Curbing Clientelism in Argentina seeks to answer an important question: why do some politicians engage in clientelism while others opt out or develop different political practices to build support? In answering this question, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro's book contributes to two distinct research programmes: first, to a long-standing discussion about what clientelism is and how it is practised; second, to a much newer debate on subnational variations in democracy and governance, because Weitz-Shapiro's book focuses on variations in the use of clientelism across local (municipal) governments in Argentina. As scholars of subnational democracy have shown, the quality of democracy varies within countries that are nationally democratic because political structures and practices vary across subnational units. Weitz-Shapiro focuses on one political practice – clientelism – and offers an explanation for its subnational variation by testing a novel hypothesis: that there are ‘audience costs’ associated to the practice of clientelism. That is, clientelism is viewed negatively by non-poor voters and therefore mayors in districts with a large middle class can lose votes if they engage in clientelistic practices. However, the book argues, mayors will only take this view into account if they face high levels of political competition (i.e., when non-poor voters have a clear political alternative). Thus, the existence of a large middle class alone is a necessary but insufficient condition for a mayor to abandon clientelistic practices.
Weitz-Shapiro tests her claim through surveys that show voters’ attitudes toward the distribution of goods by political parties. The surveys’ results are what one would expect: non-poor voters who have no need for such distribution view it negatively, while poor voters who do need it view it more favourably. She also conducts an experiment that uncovers that non-poor voters are likely to withdraw support for mayors who engage in clientelistic practices. The evidence presented in the study therefore shows that municipal districts that are either poor and less competitive, or have a large middle class, but are less competitive, will tend to be more clientelistic. In turn, districts with a large middle class and high political competition will tend to engage less in clientelistic practices. That clientelism is more pervasive in poorer rather than middle-class settings is a well-established fact. What is new in Weitz-Shapiro's study is the role that political competition plays in undermining clientelism in different structural contexts. This argument accounts nicely for subnational variation in the use of clientelistic practices and it is the book's main contribution.
So how is clientelism curbed? As mentioned above, the author argues that the growth of the middle class and an increase in political competition can curb clientelism in Argentina. However, the book does not show us any cases where we actually see a move away from clientelism toward more accountable politics as a result of a growing middle class and greater political competition. We are shown a static photograph of municipalities with a larger middle class and greater political competition, which are not clientelistic, and poorer or middle-class municipalities with less political competition that are clientelistic. The book does not provide an account of mayors who engaged in clientelism and then opted out.
Finally, in the last ten pages or so we get some insight into how clientelism might be curbed: through the centralisation of social policy. Throughout the book, Weitz-Shapiro focuses on the food distribution component of one social policy in Argentina, the Programa Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria (National Programme for Food Security, PNSA), which is nationally funded, but administrated by municipalities across the country. In 2009, however, the federal government created the Asignación Universal por Hijo (Universal Allocation per Child, AUH), a centralised conditional cash transfer programme that bypassed local politicians and avoided the discretionality identified by Weitz-Shapiro. Like Progresa/Oportunidades (Progress/Opportunities) in Mexico and Bolsa Família (Family Grant) in Brazil, the AUH is implemented through universalistic criteria, is centrally administrated and eliminates any facilitating role for local elected officials. It has thus significantly reduced opportunities for clientelism. This programme is mentioned only briefly in the conclusions, but it could prove to be a more effective way of curbing clientelism and making social policy more universalistic and effective than the pathway offered in the study. Weitz-Shapiro seems to acknowledge this herself by the end of the book. On page 162, she states that ‘The experience of Brazil and Mexico points to centralization as perhaps the most effective tool for eliminating local clientelism. Such centralization certainly offers a more direct path to accountability than the uneven experience portrayed in the preceding chapters.’
