There can be little doubt that the principal shaping force in Croatia's history in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the Ottoman advance, and the response to that advance by Croats and their neighbours, Hungary, Venice and Habsburg Austria. Borislav Grgin has recently provided an admirable overview of the Ottoman impact on the Croatian lands. Even before the battle of Mohács and the Ottoman/Habsburg dismemberment of Croatia that followed, the medieval polity was subjected to extraordinary strain. Much of the country became in effect a war zone, and agricultural and commercial activity had to be radically adjusted to cope with the ever-present threat of raids, and the need to take shelter at short notice in Croatia's fortresses and walled towns. As Marko Marulić noted in 1526, it was only behind stone walls that a Croat could feel even reasonably safe.Footnote 1 Long-established social structures came close to collapse as archives were lost, with the result that legal decisions and tenurial relationships became unenforceable. There was considerable migration. Nobles fled from the more vulnerable southern regions to the safer north, while skilled commoners crossed the Adriatic to Venice and the Marche in search of security and work. The need for coordinated defence managed by the single governor (ban) appointed by the king of Hungary from 1476 onwards challenged the autonomy traditionally enjoyed by the constituent regna of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.Footnote 2
These pervasive and often catastrophic developments are clear, though the loss of so much important evidence makes precise quantification a forlorn hope. The impact of the Turks on Croatian culture is harder to assess. Grgin's opinion on this is forthright.
The syndrome of society as a besieged fortress, created by constant clashes and wars from 1463 till 1791, spread to all social levels. It was aided by the concept of antemurale christianitatis, which revived the old ideology of the Crusades…One cannot underestimate the importance of these facts on the current [sc. contemporary] mentality of the Croatian population, as well as their relevance in the creation of modern national ideologies, myths, stereotypes, etc.Footnote 3
Grgin's argument deserves to be debated, not just in the context of Croatian history but in that of all the Balkan countries and indeed the overarching European/Ottoman encounter. In this paper, I want to offer some thoughts based on research into the specifically crusading sources. I shall attempt first to position Croatia in terms of antemurale ideology. Then, I shall refer to some of the Croatian contributions to debate at the time. I shall conclude by looking at the career and outlook of Andrija Jamometić, a Croatian Dominican and diplomat who intervened in a remarkably explosive if short-lived manner in the crusading diplomacy of the later fifteenth century.Footnote 4
Individuals and groups engaged in the arduous process of shaping a common crusading response to the Ottoman advance in the late Middle Ages created a discourse that was radically different from the one developed by their predecessors in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. At its heart, lay a basic tension between the inherent universalism of crusade and the inescapable fact that most Catholics were not – at least so far – physically threatened by the Turks. Their way of coping with this tension was in essence simple enough. A frontier community or state that was suffering Turkish attack was commonly described as a bulwark (antemurale or propugnaculum), or less frequently as a shield (scutum or clipeus). The antemurale metaphor served a number of purposes. It was colourful and dramatic, conjuring up a clear image of an embattled Christendom. Taken in conjunction with the topos of limitless Ottoman ambition forwarded by barbaric warriors whose origins lay in Asia's steppe lands, it made possible images of the sultan threatening to stable his horses in St Peter's or water them in the Rhine. And it could be coupled with another topos, that of a Christian faith that had not just been expelled from its ancestral homeland in the East but was now cornered in Europe (angulum mundi). To all intents and purposes, Christianitas was synonymous with Europa.Footnote 5 Hence, in 1501 the papal legate Raymond Perault asked the German diet at Nürnberg to consider where it would flee to if the Turks managed to breach the Hungarian antemurale. For the Turks would have no problem levelling the walls of this beautiful city with their cannon: perhaps the diet would reconvene at Lübeck and sail off to the Orkneys?Footnote 6
