In his later years, Mao Zedong said that it was time to “seal the coffin and pass the final verdict,” stating that he had accomplished two things in his lifetime: the first was to drive Chiang Kai-shek off to a few islands, and the second was to launch the Great Cultural Revolution.Footnote 1 Both the retaking of Taiwan and the Cultural Revolution were left incomplete, however, and so these partial accomplishments became his “legacy.”Footnote 2 His words reveal a sense of deep regret.Footnote 3 This article discusses the first of these regrets, namely why Mao was unable to take Taiwan and achieve national reunification at the end of the Chinese Civil War.
In late 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) planned a military campaign to take Taiwan. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, these plans were indefinitely shelved. It is therefore widely accepted that what frustrated the CCP’s plans to “liberate” Taiwan was the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent entry of the US Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. Since the early 1990s, Chinese scholarship has underlined these two events.Footnote 4 More recent Chinese scholarship has not deviated from this, and argues that the outbreak of the Korean War led to American interference in the Taiwanese affairs and therefore the Chinese Civil War more broadly.Footnote 5 Many American scholars hold a similar view.Footnote 6 Superficially, the Korean War was, of course, an important reason for the indefinite shelving of the CCP’s plans to take Taiwan. However, this article shows that there is a deeper level worth considering, namely, the decision-making process behind the initiation of the Korean War itself. When Stalin decided to initiate hostilities in Korea, he also fundamentally altered the Soviet Union’s stance on the CCP’s plans for Taiwan. Thus, ironically, it was the very same Soviet Union that had just signed a new treaty of alliance with the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC), and not the United States, that prevented CCP from taking military action against Taiwan.
According to the recollections of Wang Li, perhaps the most important propagandist of the early Cultural Revolution, Mao once confided to him that, after the completion of the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign in June 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had committed a “historical mistake.”Footnote 7 Extrapolating from this, some researchers believe that even before the Korean War, Mao had missed the opportunity to occupy Taiwan, or “lost Jingzhou due to carelessness.”Footnote 8 Some have put forward multi-causal explanations, enumerating key factors which might have delayed the CCP’s attack, such as the detection and liquidation of the CCP intelligence network by Kuomintang (KMT) counterintelligence in May 1950. Others have gone further back in the historical record in search of decisive battles in the Chinese Civil War, such as the October 1949 Battle of Guningtou (Battle of Kinmen).Footnote 9 In any case, if Wang Li’s recollection is correct, the question still stands: Could the CCP have succeeded in planning and launching the liberation of Taiwan between the completion of the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign in June 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950? Even prior to the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign, Mao was already carefully considering the issue of Taiwan’s “liberation.” The CCP quickly found that the fundamental issue was whether or not their forces were sufficiently equipped for the complex undertaking that was cross-strait operations. In the context of the early Cold War, the CCP could only rely on the socialist camp for acquiring the needed equipment. Thus, they had to form an alliance with the Soviet Union in order to develop their own navy and air force.
As will be shown, it was precisely the Sino-Soviet alliance that ultimately prevented the CCP from taking Taiwan. This is clearly a paradox. Against the complex backdrop of the early Cold War in East Asia, and using archival and other historical documents from mainland China, Taiwan, the United States, and the former Soviet Union, this article unpacks the multiple constraints on the CCP’s plans to take Taiwan and offers an explanation for this paradox.
The Constraints on the the CCP’s attack plans for Taiwan
On the eve of the decisive battle of the Chinese Civil War in mid-1948, Chiang Kai-shek began to seriously consider the strategic importance of Taiwan.Footnote 10 After the PLA crossed the Yangtze River on June 7, Chiang instructed Chen Cheng to formulate and implement emergency defense measures for Taiwan within the month.Footnote 11 In response to growing US anxiety that Taiwan might fall into the Soviet sphere of influence, Chiang insisted that the fate of Taiwan remain a Chinese affair. He recorded in his diary on June 18, that the KMT must express its resolve to the United States to defend Taiwan to the death.Footnote 12
Prior to this, during the battle for Shanghai, on May 23, 1949, Mao Zedong instructed the Central Military Commission to order the Third Field Army to prepare to enter Fujian ahead of schedule as well as to prepare for the immediate seizure of Xiamen.Footnote 13 After the battle for Shanghai, the East China Bureau proposed that the ten corps entering Fujian first rest for a month before advancing into Fujian in early July. On June 2, with the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign at its conclusion, Mao expressed his hope that the operation could be moved up to later that month, as its success was the prerequisite for taking Taiwan.Footnote 14 On June 14, the Central Military Commission sent the earliest telegram which explicitly proposed attacking Taiwan.Footnote 15 Soon after, with the battle for the mainland drawing to a close, the CCP felt the urgent need to establish a navy and air force. On July 10, Mao wrote to Zhou Enlai, stating that, given the time required to accomplish these tasks, the plan was to seize the island the next summer, in 1950.Footnote 16
Mao was well-versed in Chinese history. In their different attempts at taking or retaking Taiwan, Ming forces under Koxinga and Qing forces under the Kangxi Emperor and Admiral Shi Lang had each made extensive preparations and waged arduous battles. There were probably three reasons why the CCP considered taking Taiwan to be a more straightforward affair than it had been in centuries past. First, Mao hoped that defections could be organized and moles activated among KMT forces on the island, a tactic the CCP had used with some success throughout the civil war.Footnote 17 Second, after the KMT’s defeat in the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign, the PLA had proceeded to cut southwards like a hot knife through butter. Mao thought this meant that, after occupying Fujian, taking Taiwan would be an easy task. Third, he expected that the Soviet Union would provide material assistance in the construction of a navy and air force, and perhaps even directly participate in an attack on Taiwan.
