1. Policy direction: AHSOM and ACSS committee meetings

The overall policy direction of ASEANstats is determined through the ASEAN Heads of Statistical Offices Meetings (AHSOM), which in 2011 was renamed the ASEAN Community Statistical System (ACSS) Committee. These are meetings convened approximately once a year to “discuss current and emerging issues and developments towards the development, dissemination and communication of timely, relevant and comparable statistics”.Footnote ¹³

Unfortunately, the precise role and achievements of this decision-making organ are unclear. It appears, from the joint media statements issued pursuant to these meetings, that the matters discussed in these meetings are often of a rather general nature, and that whatever is decided upon may be quite inconclusive. For example, with regard to the production of indicators, the ACSS Committee, in 2011, simply “recognized the ASEAN Statistical Indicators (ASI) as a statistical framework and a coordination mechanism in the development and harmonization of ASEAN statistics”, and stated that it would “continue to progress in the harmonization of key economic statistics such as those on international merchandise trade, international trade in services, FDI, and manufacturing”.Footnote ¹⁴ The statement lacks anything more concrete than this recognition of the importance of the indicators ASEANstats generates, and an extremely ambiguous resolution to “continue to progress”. It says nothing about the material steps that would be taken in pursuit of this progress, or how exactly key economic statistics would be harmonized. Hence, given the lack of detailed minutes or proceedings, it is unclear exactly what goes on in these meetings, and how the rather general and aspirational conclusions set out in the joint media statements are reached. This may be seen as a dearth of transparency, which could be worrying in the light of the fact that the AHSOM or the ACSS Committee is supposed to be the main leadership organ of ASEANstats.

The lack of information about the deliberation and decision-making procedures within the AHSOM or the ACSS Committee may be symptomatic of a broader desire, demonstrated by ASEAN as a whole, to achieve consensus among Member States and avoid open conflict. This is reflected in a mode of decision-making within ASEAN that has been referred to as the “ASEAN Way” (after the official anthem of the regional body). The ASEAN Way, as Davidson has noted, is grounded on achieving consensus, an approach “which relies largely on patient consensus-building to arrive at informal understandings or loose agreements”.Footnote ¹⁵ Further, he states that the “ ‘ASEAN Way’ relies to a large extent on the personal approach in contrast to the Western way of dependence on structures and their functions”.Footnote ¹⁶ This might be seen as a way in which ASEAN and its Member States deliberately define themselves in contradistinction to the “formal legalism of most Western international institutions”.Footnote ¹⁷

In the context of the AHSOM or ACSS Committee, the desire for consensus could be reflected in the general and non-committal language that is used in the joint media statements. The express resolutions possibly represent the “lowest common denominator” of agreement among Member States, for example, if they were unable to agree on language that would demonstrate a stronger degree of commitment on the part of Member States to do a given thing. Further, the spirit of informality militates against using highly precise or exact language, which would create definite obligations on any one party.

It could be argued that a desire to perpetually achieve consensus is likely to hamper true progress on any given issue, and might render the AHSOM or ACSS Committee indecisive and ineffectual. This is a criticism that has been sometimes levelled against the ASEAN model of decision-making,Footnote ¹⁸ and which may be true of consensus-based methods of decision-making in general.Footnote ¹⁹ When parties are expected to agree, but in reality are unable to do so, decision-making is hampered or may even be stalled entirely.Footnote ²⁰ However, in spite of the possible drawbacks of consensus-based decision-making, it has been asserted that a consensus-based, non-interventionist approach is more characteristic of Asian cultures and therefore resonates better with ASEAN states.Footnote ²¹ The extent to which such an assertion is true is an intriguing question; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper to take a position on the relative merits of a consensus-based model of decision-making. It is sufficient for present purposes to highlight that some traits of broader ASEAN culture may be observed to operate within the microcosm of the ASEANstats regime.

Nonetheless, putting considerations of ASEAN culture aside, it would be difficult to deny that the joint media statements issued simply lack concrete information on how decisions are made within the AHSOM or ACSS Committee, what exactly is the content of any resolutions reached, and how these factor into broader policy-making within ASEANstats. This in turn opens up these decision-making bodies to the criticism that they act in an opaque and unaccountable manner, an issue discussed in greater detail below.