Antemurale states shared a common image and function, but they varied widely in their configuration and modus operandi. The archetypal antemurale state was Hungary, where the rhetoric dated back to the Mongol incursions of the thirteenth century and had been subjected to considerable refinement since.Footnote 7 Here, the antemurale came close to being literal, because a veritable network of fortresses extended 375 miles, from Klis and Skradin on the Adriatic coast to Szörény on the Wallachian border. These fortresses formed part of the ambitious programme of defence that was devised by King Sigismund when the Ottomans first appeared on his southern border in the late fourteenth century. Hungary's perimeter of fortresses was symbolised by Belgrade, whose successful defence against Mehmed II in 1456 became a byword throughout Europe for heroic Christian resistance. To cite just one example from many, in February 1476 Pope Sixtus IV briefed his legate to Burgundy on the repercussions of the Turkish capture of Caffa in the Crimea. Elated by victory, Mehmed II was preparing both his army and his fleet for further action. Charles of Burgundy was to be exhorted to help with men and money, on the grounds that ‘if Hungary is conquered Germany will be next, and if Dalmatia and Illyria are overrun Italy will be invaded’.Footnote 8
Venice consistently argued that its overseas territories, fleets and armies made up an antemurale that was different in kind from Hungary's but of equal importance for Christendom. The Venetians asserted that the fall of Negroponte in 1470 was just as disastrous a breach in the antemurale network as the capture of Belgrade fourteen years earlier would have been. ‘It is our will and command’, they instructed their envoys at Rome,
that you immediately inform his Holiness the Pope that our eternal and relentless enemy the [Great] Turk has not just taken by storm a single city and island that were in Christian hands, important on account of their resources and population, but that he has overcome a bulwark that shielded Christians everywhere, opening up a path and clearing the way for the invasion, conquest and spoliation of Italy itself.Footnote 9
The Knights of St John argued a similar case to that of Venice for their archipelago centred on Rhodes. Then, there is the intriguing case of Moldavia, an orthodox principality whose rulers nonetheless became adroit at weaving antemurale language into their negotiations for aid with the Catholic West. They argued that their lands sheltered Transylvania and Hungary, in effect forming an antemurale to an antemurale.Footnote 10
Behind all this lively rhetoric, a hard core of moral argumentation was folded in with some gritty self-interest. Those rulers and peoples who were sustaining the bulwark had the right to enjoy support from their fellow-believers sheltering in its lee. States which denied help to current bulwarks would forfeit the right to put forward similar claims if circumstances later forced them to take on an equivalent defensive role. And if the rulers of the frontier states were not helped out, they would be justified – or at least harder to criticise – if they allowed Turkish raiders through, exchanging immunity for their own lands for guidance on how best to reach those of their Christian neighbours (with whom, of course, they were often at odds). Granted that a showdown with the Turks could not be avoided, surely it was better to stage it at a distance from one's own crops, vineyards, towns and markets? Croatian experience would certainly have backed up that argument.
These brief comments illustrate some of the versatility, not to say volatility, of the period's antemurale rhetoric.Footnote 11 The language of the bulwark was grist to the mill of Renaissance Europe's clever, classically educated humanists and diplomats. This can be misleading. All too often what they wrote has been construed as duplicity and pretence, fuelled by ambition, flattery and a dazzling way with words. But the impressive malleability of the dominant rhetoric should not lead us to dismiss it, any more than we should write off as stale and insincere the imposing corpus of anti-Ottoman oratory that the Renaissance generated.Footnote 12 Crusaders did not, for the most part, march or sail eastwards, as numerous enthusiasts for war ruefully commented, thereby paying homage to yet another topos, that of faith in decline. But what did occur was a pulsing traffic of individuals charged with the brief of discovering, informing, networking and persuading. And above all, this two-way traffic fertilised the exchange of ideas, data and modes of argument between Christendom's embattled frontier lands and its interior. Through reports, elaborate plans for action and desperate pleas for help, in speech and on paper, the frontier states instilled in the West a deep if tendentious consciousness of the Turkish threat and what it represented. From diets, assemblies and above all the papal court, responses were duly sent back. Arguably the greatest contribution that the Turks made to European life in this period was to make contemporaries think about who they were. Not only was a new vitality injected into the ancient debate about Christianity and Islam, but Europeans reflected on what it meant to be Catholic or Orthodox, not to say German, Hungarian or Croatian.