The CCP were soon disabused of this optimism. They were forced to postpone the operation three times in quick succession. The first postponement was a result of the liquidation of the CCP’s defector and intelligence network on Taiwan. As early as April 1946, the CCP established the Taiwan Provincial Working Committee under the jurisdiction of the East China Bureau and headed by Cai Xiaoqian, a senior Taiwanese cadre who had participated in the Long March. In early 1949, CCP intelligence instructed Wu Shi (then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ministry of National Defense with the rank of Lieutenant General) and others to withdraw to Taiwan along with the KMT army in order to carry out intelligence and defection work. On August 2, 1949, Mao Zedong telegraphed Su Yu, the commander-in-chief of the Taiwan campaign, regarding the plan to attack in summer 1950, stating that if there was a large number of defectors, the attack could be initiated even sooner.Footnote 18 However, in September 1949, the CCP Taiwan Provincial Working Committee was detected by the KMT Counterintelligence Bureau, and Cai cracked under interrogation. In February 1950, Wu Shi was arrested and executed. By May 1950, the entire Taiwan Provincial Working Committee had been liquidated.Footnote 19
A second postponement came after KMT forces repeatedly repelled the PLA Third Field Army’s attacks on Kinmen and Denbgu Island in October and November 1949. These were two painful lessons for the CCP in the complexity of amphibious operations. At Kinmen (the aforementioned Battle of Guningtou), after three days of fierce fighting, a landing force of nearly 10,000 soldiers was annihilated. This devastating loss illustrated to the CCP that they had underestimated the enemy.Footnote 20 On November 3, one division of the Seventh Corps attacked Dengbu Island. After three days and nights of fierce fighting, they were forced to withdraw.Footnote 21 In the aftermath, Mao warned Lin Biao, who was then preparing to attack Hainan Island, “Amphibious operations are completely different from all the previous operations of our army.”Footnote 22 It had proven exceedingly difficult to capture even these small coastal islands. Clearly, mastering new tactics for amphibious operations necessary for taking Taiwan would be no simple task. According to a training program issued by the East China Military Region in May 1950, from July 1950 to March 1951, the various arms of the attack force were to be trained separately. From April to May 1951, the army, navy and air force would conduct joint landing exercises. Finally, the three branches would jointly attack Taiwan.Footnote 23 No one anticipated that the Korean War would break out just a month after that training program itself was finalized.
The deciding factor, then, considering the liquidation of its intelligence and defector network and the complexity of cross-strait operations, was whether or not China could acquire large-scale assistance from the Soviet Union. There was a vast disparity in naval and air force strength between the CCP and the KMT. According to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, by October 1949, the Nationalist navy had more than 150 ships. The air force had approximately 1,000 aircraft, including 500 military aircraft.Footnote 24 At this time, the CCP had only begun to construct its navy and air force. Its fleet of 183 ships mainly consisted of craft that had mutinied, surrendered, been captured, or abandoned by the KMT. Many of these were later scuttled. By April 1950, only thirty-three of these ships were combat worthy.Footnote 25 When the PRC Air Force was established, it had only 159 aircraft, of which only 104 were flight worthy.Footnote 26 On June 23, just two days before the outbreak of the Korean War, Su Yu reported that the Nationalist navy had since received more than thirty small warships from the US military. Although the PRC navy had accumulated, by that point, eighty more ships of various sizes, only twenty-six were capable of offshore operations. Su Yu proposed the formation of three transport fleets, a 25,000-strong paratrooper force, a naval air force equipped with 230 aircraft, and an army air force with 800 aircraft. If this could not be achieved, the campaign to liberate Taiwan would “rather be delayed for some time.”Footnote 27 No matter how many ground troops the PRC could mobilize, without a strong navy and air force, she could only sigh longingly at the ocean. Only the Soviet Union could help them to establish a navy and air force in time.
However, the Soviet side scheduled deliveries of naval and air force equipment across 1950 and 1951, resulting in a third postponement.Footnote 28 On March 22, 1950, Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to Soviet Defense Minister, N. A. Bulganin, proposing to expedite the purchase of the greater part of the naval and air force equipment to 1950.Footnote 29 Even if the Soviet Union agreed to Zhou’s request, the campaign to take Taiwan would still have to be postponed. On April 13, Mao telegraphed Stalin, expressing his hope to seize the Zhoushan Islands in June, occupy Kinmen Island in August, and launch an offensive against Taiwan itself after spring 1951.Footnote 30 On June 24, 1950, the day before the outbreak of the Korean War, naval leaders reported to Zhou Enlai that in order to ensure the smooth progress of the next year’s campaign to attack Taiwan, it was still necessary to purchase an additional 137 ships and 201 aircraft by September of that year.Footnote 31 So, was Moscow actually able to provide this kind of assistance on time, and would it even agree to do so?
