Greece's current economic woes are well-known. A half-century of persistent government deficits, unfunded retirement promises to an increasingly aging population, and an economy slow to modernize experiencing sluggish growth created a budget crisis exacerbated by the onset of a global recession. After protracted negotiations, workouts and write-downs left Greece defaulting on about half its debt.
Greece also has an immigration problem. Illegal immigrants still flow into Greece and violence is targeted at them. Unemployed Greeks view immigrants as an economic threat. Golden Dawn, an anti-immigrant political party, increased its parliamentary representation, immigrants are regularly assaulted, and places where they congregate have been firebombed.Footnote 1
Alasdair Roberts's history of America's first great depression (circa 1837–1843) shows that the Greek experience is neither unique nor exceptional. The 1837 U.S. recession evolved into a debt crisis that, too, saw Americans defaulting on public debts, changing their governments, rioting, and assaulting immigrants and minorities.
States borrowed heavily to finance banks, canals, and other infrastructure projects, modeling their decisions on the unusually profitable Erie Canal. The president of the Arkansas Real Estate Bank opined in 1837 that taxpayers “would never be called upon to pay either the principal or interest” on the bonds issued to capitalize the bank (p. 58). Even absent a recession, the projectors’ optimism was unfounded. When recession came the bank failed leaving taxpayers liable. Eventually eight states and the territory of Florida either defaulted or repudiated their debts. British complaints made evident their unfamiliarity with a decentralized federal system: they were flabbergasted that the federal government refused to make whole the individual states’ creditors. At home, default was taken as evidence of fundamental moral decay. Henry Ward Beecher exclaimed that when “a whole people, united by a common disregard of justice, conspire to defraud public creditors … honor fades away” (p. 80). Bankers were blamed, and sometimes rightly so. Investment bankers, like the Morris Canal & Banking Company and the United States Bank of Pennsylvania, participated in financial shenanigans that violated the spirit, if not the letter, of their underwriting agreements with several states. It took years to sort out who owed what to whom.
The economic crisis evolved into a political crisis as well. The American electorate had resisted direct taxation, but with infrastructure projects unable to financially support themselves taxpayers were asked to pay. Default had two effects. Understandably, enthusiasm for infrastructure projects waned and projects were shut down or scaled back. Moreover, public confidence in the capacity of politicians to make sound policy was shaken to the point that constitutions were rewritten to restrain them. Such restrictions allowed for future state investment in infrastructure, but they required an immediate voter-approved increase in taxes. The modern bond referendum was one outgrowth of the crises of 1837 and 1839.
The economic crisis ignited a social crisis, too. Lord Ashbury, the British Emissary to the United States, characterized the country as a “mass of ungovernable & unmanageable anarchy” (p. 194). Ashbury's opinion was undoubtedly colored by recent events in Philadelphia. In 1842 riots broke out among weavers when piece rates were reduced and among the Irish immigrants, aggravated by labor market competition from blacks. When a Negro Temperance Society parade approached the Irish section, a melee ensued. Irish rioters laid waste to three blocks of predominantly African American homes. The Irish themselves were then vilified by the anti-immigrant American Republican Party and a purposely provocative rally by the nativists in the Irish section of Kensington ended in open battle. By the time it was over, two churches were burned to the ground, dozens of people were killed, and artillery fusillades between militia and rioters took place in Philadelphia's streets. The city was placed under martial law.
Roberts is on more slippery ground when he attributes to the crisis the unraveling of the sectional compact over the tariff and nullification, the Independent Treasury, annexation of Texas and the expansion of slavery, and increasingly tense relations with Britain. Tariff rates, banking, and slavery kept tempers simmering throughout the era. Still, Roberts reminds economists that recessions are not just about investments not made, labor not employed, and output not produced, but they also have political and social consequences. Ultimately, Roberts's book ends on a positive note. The Mexican War depleted the U.S. Treasury, which was forced into domestic and foreign bond markets and found ready buyers for its debt. Non-defaulting states entered or reentered the international bond market and borrowed at precrisis rates. Despite the defaults, the United States tapped domestic and international financial markets and prospered. It remains to be seen, but Greece will probably not be so fortunate.