The Ottoman advance first impacted on Croatia in the mid-1460s, when neighbouring Bosnia fell, with astonishing rapidity, to Mehmed II's troops.Footnote 13 The collapse of medieval Bosnia in 1463 seems to have taken the sultan by surprise – he was heavily committed to operations in the Peloponnese, which held considerable attractions for him. Like his great opponent Pope Pius II, Mehmed faced difficult decisions about where to direct the bulk of his resources between the two competing areas of operation. Notwithstanding his youth and inexperience, and the uncertain domestic situation that he confronted in the wake of dynastic change, Hungary's King Matthias stabilised what was left of the Christian position in Bosnia by retaking Jajce and setting up two frontier regions (banovinas or banates) centred on the recovered fortress and Srebrenica. Humiliated by his reversal at Belgrade in 1456, wary of taking on Matthias's impressive cordon sanitaire of fortresses, deflected by Iskanderbeg, and immersed in a gruelling sixteen-year war with Venice (1463–79), the sultan made little attempt to push further westwards during the remainder of his reign.Footnote 14
The situation confronting Croatia in the six decades that separated the fall of Bosnia from the end of medieval Hungary in 1526 can conveniently be split into two phases, the hinge event being the disaster of Krbava Polje (‘Krbava Field’, near Udbina) in 1493. Up to 1493, Croatia suffered intermittent raiding; indeed, Grgin describes raids happening on an almost annual basis in the 1460s and 1470s.Footnote 15 The worst-hit area was the coastal region to the west of Bosnia, lying between Senj and Slunj. Turkish raiding parties frequently traversed this territory while making their way northwards towards Venetian Istria and Friuli, and Austrian Styria, Krain (Carniola) and Kärnten (Carinthia). As a satellite state of the Hungarian kingdom, Croatia was included, overtly or by implication, in the regular pleas for assistance that Matthias directed towards Rome. Dubrovnik was constantly alert to the menace facing it in the east and south, and was probably the most important feeder of information to the European powers. It is fair to say that it was in these decades that Croatia's political, ecclesiastical and cultural elite absorbed the language of antemurale discourse. They were well placed to do so. Despite such idiosyncrasies as the Glagolitic script,Footnote 16 Croatia was well integrated into the worlds of Italy and Hungary in the diplomatic, commercial and humanistic spheres, and we are increasingly aware of the importance of the Italian-Hungarian axis, in crusading terms as in so much else.Footnote 17 Studying the bulwark language that emanated from Buda and Venice could hardly have been surpassed as a means of learning the vocabulary and rhythms of the age's anti-Ottoman rhetoric.
From 1493 onwards, this became more relevant because Croatia suffered the calamity of Krbava Polje. In the report that was sent to Pope Alexander VI by his agent Antonio Fabregues in September 1493, and which was widely circulated, we gain a clear picture of how this latest disaster was interpreted. The rashness of the Croatian nobility in taking on the Turks as they marched through Croatia on their way back to Bosnia is accorded a charitable gloss: the Croatian army was attempting to free fellow-Christians who had been enslaved in Habsburg lands.Footnote 18 Christian losses had been terrible, only 300 soldiers escaping death or captivity out of 8,000 combatants. Fortresses, including Senj from where Fabregues wrote, had been stripped of their garrisons to field this army, so Croatia was ripe for conquest. Supplies were very limited and money from Italy was essential to pay troops to take on crucial defensive roles. Senj itself could be expected to fall in the immediate future, and with this port in their hands the Turks could easily invade northern Italy. This was the message that Alexander passed on to rulers including Giangaleazzo and Lodovico Sforza, summoning a meeting of envoys at Rome to take action.Footnote 19
The planned meeting never took place, and Croatia's plight was soon little more than one tessera in the complex mosaic of European diplomatic interactions in the months leading up to the French descent into Italy. Following King Matthias's death in April 1490, the responsibility for defending Croatia had to all intents and purposes passed from Hungary to Austria. Maximilian could not ignore Croatia's military needs in terms of his imperial responsibility for the defence of Christendom. But a greater spur to involvement was the defence of his subjects in southern Austria. The potential was there for a more belligerent response to the Turks, one that would have served Croatia's long-term interests better than Matthias's compliance with – and arguably encouragement of – Turkish raids that used Croatian lands for convenient transit. But this was not to be. Renewed Ottoman pressure on the Danube began to exploit the chronic underfunding of Hungary's fortress perimeter, bringing about the series of conquests that culminated in the disaster at Mohács in 1526. Meanwhile, Maximilian's interventions in the region had proved to be at best intermittent, suffering like all of his policies from his prevaricating approach towards his many duties.
