In his first book, Nicholas Healy attempts to explain what von Balthasar was up to by linking his theology to that of Thomas Aquinas. This may seem a rather narrow approach: one may be puzzled as to the relevance of showing that von Balthasar was attempting to develop St Thomas' thought. At the worst, one might receive the impression that the author was attempting to rescue his subject from the attentions of the doctrine police. But one can see the advantage of Healy's angle if one compares it with recent attempts to set von Balthasar in the context of postmodernist or narrative theology. Since he was neither a postmodernist nor a narrative theologian, those who discuss him in these categories do little to illuminate his thought, and given that the resonance of postmodern and postliberal lingo is limited to its current impact on the theological vernacular, it is unlikely that a permanent deepening of our understanding of von Balthasar's work will emerge from this front. On the other hand, just as the tradition Karl Barth was actually in conversation with was that of Calvin and Protestant Orthodoxy, so St Thomas was one of von Balthasar's lifelong interlocutors. Hence, Healy's narrowness pays off not only in terms of objectivity and historicity, but also in terms of making a solid contribution to our appreciation of the intentions of the author of the Theo-Drama.
The book connects von Balthasar's project to two Thomistic axia, the analogy of being and the real distinction. Healy's clear exposition of Thomas' conception of how signification works in relation to God merits buying the book for university libraries. He compares Thomas' position with that of the more rigorously apophatic Maimonides. Thomas was less rigorous because less of a perfectionist: ‘each of these terms’, he wrote, ‘signifies the divine essence, not comprehensively but imperfectly’ (Thomas, De Potentia q. 7 a. 5; Healy, p. 36). Thoroughgoing negativism with respect to our language for God does not make sense, because ‘every negative proposition is proven by an affirmative: wherefore unless the human mind knows something positively about God, it would be unable to deny anything about him’ (De Potentia, q. 7 a. 5; Healy p. 35, and although the latter doesn't happen to refer to it, von Balthasar, Theo-Logic II, pp. 100–1). We can use words analogously with respect to God because things are analogous to God: ‘The similarity between creatures and God “is the sort of analogy that holds between all things because they have esse in common. And this is how things resemble God; for being as beings [entia] they resemble the primary and universal source of all esse.”’ (Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 3; Healy, pp. 39–40).
If Christ is the concrete analogia entis (Healy, p. 97), and if, as Thomas mentions, the economic mission of the Son ‘fits’ the way in which he eternally proceeds from the Father (ST I, q. 43, a. 1), that is, if the ‘being from’ of theology ‘fits’ the ‘send off’ of the economy, then it may seem a logical development of Thomist tradition to propose that our primary analogy for the immanent trinitarian relations is the life, death and resurrection of Christ. As Healy notes (p. 126), the
notion that the economic Trinity expresses or reveals the immanent Trinity is not a new idea . . . Thomas Aquinas teaches that the sending (missio) of the Son is the prolongation into the world of his eternal coming forth (processio) from the Father. What is distinctive in [von] Balthasar's theology is the way in which all of the events of Christ's life, including even the seemingly negative events of suffering and death . . . are understood as an expression and interpretation of God's eternal life.
That is, von Balthasar has taken over Thomas' principle that things and signs indicate something positive about God and laid more trinitarian weight upon it than his Angelic predecessor. Another example of what Healy presents as von Balthasar's recasting of Thomas' teaching relates to the procession of the Spirit. Thomas wrote that, ‘When we say that in him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because he needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of his own goodness’ (ST I, q. 32, a. 1 ad. 3; Healy, pp. 86–7). Von Balthasar deploys the idea that love undergirds both the trinitarian processions and divine creation to make divine love the ground of the possibility of ‘Theo-Drama’, or divine creation and redemption: ‘The immanent Trinity must be understood to be that eternal, absolute self-surrender whereby God is seen to be, in himself, absolute love; this in turn explains his free self-giving to the world as love, without suggesting that God ‘needed’ the world process and the Cross in order to become himself’ (von Balthasar, Theo-Drama IV, p. 323; Healy, p. 129). This ‘agapic principle’ can then be turned to the defence of the feature of von Balthasar's theology which Thomists like Daniel Yocum and Matthew Levering have seen as bordering on tri-theism, via the idea of a separation of Father and Son in the Passion. Healy argues that, although von Balthasar's ‘extreme language of “God's separation from himself” undoubtedly runs the risk of anthropomorphism’ the Swiss theologian is
aware of this danger and repeatedly cautions against any univocal predication of change and suffering in God. Words such as ‘separation’ and ‘distance’ stand in need of further clarification . . . Balthasar does not mean to suggest that there is negativity in God's inner life. These words must be understood as analogous concepts which point to a positive modality of selfless love. In every act of genuine love there is an affirmation of the other that requires something like a total self-surrender, including (implicitly) a willingness to die for the other . . . While . . . in our experience suffering is always bound up with . . . the negative consequences of sin, it also seems true that the capacity to suffer freely for another . . . unveils the depths of the original self-surrender that is required to love the other as other. (Healy, pp. 133–4)