The Soviet Union’s initial position on the CCP’s attack plans
At the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, the Russian journal, Far Eastern Affairs, published a series of interviews by the director of the Far East Institute, S. N. Goncharov, with I. V. Kovalev. Kovalev served as the head of a contingent of Soviet experts assisting the CCP from 1949 to 1950 and was a representative of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) attached to the CCP Central Committee.Footnote 32 According to his recollection, while secretly visiting Moscow from June to August 1949, Liu Shaoqi requested Stalin “use the Soviet Air Force and submarines” to support the PRC’s attack on Taiwan. During the talks on July 11, Stalin demurred, stating that doing so “would mean a conflict between the Soviet Union and the US Air Force and Navy, providing an excuse for them to start a new world war.” It is alleged that Liu then withdrew the request on behalf of the CCP Central Committee.Footnote 33 However, Liu’s translator, Shi Zhe, protests, “This is absolutely impossible!” Shi explained, “Requesting Soviet assistance to take Taiwan was completely out of the question! This is something Kovalev fabricated out of whole cloth.”Footnote 34 Years later, Goncharov, based on subsequently released archival documents, still held that “during Liu Shaoqi’s visit to the Soviet Union, the Chinese side did indeed make the request that Stalin provide direct military assistance for the CCP’s attack on Taiwan, which was refused by Stalin.” However, it remains unclear whether Liu retracted the request regarding Taiwan at that time. At the end of 1949, Mao visited the Soviet Union and again requested Soviet assistance for the CCP’s planned attack on Taiwan. Stalin agreed to the Chinese side’s “minimum plan,” which involved Soviet Union provision of naval and air force equipment and the training of Chinese personnel, while rejecting the “maximum plan,” which denoted the deployment of Soviet “volunteer troops” to assist in an attack on Taiwan.Footnote 35
The declassification of documents from both China and Russia shows that the CCP did indeed request Soviet assistance to take Taiwan in both June and July 1949. But how and when were Mao’s “minimum” and “maximum plans” for Soviet assistance requested?
From the late stages of World War II until mid-1949, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the two Chinese parties was in flux. Stalin initially hoped to ally with the KMT through the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. He then went on to support the CCP’s occupation of Manchuria before ultimately deciding to fully support the CCP in seizing power over all China. Stalin had long harbored numerous suspicions about Mao.Footnote 36 Regardless, by the summer of 1949, Stalin had resolved to frustrate the US strategy of encircling the Soviet Union in Asia by making a geostrategic alliance with Mao’s China.Footnote 37 Considering this, what was his attitude towards the CCP’s goal of liberating Taiwan?
The CCP informed Moscow of its plan to launch an attack on Taiwan precisely when the two sides decided to form an alliance. On June 11, 1949, Mao told Stalin that the CCP planned to “resolve the Taiwan issue next year.”Footnote 38 According to private files kept by Kovalev, before Liu Shaoqi left Beijing (then still called Beiping), Mao telegraphed Stalin, requesting direct air and sea support from the Soviet Union for the landing operation on Taiwan. He received a vague response.Footnote 39 A record of Stalin’s first meeting with Liu on June 27 clarifies the matter.Footnote 40 It reveals that it was not Liu who proactively raised the Taiwan issue. During the meeting, Stalin agreed to help clear mines from the Shanghai river; to provide the CCP with forty fighter jets to help disperse Ma Bufang’s cavalry in the Northwest; and to send a squadron to Qingdao to help the CCP consolidate its coastal defenses. At the same time, he expressed that the Soviet Union was prepared to help the CCP build its own fleet and agreed to help the CCP build aircraft assembly and repair plants, adding that the Soviet Union would provide the latest fighter jets.Footnote 41 In other words, the Soviet Union could provide direct naval and air military assistance for any conflict occurring on the Chinese mainland.Footnote 42 As for any off-shore operations, while the Soviet Union would help in setting up its navy and air force, the CCP would have to go it alone. Stalin had tactfully stated the Soviet Union’s position even before any request for assistance was made. The Soviet Union would not directly assist an attack on Taiwan, but it could provide indirect assistance.
