissez-faire economics for statist redistribution policies. Working under many of the same influences as Arnold—German humanism, liberal Protestant theology, and admiration for continental educational systems—these figures argued that the goal of political life was the realization of one's best self, and that this was impossible for most people without state support.Footnote 10 The purpose of the state was not to protect a set of minimalist economic rights but rather to establish an institutional foundation that would permit the greatest number of people to exercise both private and civic virtues. This reformed version of liberalism would set the agenda for both the British welfare state and for the expanded vision of American government advanced by the two Presidents Roosevelt and then stewarded by Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson.Footnote 11
The past half century has seen this particular model of the liberal state slowly whittled away, first by the “small government” overhauls of the 1980s and ’90s, and then by the neoliberal austerity measures imposed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. What is noteworthy in retrospect, though, is the coincidence between right- and left-wing versions of antistatism during this period. As Bruce Robbins argues, the Reaganite attack on the regulatory state was matched by the Foucauldian critique of state institutions and subjectification—transferred, a bit awkwardly, from the French to the American context and imbued with a countercultural animus.Footnote 12 There were some spaces in which these different strains of antistatism directly converged (tech culture comes to mind), but for the most part it passed unnoticed. During the Donald Trump era, however, the American left has come back around to a defense of authoritative institutions that can sound downright Arnoldian. For while Trump gained some traction in 2016 by criticizing neoliberal economic policy, his administration largely deregulated industry and finance, attacked institutions of official expertise, scapegoated the permanent bureaucracy, and used racism to undermine the very notion of public goods. Trump is in some ways the ultimate Arnoldian Philistine, drumming up white religious populism and antiestablishment anarchy while actually benefiting finance capitalism. In response, a variety of voices on the American left have come to agree that rebuilding some kind of equitable institutional infrastructure is imperative. This has made for an occasionally disorienting political season, as left-wing commentators rally behind the FBI, wax nostalgic for the institutional norms of the Eisenhower years, and chastise Trump's antimask followers for not obeying the correct scientific and medical authorities. (Edward Said's Reference Said2003 vision of “alternative communities all across the world, informed by alternative information” has lost some of its luster.)Footnote 13 Even the word “normal,” which for decades was a bugbear of academic critique—see: The Trouble with—has become a bloody shirt: Trump's behavior was deplorable because it was #notnormal, a violation of the unwritten rules that gelled in the years after World War II.Footnote 14
Whether this current normative mood on the left turns out to be a modest course correction or an overreaction remains to be seen. There is certainly the danger of reactionary self-critique, as when some blame postmodernism for begetting Trumpian post-truth or canon-bashing for the current downsizing of humanities departments.Footnote 15 Nevertheless, the present does seem like a moment when we might use Arnold to reexamine our longstanding ambivalence toward institutions. In particular, I would suggest, Arnold's essays foreground the fine line between paternalism and empowerment within institution-building projects. When those with power create public goods for those without, when do we read their actions as empowering and when do we read them as condescending and paternalistic? How do you construct public goods to aid the marginal without imposing some conception of how they ought to think, act, and live? In short, what is the difference between lifting up and talking down?
Arnold's support for state schools, David Russell shows, is usually read in the latter vein: by opposing Lowe's Revised Code, Arnold seemingly cast his lot with Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth's missionary-style vision of education as a kind of civilizing influence for the rising classes. Russell himself denies the charge, pointing out that while Arnold does emphasize the “civilizing” effects of education, his emphasis lies not on “the cultivation of a paternal elite” but rather on “the diffusion of conditions” for aesthetic experience.Footnote 16 But it is worth asking how real the distinction is. Robbins maintains that this ambiguity is endemic to social-democratic projects generally, and notes the long-standing disagreement among historians as to whether the welfare state was a top-down project enacted defensively by elites or a bottom-up one agitated for by the proletarian grassroots.Footnote 17 Arnold's essays on education walk that line very delicately. Approach them skeptically and they patronizingly trumpet “the advance of [the poor], and their class in civilization” (2:223). Approach them sympathetically and they aim to create, as Russell says, “the materials and the framework for equality.”Footnote 18 For the Arnold of “A French Eton,” “a citizen's relation to the State” is not “that of a dependent to a paternal benefactor” but instead “that of a partnership to the whole firm”—for the state itself is the people “in their collective and corporate character,” and the individual is part of “the joint energy and intelligence of the whole community” (2:294, emphasis original; 2:300).Footnote 19
Arnold's ability to straddle such lines, more than anything else, seems to explain why he remains a vexed figure for us. Ruskin and Carlyle, though by most measures more reactionary than Arnold, attacked industrial capitalism through a combination of Romantic conservatism and quasisocialism that feels decidedly untimely. You can invoke them as voices in the wilderness without anyone thinking that you've signed onto their entire platforms. Meanwhile Arnold, with his determination to free his compatriots from the mental shackles of bad religion, capitalism, and self-satisfied nationalism, remains a little too recognizable. His bugbears are our bugbears, and his pitfalls remain our own.
