John Stuart Mill disliked William Whewell even though he never met him. When he once had the opportunity, he declined, wrongly believing Whewell to be a defender of slavery, cruelty to animals and forced marriages. More generally, Mill believed Whewell's emphasis on unmediated ‘intuition’ to be simply an excuse for arch-conservatism. The caricature of intuitionism which Mill sometimes sketched reduced it to the view that what was right and true in science, ethics and politics was whatever happened to seem so to a self-appointed elite, with Whewell, the master of Trinity College, Cambridge, at its head. Laura Snyder's central aim in Reforming Philosophy is to unpick and undermine this image of Whewell, which Mill popularized during the peak years of his influence between the 1840s and the 1860s, and which has only rarely been challenged since. In this task she succeeds admirably.
Given that the exclusive focus in this book is the philosophical battle in print between Mill and Whewell, it is strange that neither man is mentioned in the title, which hints at a broader context, largely absent in what follows. Snyder notes in her introduction that many other studies of Mill and Whewell have been flawed because they read their philosophical writings ‘out of their contexts’, and she goes on to suggest that the only way to understand Mill's and Whewell's motivations is to attend to ‘the social and political context of the controversy’ (p. 30). In practice, however, the ‘context’ within which Mill's and Whewell's philosophical ideas are placed by Snyder is a very narrow one. First and foremost the term is used to refer to the other dimensions of the disagreement between these two men – the ‘argumentative context’ – and to other parts of their published corpora. The biographies and political commitments of the two protagonists are certainly mentioned, but not developed in a sustained manner. For historians of science who have become accustomed to contextual histories which cast far and wide among political associations, theological commitments, economic imperatives and power relations, not to mention social networks, literary marketplaces, readers' responses and popular culture, Snyder's will seem a somewhat restricted sense of context.
Snyder pursues the particular historical task she has set herself, nonetheless, with immense rigour and erudition. After an introductory chapter offering biographical information about Mill and Whewell, and explaining the senses in which each saw himself as a ‘reformer’ of science and society, the book is composed of five chapters examining how the two subjects of this joint intellectual biography disagreed. The first two chapters look at Whewell and Mill in turn on the question of induction. The remaining three compare their arguments about science, morality and politics and political economy. Given the author's aim to give Whewell a more sympathetic hearing than he has previously received, it is not surprising to find that Mill's views are quite regularly described as odd, strange, misleading, contradictory or confused, whereas Whewell is generally given the benefit of the doubt. Several very important points are successfully developed along the way, including a persuasive denial of the idea that Whewell's philosophy of science was either a mere variety of Kantianism or an anti-empirical kind of intuitionism. One central idea of the book is that Whewell, who saw himself as a renovator of Bacon, had a much more sophisticated conception of inductive philosophy than that defended by the ultra-empiricist Mill. The later chapters include an important reminder that Mill, as well as Whewell, defended an elitist social philosophy. Mill diverged from his Benthamite origins by denying that all pleasures – whether poetry or pushpin – were of equal value. The way he believed that the superiority of poetry could be established was by consulting those more ‘cultivated’ members of society who, having experienced both ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures, could (apparently) testify authoritatively to the superiority of the former.
Historians of science, as well as historians of the philosophy of science, will find much enlightenment here. One of the most interesting sections of the book explains how Whewell used Richard Owen's idea of anatomical ‘archetypes’ as an exemplar of the right way to think about the relationship between empirical evidence and organizing ideas in the sciences. Those archetypes existed originally in the divine mind and could now be perceived as patterns behind the various observed forms of the living world. Another virtue of this portrait of Whewell is that it shows that, broadly speaking, he came to theology through science rather than using science to bolster a pre-existing theological commitment. His interest in theology increased with age, but in his early years it was the reform of inductive science that was his real passion. Snyder is also surely right to emphasize that while Whewell had an encyclopedic knowledge of the sciences and their history, Mill approached the subject as a philosopher of a much narrower scope. Snyder mentions, for instance, that when he had completed a draft of his System of Logic (1843), Mill then asked his friend and protégé Alexander Bain to go through the manuscript trying to think of scientific examples with which to illustrate the philosophical points (pp. 152–3). Darwinian scholars will enjoy a perceptive discussion of the influence of Whewell's ideas about scientific method on Darwin's theorizing, and of Whewell's thoughts about the Origin of Species, which bore a quotation from his own Bridgewater Treatise on its frontispiece.
The days are long gone in the history of science when the authors and readers of books in the field were primarily working scientists. It is still the case, however, that writers and readers of books about the history of philosophy are as likely to be philosophers as historians. This presents historians of philosophy with a problem. Snyder ends her book with a plea for the direct contemporary relevance of the nineteenth-century philosophical ideas she has so lucidly set out in Reforming Philosophy. The idea that contemporary philosophy of science will be reinvigorated by a school of neo-Whewellians seems to me unlikely, but possible. While the suggestion Snyder makes about Whewell, that ‘we can substitute an evolutionary epistemology for his theologically based one’ (p. 332), while still retaining the essentials of his philosophical teachings, seems to capture perfectly the awkwardness of treating historical figures as intellectual contemporaries.
Snyder's book shows brilliantly and conclusively that Mill's political prejudices led him to misrepresent Whewell as an intuitionist and an arch-conservative. An interesting question, and one to which other historians might wish to turn their minds, is how Mill was able to succeed in persuading his peers and posterity of the truth of this falsehood. To put it another way, one of the facts that Reforming Philosophy makes quite clear is that what philosophers actually write in the pages of their books and what they are taken to have written are two very different things.
