This book offers a thorough analysis of the mishu (secretary) institution within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the role of mishu in policymaking, from the Party’s founding in the 1920s through Xi Jinping’s current third term. Given the paucity of scholarship on this topic, Tsai’s work is both timely and valuable. Drawing on meticulous documentary research, Tsai provides an in-depth examination of the mishu system. The book consists of five chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter introduces the analytical framework. From the second chapter onward, the author traces the evolution of the mishu institution and its functions across different leadership eras.
In the party’s early years, mishu played powerful roles in decision making, with figures like Mao Zedong using their positions to influence policy, leading to concerns about “mishu dictatorship.” The establishment of the Central Secretariat in 1926 sought to curb such power, but during the Cultural Revolution, trusted mishu again wielded substantial authority to shape policies. After Mao, reforms aimed to professionalize and limit mishu power, though leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin still relied on trusted aides to strengthen their control. Under Xi Jinping, the mishu system has returned to active participation in decision making, as Xi appointed close allies Li Zhanshu and Ding Xuexiang to head the Central Office, enabling him to centralize authority and monitor the broader party apparatus. Despite efforts to regulate mishu appointments, the system remains vulnerable to the dominance of personalistic rulers who use it to reinforce their power, highlighting enduring tensions between institutional constraints and individual authority within the CCP.
While the book is a useful descriptive account of the mishu system, its analytical framework could be strengthened. The key concepts introduced in chapter one are sometimes confusing. Tsai classifies top leaders into two categories: those with mainly rational-legal authority and those with mainly charismatic authority. According to Tsai, Hu Jintao falls into the former category, while Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping belong to the latter. However, this classification seems to stretch Weberian concepts. Max Weber defines charismatic authority as resting on the extraordinary personal qualities of a leader. While Mao arguably fits this definition due to his revolutionary leadership, it is debatable whether Xi Jinping possesses comparable charismatic legitimacy. Perhaps the notion of personalistic rule would better capture Xi’s leadership style.
The author characterizes mishu as a type of clientelistic elite, distinguishing between those grounded in “traditional authority” and those in “rational-legal authority.” Tsai argues that directors of the Central Office and personal mishu belong to the former category, while other mishu fall under the latter. However, this raises an important conceptual question: is it coherent to describe elites as simultaneously clientelistic and rooted in rational-legal authority? Since the book mainly focuses on the first group, it would be clearer and more consistent to define only this subgroup as clientelistic elites.
Tsai references Weber’s concept of traditional authority but applies it differently: rather than deriving from longstanding customs, Tsai uses it to describe “China’s traditional culture of personal relationships” (p. 32). This redefinition departs from Weber’s original meaning and may benefit from clarification.
The book raises an important question: under what conditions do mishu play a policymaking role instead of merely providing administrative support? According to Tsai, this depends on the type of top leadership. When top leaders possess mainly charismatic authority, as with Mao and Xi, mishu are more likely to influence policy. Conversely, under leaders with rational-legal authority, such as Hu Jintao, mishu tend to play more limited, service-oriented roles. Tsai relies on whether mishu concurrently hold Politburo positions as an indicator of policymaking influence, citing figures such as Wang Dongxing under Mao and Cai Qi under Xi.
However, what exactly does it mean for mishu to “influence” policymaking? Do they shape leaders’ thinking through information filtering and agenda-setting, or are they mainly channels through which leaders bypass bureaucratic structures? In Wang Dongxing’s case, the latter seems more accurate: he worked to implement Mao’s directives directly, especially during the Cultural Revolution. But what about Cai Qi under Xi? Does Cai meaningfully shape policy, or does he simply execute Xi’s agenda? If the former, what strategies does he use? If the latter, why does Xi rely on mishu rather than issuing direct orders to bureaucrats or reshuffling personnel to ensure compliance? Although it is understandably difficult to answer these questions due to limited access to elite decision-making processes, laying out possible mechanisms through which mishu exert influence would have strengthened the analysis.
The discussion of Mao’s relationship with Yang Shangkun, who served as director of the Central Office from 1945, is also thought-provoking. Tsai notes that Mao distrusted Yang, a suspicion that intensified after Mao discovered the Central Office had bugged his train in 1961. Yet it remains puzzling why Mao allowed Yang to remain in this critical position for so long despite this distrust. Further elaboration on such contradictions would add nuance to the analysis.
Despite some conceptual ambiguities, Tsai’s book is an important and highly recommendable contribution to the study of Chinese politics. Its focus on the mishu institution offers fresh and valuable insights into the CCP’s inner workings and elite dynamics.