Liu Shaoqi took the hint. He did not request direct Soviet assistance for the armed attack on Taiwan in his written report to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee on July 4, 1949.Footnote 43 On July 6, hoping to hold more specific negotiations, Liu wrote to Stalin again, requesting that the Soviet Union provide naval and air force training.Footnote 44 On July 10, as part of “preparing to seize Taiwan summer (1950),” Mao proposed sending personnel to the Soviet Union for training so they could provide air cover for cross-strait operations.Footnote 45 On July 11, Stalin held talks with Liu with the participation of Soviet military leaders. Kovalev recalls, “Liu Shaoqi once again requested that the Soviet Union provide naval and air force assistance during the CCP’s attack on Taiwan and was rejected by Stalin on the spot.”Footnote 46 However, Kovalev’s recollection does not clarify whether Liu was asking for direct or indirect assistance. Liu’s report to the CCP Central Committee records that Stalin took the lead in inquiring about the construction of the CCP’s navy and air force during the talks, and that he also promised to help set up a naval school and to help the CCP to construct its coastal defenses.Footnote 47 This means that it was Stalin, not Liu, who took the initiative in discussing indirect Soviet assistance for the attack on Taiwan.
What is clear is that a request for direct assistance was eventually made, and that it was rebuffed. On July 25, 1949, Mao asked Liu to deliver a message to Stalin putting forward specific requests for indirect assistance. He asked that the Soviet Union train 1,000 pilots and 300 ground crew for the CCP within six months to one year, sell them 100–200 fighter jets and 40–80 bombers, and assist in establishing a naval fleet. With this assistance, “Taiwan can be attacked in the second half of next year.” Mao also tentatively proposed that, “perhaps we will have to ask you to send Soviet air force and naval experts and pilots to participate in military operations,” provided that could be done in a way that did not impact Soviet–US relations.Footnote 48 It was therefore Mao who first raised the request for “direct assistance.” Stalin’s reply to this request is found in the talks between the CCP and Soviet leaders on July 27. Chinese individuals who were involved recall that, during the talks, the Soviet side agreed to sell China the fighter jets and bombers as well as spare parts and heavy bombs. The Soviet side also agreed to train Chinese pilots, suggesting that aviation schools could even be set up in China itself.Footnote 49 Kovalev recalled that during this meeting, Stalin once again stated that the Soviet military would not participate in an attack on Taiwan, and that Liu, at the behest of the CCP Central Committee, subsequently withdrew the request for direct assistance.Footnote 50 Currently available documents cannot confirm the Soviet side’s account—that Liu withdrew his request—but it can confirm the account found in Chinese documents that the Soviet side had once again proactively offered indirect assistance.Footnote 51
Moscow quickly began to fulfil its promises.Footnote 52 However, the defeats in Kinmen and Dengbu discussed above made the CCP’s need for direct Soviet naval and air force assistance even more urgent. On December 16, 1949, Mao arrived in Moscow. During the talks, when Stalin raised the idea of helping China to construct a navy, saying “you provide the people, and we provide the ships,” Mao replied with another request for direct assistance. He noted that “some of our generals” hoped that the Soviet Union would send volunteer pilots or “secret troops” so as to take Taiwan as soon as possible. Stalin replied:
Assistance will not be withheld, but the form of assistance needs to be carefully considered. The main problem here is not to provide an excuse for American intervention. As for staff and instructors, we can provide them at any time.Footnote 53
Stalin’s meaning was very clear: if the Soviet Union were to provide the CCP with direct assistance, the United States would respond with direct assistance to the KMT. Therefore, the Soviet Union could assist the CCP in building its navy and air force, but they would be on their own in any attack on Taiwan.
To Moscow, the question of the “liberation” of Taiwan was an extension of the Chinese Civil War, and in principle, they had no reason to withhold assistance. This was especially the case ever since that the Soviet embassy in China had determined at the end of 1948 that Washington’s “cessation of aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime was not accidental.”Footnote 54 However, during Mao’s visit, the US government publicly announced it would not aid the KMT in defending Taiwan either. This resulted in Stalin entirely rethinking his support for the CCP’s plans to take Taiwan.
