With approximately 88 per cent of its population being Muslim, Indonesia is demographically the largest Islamic country in the world. Given this fact, many would expect nothing less from Indonesia than to play a more activist role in conducting its foreign policy towards the global Ummah or Muslim solidarity. In Indonesia and the Muslim World, author Anak Agung explicates the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy by examining the role of Islam in its formulation and implementation. By mainly drawing on sources from Soeharto's new order regime, the Agung explores the nexus between societal religiosity, domestic politics and geo-political concerns in Indonesia's foreign policy since independence. The general argument that pervades the book is that Indonesia has incessantly played down the religious factor in conducting its foreign policy. The author validates this argument by evaluating four case studies: Indonesia's participation in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC); its response towards issues in the Middle East, such as the Palestinian issue and the first Gulf War; its handling of the Moro problem in the Philippines; and lastly its involvement in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict of the 1990s. The playing down of the Islamic factor, it is argued, is consistent with the basic tenets of Indonesia's foreign policy outlook of bebas-aktif (independent and active), as defined in the 1945 Constitution.
Agung's analysis begins with a re-cap of the shifting nature of domestic politics in Indonesia as well as the changing external environment, from President Sukarno to Soeharto. Committed to the bebas-aktif principle, Agung emphasises that economic development and political stability served as a strong basis for the New Order government of Soeharto in its foreign policy agenda (p. 13). Agung then tests his central postulation on Indonesia's relations with the OIC. Despite being the largest Islamic country, Indonesia's participation in the OIC was never made a foreign policy priority. Indonesia's minimalist approach in the OIC resulted from the fear that it is perceived by the West as tolerating radicalism of some of the OIC member states (p. 62). In relation to its responses to the Middle East conflict, particularly on the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel, the Palestinian issue, and the first Gulf War, Agung again reiterated Indonesia's caution, if not reluctance, in playing along with Islamic sentiments and conducting its foreign policy on the grounds of Islamic solidarity.
Similarly, Indonesia refrains from looking at the Bangsa Moro independence struggle against the Manila government in the Philippines as a religious conflict; rather, it is seen it as a political one. Compelled by the ASEAN spirit, Indonesia assumes the role of a facilitator, by refusing to interfere in an intra-state conflict or the domestic affairs of a neighbouring country (p. 125). The centrality of the Islamic factor in its foreign policy towards the Bosnian-Herzegovina conflict was also underplayed by Agung, despite Soeharto making a historic and brave visit to Bosnia in the middle of the war. Doubts were raised as to whether the visit was a gesture of Muslim brotherhood sentiments, or simply an act within his capacity as NAM chairman, not as Indonesian President. Soeharto was also seen to have cleverly maximised on the competition of power between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence to strengthen his grip on political power. The book sums up with a brief examination of the post-Soeharto period, paying close attention to the presidencies of Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and how they conducted their foreign policies vis-à-vis 9/11 and growing radicalism among several sections of the Muslim community at home. Agung concludes that Islam has been fully utilised as a form of ‘symbolic politics’ by Indonesian foreign policy-makers to win political support for certain policies, divert attention from certain domestic problems, contain any dissension, and to improve the government's standing (p. 167).
The main strength of the book is the utilisation of linkage politics theory, which accentuates the correlation between domestic politics and international relations. Agung's work effectively shows the multifarious linkages of economic, social, political, religious and cultural facets with the external environment in foreign policy-making. Moreover, Indonesia and the Muslim world is rich in material and data, displaying a fair share of both primary and secondary sources. It includes interviews with diplomats and foreign policy analysts, as well as an analysis of speeches. Nevertheless, this work could be strengthened in several ways. In discussing the policy friction between the military, ABRI, with the Department of Foreign Affairs regarding the Bosnian issue, the author made an unsubstantiated claim pointing to the Islamist and nationalist-secular divide as the root cause. While this point is valid, some evidence is required to strengthen the argument further. Moreover, Agung constantly points to the bebas-aktif (independent and active) principle as the core of Indonesia's foreign policy, when as indirectly demonstrated by Agung himself, the ‘balance of power’ or bandwagoning strategy is at play. Despite being a member of NAM, Indonesia crafts its policy carefully in such a way as not to sour its relations with the superpowers. Like all small states, Indonesia constantly finetunes its foreign policy towards changing a international relations landscape — from the bipolar world of the cold war era to the uni-polar one dominated by the US.
