Philosophical developments towards the end of the Hellenistic period and in particular the re-emergence of Plato and Aristotle as figures of authority in the first century B.C. have recently attracted a considerable amount of interest. Clausen's work contributes to these debates through a detailed investigation of the Platonic and Aristotelian background that can potentially be seen as informing Cicero's Lucullus (i.e. the surviving treatise from the first version of his work on Academic philosophy, also known as Academica Priora). The book was originally presented as C.'s doctoral thesis (Marburg); as such it benefits from a clear and simple structure and method of exposition, while detailed chapter headings and sub-headings partly compensate for the lack of indexes.
The choice of topic requires C. to focus on specific questions and arguments regarding the possibility of secure knowledge and the reliability of the senses. There are hardly any references to other Ciceronian works and, as a result, the book will be of more interest to students of ancient epistemology than to scholars of Roman studies who might be looking for a broader picture of Cicero's philosophical and intellectual outlook. Readers interested primarily in Cicero may also be discouraged by the fact that more than half of the book (chs 1–2) is devoted to an exposition of those aspects of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic epistemology that C. considers most relevant to the concerns of the Lucullus. Through this selection of particular topics and passages (e.g. Rep. 7.523a–525b from Plato; DA 2.5–12 from Aristotle), C. traces a common ‘Platonic-Aristotelian theory’ characterized mainly by a view of perception as a discriminatory faculty able to discern objects in their distinctness (Unterscheidung). This is contrasted with a ‘two-step’ Stoic theory of perception as presentation (Vorstellung), whereby the senses passively receive impressions whose content is subject to approval (assent) by the commanding part of the soul (ch. 2).
The central aim of the book, which is to shed light on Cicero's reception of Plato (p. 9), is pursued in ch. 3, where the discussion turns to the Lucullus. The main challenge is to assess the relevance of a Platonic/Aristotelian background in a dialogue that essentially recreates the Hellenistic debate between Stoics and Academic Sceptics over the feasibility of secure knowledge acquired through the senses. C. points to the Platonic connection offered by two of Cicero's own teachers, Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, both of whom claimed to be Plato's ‘rightful heir’ and enlisted him as an ally for their respective views. The fact remains, however, that in the Lucullus the eponymous character, speaking on behalf of Antiochus, rehearses explicitly Stoic arguments against Academic scepticism (see Luc. 17, 28) while only a few oblique references are made to Philo's views. C. rightly acknowledges that all the arguments put forward in the dialogue (even the sceptical ones of the pre-Philonian Academy voiced by Cicero in propria persona) are derived from Stoic premises. Thus the analysis eventually centres on clarifying the differences between this dominant Hellenistic Vorstellung-approach and the Platonic/Aristotelian Unterscheidung-view (C. maintains that these differences have been obscured and overlooked by Antiochus and modern scholars respectively, p. 193). C. finds traces of pre-Hellenistic epistemology mainly in Luc. 19–22, but it would have been equally possible to refer to Stoic parallels for the views expressed there on the senses delivering their own judgements (S.E. M 7.258) or on experts’ ‘technical’ impressions (D.L. 7.51).
C.'s investigation is conducted on the basis of parallels between the Lucullus and earlier epistemological views at the theoretical level, and there is no discussion of source-critical or historical problems such as the availability of particular texts and the extent of their consultation by Antiochus and/or Cicero. On the whole, C.'s book provides an interesting additional angle for examining the debate in the Lucullus and Antiochus’ syncretistic project which (in the case of epistemology) is seen by C. to have subsumed Plato and Aristotle into the Stoic outlook. It will be more useful for scholars who are familiar with the text and the issues and wish to consider an alternative approach, than for newcomers to Cicero's Lucullus.