If we step back from Healy's laudable effort to make von Balthasar's project intelligible to Thomists, we can see that, starting from a Thomistic foothold, the great twentieth-century theologian makes moves which did not occur to St Thomas. That can't be explained by the time distance, since they did occur to Thomas' contemporary, St Bonaventure, a figure Healy ignores. The ideas that the economy or salvation history might tell us as much about God as the structure of the human mind does, or that Christ is the concrete analogy of being, are both found in Bonaventure (Ratzinger's 1959 habilitation, The Theology of History in Saint Bonaventure is very informative on both points, as is the second volume of The Glory of the Lord). Above all, the practice of reducere, or explaining a fact or event by ‘reduction’ to its first cause is used by Bonaventure for everything from created matter (this gives him the idea of the cosmos as the expression of the Trinity) to the behaviour of the Petrine office as the criterion for all ecclesial behaviour (Ratzinger describes this as a dud idea). A reducere is at work in von Balthasar's claim that we can exposit the events of the economy or human suffering by reference to something analogous in the Trinity. Healy's treatment would have been more rounded and objective if he had put it up front that the clue to what he calls von Balthasar's innovations with respect to Thomas is conformity to Bonaventure. Cyril O'Regan has recently complained about the failure to address the Bonaventurian provenance of the idea of expression in David Schindler's fine Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, to which this book forms a companion volume. The debate with which both books are concerned is about whether all reductio is reductio ad absurdum, that is, as much about how far symbolism and expression go with respect to the Trinity as about analogy. Or are analogy and expression just the same?
Like Schindler, Healy finds the ‘nub’ of von Balthasar's ‘development of Thomism’ in his using the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures to suggest that difference itself (that is, ‘distinction’) expresses something in the Triune God (Healy, p. 83). The purport of this is, as before, to defend von Balthasar's idea of a ‘distinction’ (or, as uncharitable readers would have it, ‘separation’) of the persons of the Trinity. Healy reminds us that, for von Balthasar, the ‘real distinction’ was Thomas' most important idea. For Thomas the source of the ‘resemblance’ between creatures and God is esse. Hence, does the way in which creatures have ‘esse’ (within a difference from essence) resemble the way in which the persons of the Trinity are esse (within a ‘difference’ between the divine persons)? Healy's way of putting this is to say that the real distinction is good or positive (Schindler's more elaborate treatment makes difference a transcendental), not merely displaying a lack within created reality, its non-necessity, but rather, presenting God's ‘love of own goodness’ (ST I, q. 32, a. 1 ad. 3), the trinitarian processions and relations. If one likes this sort of thing, focusing von Balthasar's trinitarian thought within the framework of the analogia entis and the real distinction is a neat and simple way of capturing it at a glance.
Healy points out that, for von Balthasar, the Trinity, and God's ‘dramatic relationship with the world’, is the ‘true eschaton’ (Theo-Drama V, p. 57; Healy, p. 15). Although one may nonetheless be tempted to deplore his choice of title on the basis that Eschatology is the Four Last Things, not the Trinity (Heaven, Hell, Death, Judgement – don't tell me the beatific vision is the Trinity), Healy achieves two things by relating his apologia for trinitarian difference to eschatology. In the first place, he can explain why eschatology is woven right through von Balthasar's corpus, from his doctoral dissertation, Geschichte des eschatologischen Problems in der modernen deutschen Literatur (1930) and the Apokalypse der deutschen Seele (1937–9), through to the fifth volume of the Theo-Drama, and the little aggressive books written against the charge of universalism, such as Dare we Hope that All May Be Saved? (yes). Second, he can show, in relation to this hope, that separation and tragedy are not quite as central to von Balthasar's vision as some imagine. It is not the Passion which has the Last word, but communion, not difference but (re)union:
without the Resurrection his death would cease to be gift, and our life would cease to be a life of communion with him. This simple idea lies at the heart of Balthasar's theology, and it helps us to avoid a . . . nihilistic view of kenotic obedience. You can only give yourself totally and perfectly by remaining an abiding source of life and joy for the beloved . . . the form of the Son's total-gift-of-himself to the Father is an abiding ‘return’ to the world in the Eucharist. (Healy, pp. 195–6)
The author will no doubt join me in observing that, however good his book is, the most readable paraphrase of von Balthasar's thought remains the works of a well-known Bonaventurian communio ecclesiologist. Whether or not it was a dud idea the first time round, I'd go there for help from the doctrine police, not to Thomas.
