How should we relate to religious discourse, if we are no longer in a position where we can wholeheartedly believe in the truth of central religious propositions? This question, which has been with us since at least the Enlightenment, has commonly been handled by addressing the content of the discourse. Many have tried to solve the problem by reducing the content, by simply getting rid of propositions we find it difficult to believe to be true. Others have tried to reinterpret religious language so that it concerns things we can believe, rather than supernatural claims (as in Bultmann's famous programme of demythologization).
However, in recent years, new approaches have been gaining ground, approaches which do not focus on the content of religious discourse, but rather on the attitude we hold towards it. The central idea is that a religious commitment need not be based on belief. Here, we find non-doxasticism, which holds that a religious life can be based on weaker cognitive attitudes such as propositional faith, hope, or acceptance. We also find the more radical approach of religious fictionalism, which treats religious discourse as fiction and consequently religious life as a game of make-believe.
Religious Fictionalism by Robin Le Poidevin is part of the series Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Religion, which, according to the back-cover notes, aims to provide ‘concise and structured introductions to all the central topics in the philosophy of religion’. This brief introduction presents the main ideas of religious fictionalism along with the topics most discussed in relation to it, with an emphasis on the fictionalist problem of evil. It also contrasts fictionalism with realism, and it explains how many non-realist views on religion originally emerged as responses to verificationism about meaning.
The first chapter is on religious realism. Different varieties of realism are briefly introduced, along with two major arguments for treating religion in a realist manner: the argument from historical intention and the argument from the efficacy of belief. Since realism is standardly viewed as the default position regarding religion, and perhaps therefore rarely argued for, these arguments feel surprisingly fresh and thought-provoking. We also get a presentation of several arguments commonly invoked against religion and theism. Here, however, they are put into perspective by being cast as problems for religious realism, and the chapter ends by raising the question of how these problems apply to fictionalism.
In the second chapter, Le Poidevin explains how, in the middle of the twentieth century, non-realist views of religion emerged as a response to the verificationist theory of meaning (a theory which denied meaning to religious propositions due to their lack of empirical verifiability). The chapter is centred on Richard Braithwaite's view of religious language, as expressed in An Empiricist's View on the Nature of Religious Belief from 1955, a view which combines ‘conative expressivism’ with an early version of fictionalism. It also briefly introduces the view of A. J. Ayer and reflects on the possibility of adopting positivism as a view on religion.
The third chapter is also the main chapter of the book, presenting fictionalism's core ideas. As is common when presenting religious fictionalism, it is done with an eye towards fictionalist theories on other topics. As usual, Bas van Fraasen's scientific fictionalism is mentioned, as is the moral fictionalism of John Mackie and Richard Joyce. However, rather than simply drawing upon these theories, Le Poidevin highlights the differences between these kinds of fictionalism and religious fictionalism, arguing that the latter is more radical and more truly fictional than the others.
The subsections of chapter 3 contain brief treatments of several of the issues most commonly discussed in relation to religious fictionalism. Le Poidevin centres the discussion on two fictional characters, Reginald the realist and Fiona the fictionalist. This way of writing both clarifies the positions and allows Le Poidevin to explore the underlying ideas in a creative fashion, without having to make firm commitments. I find the section on the moral seriousness of the fictionalist especially interesting. Here, Fiona makes the thought-provoking suggestion that a religious fictionalist might be better off than the traditional believer when it comes to morality, since it is better to work out one's own moral principles than to receive them more or less passively from an authoritative source. Another subsection worth mentioning is the one on ‘Creed and Prayer’, where Le Poidevin discusses the fictionalist's ability to perform religious actions which might seem problematic given her lack of belief. Can a fictionalist really recite the Creed without being inconsistent? According to Le Poidevin, the answer is yes. In reciting the Creed, the fictionalist only pretends to express belief and Le Poidevin is also careful to point out the importance of the fictionalist engaging with all aspects of the fiction. However, when it comes to private prayer, Le Poidevin discusses separate reasons a fictionalist might have for praying. This seems at odds with his treatment of the Creed. Why demand that a fictionalist must have some independent reason to pray when reciting the Creed can be justified as being part of a greater fiction? Presumably, for the fictionalist, all religious action could be justified in this latter, more ‘holistic’, way.
Unlike other subtopics, the problem of evil on fictionalism is given an extended treatment, with a chapter of its own. This insightful discussion is the most obviously original contribution of the book. Le Poidevin characterizes the problem of evil as an inconsistency problem for (theistic) religious fiction. He assesses and rejects two suggestions on how to deal with the issue: to exclude the problem from the fiction (by excluding gratuitous suffering) or to rest content with an incomplete fiction. Instead of these ‘easy rejections’, which make the problem of evil largely irrelevant for the fictionalist, Le Poidevin points out that fictions can include paradoxes like the problem of evil. He suggests that such a paradoxical religious fiction might be more intriguing and emotionally satisfying than the alternative, since it lets the problem of evil remain a struggle for the fictionalist. This discussion shows that the problem of evil is surprisingly relevant for the fictionalist, and Le Poidevin's solution also highlights how a fictionalist engagement with religion might contain serious existential depth.
The final chapter is followed by an epilogue, where the question how fictionalism can treat the problems of realism is finally answered. The epilogue ends with two highly interesting questions. The first is how fictionalism relates to agnosticism and non-doxasticism, a question currently under debate in very recent literature. The second is whether fictionalism might have some advantages over realism. This question, hinted at in the discussion on fictionalism and morality, is intriguing to say the least, and an affirmative answer would surely turn the tables on the realist. Proponents of fictionalism usually rest content with the claim that fictionalism can constitute a rationally permissible way for the atheist to engage with religion. As far as I am aware, no one argues that fictionalism is superior to realism. Simply raising the question, as Le Poidevin does, points to a new and bold possible direction in the field.
Boiling down an entire field to the short format required by the Cambridge Elements series is no easy task, and most of the time, Le Poidevin does it remarkably well. There is, however, one major issue I think is missing. The second chapter convincingly shows how fictionalism became a viable view at a time when philosophy was dominated by theories such as verificationism. However, verificationism is now as dead as a theory can get, and I cannot help but wonder if and how religious fictionalism could be motivated in relation to contemporary theories of meaning. Surely, the most interesting question is whether religious fictionalism can be a relevant option for us, today.
All in all, Religious Fictionalism constitutes an accessible introduction to its subject, suitable for anyone not yet acquainted with religious fictionalism. At the same time, there is also much of interest for those of us already familiar with the topic, especially on the fictionalist version of the problem of evil.