After 1526, independent Croatian engagement in crusading discourse splintered into the various parts of the shipwrecked kingdom, the wistfully named ‘remains of the remains of the once glorious kingdom of Croatia’. First, there were the various coastal cities that escaped occupation, ranging from Senj southwards to Dubrovnik. Thanks to Wendy Bracewell's monograph on Senj, we are well aware of the prominent role that holy war, of which antemurale rhetoric formed such a key part, played in the culture that was created by the uskoks.Footnote 20 There exists no comparable study for Dubrovnik, whose management of the shifting balance of power in the western Balkans would likely repay close analysis. The northern regions that passed into Austrian control naturally subscribed to the gradual absorption of holy war thinking into Habsburg imperial ideology. This had already begun under Maximilian I, and in due course it would result in the second genuine – as opposed to metaphorical – antemurale to which the region played host, the famed Austrian military frontier or vojna krajina. My subject, however, is ideas and their communication rather than structures, and from that viewpoint the political agencies that continued to represent Croatian interests are less significant than the range of individuals who continued to promote the cause of their occupied and divided country.
A good starting point for such an enquiry is Michael Petrovich's 1979 article on Croatian humanists who wrote about the Ottoman threat. Petrovich identified ‘some two hundred’ Croatian humanists, and provided useful résumés of the contributions that about a dozen of these men (mostly hailing from the Adriatic coastal towns) made to the literature frequently labelled as Turcica, early printed works about the Ottomans. It is regrettable but not surprising that so little of this bulky output has benefited from modern editions. Two points do, however, emerge from Petrovich's survey, when one compares these works with the overall spread of Turcica.Footnote 21 The first is the eclectic spectrum of genres to which they belonged. There was a literature (both poetry and prose) of lamentation, which described the destruction and sufferings of the Croats themselves without losing sight of the broader sequence of Christian setbacks and losses into which Croatia's plight fitted. Good examples of such texts are Šimun Kožićic Benja's poignantly titled De Corvatiae desolatione of 1516 and the letter appealing for a crusade that Marko Marulić wrote to Pope Adrian VI six years later.Footnote 22 There was a literature of instruction, in which the enemy's strengths and weaknesses were described with a view to defeating him; though also, in a manner characteristic of the Renaissance Feindbild, of shaming fellow-Christians by reference to the military, moral and domestic virtues practised by the Turks.Footnote 23 There were texts that sprang from the personal experience of campaigning and captivity: these make for some of the most rewarding reading.Footnote 24 And naturally there were pièces d’occasion, texts intended to exhort and persuade envoys at assemblies and diets, with an eye on the particular situation faced by the Croatian patria.Footnote 25
The other point to make is that mutatis mutandis, we find in these Croatian contributions a set of themes and topoi that are familiar from their Hungarian, Italian and German counterparts. Hence, the Turks are, by definition, the enemies not just of individual states but of Christianity. Croatia's sufferings are typical of the Christian countries that the Turks attack. Its young men are fighting for home and hearth – ‘pro patria pugnans proque domibus suis’Footnote 26 – but they are also defending Christendom. For should they falter, which they will unless reinforced, others will pay a price. As Marko Marulić expressed it in 1522, ‘in my judgement help must be despatched without delay to [Croatia], because if the enemy – God forbid – succeeds in conquering it, the road will be open to him to invade Germany and Italy, overcome all of Illyria, and subjugate the whole of the Christian world’.Footnote 27 In short, the vision is one of a stricken, meritorious and strategically vital antemurale.Footnote 28
Thus, there was a strong commonality of both genre and theme between the output of Croatia's humanist elite and that produced by its various neighbours. But we should not infer that there was no difference between these outputs. For the same humanists who lamented what was happening to Croatia were at the same time composing its national history. They disseminated what they wrote not just through the press, but through their personal contacts; for they included bishops, legates and ambassadors, chancellors, men of letters, high-ranking city officials and a naval commander. So, at the very time that the nation faced catastrophe, talented and prominent members of its elite highlighted the glories of Croatia's past and constructed its singularity.Footnote 29 Juraj Šižgorić (c. 1445–1509), for example, wrote a text about the hinterland of his native town of Šibenik and the ways of its people, as well as a poem describing the destruction inflicted on its surroundings by Turkish raids. The celebratory and the elegiac were bed fellows.Footnote 30
