Philosophers have written a lot about knowledge, Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger remind us in their preface, but a good deal less about ignorance. That is unfortunate, because ignorance is ‘often just as important, usually far more scandalous, and remarkably undertheorized’ (p. vii). It is an odd beginning, not only because philosophers from antiquity onwards have, notoriously, tried to persuade us that we are in fact ignorant of what we thought we knew, but also because this is not really a philosophical book. If philosophers have missed a trick, they won't discover it here. What these essays do demonstrate is that particular examples of ignorance can be of considerable historical and sociological interest. Topics covered include military secrecy (Peter Galison's essay is among the best), efforts by the tobacco industry and global-warming denialists to ‘maintain controversy’ in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence, suppression of Native American fossil knowledge, neglect of West Indian herbal abortifacients, and ‘white ignorance’ in the United States. We also get a long essay on the epistemology of orgasm (Nancy Tuana) that combines deft historical sketches in the Foucauldian/Laquerian mould, snippets of evolutionary theory (sometimes confused), personal anecdotes, brief flurries of prose-poetry, and a remarkably tedious procession of double entendres.
Agnotology is, by any standard, an eclectic collection. It is easy to imagine appreciative readers for any given essay; much harder to imagine a readership for the book as a whole. Of course, that is a problem characteristically faced by new research fields: they cut across existing academic boundaries. But despite the editors' aspirations, there is not much sign that the case studies collected here demand or supply significant new theoretical insights. Certainly they do not appear to do so qua studies of ignorance. The details are frequently fresh and interesting; the general lessons (‘Not all things are worth knowing at any cost’, p. 22; ‘What we attend to and what we ignore are often complexly interwoven with values and politics’, p. 131) tend to be rather familiar. The case for a new ‘ology’ – agnotology, the study of ignorance – has not been made.
That is not to say that it could not be, but it is perhaps worth noting one not-very-stringent necessary condition. Agnotology makes sense as a discipline only if explanations for cases of ignorance (false beliefs, unjustified beliefs, absent beliefs) are systematically different from explanations for cases of knowledge. More crucially, it makes sense as a historical and sociological discipline only if the kinds of explanations historians and sociologists should be offering for cases of ignorance are systematically different from those they should be offering for cases of knowledge. Given prevailing historiographical prejudices, Proctor and Schiebinger will have to fight hard if they are to persuade their fellow historians of science of that. Many philosophers – and, no doubt, a few old-fashioned historians – would be delighted if they succeeded. Some might also appreciate the irony: after a decade or three of studied detachment from the traditional concerns of epistemology, historians of science may be sneaking back into the truth-and-rationality business via the study of ignorance.
