Like the politics he is so much a part of, Alejandro Toledo is a flawed man. Elected president in 2001, Toledo had the potential to transform Peru. A person of unmistakable Andean features, like the majority of Peruvians, with an impeccable educational background, a successful professional trajectory, and enhanced democratic credentials gained in his fight against Alberto Fujimori, Toledo rode to power with the support of the indigenous poor and the urban middle and upper classes. After a decade of Fujimori's autocratic and corrupt rule, many hoped that Toledo would provide just the right balance of economic pragmatism, social inclusion, and democratic reform. But his five-year term was largely squandered, mired in undisciplined governing, petty corruption scandals, and lack of political initiative. The ideas were there, but they remained largely unfulfilled by a president who seemed distracted, perhaps even indifferent.

St. John does an excellent job in describing both the accomplishments and the failures of Toledo's 2001–2006 administration. The book is organized in eight chapters. The first two provide useful background on the rise and fall of Alberto Fujimori and Toledo's biography, up to his 2001 presidential victory. Chapters 3 through 5 offer the most important contribution of the book, namely an informed and detailed analysis of Toledo's domestic policies. Chapter 3 discusses the difficult task of maintaining a free-market economic orientation in the presence of strong demands to diversify the economy and reduce poverty. Chapter 4 chronicles Toledo's efforts to engage in institutional reform and shows how initiatives to reform the military, the police, the security apparatus, and the judiciary—institutions deeply damaged by the Fujimori regime—largely failed. Accusations of nepotism, cronyism, and petty corruption came to distract Toledo and undermine his political support, which ultimately affected his ability to enact reform.

Toledo was successful in implementing political decentralization. Paradoxically, this reform came to undermine his own party as well as other more established organizations as the new spaces it opened for political competition came to be occupied by local and independent movements. Chapter 5 is devoted to the analysis of social policies, where the record is again mixed. As St. John notes, in quantitative terms, the record looks good or adequate, but the quality of services such as public education and health was dismal. In terms of strengthening the safety net, the coverage grew but the monetary and non-monetary support given was insufficient to make a clear dent in poverty levels. Issues of citizen insecurity were not seriously addressed. The book turns to foreign affairs in chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 8 offers a “report card” of the Toledo administration, with a pithy conclusion: “Much went right between 2001 and 2006, and much went wrong” (p. 186). The book's epilogue has Toledo mulling over his decision to run for reelection in 2011, but the story did not end well for the former president. After months in the lead, Toledo's candidacy collapsed and he ended up in fourth place, behind not only Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori but also his own former minister of finance, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.

At this writing, Toledo is facing a formal congressional indictment for money laundering stemming from shoddy real estate acquisitions in the amount of $5 million. Despite the indictment, or perhaps because of it, Toledo has announced his intention to run for reelection in 2016. If a criticism can be made of the book, it is that it pays little attention to Toledo's dealings with his congressional party and sheds little light on Toledo's inner core of advisors, other than his influential first lady. Overall, the book provides a serious and fair assessment of a presidency that raised many hopes but disappointed as much as it pleased.