2. Sources of statistical information

The vast majority of the statistical information used in the ASEANstats indicators is sourced from the various ASEAN Member States: these might be obtained directly through state submissions, or obtained from the publications or websites of the National Statistical Offices (NSOs). A good example of this is found in Table I.1 (Number of Mid Year Population of ASEAN Countries, 1980–2009) and Table I.2 (Population Growth in ASEAN, 1980–2009) of the “ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2010”.Footnote ²²

Statistics are also obtained from other international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). For example, Table I.5 (Urban Population, 1990–2008) of the “ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2010” contains statistics from the ADB's “Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific”Footnote ²³ for 2001–2009, the Population Division of the UN Secretariat, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Footnote ²⁴ for 2004–2009.Footnote ²⁵ This is in addition to statistics submitted by ASEAN Member States and obtained from their NSOs.Footnote ²⁶ Similarly, in Table II.1 (Adult Literacy Rate, 1990–2008), additional statistics are obtained from the UN Statistical Division's Millennium Development Goals (MDG),Footnote ²⁷ 2006–2009, as well as the other sources listed in Tables I.1 and I.2 of the “ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2010”.Footnote ²⁸ Information in a particular area may also be obtained from specialized international organizations: for example, Table III.1 (Unemployment Rate and Labour Force Participation Rate, 2002–2009) and other tables reflecting labour-related statistics contain information from the International Labour Organization's LABORSTA Database.Footnote ²⁹

This practice of obtaining information from international organizations is also reflected in other ASEANstats publications. For example, the “ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook 2011”Footnote ³⁰ and the “ASEAN Community in Figures 2011”Footnote ³¹ publications draw heavily on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) Databases of October 2010 and April 2011, respectively, as sources of statistical information.Footnote ³²

The inclusion of statistical information sourced from international organizations lends legitimacy to the ASEANstats indicators regime. Of course, the information these organizations obtain also needs to be scrutinized for accuracy and bias. Nonetheless, international institutions such as the ADB, the UN, and the IMF are usually viewed as supplying generally reliable statistics, which many other states or international bodies use. The ASEANstats regime benefits from tapping into this flow of information: the fact that it uses an established source of statistical information increases its legitimacy, or at least the appearance thereof. Of course, the information published by international organizations could possibly have been obtained from the states themselves. Nonetheless, information published by a widely recognized international organization carries some impression of legitimacy, even if that information were not collected first-hand but rather obtained from a third-party source.

The difficulty in using statistics submitted by a state is that such information is open to manipulation by the target states. In fact, there is arguably a real risk of such manipulation occurring. Member States are acutely aware that the publication of these indicators makes this information about them available to the world at large. Any shortcomings on the basis of a given standard will thus reflect poorly on the nation, and may have negative repercussions in terms of attracting foreign investment or foreign aid.

Member States thus have an incentive, and also the opportunity, to manipulate these statistics to make them reflect more positively on themselves than the statistics otherwise would. As Merry succinctly puts it: “Countries, of course, are eager to show themselves in the best light and worry about ranking.”Footnote ³³ Such manipulation need not consist of outright inclusion of false data; rather, it could involve using selective or biased measurement techniques, thereby making the figures appear more favourable than they otherwise would. The temptation to manipulate information is fully understandable when the target of an indicator wishes to portray itself in a better light than is actually the case. In fact, such manipulation could even occur inadvertently as a result of subconscious biases affecting the choice of the measurement techniques used. Yet such manipulation presents a real and insidious risk to the legitimacy of indicators.

Even if Member States do not manipulate the information they submit for inclusion in ASEANstats indicators, there is also the possibility that they will withhold information that does not reflect well on them. This is, if anything, more likely to happen than outright doctoring of statistical information. For example, a state might choose not to publish its infant mortality rate, for fear that a high rate reflects badly on its overall health-care and sanitation systems, and the medical support it gives to mothers and infants. Alternatively, it might simply choose not to collect and compile this information, knowing that the outcome of the data-gathering is likely to reflect badly on it anyway. A related risk is that a state fails to disaggregate data by possible and prohibited grounds of discrimination. An apparently sanguine statistic may thus conceal the fact that a minority class within the larger measured class is falling far short of the statistical average that the indicator shows.

Interestingly, given that indicators are often used as a basis for assessing states for the purposes of granting aid, it is conceivable that states could manipulate data in such a way as to present a poorer picture and thereby obtain more aid. This would be a perverse result of using indicators, which could likewise generate misleading indicators.

Of course, there are many other reasons why certain statistical information is unavailable; for example, it might be too difficult or expensive to collect. It cannot be assumed that the lack of information is due to it being deliberately withheld by the state. However, the possibility of this happening is an undesirable but unavoidable consequence of a system that relies on target states to provide the information for indicators, and then implicitly commends or disapproves of their performance.

For the avoidance of doubt, it should be emphasized that this paper is not asserting, in any way, that any such manipulation or withholding of information is occurring with regard to ASEANstats indicators; it is beyond the scope of the paper to determine whether such actions have in fact taken place. Nonetheless, as with all indicators that use information submitted by the targets themselves, this is a plausible risk, and therefore deserves the attention of any parties involved in the generation and use of indicators.