It is worth glancing at the career at one of these lobbyists, Tomaso Negri of Split (Spalato) to flesh out their modus operandi, motivation and impact. Born probably between 1450 and 1460, Negri did not have to leave his hometown to gain a sound education from a cluster of gifted Italian teachers. Giuseppe Praga showed that Negri moved within the overlapping orbits of three powers that for different reasons were implicated in Croatia's defence against the Turks. The first was Venice, of which Negri was legally a subject. Negri was talent-spotted by Doge Loredan in 1503 when he gave an incisive report on Hungarian affairs; thereafter, the Venetians listened attentively to Negri's views and showed their gratitude by promoting his interests. In return, he viewed the republic as one of Croatia's best hopes. It was at Venice, shortly before his death, that he had his portrait painted by Lorenzo Lotto, and commissioned his tombstone. Secondly, there was Rome, where on several occasions Negri gave impressive orations about Croatia; his finest speech, delivered at the Fifth Lateran Council in 1512, was immediately printed. From this source too rewards followed, most importantly the see of Trogir, where Negri ended his life in the 1530s. Then, there was Croatia itself, or rather powerful individuals there. Negri served first the archbishop of Split, the Venetian Bernardo Zane – in whose company he came to Rome in 1512 – and following Zane's death Pietro Berislao of Trogir, Croatia's ban. After Berislao in turn died (in battle) in 1520, Negri appears to have functioned as a free agent, serving, as Praga put it, not a person but a cause.Footnote 31
We have learned not to expect purity of motivation from humanists, who often had no means of support except their own talent.Footnote 32 Like his peers, Negri was ambitious for fame, wealth and advancement, and he managed to fashion a successful career, inter alia, from working for Croatia's defence. But that is no reason to label him an opportunist. His impact was varied. Praga showed that Negri is due much of the credit for bringing about the relief of Klis in 1524, thereby rendering a considerable service to his country.Footnote 33 Less susceptible to analysis is the effect of the speeches that he gave, but I would place most emphasis on the cross-pollination that took place as he and others like him moved between Croatia, Hungary, Venice, Rome and the other power centres of the day. There is a strong case for arguing that men like Negri, Šimun Kožićic Benja, Giovanni Stafileo and Antun Vrančić played the central role in both creating and disseminating Croatia's profile.
This choir of Croatian voices includes that of Andrija Jamometić. His views were unusually well articulated and distinctive; more to the point, for a few months in 1482, he triggered a full-blooded crisis in European diplomacy.Footnote 34 The early years of Jamometić are very obscure, thanks to the loss of so much documentation during the Ottoman conquest. We can surmise that he was born around 1420–30 into the aristocracy – indeed, his family origins have become relatively clear, though we still have no idea of either his birthplace or his education.Footnote 35 Jamometić entered the Dominican order and left his country for a career abroad. In joining the Croatian diaspora, he resembled many of Petrovich's humanists, though it is important to stress that Jamometić showed no sign of humanistic leanings: that is one reason why he is interesting. In 1476, he was appointed titular archbishop of Granea, now on the Montenegro–Albania border. He also entered the service of Frederick III, for whom he carried out several diplomatic missions to Rome between 1478 and 1481. One of the aspects of his brief was the promotion of a crusade against the Turks, and his imperial master placed particular emphasis on the need for Sixtus IV to adopt a more pacific policy in Italy – with specific reference to Medici Florence – as the essential preliminary to a substantial crusading venture. During his last Roman mission in 1481, Jamometić overstepped the mark in his criticism of the pope and suffered imprisonment in Castel Sant’Angelo. Forgiven by Sixtus, the errant envoy was released and made his way north of the Alps.
In the spring of 1482, the Croat enjoyed his brief moment of fame. At Basel on the Feast of the Annunciation, he dramatically proclaimed a general council of the church and issued a summons to the Pope to come to Basel to defend his behaviour. It was an astonishingly rash venture, one that he apparently embarked on without any preparation. Nonetheless, for a few weeks, the extraordinary proposal appeared to gain traction. Basel's patriciate was excited by the prospect of their city again becoming the seat of a general council, Frederick III did not immediately condemn his former diplomat, and Lorenzo de’ Medici thought he saw the possibility of gaining a march on Sixtus IV, with whom he remained at odds in the wake of the Pazzi crisis. In theory at least, crusade and council alike appealed to the French. Meanwhile the pope was hemmed in at Rome by a Neapolitan army. Would this eccentric action by the titular archbishop of an obscure Balkan see bring about the fall of an anointed pope? The answer was no, because Sixtus recovered his position at Rome, Frederick intervened to stop Jamometić getting any further, and the man was arrested. In 1484 he died, most likely by his own hand, in his prison cell.
