When in 1990 the Russian government admitted for the first time that it had routinely dumped atomic waste into the oceans, the announcement angered many. Not only had the Russians always denied disposing of radioactive materials at sea, but for many years they had denounced similar practices by the US and the UK. They were doing it even in 1961, when Pravda launched a vitriolic attack on the ‘poisoners of wells’. Who were really the polluters, then?
Jacob Darwin Hamblin makes it clear that from the end of the Second World War to the 1990s the disposal of radioactive waste at sea was a key feature in the uses of atomic energy. And it typified – as we now know – the programmes of all nations that ‘went nuclear’. His monograph reveals that for a long time dumping radioactive materials was considered a perfectly viable disposal strategy, and, at least until the late 1960s, was rarely an object of environmental concern. Certainly the issue was debated by several groups of scientists (as experts) and governmental officers (as decision-makers). But their discussions were prompted not by widespread opposition to the use of oceans as ‘atomic sewers’ but by considerations about the economic costs involved, the health risks to humans (to do with the food chain in the sea) and the reactions and fears that dumping caused in the general public. The management of these issues became the key factor in maintaining a need for expert advice as well as justifying more research in order to frame a sounder regulatory framework. As Hamblin shows, the negotiations and conflicts between experts and government advisers shaped the historical trajectory of waste disposal at sea.
Among scientists, ocean dumping was at the centre of a controversy between oceanographers (and marine scientists more generally) and health physicists. The former felt that no decision could be taken with regard to disposal until greater knowledge was available as to how oceans functioned. There was concern, for example, about the routine practice of dumping in deep sea waters when understanding of deep sea currents was so little advanced. Concerns along these lines often enabled these scientists to request additional funding for oceanographic research and surveys. In Hamblin's view, the attempt to secure the oceanographers' approval on dumping regulation or practices led to the establishment of new patterns of patronage for their science, not least thanks to newfound abilities to claim funding from atomic agencies. By contrast, the health physicists, who were responsible for monitoring levels of radiation exposure (especially in nuclear establishments), were sceptical about the oceanographers' claims. Their studies of permissible radiation doses showed that, given known levels of dilution of radioactivity at sea, dumping operations could be expected to have no noticeable effect. If the health scientists were right, no further oceanographic research was needed.
Three developments moved the debate between these two groups to another level. First, national and international scientific institutions, including the US National Committee on Radiation Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency, produced recommendations on these issues. Second, atomic agencies from the US, Britain and France routinely dumped atomic waste not just into the oceans but into rivers and lakes. Third, and most importantly, local communities became anxious and vocal about these issues, both before and after dumping operations. At the same time, ocean dumping began to figure in nuclear diplomacy, especially when the Russians tried to use the disposal issue as a propaganda weapon in order to obtain more favourable conditions in international agreements.
Hamblin's study is timely and absorbing, discussing an aspect of the history of atomic energy programmes on which very little had been known. One wonders at times whether the plot of his book unfolds a little too firmly along the lines of selected archival material. Moreover, given the centrality that media coverage has had on public responses to dumping and assessments of those responses, it would have been useful to have more about how these events were portrayed in non-US newspapers, which are only marginally considered here. Even so, Poison in the Well is an incredibly precious exposé. Its revelations are based on an impressive amount of archival evidence, largely from US and UK national repositories. And they demonstrate that historical studies of science and technology can throw new light on attitudes towards power and scientific expertise in present societies. Especially welcome is the effort to describe the history of radioactive waste disposal by looking at contingent factors and hidden agendas rather than assuming that the ‘guiding light’ for the experts' decision-making was their scientific approach. If anything, scientific principles were evoked when dumping practices needed to be justified, which in turn allowed the scientists to ‘cash in’ as their expert advice and approval were called for. Not only does the book show that ‘who pays the piper calls the tune’, it also illustrates remarkably well that inviting the piper to play a specific tune can be a rather costly exercise.