Similar challenges of inaccurate or absent data were faced during the development of the UNDP Human Development Reports, constraining the development of its indicators. In that case, where faced with potentially inaccurate official statistics, the Human Development Report Office, generator of the indicators, adopted alternative data compiled by universities. When confronted with a dearth of data, resort was had to non-official academic estimates.Footnote ³⁴ ASEANstats will have to overcome similar problems if it wishes to expand and develop its indicators further, and the strategies that other generators of indicators have adopted may prove helpful in this regard. If the ASEANstats regime succeeds in overcoming such issues, its indicators will have the potential to be used in many constructive ways. In particular, and as discussed below, the mobilizing power of these indicators can be channelled to spur the development of ASEAN states in respect of the qualities measured in the indicators.

In addition, it is crucial for ASEANstats to ensure that the information it uses is accurate because the legitimacy of the ASEANstats regime is largely reducible to the extent to which the accuracy and reliability of its statistics can be guaranteed. ASEANstats would have to put in place measures to ensure ASEAN Member States adopt information-gathering processes that are sufficiently transparent, as well as statistically sound. For example, it should require the disaggregation of statistics by any possible grounds of discrimination such as gender, ethnicity, or age. Such disaggregation is now standard practice in the compilation of most statistics.Footnote ³⁵ In addition, mechanisms could also be established by which ASEANstats may independently review the reliability of this information, and thereby protect the legitimacy of its regime. At the moment, such measures are lacking. An added benefit of such increased rigour would be to help ASEANstats achieve one of its stated objectives, which is to “promote improvements in the official statistics generated by [ASEAN] member countries”.Footnote ³⁶

In this regard, it is worthwhile considering that one possible reason why ASEAN set up its statistical office and indicator regime was in order to garner greater authority and legitimacy as a regional body representing an aggregation of states. To some extent, obtaining and publishing this sort of information is part of what might be expected of a transnational organization. Many similar statistical projects are undertaken by prominent international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, or the ADB. In particular, the European Commission, also a regional body representing a group of states, collects and publishes statistics for the region it represents.Footnote ³⁷ Hence, for ASEAN to fill a similar role with respect to Southeast Asian nations may just be something that it would naturally and eventually do as it matures as a regional body. In the light of this, the need for ASEAN to show itself as capable of producing accurate and reliable indicators is all the more pronounced.

1. The “supply” and “demand” hypotheses

Dutta suggests two approaches to understanding the way in which the end-users of indicators influence the production of indicators, in particular, how they influence the degrees of accuracy and accountability present in the process of generating indicators. These are the “demand” and “supply” hypotheses.Footnote ⁴⁰ The “demand” hypothesis postulates that end-users motivate change through their demand for more accurate information, or greater accountability or transparency in the production of indicators: “as the stakes of the decisions that depend on governance indicators rise, [end-users’] demands for increased accountability should grow in volume.”Footnote ⁴¹ This then influences the production process, and importantly leads to greater accountability or transparency in the process of producing indicators. The “supply” hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that generators of indicators take primary responsibility in initiating change, raising the standards of any information they supply. In order to attract end-users to use their indicators, a generator is naturally driven to supply the sort of information that appeals to end-users, that meets their needs, to “provide those types of accountability that tend to further the task of convincing potential users that its indicator has the marks of accuracy”, thereby fulfilling “heightened levels of transparency and reason-giving” that prove its information to be reliable.Footnote ⁴² In contrast to the “demand” hypothesis, the “supply” hypothesis predicts that “high levels of accountability result not from demands by users or targets, but from competition by indicators to secure the patronage of users”.Footnote ⁴³

Dutta argues that the “supply” hypothesis is more convincing, with more explanatory power than the “demand” hypothesis, although it is still incomplete because it fails to accord sufficient significance to the roles of reputation and identity.Footnote ⁴⁴ Reputation makes potential end-users more confident of the reliability of the indicator and saves the generator time in convincing them of the same.Footnote ⁴⁵ The relationship between identity and participation is ostensibly that where

then generators of indicators may be more willing to allow for these outsiders to participate in and review the process of generating indicators. This, similarly, leads to greater accountability and accuracy in the indicators.

Looking at the issue of accountability and accuracy from the point of view of the end-user of the indicator—that is from the “demand” side—Dutta predicts that “[w]hen a user is still deciding which indicator to employ, it is likely to be drawn to indicators that appear more accurate, all else being equal”.Footnote ⁴⁷ This actually lends support for the “supply” hypothesis, for it means that generators will strive to provide accurate indicators in order to capture a larger slice of the market for indicators.