The significance for this paper of the Jamometić saga lies in the list of complaints that the Croat directed at the pope in 1482, the charges on which he proposed that Sixtus should stand trial. They were a mixture of items including simony, dynastic aggrandisement and the sponsorship of assassination (Sixtus's complicity in the Pazzi conspiracy was still fresh in people's memory). But there were also a number of charges specifically relating to the crusade. These did not all reference the Ottomans: Jamometić accused the pope of forming a covert alliance with the Mamluk sultan to forward his ambitions against the Medici and other Italian powers. But the Ottoman charges dominated. Jamometić accused the pope of neglecting the crusade by prioritising a series of unjust wars in Italy, ‘lest an expedition be undertaken against the enemies of the Christian religion, who have shed innocent blood and thanks to you continue to do so’. Sixtus had compelled (coegisti) the Venetians to make peace with the Turks in 1479. He had stirred up Germans and Hungarians to attack Venice, ‘as if the most illustrious lordship of Venice did not adhere to the Christian faith’. And he had permitted (permisisti) the Turks to invade southern Italy in 1480 in pursuit of his feud with Ferrante of Naples. In short, Sixtus was a friend of the Turks. ‘Ecce opera Sixti.’Footnote 36
The first thing that has to be said about these abrasively hostile comments is that they were more than just a cry of pain for a distressed patria. Jamometić did not single out his homeland for mention in his 1482 summons. As the archbishop of a see that had been occupied by the Turks, Jamometić had an ex officio duty to speak up on behalf of the Christians who had fallen under Ottoman rule, and as an imperial diplomat he had engaged closely with the minutiae of papal policy. The violence of his accusations could be ascribed to his insider knowledge of the duplicitous way in which Sixtus's court operated. It is possible to argue that Jamometić's Croatian origins played no role at all in his rebellion of 1482. But this seems unnecessarily cautious. During his imperial service at Rome, Jamometić had acted on several occasions on behalf of Croatian interests; in May 1480, for example, he lobbied alongside Dubrovnik's envoy for the supplying of the port in readiness for an Ottoman naval assault.Footnote 37 It is plausible that in the spring of 1482 Jamometić was not only expressing his own disappointment as a Croat, but the resentment of well-informed compatriots that behind Rome's constant assertions that it was working on their behalf, in practice the pope was pursuing aims that undermined the prospects of a crusade that would relieve their position.Footnote 38 Even the restrained Šimun Kožićic Benja of Zadar, in appealing to Pope Leo X for help in 1516, was prepared openly to question the morality of building Roman palaces instead of ransoming fellow-Christians from Turkish bondage. Benja did not mince words. The prices that had recently been charged for captured Christian children showed that for a fraction of what the pope was spending on his construction projects, all the individuals rounded up by the Turks could be redeemed. If Leo did not rearrange his priorities, Benja went on to declare, the Croats would be driven by desperation and want to join forces with the enemies of the faith.Footnote 39
So in the charges levelled against Sixtus IV by Jamometić in 1482, we witness a representative of the antemurale taking issue with the priorities and methods of Christendom's centre of authority. Such a challenge had both precedents in crusading history and echoes in Jamometić's own times. In the late thirteenth century, the defenders of the embattled crusader states had expressed their alarm that its needs were being placed second to the prosecution of the pope's goals in Italy. In the early fourteenth century, the enthusiastic lobbyist Marino Sanudo Torsello returned to the theme in the context of hopes to recover the Holy Land.Footnote 40 Just months after Jamometić launched his attempt to bring down Sixtus at Basel, the Venetian Girolamo Lando, who as titular patriarch of Constantinople bore a similar ex officio responsibility to the archbishop of Granea, confronted the pope in an analogous, though somewhat more restrained, way in conjunction with the republic of Venice.Footnote 41 And it is possible that similar charges originated with Jamometić's fellow-countryman Luca de Tolentis, bishop of Šibenik and crusade collector, whom Sixtus IV was trying to get his hands on in April 1484 because ‘he won't stop making daily complaints about us’.Footnote 42
