This is a fine primer on the strategic interactions between Russia, the United States, and China, on the one hand, and the Central Asian countries themselves. The book’s title comes, of course, from the Great Game metaphor overused by commentators and even scholars who sought to make a comparison between the earlier British–Russian struggle for Central Asia and a supposed post–Cold War U.S.–Russian struggle for the same region. Alexander Cooley utilizes this metaphor as a framing device, but is careful to note that it “remains deeply blinding” to the local conditions in the region, as well as the current great power interactions (p. 5). The key differences between the Great Game and the current circumstances are made clear in the book’s introduction: The great powers are states, rather than empires, who are furthering their non–mutually exclusive interests in a non-zero-sum environment mediated by the “local rules” of the sovereign states of Central Asia. This does not mean an absence of great power rivalries, competition, and concerns over the influence of others, but rather that the situation now is far more complex.

Although Great Games, Local Rules is almost entirely concerned with Central Asia itself, its primary value is that the region serves as an excellent window onto the future of the developing multipolar international system. It is nontheoretical in the sense that it is neither theory building nor theory applying, but a convincing case is made that the lessons learned in Central Asia will provide future scholars and observers with dynamics to watch for in other regions. One could easily see research projects sparked by this work.

The first lesson Cooley illustrates is the need of the great powers to navigate and be flexible in the face of “local rules.” The sovereign states of Central Asia may be relatively weaker than their great power counterparts, but are “not passive pawns in the strategic maneuverings of the great powers, but important actors in their own right” (p. 8). National and subnational interests are shown to facilitate as well as frustrate the interests of the external, great power actors. Related to this is the “multiple principals” problem that strengthens the Central Asian rulers as they are able to play one great power off against another, as well as hedge their commitment to these relationships. This is well explained in chapters that outline the local rules of Central Asia, the consolidation of authoritarianism, the bidding war over Kyrgyzstan military bases, and the region’s endemic corruption. One can see this dynamic more broadly in the international system as smaller states appear to have more flexibility in their policies than during the Cold War or post–Cold War periods.

Second, the great powers may have different interests in particular regions and countries that allow them to pursue their goals simultaneously and without direct conflict. This does not mean that competition will not occur—far from it. However, as Cooley shows, these great power interactions are quite complex, with conflict, competition, and cooperation occurring at different times or even the same time, depending on the issue and interests in question. The possible exception to this is Russia, which appears constrained by the legacies of the Cold War and has a tendency to see American policies through a zero-sum lens. But even here, there is a mixed record. Similarly, the normally close relationship between Moscow and Beijing is sometimes hampered by Chinese energy policy, which, despite China’s claims to the contrary, undermines Russia’s standing in the region. Consequently, the relationships among the great powers may defy our expectations from previous periods and established international relations theory.

Third, the rise of non-Western international organizations is an important development in post–Cold War politics. These copy “the form, but not content” of key Western-dominated institutions, but serve the goals of local actors and the authoritarian great powers by establishing multinational bodies that consolidate local, nondemocratic norms, as well as provide alternative security arrangements and economic benefits (p. 8). Furthermore, autocratic governments are no longer dependent upon loans and economic development assistance from the International Monetary Funf and World Bank but can seek these out from governments unconcerned with their commitment to democracy, human rights, or good governance. Central Asia serves as a harbinger of the ways in which non-Western organizations and access to no-strings funding sources will shape the future global balance between democracy promotion and authoritarian resistance.

Lastly, the United States is at a disadvantage in the developing multipolar world. This is an underlying theme of the book and evident throughout, though it is underexplored by Cooley. Absent the justifications found during the Cold War struggles for the need to do whatever it takes to defeat communism, America’s rhetorical commitment to human rights, democracy, and state sovereignty undermines its soft power and the pursuit of its interests. It also furthers conflict with the autocratic great powers. In Central Asia, U.S. support for democratization, criticism of human rights abuses, and support for liberal, nongovernmental organizations has backfired as these countries have seen the United States as threatening the most important of the region’s local rules: the supremacy of regime survival. Authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China are better positioned to assert that they do not support regime change or wish to interfere in local governance—in fact, China has made this a central pillar in its foreign policy. In other regions, this same pattern is already evident.

Similarly, U.S. professions of the importance of the sovereignty of the Central Asian countries and its principled rejection of the formation of new “spheres-of-influence” is seen from the Kremlin as a threat to Russian interests. This contrasts with Beijing’s overt and continuous insistence that it respects Russia’s “privileged” role in Central Asia, which has gone a long way in soothing Moscow’s concerns vis-à-vis China (p. 166). Consequently, the rather limited American policy goals in the region are seen as inherently more threatening than China’s actual influence, despite the objective realities of China’s rising power and geographic proximity. We can already see a similar dynamic playing out in East Asia and the Middle East. Thus, in this new world order, America’s inability to play the traditional great power game of “spheres-of-influence” may provide smaller countries with more options but may lead to conflict with rising powers interested in asserting what they see as their natural dominance over “their” region.

Overall Great Games, Local Rules is a solid book that will serve as a fine foundation for those interested in the dynamics of this region among the great powers and between them and the local actors. Its attention to the local rules of Central Asia is impressive, and its nuanced view of the great powers’ interests in the region is notable. However, at times it feels more like an overview of these dynamics than a deep examination into them. In terms of the balance between the great powers and the local rules, the book too often emphasizes the latter over the former. While this is useful in its own right, the interactions between the great powers themselves (especially between Russia and China) could have been enhanced. Nonetheless, I recommend this book for those interested in the region, for it offers an illuminating perspective on the intersection between the great powers and the arena within which they operate.