Adopting Dutta's analysis of the “supply” hypothesis, it is helpful for us to consider the significance of this hypothesis in the production of indicators in the ASEANstats regimes. The “supply” hypothesis would predict that the ASEANstats regime, as a generator, seeks to convince potential users that its indicators are accurate, produced through a transparent and accountable process, and are therefore reliable. In the complex global regulatory environment, ASEANstats is competing with various other generators of indicators to provide the best statistical information, and providing more accurate and reliable indicators would give it an edge over other generators.

It would be correct to say that, in the context of ASEAN, the “supply” hypothesis is more persuasive than the “demand” hypothesis. The “supply” hypothesis analysis is particularly relevant to the ASEANstats regime in the light of the fact that it is a relatively poorly known or recognized supplier of indicators. ASEAN as a whole is thought in some circles to lack influence, legitimacy, and authority as a regional body.Footnote ⁴⁸ If so, then it would be all the more pertinent for ASEANstats to seek legitimacy as a generator of indicators through convincing end-users that it is capable of supplying accurate and reliable indicators, which meet the needs of end-users. This relates to the role of reputation: legitimacy strengthens the reputation of ASEANstats. Conversely, ASEANstats would be reluctant to do anything that might tarnish the reputation of ASEAN as a whole.

However, having said that, ASEAN is probably fairly unique in providing such extensive statistical information solely on Southeast Asian states, in a format whereby these states may be readily compared on the basis of many different social and economic standards. ASEAN is also recognized as the regional representative authority of Southeast Asian states. To this extent, ASEAN therefore does not compete directly with other generators of indicators to provide the same information in the same format, although other generators may provide similar or related information. This dominance in the market for indicators for Southeast Asian states may therefore reduce to a small extent the applicability of the “supply” hypothesis to the ASEANstats regime.

The “demand” hypothesis would be extremely difficult to prove in the current context of the ASEANstats regime: there is no evidence that either targets or end-users of the ASEANstats indicators are driving change in the generation processes of the indicators through making demands for greater accountability or accuracy. This is largely due to the opaque operation of the AHSOM and ACSS Committee, which exists notwithstanding that the content of the ASEANstats indicators deals with subject areas of the utmost importance, namely factors in the healthy political, economic, and social functioning of entire sovereign states. There is a possibility that ASEAN Member States are influential in driving change behind the closed doors of ASEANstats. Yet, without further information on how ASEANstats operates, this would be difficult to prove or disprove.

Hence, the ASEANstats indicator regime, as it exists at present, corroborates Dutta's conclusions that the “supply” hypothesis of accountability is more convincing than the “demand” hypothesis.

2. The AMRO

At this juncture, it is apposite to examine an important organ, related to ASEAN, which probably makes use of the ASEANstats indicators for actual regulation of ASEAN states. Study of this organ's function also raises questions about issues of accountability with ASEAN.

The AMRO was established in Singapore in 2011 by what are known as the ASEAN + 3 nations: that is, the ten ASEAN Member States plus China (including Hong Kong), Japan, and South Korea. It was established as an independent “regional macroeconomic surveillance unit” to monitor and analyze economies in the East Asia region, and “to contribute to early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial actions and effective decision-making” of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM).Footnote ⁴⁹

The CMIM is a multilateral currency swap arrangement between the ASEAN + 3 nations, which took effect in 2010. The setting up of the CMIM followed from a series of bilateral currency swap arrangements that East Asian economies began to enter into following the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis to help manage regional liquidity issues. The CMIM multilateralized these currency swap arrangements. The core objectives of the CMIM are “to address balance-of-payments and short-term liquidity difficulties in the region” and “to supplement the existing international financial arrangements”.Footnote ⁵⁰

Hence, in a time of economic crisis, when one of the ASEAN + 3 nations requests a currency swap, the AMRO is the chief institution that administers and supervises any currency swap agreements that are activated; it ensures that funds are properly disbursed and utilized, and that the terms of the agreements are complied with. However, when there are no immediate economic difficulties or crises, the AMRO's primary task is to assess the economic state of the overall ASEAN + 3 region, as well as individual states within this group, and to prepare quarterly economic surveillance reports on its findings.Footnote ⁵¹ These reports are deliberated on through the ASEAN + 3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) process at the biannual ASEAN + 3 Finance and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting (AFDM + 3). Naturally, these reports ought to make use of information obtained from ASEANstats indicators, as well as other independently sourced or researched statistics.

However, it is interesting to note that the reports that AMRO produces, as well as the minutes of meetings in the ERPD process are actually not made available to the public.Footnote ⁵² In the light of this, it is not possible to determine if the ERPD actually makes use of ASEANstats indicators, although it would be only natural for it to do so.