What the complaints of Jamometić, Sanudo and Lando reveal is an ongoing and perhaps inevitable tension between warfare at home and crusade abroad, expressed as a confrontation between the agencies and spokesmen of centre and periphery (or antemurale). But the confrontation was never straightforward. King Matthias Corvinus, who faced similar criticisms of neglect and diversion to those that Jamometić directed at Sixtus, was the period's leading antemurale ruler. He had turned away from Bosnia following his early successes there, and the instigators of a rebellion that the king had to put down in 1471 included some prominent southern Hungarians and Croats. Jamometić was well aware of the equivocal character of the Hungarian king's antemurale stance. Jürgen Petersohn has surmised that Jamometić entered Habsburg service out of disappointment with Matthias's Turkish policy.Footnote 43 For his part, the emperor must have been tempted to make use of Jamometić's services by the man's first-hand acquaintance with conditions in Croatia. When Jamometić went to Rome on Frederick's behalf in 1478, he complained that Matthias was conducting an ‘open door’ policy with the Turks, allowing their raiders to ravage Austrian lands.Footnote 44 Additionally, the Croat's confrontation with Sixtus IV in 1482 went far beyond a demand that the pope adjust his priorities. Certainly, the Turks must be resisted, but Jamometić also called for a return to conciliar government, followed by root and branch reform of the church.Footnote 45 Indeed, writing to Frederick III in June 1482 defending his actions at Basel, he argued that unless the church was thoroughly reformed it was a waste of time trying to promote a crusade, as he had laboured so hard to do a few years previously at the emperor's behest.Footnote 46
Jamometić's actions in 1482 and their background form a reminder of the complex hinterland to the period's antemurale rhetoric. In public discourse, it was beyond challenge, enjoying the sort of kudos that democratic values do today. But at the same time, it was constantly subverted, most clearly by blunt political reality, but also by a potent counter-argument to the effect that a crusade against the Turks had to wait until peace had been secured within Christendom's interior. This peace entailed the subjugation of those – whether Medici Florence or Habsburg Austria – whose malevolence allegedly impeded the good work of the organising and contributing states.Footnote 47 In the past, recognition of the power interests that drove this counter-argument has often led to dismissal of the entire antemurale discourse as elaborate camouflage.Footnote 48 I think we have moved on from that polarised position. We can usefully learn from Cemal Kafadar's recent analysis of the way things worked on the Turkish side of the antemurale, albeit in a somewhat earlier period. Identities and values were no more absolute and clear-cut among the early Ottomans than they were among the Christian opponents of their successors. As Kafadar put it, ‘All this commotion had a certain cosmic significance in the minds of the actors because it was, or one could occasionally and selectively remember it to be, played out in the name of a much larger struggle between two competing transcendental visions: Islam and Christianity.’Footnote 49 Both on the Muslim and on the Christian side of the frontier identities were fluid, values and beliefs interacted with circumstances and were affected by shifts of power and movements of people, and the conversions and religious commingling that they generated.Footnote 50 Croatian identity could cross over the religious divide, as evinced by the famous attempt by Bishop Antun Vrančić in 1559 to reach accommodation with an Ottoman official called Hasan-bey ‘for the sake of our common Croatian origin’.Footnote 51 That instance, and others like it, does not negate the argument that the image of Croatia as an embattled and valiant antemurale played a significant role in sustaining Croatian national awareness during one of the most disastrous periods in the country's history. Given the political divisions of the time, it could not generate the military assistance that might have saved Croatia from collapse and division. But it did other things that are, regrettably, less susceptible of proof. Most clearly, it demonstrated Croatia's embrace of the humanist mode of debate that had become the fashionable means of communication across the entire Catholic community. More broadly, it affirmed Croatia's membership of that community, and it constituted a lasting reminder of an aspiration towards national unity.Footnote 52 Croatia was shown indubitably to belong to Europa, which in the reconfigured crusading discourse of the times was the Christian community threatened by the Ottomans. That the natural home for Croatia's freshly achieved national unity is seen as a European framework of political power is strikingly resonant of what was said and done in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and arguably owes much to it.Footnote 53
