This collection includes thirty essays, dealing with subjects that range chronologically from 1917 through the first decade of the 21st century. Most of the essays originally appeared in various edited volumes and periodicals, including the London Review of Books and the Journal of Palestine Studies. They are grouped into four loosely organized sections: “1948 and After,” “To Oslo and Beyond,” “Breakdown of the Peace Process,” and “Perspectives”—of which the first three are particularly strong. While there are some historical essays that present new material, most are topical and about half are book reviews. The best of the historical essays is “Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria,” in which Shlaim recasts the much-maligned colonel in the role of an Arab Mustafa Kemal who was more than willing to sign a permanent peace treaty with Israel and resettle 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria to jump-start agricultural development in the sparsely populated Jazira region. The plan, which ultimately fell victim to a combination of Israeli intransigence and Zaim's short tenure as president, raises the counterfactual question of what might have been—a question to which Shlaim returns in other essays. The topical essays and book reviews are, as one might expect of pieces written for the London Review of Books and similar publications, aimed at an educated, albeit nonspecialist audience, and Shlaim's use of the book review format to engage in wide-ranging ruminations about history, politics, and personalities is particularly masterful.
Shlaim's central (although not exclusive) focus is, as the title connotes, the Israel–Palestine conflict, and while the essays cover a range of issues pertaining to that conflict Shlaim sustains an argument throughout that might be reduced to a few essential points. To begin with, Shlaim views the conflict as a clash of nationalisms. This is, of course, one of several frameworks commonly employed in historical narratives (another is to situate the conflict within a framework of settler colonialism), but the implications of using it are rarely remarked upon. If the conflict is, indeed, between two nationalisms, then the claims of both sides are equally legitimate—although, as Shlaim repeatedly asserts, this does not imply a moral equivalency between victimizers and victims—and the only appropriate solution is a two-state solution, which Shlaim strongly supports. The settler-colonial framework, in contrast, leads one down the road of delegitimizing the aspirations of one side and, ultimately, to a one-state solution. But just as Israel's legitimacy rests on the sanction it received from the international community in 1947, its settler-colonial project, begun in the aftermath of the 1967 war, has no such international sanction and, in fact, directly contravenes the spirit of UN Resolution 242 and international law. For Shlaim, then, repudiation of the latter is requisite but does not dictate the rejection of the former.
If the events surrounding 1948 represented one turning point in the conflict and 1967 represented another, the 1993 Oslo Accord marked a third. Between 1948 and 1993, most of the world chose to view the Israel–Palestine conflict as an interstate one that would be resolved when Israel and its neighbors turned the armistice agreements ending the first war for Palestine into full-blown peace treaties. But as Shlaim reminds us, there were two phases of that war, and only one of them can be characterized as an interstate conflict. What the 1993 Oslo Accord did was to restore the conflict to its rightful owners, Israelis and Palestinians. Once they resolve their differences the logic of the interstate dispute disappears, as Shlaim demonstrates in his account of the Israeli–Jordanian peace negotiations.
For all its significance, Oslo was, for Shlaim, deeply flawed. To most commentators the chief flaw of Oslo flowed from the exchange of recognitions, whereby the Palestinians threw away their most important bargaining chip at the inception by discarding their claim to 78 percent of the territory in question. Shlaim believes Oslo was flawed because it evaded the issue of Palestinian sovereignty. While he shuns the “St. Yitzhak” swooning that became fashionable after the prime minister's assassination in 1995 (“Yitzhak Rabin inflicted more punishment and pain on the Palestinians than any other Israeli leader to date [p. 224]”), Shlaim does point out that for all of Rabin's faults, his successors proved far worse for Palestinians. Shlaim is particularly scathing in his remarks about Rabin's Likud successors. When it came to the question of Palestinian sovereignty, both Labor and Likud fell back on historically determined default positions: for Labor, it was the “Jordan option”; for Likud, it was “Greater Israel.” Even when Likud prime ministers engaged in the “Oslo process,” they borrowed from Vladimir Jabotinsky's playbook: since “the Arabs” will never accept a Jewish state, Jabotinsky believed, Zionists must first establish an iron wall of military might and then force the enemy to negotiate surrender from a position of weakness (according to Shlaim, Ariel Sharon's sole deviation from the playbook was to abandon the second step after snatching up what he could—an act of attempted “politicide” against the Palestinian people [p. 288]). In the end, both sides contributed to the collapse of Oslo (Shlaim is no fan of Yasir ʿArafat either). But ultimately, since “Israel preferred land to peace” (p. xi), the lion's share of the blame rests on Israel's shoulders.
Throughout the essays, Shlaim never loses his flair for the telling detail, the bon mot, and the caustic gibe. Of a former president of the United States, Shlaim writes, “Reagan spent many sleepless afternoons in the White House worrying about the Soviet threat” (117). On American aid to Israel between 1948 and 1991, he states, “Rarely in the annals of human history have so few owed so much to so many” (p. 119). He also demonstrates a remarkable ability to pin down complex personalities and entire careers in a single phrase. Golda Meir, for example, “was, in fact, the perfect henchwoman for the chief proponent of the policy of clobbering the Arabs hard on the head until they surrendered” (p. 125), while Ehud Barak “approached diplomacy as the extension of war by other means” (p. 204), and Benjamin Netanyahu “was not as bad as people had expected—he was much, much worse” (p. 269). There are the occasional groan-eliciting missteps, as when Shlaim asserts, “Whichever way one looks at the Palestinian struggle for independence during the British mandate, it is the story of how the Mufti muffed it” (p. 27) or describes George H. W. Bush's claim to have established a New World Order after the Gulf War as “the mother of all prattles” (p. 120). For the most part, however, Shlaim's wit sparkles. As an essayist, he follows in the venerable tradition of another commentator on things Middle Eastern, Elie Kedourie, who might be forgiven his reactionary politics for his flair in skewering folly and pomposity. One key difference, however, is that Shlaim is able to balance ridicule with compassion, to which his essays on Edward Said and Hanan Ashrawi and his interview with King Hussein of Jordan attest.
No less remarkable is his prescience: in the penultimate sentence of the essay, “Israel and the Gulf,” Shlaim writes, “A growing number of Israelis also came to recognize that time was not on their side, that there could be no military solution to the intifada, and that bold political initiatives were needed to arrest the slide toward civil war” (pp. 150–51). This is a verdict on the run-up to Oslo few would dispute today—even though it was written in 1991, two years before the accord.