More importantly, however, that nothing is known about the proceedings of the ERPD process raises some concerns about the opaque conditions under which ASEANstats indicators may be used and decisions made concerning economic regulation within the ASEAN + 3 region. This is particularly pertinent given that the AMRO plays a very significant role in the economic life of ASEAN + 3 states: in essence, through regulating the currency swap mechanism, it is making decisions concerning the way in which the foreign exchange reserves of ASEAN + 3 states are spent. Furthermore, the sums invested in the CMIM are substantial.Footnote ⁵³

It is understandable that issues of economic policy might arguably need to be kept confidential and only between interested parties. However, this fails to assuage concerns that the interests of citizens in ASEAN + 3 states may not be inadequately represented, and that the lack of transparency undermines any effective means of holding governments accountable for the way in which they represent their countries within the ASEAN + 3 circle. Hence, greater accountability and transparency are probably quite necessary in the ERPD process.

The opacity in the ERPD process echoes the lack of clarity surrounding the proceedings and resolutions of the AHSOM or the ACSS Committee. Taken together, these are reflective of a broader trend of unaccountability and lack of openness pervading throughout ASEAN, an issue that unfortunately has repeatedly dogged the regional bloc.Footnote ⁵⁴ Hence, there is a pressing need for ASEAN to address this deficit in transparency and accountability, which is evidently prevalent throughout its various governance organs and structures.

1. Economic and social standards

For a start, there is a vast disparity between the degrees of the economic and social development of various ASEAN Member States. Anyone perusing the ASEANstats indicators will likely be struck by this disparity.

Economically, some ASEAN Member States are considered to be generally prosperous, while others are extremely poor. For example, in 2010, Singapore's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was US$43,929, and Brunei Darussalam's was US$29,915. In comparison, Cambodia's GDP per capita was only US$731, and Myanmar's was even lower at US$715. The rest of the ASEAN Member States fall between these two extremes.Footnote ⁵⁵ A large disparity is also seen in the inflow of foreign direct investment into different ASEAN Member States. In 2010, Singapore's FDI inflow was US$35,530 million, Indonesia's was US$13,304 million, and Vietnam's was US$8,000 million. In comparison, Myanmar's was US$450 million, and the Lao PDR's was a mere US$333 million.Footnote ⁵⁶

On the basis of other socioeconomic standards, the extent of development between ASEAN Member States also differs greatly. For example, in the area of telecommunications, in 2010, Singapore had 700 Internet subscribers or users per 1,000 persons, Malaysia had 553 users per 1,000 persons, and Brunei Darussalam had 500 users per 1,000 persons. In contrast, Cambodia had 12.6 users per 1,000 persons and Myanmar had none.Footnote ⁵⁷ Similarly, in terms of cellular or mobile phone density, in 2010, Vietnam had 1,752 units per 1,000 persons and Singapore had 1,436.6 units per 1,000 persons; Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand also had more than 1,000 units per 1,000 persons. In contrast, Myanmar only had 12.4 units per 1,000 persons.Footnote ⁵⁸

Given the huge disparities as outlined above, the simple, mobilizing effect that the ASEANstats indicators might have is to spur the less developed countries within ASEAN to strive more aggressively towards economic and social development, and to thereby close the gaps between them and the more developed states. These indicators demonstrate that certain ASEAN Member States are lagging far behind their counterparts in various areas of economic and social development. In fact, the juxtaposition of their low levels of development against comparatively much higher levels achieved by other Member States makes the former appear all the more inadequate. Given that these indicators are publicly available, the states that do not perform as well on these indicators could fear the negative publicity and reputational damage that could result from the impression these indicators convey. They could therefore be conceivably driven to improve the relevant sectors of their economy or society, so as to perform better in the future. For example, a state that has low FDI might increase its efforts to attract foreign investors through trade agreements or taxation rebates, or a state with poor telecommunication coverage might upgrade its telecommunications systems and extend its reach to a greater proportion of the population. In this way, the ASEANstats indicators may have the effect of driving development within the less developed ASEAN Member States.

Furthermore, these disparities may also have the effect of driving redistribution and aid to the less developed ASEAN nations. This may occur between ASEAN states, or may involve an influx of finances and resources from outside the ASEAN region. In particular, one would expect that these indicators would be powerful in mobilizing the more developed ASEAN states to aid their less developed and more impecunious counterparts within the regional bloc. These indicators, through highlighting this pronounced disparity in standards of development, could presumably appeal to some sense of goodwill or charity, if not some soft obligation to provide aid, on the part of the governments of the wealthier ASEAN states.

At present, it does not appear that ASEAN Member States are intentionally tapping into the mobilizing power of the ASEANstats indicators to spur change. It may be that Member States are steering away from explicitly using the indicators in this manner in order to avoid embarrassing any Member States that fare less well on the indicators. Nonetheless, if ASEAN is conscious of the mobilizing power of indicators and directs its mind towards developing creative means of harnessing this power, the ASEANstats indicators hold much promise of being used for good.