The US policy orientation towards a PRC attack on Taiwan
Until March 24, 1948, the long-term strategy of the US National Security Council (NSC) had been to promote the establishment of “an independent and unified China which is friendly to the United States and capable of becoming an effective barrier to possible Soviet aggression in the Far East.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated for providing both limited economic and military assistance to the Nationalist government, while the State Department suggested providing limited economic assistance only.Footnote 55 However, once US decision makers realized that the KMT was likely to be defeated in the civil war, the objective of US policy towards China became preventing the soon-to-be-victorious CCP from completely aligning itself with the Soviet Union. On September 7, 1948, George F. Kennan of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff drafted NSC memorandum 34. NSC-34 argued that US aid could not fundamentally change the course of the civil war, and that US policy towards China should be designed to “prevent so far as is possible China’s becoming an adjunct of Soviet politico-military power.”Footnote 56 On February 28, 1949, the State Department submitted a document to the NSC further suggesting that, in order to prevent the CCP from aligning itself with the Soviet Union, the US should avoid direct intervention in China’s internal affairs, but also that it should adopt various political and economic measures to drive a wedge between the CCP and Moscow.Footnote 57
As for Taiwan, as early as March 1949, the CIA believed that if the United States did nothing, the CCP would sooner or later take control of Taiwan. By October, it further believed that, “failing US military occupation and control,” Taiwan “probably will succumb to the Chinese Communists by the end of 1950.”Footnote 58 This recognition reanimated a debate between the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From December 1, 1948, the NSC had issued the NSC-37 series of documents on the Taiwan issue. The basic position of NSC-37 was that, in view of “Formosa’s strategic importance,” Taiwan should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the CCP. At the same time, it still held that the United States should avoid direct intervention or stationing troops on the island, as this would help the CCP to “rally support to themselves as defenders of China’s territorial integrity and handicap our efforts to exploit Chinese irredentist claims with respect to Soviet actions in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang.”Footnote 59
On December 23, 1949, after Mao arrived in Moscow, the NSC drafted NSC-48/1. Regarding the Taiwan issue, the document argues that, from a military point of view, the first line of defense for the United States in Asia included the five main islands of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines, but, crucially, not Taiwan. It argued that any opposition to the CCP’s occupation of Taiwan may be counterproductive, in that the CCP could use such opposition to rally “all the anti-foreign sentiment in China to their side.” It further pointed out that any perception of the United States as occupying Taiwan “would inevitably expose the U.S. to charges of ‘imperialism’ and seriously affect the moral position of the U.S. before the bar of world opinion, particularly in the Far East, at a time when the U.S. is seeking to expose Soviet imperialist designs on other nations.”Footnote 60 On the same day, the Department of State issued a policy information paper regarding Taiwan which declared that all statements or speculation about the island should avoid promoting the following erroneous views: that maintaining Taiwan could save the Nationalist government; that the United States has a special interest or ambition regarding Taiwan and wants to establish military bases on the island; that the loss of Taiwan would severely damage American interests; or that the United States has a responsibility or obligation to take action to save Taiwan.Footnote 61
The military thought differently. On December 27, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted NSC memorandum 37/9. It indicated that, while the United States should not militarily occupy Taiwan, providing military assistance to the anti-communist government on the island aligned with US security interests as long as such an assistance program was strictly managed, had clear objectives, and was realistic in terms of what it could achieve. Based on this, the Joint Chiefs recommended an immediate investigation of the types and scale of military assistance appropriate for Taiwan.Footnote 62 The State Department contested this, stating that the United States should approach the request from the Nationalist government for increased assistance with the utmost of caution. This was because, if Chiang Kai-shek were to fail, the consequences for “America’s prestige” and its relations with other partners in the region and around the world would be dire.Footnote 63
On December 29, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department attempted to reconcile their positions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, from a military perspective, the KMT regime in Taiwan was more stable than it had been in the past, meaning that less funding was necessary for Taiwan to sustain itself longer than the United States had originally anticipated. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs advocated for increasing military assistance to Taiwan as needed and even sending military advisors to the island. The State Department strongly opposed this, arguing that such actions would merely delay Taiwan’s fall by a year, but at the cost of diminishing America’s prestige, inciting hatred among the Chinese people, and providing the Soviet Union with an opportunity to condemn the United States in the United Nations. Moreover, they argued that, as per NSC-48/1, Taiwan held no strategic significance for US defense, meaning such costs were unjustifiable. The State Department held that “it would have to be for a very important strategic purpose that we would take an action which would substitute ourselves for the Soviets as the imperialist menace to China.” It argued that, while the CCP viewed the Soviet Union as its only ally at that time, the Soviet Union aimed to annex several provinces in northern China, a fact which would sow the seeds for an “inevitable conflict between China and the Soviet Union.” After all, Mao had seized power through his own efforts rather than with Soviet support, which was “our one important asset in China.”Footnote 64 Following the debate, President Harry S. Truman generally supported the views of the State Department. NSC-48/2 passed on December 30, determining that:
The United States should exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention.
