Huw Price is a prominent voice in the project to unite two of contemporary pragmatism’s core commitments: naturalism and anti-representationalism. Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism is Price’s attempt to chart a way forward for a naturalism without representationalist presuppositions; in short, a pragmatist naturalism. The vehicle for this journey is a novel version of linguistic expressivism, a union of the expressivisms of Simon Blackburn and Robert Brandom, which Price calls “global expressivism”. Price wants to show how his global expressivism can provide the basis for a recognizably naturalistic project that eschews representationalism and its substantive semantic explanatory notions in favour of a more ‘anthropological’ approach to philosophical problems.
The foundation—to use a very un-pragmatist term—of the book consists of Price’s Rene Descartes Lectures, delivered in May 2008 at the Tilburg Center for Logic and the Philosophy of Science. But the book is not a solo affair; it also includes four essays commenting on Price’s work and themes by Blackburn, Brandom, Paul Horwich, and Michael Williams. Price replies to these essays in the final chapter.
Price begins by introducing a distinction between kinds of naturalism that will be familiar to readers of his recent work: object naturalism and subject naturalism.Footnote 1 Object naturalism is what ordinarily goes under the name ‘naturalism’ in contemporary philosophy, namely the view that “all there is is the world studied by science” (4-5), and that “all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge” (5). Subject naturalism, by contrast, says that:
… philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about ourselves. Science tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims and ambitions of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way (ibid.).
Price argues that subject naturalism is prior to object naturalism, that object naturalism “depends on validation from a subject naturalist perspective” (6). Furthermore, Price thinks that there are “strong grounds for doubting” (11) whether object naturalism can be validated from the subject naturalist perspective.
Object naturalism cannot be validated because there are substantial (big-R) Representationalist semantic notions at the heart of object naturalism but to which the object naturalist has no access on their own terms. Additionally, Price thinks there are good reasons to reject these Representationalist notions outright in favour of semantic deflationism. Subject naturalism thus seems the superior naturalist position.
One of the things at stake in this debate are what Price calls “placement problems” (5), the attempt to find the place of certain problematic objects or properties in the world conceived of in a naturalist way, things such as meaning, value, consciousness, and so on. These ‘hard problems’ look very hard indeed from an object naturalist standpoint, but Price thinks that, on a subject naturalist understanding, they become problems that “originate as problems about human linguistic usage” (7), that is, they are problems not about the place of objects or properties in the natural world, but about “a plurality of ways of talking, of forms of human linguistic behaviour” (20). The task now is to “explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us come to talk in these various ways” (ibid.).
But how do we leave representationalist notions behind and adopt this much different subject naturalist view of placement problems? This is where Price brings Blackburn and Brandom on stage to construct his global expressivism. Traditional, local expressivists like Blackburn, however, are committed to the “bifurcation thesis” (30), the idea that some uses of language are genuinely descriptive, and the rest—those given an expressivist account—are not. Price thinks that this severely limits the progress that expressivists can make in understanding assertions in general, especially since the expressivist shouldn’t be helping themselves to Representationalist notions to explain the descriptive side of the bifurcation.
So to take expressivism global, Price needs a way to say what all assertions have in common without appealing to Representationalism. Enter Brandom’s inferentialism.Footnote 2 According to Brandom, all assertions are moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons. A global expressivism thus rejects the bifurcation thesis, and holds instead that all assertions, qua assertions, are created equal, and best understood in Brandom’s expressivist terms.
However, Price thinks that there is a way for the inclinations that led to the bifurcation thesis to be accounted for on his global expressivism. He thus offers a new bifurcation: between “i-representations” and “e-representations” (36). Roughly, i-representations are the internal, inferential roles that representations play, while e-representations are in the business of tracking the external environment. Price holds that these two senses of representation must be distinguished, and that it is forcing them together that leads to Representationalism and object naturalism.
With this distinction, we can now separate content from correspondence. All assertions get content (via the game of giving and asking for reasons), but not all correspond to some feature of the “external world” (41). So instead of asking how to match up language and the world, as we would if we were in the grip of object naturalism and Representationalism, we now have the decidedly pragmatist project of asking “how there come to be statements with particular contents,” i.e., how we come to talk in the plurality of ways that we do. This recognition of the Wittgensteinian plurality of language is what leads Price to ask for pragmatist explanations of how our vocabularies come to be, and for what they are useful.
Because this pragmatist explanatory project is still a naturalistic one (under the auspices of subject naturalism), Price refers to it as a “scientific” project, construing science broadly enough to encompass the ‘anthropological’ questions that become the focus of pragmatist naturalism, questions as to the function and use of our vocabularies.
But one therefore wonders if there isn’t a tinge of scientism in Price’s naturalism, a scientism that may turn off some fellow pragmatists. Though Price aims to set aside traditional metaphysical problems in favour of questions of pragmatic explanation, what is not clear is the kind of explanation that is required, and if it is one that can be given by philosophy, or should instead be in the domain of science, broadly construed to include anthropology. Price seems to suggest that his endeavour is anthropological, but he is a philosopher. Is it up to anthropologists to tell us what functions our vocabularies play? Then the role of philosophers is unclear. If it is the job of philosophers, then on what basis can they give these explanations from their armchairs? It seems empirical study should be necessary.
As Price acknowledges in a footnote, this sort of endeavour is in tension with the Wittgensteinian aspects of this pragmatist project (20, n. 9). A Wittgensteinian pragmatist will find little with which to disagree in Price until he characterizes the pragmatist project in the scientistic manner of giving explanations for why we talk in the plurality of ways that we do and what function they serve in our form of life. This sort of pragmatist will want to eschew explanations for descriptions of our practices which dissolve the apparent need for explanation. Whether this tension in the pragmatist project can be overcome in the spirit of Price’s work is a nice question, but one to which Price offers no answer.
The other papers in the book shed valuable light on Price’s arguments, either through agreement or contrast, and Price’s reply, in which he links his views to those of Wilfrid Sellars, helps to clarify the views he puts forward in the lectures. But to whom will this book be useful? Undoubtedly, Price’s lectures are an important contribution to the literature on philosophy of language, metaphysics, naturalism, and of course pragmatism. But however interesting or important, it is unclear whether the volume as a whole will appeal to those beyond the pragmatist camp. Someone outside of pragmatism reading this book will undoubtedly wish that the commenting essays were more fundamentally critical of Price, instead of the intra-pragmatist disputes over detail that we get.
The volume thus has a kind of bifurcation of its own: the lectures an engaging contribution to the literature which any philosopher will find stimulating (positively or negatively), and the comments and reply intended more for fellow pragmatists. But in a book full of bifurcations, perhaps that is fitting.