2. Philosophy and ideology

In addition, the ASEANstats indicators may also be doing more for the cause of development than just mobilizing or initiating governmental action. In another sense, the ASEANstats indicators have doctrinal value, they say something about what development means in the context of ASEAN. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, certain assumptions always underlie indicators: for example, that an indicator measures a given quality or characteristic is itself an assumption that this quality is worth measuring. The indicator is therefore saying that this quality is important. Indicator regimes, such as that established by ASEANstats, often measure various social and economic aspects of a country, and thereby paint a comprehensive picture of what an ideal state should look like. Through measuring qualities such as GDP, or FDI, or health-care standards like infant mortality rate, or telecommunication connectivity, the ASEANstats indicator regime is implicitly saying that these are worth measuring, and are therefore important aspects of a country.

Hence, at a more fundamental, ideological level, and regardless of whether they are meant to or not, the ASEANstats indicators are promulgating a certain conception of the developed Southeast Asian nation; this conception is, broadly speaking, one in which the ideal nation has attained high levels of the various standards measured. These are primarily standards of social and economic development, as demonstrated by the various categories of indicators within the “ASEAN Statistical Yearbook”. This, as mentioned above, comprises indicators on areas such as education, health, labour, telecommunications, macroeconomics, and significant industries, such as agriculture or manufacturing.

It is particularly telling that the ASEANstats indicator regime focuses on various aspects of social and economic development while not addressing civil and political traits that other similar indicator regimes often measure. To this extent, it is decidedly one-sided. For example, the ASEANstats indicators do not measure the extent to which various civil and political freedoms are permitted in ASEAN states, such as the freedoms of speech, assembly, or expression, freedom of religion, or the presence of a free press. Implicitly, therefore, the ASEANstats indicators are declaring that these traits are not as important or essential to an ASEAN state (or at least not as important or essential as the social and economic qualities measured), and are thus left out of its model of development.

The reason for this conspicuous asymmetry in the attention paid to the two different classes of qualities could possibly be traced back to a lack of consensus between the ASEAN states on the civil and political traits a state should embody, or the civil and political freedoms it should allow. The ASEAN model of decision-making has usually been consensual, and Member States would prefer to steer clear of an area in which they are aware that no consensus can be reached. This is coupled with a strong belief in non-interference or non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other ASEAN Member States.Footnote ⁵⁹

In the light of this model of decision-making, ASEAN states would be quite unlikely to reach consensus on the civil or political traits that should define a nation, given that there is so much diversity in the modes of political governance that dominate in the different ASEAN states. Brunei is a constitutional sultanate, and in practical terms an absolute monarchy, while Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand are constitutional monarchies with multiparty democracies under them; Vietnam and the Lao PDR are communist states, while Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore are forms of republics premised on representative democracy. Myanmar has at present a fledgling civilian parliamentary government, but has for many years been ruled by its military, which still dominates the local political scene.Footnote ⁶⁰

In the light of all these differences, it is perhaps unsurprising that the ASEANstats indicators avoid delving into any vaguely political subject area. Any attempt to incorporate the measurement of civil or political standards that lean towards a particular political ideology, into the ASEANstats indicators, would have met with strong disagreement and opposition. Further, such an attempt could be seen as a form of interference in the internal affairs of other states: for example, the measurement of press freedom might have been viewed by the more authoritarian states within ASEAN as advocating a more liberal model of governance. It is not unheard of for such political differences and contestation to suppress the expansion of an indicator,Footnote ⁶¹ and this may thus provide a reason for the unexplained, lopsided focus of the ASEANstats indicators.

Aside from the fact that decision-making in ASEAN usually follows a consensus-based model, there may be a further political reason why the ASEANstats indicator regime aims only to measure qualities that ASEAN states can readily agree to measure. The entire statistics and indicator project can be seen as a political tool for unifying the ASEAN states: it provides a cause that this collection of highly diverse nations can rally around and collectively associate with. In fact, it is relatively straightforward and uncomplicated to execute a statistical project. Certainly, a statistical project would be more value-neutral than initiating a project aiming to initiate substantive transformation in a given area of governance within Member States, such as eradicating corruption within government structures. Hence, if we see unifying the efforts of the ASEAN Member States around a common, concrete goal as an aim for the ASEAN statistical project, then it would be only natural for the indicators to incorporate relatively uncontroversial standards that most, if not all, ASEAN Members States can agree ought to be measured. It would be a divisive and counter-productive exercise if ASEANstats were to attempt to measure traits of civil or political society that ASEAN governments might object to on a fundamental, ideological level.