Regarding Taiwan, although it was mentioned that efforts should continue “to deny Formosa and the Pescadores to the Chinese Communists through diplomatic and economic means,” NSC-48/2 emphasized that its “importance … does not justify overt military action.”Footnote 65 There were even rumors in Washington that the State Department had already instructed US diplomatic missions to begin preparing public opinion for an inevitable abandonment of Taiwan.Footnote 66 In summary, the focus of US policy in Asia at this moment was no longer to protect Taiwan but to prevent the consolidation of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
The changes in US policy towards China, particularly the State Department’s stance, were likely related to Mao’s prolonged stay in Moscow. Although Mao had decided to “lean to one side,” he was still somewhat resentful of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government in August 1945. After the establishment of the new Chinese government, Mao repeatedly expressed that the CCP hoped to renegotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Stalin consistently ignored him. When Mao went to Moscow, he formally made this request, but was flatly rejected by Stalin. Mao was greatly angered and decided to shut himself in, remaining in his lodging for more than a week, which led to speculation and rumors that he was under house arrest.Footnote 67 This situation naturally drew the attention of the White House. On January 4, 1950, the CIA received intelligence from a “reliable source” indicating that, with the Soviet Union having agreed to assist in the establishment of a navy and air force as well as to send personnel to participate in military planning, PLA forces would invade Taiwan in early spring of that year. However, the report also claimed that the CCP had agreed to unconditionally and permanently lease Dalian and other ports to the Soviet Union, as well as to allow Soviet troops to be stationed in Northeast China and Xinjiang. Furthermore, if attacked by foreign forces, the Soviet Union would have the right to use all Chinese airfields.Footnote 68
This provided the United States with a rare opportunity to spark a contradiction between China and the Soviet Union. The next day, Truman issued a statement at a press conference, calling on all nations to refrain from seeking spheres of influence, control, or privileges in China, claiming that the United States had no “predatory designs” towards any Chinese territory. He expressed that the United States had no intention of acquiring privileges in Taiwan or establishing military bases, nor did it intend to get involved in China’s internal affairs. He added that the US government would not provide military assistance or advice to the KMT.Footnote 69 Following this, Secretary of State Dean Acheson further clarified that Taiwan had long been a province of China, that the United States did not seek to seize the island, nor would it use its military to defend it, and that the United States did not intend to militarily intervene in Taiwan in any way.Footnote 70
This public statement was naturally made in hopes of using the Taiwan issue as means of gaining the CCP’s favor, thereby driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union and preventing the two countries from forming an alliance. However, Stalin keenly perceived this and took the lead in appeasing Mao. He had already begun to worry about Mao’s drawn out seclusion in Moscow.Footnote 71 On January 1, 1950, Mao told Roschin, who came to pay a courtesy visit, that Myanmar, India, and the United Kingdom had all recently expressed their intention to recognize the PRC, and that he was preparing to cancel all activities in the Soviet Union and return home early. However, he said that, before leaving, he wanted to discuss some “substantive issues” with Stalin.Footnote 72
The “substantive issue” to which Mao was referring was, of course, the issue of signing a new treaty. If Stalin continued to delay, and if he were to allow Mao to return home empty-handed, this could create a rift between China and the Soviet Union that could be exploited by the United States, resulting in China turning to the West. From a geostrategic perspective, this would be a defeat for the Soviet Union, and a victory for the United States. Stalin had to make concessions. Therefore, on the evening of January 2, 1950, V. M. Molotov and A. I. Mikoyan were ordered to visit Mao and listen to the Chinese side’s opinions on a new Sino-Soviet treaty. Mao made three proposals, and Molotov agreed to each without hesitation. Molotov agreed to a state visit by Zhou Enlai, to the abolishing of the old Sino-Soviet treaty, and to the creation of a new treaty. Mao was overjoyed.Footnote 73 The haze over Moscow was swept away. In keeping with Mao’s instructions, an olive branch extended by the US Consulate in Shanghai was “ignored,” and informal contact with US Ambassador Philip C. Jessup in Hong Kong was refused.Footnote 74 The Soviet Union also took some actions that pleased China, including agreeing to provide all the aviation fuel needed for the training of the PRC Air Force.Footnote 75
With Truman having publicly stated his readiness to abandon Taiwan, and Stalin having finally agreed to sign a new alliance treaty, the CCP was even more confident about launching an attack on Taiwan. On January 5, 1950, during a military meeting, Su Yu proposed that since the United States had recognized Taiwan as part of China, the United States had no reason to intervene in the final battle of the Chinese Civil War, and that it would not send troops to protect the KMT.Footnote 76
On January 11, 1950, Mao sent a telegram to Su Yu, requesting a report on the preparations for an attack on Zhoushan and Kinmen, and urging him to come to Beijing for discussions. Liu Shaoqi and Li respectively sent materials related to operations in Zhoushan, Kinmen, Hainan Island, and Taiwan to Moscow, emphasizing that naval and air force capabilities had to be strengthened as soon as possible.Footnote 77 Mao then instructed Kovalev to inform Stalin that Air Force Commander Liu Yalou would arrive in Moscow within three to five days with plans for the attack on Taiwan.Footnote 78 On January 17, the Front Committee of the Third Field Army proposed six major tasks for the year, the primary one being to “annihilate the Kuomintang army on the southeast coast and Taiwan.” On the same day, Xiao Jingguang took command of the navy, with the first task assigned to him being to coordinate with the Third Field Army in preparation for cross-strait operations and the occupation of Taiwan.Footnote 79 On February 4, Mao instructed Su Yu again to intensify the training of a paratroop unit for the purpose of a “Taiwan landing operation.”Footnote 80 On February 11, in order to enhance naval and air force training, Mao telegraphed Stalin, requesting that he deploy a group of Soviet military advisers and purchase the corresponding equipment, materials, and fuel.Footnote 81
Conversely, the KMT was greatly disappointed by the United States’ stated position of non-interference in the Chinese Civil War. Chiang Kai-shek lamented in his diary that this move “dealt me a heavy blow, and the morale of the people plummeted.” He added, “the future of the country seems even more uncertain than before, and there is no escape.” He concluded that there was nothing to do but “heed the mandate of heaven” (literally, give in to fate).Footnote 82 However, as will be seen, the way which Stalin rethought the CCP’s plans to take Taiwan represented a turn of fate for Chiang.
