Glenn Tinder fears for liberty's fate in the context of mediocrity and mendacity. Moderns use their liberty to choose “pleasure rather than virtue, entertainment rather than beauty, and sentimentality rather than wisdom” (2). Sometimes the liberty of liberal regimes has been hijacked into the service of genocide and war crimes. Why continue to treat liberty as a worthy ideal, Tinder asks, when it can be and has been used frivolously or wickedly?
After cataloguing the historical and philosophical evidences of liberty's dangers for three chapters, Tinder returns to his original question. Liberty is good, he writes, because it is a “gateway into the realm of values” (62). Certain moral ideals, creative actions, and orders of justice are good only when freely chosen. A gateway is only as meaningful as the place to which it leads, so individuals must be able to discern proper human ends in order to use their liberty well. Dialogue, Tinder argues, is the key to liberty's gateway: dialogue is the means to understanding proper human ends.
Liberty offers a distinct contribution to political theory in the specific lines it draws between liberty, truth, and dialogue. Liberty is consummated in seeking truth through dialogue, dialogue being most meaningful when it takes place between individuals who have different presuppositions. The alleged wall of separation between reason and revelation, the ostensible impossibility of dialogue between people in these two groups, is particularly troubling to Tinder. A liberal society can maintain its integrity only when humanist reason, which “rests primarily on deductive operations of the human intellect and on common human experience,” and religious conviction, which “rests primarily on ostensible revelation” (5), meet in the public square to conduct dialogue. Tinder is hopeful for such dialogue, and demonstrates his reasons for optimism through the structure and content of his essay. At each stop along the path towards understanding liberty, he pauses to consider the presuppositions particular to humanist reason and religious conviction. In only a few instances does he conclude that religious faith and humanist reason are unable to reach a sufficiently similar conclusion.
Tinder's dialoguing society is reminiscent of Amitai Etzioni's communitarian megalogue. Both authors share the expectation that such discussion can preserve liberalism, but in contrast with Etzioni, who sees evidences of megalogue everywhere in society, Tinder holds that only a few rare individuals will participate in the kind of dialogue—genuine truth-seeking—that constitutes community. Though he may be less optimistic than Etzioni, he is almost cheerful in contrast with Alasdair MacIntyre's dark prognostications. For MacIntyre, modern pluralism's incommensurable miasma has rendered dialogue almost moot. Tinder sees those same incommensurable philosophical starting points as the very reason dialogue is important. He offers instances in which humanist reason and religious convictions share common ground, concluding that modern liberalism makes dialogue neither impossible on the one hand nor inevitably successful on the other. His argument that there is common ground would have been strengthened if he had addressed MacIntyre's argument that modernity (humanist reason, to use Tinder's term) must slide toward nihilism, a philosophy that finds the very element of religious conviction revolting.
Whether this ground is held in common or not, the tensions that liberals must navigate certainly exist. The facts of both human depravity and human dignity mean the liberal state navigates the tension of guarding against the former while defending the latter. The reality and consequences of human depravity, so named by the Christian teaching of original sin and described by Kant as “radical evil,” have been brutally evidenced in the twentieth century by the bloodiest wars and most widespread killing in history. Yet for Tinder, human dignity is an equally important facet of the human condition. The Christian teaching for human dignity is vigorous, though it has been vitiated by certain proud or convoluted dogmas, Tinder argues. Finding a basis for universal human dignity in humanist reason is more difficult, and Tinder notes that “practically all assaults on human dignity, the scale and ferocity of which distinguish the twentieth century from all other civilized eras, were carried out by anti-Christians” (118). The fact that humanist reason cannot arrive at universal human dignity, however, does not preclude dialogue on this point since many on both sides of the religious divide “share a concern for personal dignity” (119).
Furthermore, while liberty is meaningful only when used for proper ends, individuals also need to maintain a posture of tolerance in order to continually seek and understand truth. Liberty is good only when its choices are guided by moral truth, but grasping moral truths is not a simple matter because liberal societies cannot survive without tolerance, that is, the allowance of room to troublesome acts of communication or, more broadly, a space for individuals to meet and seek truth (223). The values of tolerance are truth and community, both of which are accessed (or, created, in the case of the latter) through dialogue. In order for tolerance to be genuine, the author argues, one must maintain a degree of uncertainty in his persuasions. One cannot explain the entirety of the universe in reason's terms, Tinder rightly asserts, but he also attempts to leave room for actual knowledge, noting that “dialogue would be unpromising if not hopeless unless people with deep and unshakable assurance of certain truths, or supposed truths, took part” (231). Tinder hopes that individuals will walk the tightrope of dialogue, balancing between an arrogance that can lead to blind generalizations and a complete abnegation of truth. At the end of this balancing act, though, one is still left wondering whether Tinder views epistemic certainty, or even truth dearly held, as the archenemy of liberty. If so, does this allow for the religious faith—even his own—that he wants to enfranchise in the dialogue? In particular, must Christian faith be de-fanged and de-clawed before allowed to the table—for instance by repudiating its historic soteriological exclusivism in favor of Tinder's idiosycratic universalism?
Tinder adds to this lingering uncertainty by his suggestion that laws prohibiting an immoral action undermine morality because they remove individuals' opportunity to choose moral action for themselves. Using the Aristotelian notion that an act is moral only if it is freely performed, he turns to the loaded example of abortion and suggests that “perhaps abortions in many circumstances should be allowed simply in order that not having an abortion can remain a moral act” (334–35). Such logic fails to account for the fact that some human goods, such as life, are morally valuable in themselves, whether or not they are chosen or desired.
Tinder explains the parameters of his argument at the end of the book by placing an emphasis on the spirit of liberty over the letter of liberty. The spirit of liberty, “expressed in communality—in searching dialogue, in fidelity to the truth,” is given structure and consequence by the letter of liberty, “all conditions of liberty, such as constitutions, laws, customs, and schools” (305). The tendency to focus on the letter of liberty is based on a faulty assumption, Tinder argues, that liberty is structural and objective while in fact it is mysterious and fundamentally tied to the personhood of individuals. Having started by warning his audience that few will choose to use liberty well, Tinder closes by warning that education is impotent to guarantee that a proper spirit of liberty will prevail. A liberal society will survive only if it contains a few within its borders who pursue the dialogic quest for truth with tolerance and love for their own neighbors, having come to terms with their contingency in the face of transcendent mysteries. This conclusion could inspire many, if Tinder has left those mysteries intact.