Yet it may be possible to attach great normative significance to this pronounced slant of the ASEANstats indicators. This trend may, in fact, be reflective of a broader attempt on ASEAN's part to define itself against liberal modes of government in the global West, with their emphasis on civil and political rights. ASEAN states, on the whole, tend towards forms of government that would be considered less liberal, or even illiberal, from a Western perspective. Myanmar is an extreme example, having been ruled by a military junta for the past few decades and only now making a slow transition to a democracy. Singapore, although it is formally a parliamentary democracy, has also been often criticized for its authoritarian government, in which a single political party dominates the local political scene. Further, ASEAN has been known to attempt to propagate its own distinctive political ideology. The contentious “Asian Values” system has been widely seen as an example of ASEAN (or more broadly Asian) societies reacting against liberal modes of government through advocating different ideas of what an ideal government should look like.Footnote ⁶²

It may be then, that the ASEANstats indicators can be seen as simply another example of this refusal by ASEAN states to subscribe to a liberal model of governance, where civil and political freedoms are frequently emphasized and given pride of place. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate all the nuances and complexities inherent in these conflicting theories of government, this does not detract from the fact that the ASEANstats indicators may reveal a more general, almost “subconscious” political philosophy held by ASEAN and its Member States. It has been said that the Human Development Index (HDI) of the UNDP was “designed to persuade”.Footnote ⁶³ While the ASEANstats indicator regime was not designed as a clear response to what was deemed to be an inferior method of measurement (in the way that the HDI was designed to replace gross national product (GNP) per capita as a measure of development), it may be that the ASEANstats indicators were intended to incorporate a certain political ideology, and that this is not reflected in the indicators purely by chance.

Hence, having considered all these possibilities, it is perhaps unsurprising that the ASEANstats indicator regime demonstrates a somewhat skewed focus on economic and social development. In any case, its selective emphasis reveals pertinent information about the ideology driving ASEAN as a broader regional, political body. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal at any length with deeper issues of the theories and ideologies behind ASEAN as a regional body, and the process of regional integration within Southeast Asia. The point to be made here is simply that even a set of indicators may perform a unique function in ideological propagation. Hence, even though indicators are often seen as no more than collections of hard, numerical data, it is important to realize that indicators can have more profound effects than might be apparent at first glance.

1. Transparency

Transparency is almost always argued for in conjunction with accountability, and therefore is often regarded as being a necessary element of accountability. In essence, transparency is the public provision of information. However, Stewart does not regard it as being an accountability mechanism because there is no specified accountee when information is released to the public in general, and there is usually no means of securing a legal remedy on the basis of this information. Rather the information is often just provided for the edification of the public. Therefore, Steward regards transparency and the provision of information as “a necessary but not sufficient condition for accountability”.Footnote ⁸⁷

In the context of ASEANstats, individual ASEAN Member States are capable of obtaining information on ASEANstats through their national representatives at the AHSOM and ACSS Committee. Further, the ASEAN Secretariat keeps tabs on individual ASEAN organs and offices, such as ASEANstats, and is required to report back to the biannual ASEAN Summit on the work of ASEAN in general.Footnote ⁸⁸ As such, and as explained above, there is probably little difficulty in ASEAN Member States holding ASEANstats to account.

However, notwithstanding the fact that ASEANstats may be accountable to individual ASEAN Member States, what is of greater concern is the lack of transparency towards the public at large, resulting in an inability of the public to hold it to account. The considerable dearth in the information provided to the public about the operations of ASEANstats is a problem that arises in several areas. There is little detailed information on the proceedings or deliberations of the AHSOM or ACSS Committee. In the context of the AMRO, none of the reports it produces nor the proceedings of meetings in the ERPD process are made known to the public. Further, there is in some cases little or no information on the sources of the statistical information used by ASEANstats in compiling its indicators, apart from stating that this was information submitted by individual Member States. This gives rise to the danger of inaccurate or withheld statistics. There should be little doubt that this culture of opacity must change.

Stewart notes that transparency brings about other benefits, even in the absence of accountability mechanisms. For example, providing information to the public can “strengthen the operation of other responsiveness-promoting practices, including market competition, general political mechanisms, and peer, public reputation, and social practices and incentives”.Footnote ⁸⁹ He notes also that other stakeholders, even if they lack accountability rights, may use the information made public to anticipate policy decisions, and lobby for changes in their favour.Footnote ⁹⁰

To the extent that ASEANstats and the indicator regime it has generated is a global regulator, it is of the utmost importance that its practices comply with requirements of transparency. It is not difficult to imagine that increased transparency in its practices, for example in the area of data collection and selection, could lead to greater pressures on it to ensure that its practices do meet established standards of accuracy or reliability. This would then mean that end-users are more prepared to rely upon the indicators that ASEANstats supplies, and also that the targets of these indicators are assured that they are fairly and accurately reflected. In general, transparency would lead to greater faith in and dependency on the ASEANstats indicator regime.