Changes in the Soviet Union’s position towards the CCP’s plans to attack Taiwan
With the imminent signing of the new Sino-Soviet treaty, the CCP’s chances of taking Taiwan seemed to be at their peak. At the end of May 1950, Mao approved a military expansion plan for the navy and air force submitted by Acting Chief of General Staff Nie Rongzhen.Footnote 83 As mentioned earlier, the East China Military Region issued a training outline for the final landing exercises of the army, navy, and air force. The success of this depended on the Soviet Union’s provision of naval and air force equipment, something which was now a longstanding promise. All that was left to do was to wait for the east wind to blow. However, it was precisely because of the conclusion of the new Sino-Soviet treaty that both the Soviet Union and the United States altered their geostrategic calculations such that the possibility of the CCP’s use of force to attack Taiwan was entirely cut off. So, what exactly happened during the treaty negotiations that January 1950?
In order to maintain the alliance with the CCP, Stalin made a concession to Mao in early January 1950, agreeing to a re-negotiation of the Sino-Soviet treaty. However, two major events occurring one after the other during the negotiations aroused Stalin’s ire. These were the way the CCP refuted Acheson’s speech and the Chinese proposal on the “Lüshun, Dalian, and Chinese Changchun Railway Agreement.” In order to obtain an on-paper alliance between China and the Soviet Union, Stalin had to make concessions again, tolerating Mao “going his own way” and accepting the Chinese demand to take back the Lüshun-Dalian area and the Changchun Railway. At the same time, in order to maintain and protect the Soviet Union’s strategic interests in the Far East and prevent China from approaching the United States and the West, Stalin halted the indirect assistance for the CCP’s plans to attack Taiwan, and instead suddenly gave the go ahead to Kim Il Sung for his attack on South Korea.Footnote 84
Mao’s prolonged stay in Moscow and the lack of immediate results in the Sino-Soviet negotiations presented the United States with another opportunity to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. On January 12, 1950, Acheson delivered a lengthy speech, vigorously promoting the idea that it was not the United States but Russia that had historically infringed upon China’s sovereignty and interests. The speech also mentioned, in passing, that Taiwan was not within the US Pacific defense line.Footnote 85 The speech angered Stalin. After all, the Americans were trying to undermine the relationship between China and the Soviet Union at a critical juncture! The Soviet Union had to retaliate immediately. On January 17, Stalin sent Molotov to meet with Mao, delivering Acheson’s speech and demanding that the CCP issue an official statement refuting the rumors spread by the United States. Mao suggested that the statement could be issued by Xinhua News Agency, but Molotov stressed that it would be best for the statement to be undersigned by the PRC government itself. Mao agreed to personally draft a document to be sent to Beijing for issuance by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 86
However, the document drafted by Mao was actually delivered in a speech made by Hu Qiaomu, the director of the News and Publishing Administration, to Xinhua reporters. Mao telegraphed Liu Shaoqi on January 19, 1950, ordering the document to be issued in Hu Qiaomu’s name, not the government’s.Footnote 87 On January 21, the People’s Daily printed Hu Qiaomu’s rebuttal of Acheson’s speech.Footnote 88 This deviation from his instructions enraged Stalin. According to Shi Zhe’s recollection, Stalin and Molotov personally reprimanded Mao and Zhou Enlai on January 27. Molotov complained that China’s statement did not represent the government, and that this approach did not adhere to the “agreement reached by both parties,” and that the CCP had “broken its promise.” Stalin remarked that a statement issued by a journalist “is worthless,” and that, straying from the original plan, the CCP had “left openings for the enemy.” Ominously, he added that it would “learn a lesson” from this.Footnote 89
Why did Mao insist on going on his own here?Footnote 90 It is possible that he was too proud to allow himself to be manipulated by Molotov,Footnote 91 but it is more likely that he intentionally wanted to leave room for to maneuver in terms of restoring relations with the United States.Footnote 92 Stalin believed the latter. Thus, on January 28, Stalin accepted the Chinese side’s protocol regarding Lüshun, Dalian, and the Changchun Railway, thereby removing the last obstacles to the signing of a new alliance treaty, but at the same time, he changed his position on supporting and assisting the planned attack on Taiwan. Pravda began to reprint extensively news about the United States “deciding to become the enemy of the Chinese people” and its prevention of the PLA attack on Taiwan.Footnote 93 At the same time, Molotov reminded Mao that American imperialism always “uses the spread of rumors as a smokescreen to realize its plans for aggression.”Footnote 94 His purpose was to warn the CCP not to get too close to the Americans and to no longer harbor illusions about recapturing Taiwan.
