In 1974, the Watergate scandal, President Nixon's resignation, and the Arab oil embargo undermined Washington's promise to support the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the event of renewed war. Reflecting public desires to forget Vietnam like a bad dream, an emboldened U.S. Congress reduced aid to RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu and contested President Ford's war-making powers. In Hanoi, meanwhile, the Workers' Party Politburo received warnings from both Moscow and Beijing of future aid cutbacks. The Politburo instructed the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) to prepare plans for a two-year military campaign that would compel the RVN to implement the political provisions of the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords.
Black April is an impressive account of the fighting that began in Vietnam's central highlands on March 4, 1975, and ended with RVN surrender on April 30. Former U.S. Army Captain Veith is too young to have served in Vietnam, but he has mined American archives assiduously, read scores of Hanoi publications in English translation, and tracked down numerous former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) officers now residing in the United States. The author dedicates his book to those ARVN personnel “who stood and fought.” During his extensive research, however, Veith also developed considerable professional respect for the PAVN enemy, beginning with generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung.
PAVN seizure of Ban Me Thuot caught ARVN forces by surprise. President Thieu ordered a counterattack to retake the town, but other PAVN units had already cut off access from the coast. Thieu then authorized the larger garrison at Pleiku to withdraw, which quickly became a terrible rout, with several thousand soldiers and accompanying civilians killed. PAVN forces captured 10,000 ARVN personnel and escorted 20,000 civilians back to Pleiku and Kontum. Senior ARVN officers used C-130 Hercules aircraft to evacuate their families and belongings.
Word of this disaster spread quickly throughout South Vietnam. Some people panicked, others renewed their determination to resist “the Communists,” and still others were elated that Thieu's days might be numbered. Veith points out that Quang Tri Province, where ARVN forces had devoted three bloody months to retaking territory in 1972, was now lost to the PAVN in one day. One hundred thousand residents fled south to Hue, and very soon 800,000 people were trying to reach Danang. The RVN's Airborne and Marine divisions were as good as any PAVN division, yet they could not stop the enemy advance, what Veith calls a “runaway train” (p. 172). On March 26, Marines were reduced to shooting army and civilian competitors for space on an evacuation ship.
On March 18, the Politburo decided that South Vietnam could be liberated in one year rather than two. One week later, the Politburo judged that Saigon could be taken before the onset of the rainy season in late May. By then, Hanoi probably no longer felt the need to negotiate with anyone. By early April, the ARVN General Staff could see that defeat was certain, unless President Ford authorized large-scale American air and sea attacks on PAVN tank columns sweeping down the coast. This Ford was not prepared to do. Thieu resigned on April 21 and fled the country. Veith extols examples of continuing ARVN resistance, until command and control evaporated and troopers melted away, leaving their uniforms and boots on the street.
Veith argues that the ARVN could have prevailed over the PAVN if Congress had not reduced aid to Thieu. Yet his own narrative reveals huge quantities of ARVN ammunition, petrol, trucks, and rations falling into the hands of advancing ARVN units. If the ARVN took the offensive before the PAVN, it was not lacking in supplies. Veith reveals that ARVN divisions reverted to territorial responsibility, rather than being ready to operate elsewhere. Families of soldiers mostly lived alongside. Under enemy assault, this triggered what Veith labels the “family syndrome,” with personnel deserting their posts to try to protect loved ones. When Thieu decided that ARVN units in the northern half of South Vietnam should retreat to defend Saigon and the Mekong delta, he said nothing about military dependents.
Veith credits the PAVN with consummate staff work, command and control superiority, and skilled intelligence and counterintelligence operations. He mentions PAVN improvements in logistics, yet does not weave this vital element into his narrative. He also does not appreciate how important provincial and district units were in cutting off road transport, providing local support to main force divisions, handling prisoners, and forming a new administration.
Citations in Black April are inadequate, with as many as six pages going by without a single endnote. I can only guess that in some cases the relevant sources are still classified. But this does not prevent Black April from being the best military history of the fall/liberation of South Vietnam to appear to date.