A model for transparency that ASEAN, as a whole, could follow is that of the UNDP.Footnote ⁹¹ The UNDP has undertaken to ensure that its operations are strongly transparent through unreserved publication of its financial, procurement, and programme information. It has a clear Information Disclosure PolicyFootnote ⁹² that sets out the types of information that the public has access to, where the public may access this information, the organization's principles of confidentiality, and importantly, a process of appeal and review by which a person denied access to information may submit a further appeal for information to an Oversight Panel. This policy is an unequivocal commitment to ensuring that, as far as possible, the public will be able to know and understand what is going on within this organization, and to use this information to hold it to account if necessary. This is a comprehensive policy of transparency that ASEAN would do well to emulate.

A meticulous or conscientious commitment to transparency, perhaps through the clear institution of mechanisms for information disclosure and promulgation, cannot be a bad thing. It would show ASEANstats to be an open and honest organization, having nothing to hide. The corollary of this would be an inference that the information disclosed is reliable and may be trusted. A deliberate commitment to transparency, therefore, would go a long way towards raising the profile and reputation of ASEANstats as a provider of statistical information. Like accountability, transparency is no magic panacea; however, it has an important methodological value that cannot be neglected.

2. Non-decisional participation

Measures of non-decisional participation are perhaps the easiest for an organization to implement. Some examples of these include providing avenues for other stakeholders to attend meetings and to submit evidence or opinions to decision-making bodies, without having any vote or role in the final decision, or opportunities to be consulted, or to submit feedback that is then considered and acted upon. In essence, these are all measures whereby “outsiders” to an organization are given the opportunity to be heard before “insiders”, and to influence the latter who actually make the decisions.Footnote ⁹³ As with transparency, non-decisional participation may enhance other responsiveness-promoting measures. First, the simple supply of information may lead to different decisional outcomes. Second, the mere provision of an opportunity for participation may spur greater involvement from interest groups who then influence how decisions are made.

In the context of the ASEANstats indicator regime, it would be relatively straightforward to implement various channels whereby interested parties may submit feedback or establish some sort of forum whereby independent experts in the areas of statistics or information gathering are consulted. It is possible that ASEANstats already does quietly invite feedback from independent parties. However, it would be far better if such processes were made public and more open. This study was unable to uncover any indication of widespread gathering of public feedback.

Non-decisional participation has the advantage of not eroding the existing decision-making power of the parties currently in control. It does not require that existing decision-makers cede or share any of their decision-making power with other interested stakeholders. For this reason, implementing measures of non-decisional participation is non-threatening towards existing power-holders. Rather, all that it requires is that existing decision-makers adopt a more receptive or open-minded attitude towards the opinions of other stakeholders. Of course, non-decisional participation has the corresponding shortcoming of being a weaker means of redressing the problem of disregard. Effective implementation of this remedy requires a commitment on the part of decision-makers to consider alternative viewpoints in good faith. It would render this measure meaningless if decision-makers nominally gathered feedback without giving it any serious consideration.

3. Reason-giving

Reason-giving, like a requirement of transparency, is not in and of itself an accountability mechanism. However, as with transparency, requiring a decision-maker to state reasons and justifications for decisions made may allow a party to invoke accountability mechanisms or other remedies on the basis of the reasons given for the decision.Footnote ⁹⁴ Thus, it is similar to the provision of information under transparency requirements. Yet, it goes further: a practice of reason-giving implies that the reasons given must stand up to some standard of reasonableness or non-arbitrariness. A requirement of reason-giving suggests the possibility that some consequence could follow if the reasons given are not sufficiently cogent, convincing, or credible. This consequence could be a demand for a further and better reason, an appeal to a higher supervisory body or, at the least, some sort of reputational sanction. It is not difficult to understand that the public reputations of decision-makers will inevitably suffer if they issue reasons that are deemed implausible or questionable. In this way, reason-giving more closely resembles accountability mechanisms than it does transparency.

In the context of ASEANstats, reason-giving would serve to shed light on its organizational practices. It would help paint a more unified picture of the direction that ASEANstats seeks to take through its indicator regime, by explaining the various policy choices that are implicit in generating a set of indicators. For example, as mentioned above, the ASEANstats indicators are conspicuously one-sided in their focus on various aspects of economic and social development, while neglecting areas of civil and political development. An explanation for this lopsided focus could be simple: it might just be the case that ASEANstats has chosen to prioritize aspects that are more immediately quantifiable. Yet even a simple explanation such as this would clarify the context and assumptions behind the ASEANstats indicators, and guide end-users in the application of the information they contain.