The tsunami that struck the shores of northern Sumatra on December 26, 2004, brought the Indonesian province of Aceh to the world's attention. The cataclysmic event also proved to be a turning point in the convoluted political relationship between the province and the central government in Jakarta. Elizabeth F. Drexler skillfully traces the history of the events that preceded and followed this disaster and analyzes the political consequences for the future stability of both Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia. In the course of doing so, she examines the role of international humanitarian agencies that take it upon themselves to intervene in the affairs of developing countries.
For several years before the tsunami struck, the Indonesian government had been engaged in a campaign of military repression designed to bring the Acehnese to heel. This was only the latest in a cycle of such campaigns in which violence alternated with periods of relative peace. To those who are not familiar with the nitty-gritty details on the ground, the conflict appeared to be between the Indonesian government, which, through the agency of the Indonesian National Army (TNI), sought to eradicate the Acehnese separatist movement, whose origins might be traced to the time when the republic secured its independence. In her book, Drexler paints a different portrait. It is not at all clear that the majority of the population ever desired the absolute break with the republic for which the more extreme elements of the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement) strove. The origins of the struggle are anything but unambiguous, even though—as the author points out—the standard media reports announced that “separatist rebels have been fighting for independence since 1976” (p. 86), the year in which a group of left-wing intellectuals called Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh) came into existence, primarily in response to the government's control of the liquid natural gas resources that had been recently discovered in Aceh.
A key observation in Drexler's analysis of the history of the violence is that the Indonesian government represented the threat that Aceh Merdeka posed as a widespread separatist movement. A dozen or more of its members had been systematically executed by 1983, but the military campaign—and the killings—continued. From 1989 to 1998, during a period that came to be known as the DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer, or military operations zone), the TNI subjected the Acehnese to violence of an even more intensified nature, but for a short time after the fall of Suharto, there were hopes in some quarters that legal authority would overcome the wanton behavior of the TNI. These hopes proved unfounded, but a cease-fire, mediated by international agencies and known as the Humanitarian Pause (2000–2001), briefly brought some peace. It also marginalized nongovernmental organizations that advocated human rights and laid the foundation for a further resumption of violence. Drexler is unimpressed by the results of the internationals' intervention. In her view, “captive to narratives that proclaimed this conflict intractable, this international intervention contributed to making it irresolvable” (p. 18). She scrutinizes the character of the alleged contending forces and gives us an enthralling description of the murky manipulations of shadowy Machiavellians, rarely glimpsed but whose machination was palpably felt in death and destruction.
Far from being a pair of antagonists mutually hostile to each other, Drexler portrays the TNI and GAM as implicit partners in an enterprise designed to advantage both of them. This partnership is evident in a curious phenomenon that provides Drexler with a major motif, the “dark pattern.” “The dark pattern introduced a powerful indeterminacy [between the TNI and GAM] that corrupted the identities of and boundaries between the two acknowledged sides” (p. 135). More specifically, the dark pattern “encompassed not simply unauthorized individuals wearing military uniforms but also the legacies of the GPK [Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, a group defined by the military as a disorganized gang]: deserters and former, disavowed, or active military members” (p. 135). As a consequence, “the dark pattern [introduced] the possibility that perpetrators [of human rights abuses] might be agents of either side” (p. 135).
On August 15, 2005, after the tsunami, the government of Indonesia and the GAM signed a memorandum of understanding that resolved the issues contested by the two parties and led to a peace settlement that remains in force. The GAM surrendered its weapons and withdrew its demand for independence. The government, for its part, granted to Aceh increased autonomy, the authority to tax its residents, jurisdiction over its natural resources, and the right to have local political parties. Also negotiated were amnesty for the rebels and the release of political prisoners. The negotiations, although they brought reconciliation between the TNI and GAM, also created serious splits among human rights organizations, and avoided the question of accountability for the atrocities that had been committed and still rankle among the victims of such crimes as the “Bantaquiah” affair, a massacre in which at least thirty civilians lost their lives. This evasion of responsibility was the price of peace, and one that the TNI and GAM were more than willing to pay, as the memorandum of understanding enabled perpetrators in both parties to escape legal retribution and allowed prominent GAM adherents to run (successfully, as it happened) for political office in their province.
There may yet be an added price to pay, though. After taking a close and thorough examination of the implications of a peace obtained through deliberate amnesia on the part of all signatories to the memorandum of understanding, Drexler forthrightly argues that the triumph of the politics of expedience over legality and accountability perpetuates a sense of injustice that threatens the security of both Aceh and Indonesia. On this score, of course, the future will make its own case.
Aceh, Indonesia is an excellent contribution to the literature on Aceh Province and a magnificent addition to the ethnography of violence. This well-researched monograph provides a fresh insight into the machinations of the TNI, GAM, and other parties in the decades-long history of the province, in addition to offering a cogent reevaluation of the limits of nongovernmental agencies. I recommend Drexler's excellent study as a must-read for all Indonesianists.