Some researchers believe that after Truman’s statement and Acheson’s speech were published, the Soviet Union “completely changed” its attitude on the matter, transitioning from refusing to help the CCP to attack Taiwan to supporting and encouraging the CCP to attack.Footnote 95 This article finds quite the opposite. As mentioned earlier, in 1949, Stalin agreed to provide indirect assistance for an attack on Taiwan by helping the CCP to establish its navy and air force. However, after February 1950, the Soviet Union halted this assistance. Zhou Enlai repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to render naval and air force orders as soon as possible. Mao even personally sent a telegram to Stalin expressing his hope that the Soviet Union would send additional air force advisors and deliver the goods within the time frame stipulated by the agreement.Footnote 96 The Soviet Union ignored these requests.Footnote 97 Until the outbreak of the Korean War, the aircraft, warships, and main equipment and materials needed by China to prepare for the Taiwan campaign went unfulfilled. The Soviet Union only sold some 119 combat aircraft at a discount when the Soviet Aviation Division, which was responsible for air defense in East China, was ordered to return from China in October 1950.Footnote 98 However, the purpose of this sale was no longer to attack Taiwan but to “Resist America and Aid Korea.” As for the other orders of aircraft, coastal artillery, and warships, until the beginning of 1951, the CCP received “too little, with most of the ships never delivered.”Footnote 99
It bears repeating that, despite having signed an alliance with the Soviet Union, the CCP still hoped to retain some room for maneuver in its relations with the United States. On June 25, 1950, a consultant and representative stationed in East Asia for the US Northwest Airlines, Liu Xingji, came to Beijing from Hong Kong and directly wrote to Mao Zedong, requesting negotiations with the PRC regarding the restoration of Shanghai’s international air travel, as well as the discussion of some north–south transportation issues. Mao instructed Zhou Enlai to handle it at his own discretion.Footnote 100 But on the same day, the Korean War broke out, severing the last thread of contact between the CCP and the United States. From the Soviet perspective, as William Stueck points out, once Chiang Kai-shek’s last stronghold in China was destroyed, “prospects of American recognition of the new regime in China would rise considerably.”Footnote 101 Of course, as long as the Soviet Union stopped providing the CCP with aircraft and warships, an attack on Taiwan would be considerably postponed. However, given the impending signing of the new Sino-Soviet treaty, Stalin was faced with the problem of finding a legitimate pretext for this. The Korean War gave him one.
The international academic community has long debated Stalin’s motives for agreeing to Kim Il Sung’s proposal to launch an attack on the South. The authors maintain that the answer is found in China’s demands during the Sino-Soviet treaty negotiations—specifically, regarding the return of Lüshun, Dalian, and the Changchun Railway. This confronted Stalin with a dilemma: refusing China’s demands would prevent the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty; accepting China’s demands would mean the Soviet Union would lose a military base and its main outlet to the Pacific. Whichever choice was made would deal a fatal blow to the Soviet Union’s strategy in Asia. How to escape this predicament? The authors infer that it was likely the following clause in the draft agreement penned by Zhou Enlai that inspired Stalin: once a war or the danger of war occurs in the Far East, “the two countries can jointly use the Lüshun naval base to facilitate joint operations against the enemy.”Footnote 102 This means that as long as tensions arose in the Far East, China would inevitably demand that Soviet troops remain at Lüshun. As for the location of military conflict, since the Soviet Union was unwilling to allow the CCP retake Taiwan for fear of enabling a Sino-American rapprochement, the only remaining option was the Korean Peninsula. Stalin therefore accepted the Chinese draft agreement regarding Lüshun and Dalian while simultaneously notifying Kim Il Sung to come to Moscow to discuss plans for an offensive in South Korea, killing two birds with one stone.
Just as the CCP was about to reclaim Lüshun, Dalian, and the Changchun Railway, and just as they were about to launch the campaign to take Taiwan, a crisis erupted in the Far East that ensured the Soviet Union could maintain its Pacific outlet and military base while also preventing the CCP from obliterating the last remaining obstacle to a US recognition of the PRC. This is where Stalin’s shrewdness lies. This article will now show how the fundamental reason for the change in the US position towards Taiwan was not the Korean War, but the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
The straw that broke the camel’s back: The Korean War
On February 14, the new Sino-Soviet treaty was signed and announced to the public.Footnote 103 The formal announcement of the Sino-Soviet alliance obviated the need for whatever remaining plans Acheson had to effect a “wedge strategy.” In April 1950, US intelligence was continuously reporting that Soviet aircraft had entered Chinese coastal airports, and that the PLA was “mobilizing a million troops” along the southeastern coast to prepare for an attack on Taiwan, writing, “in view of widespread Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists the chances for a successful defense of Taiwan by the Nationalist Government are very slight.” It further reported that China had strengthened its comprehensive support for the anti-colonial struggle in French Indochina, and that Southeast Asian countries had become “unstable” due to the instigation of communist and pro-communist forces. All these signs indicated that US interests in Asia were facing a “new and powerful challenge” initiated by the Soviet Union “utilizing the Chinese Communist Party.”Footnote 104 After the PLA occupied Hainan Island, the CIA concluded that the PRC would likely capture Taiwan by the end of 1950, which was, in its estimation, “the most likely course of future developments.”Footnote 105 It was against this backdrop that NSC-68, a document which helped to define the rest of the Cold War, was written.
The direct background of NSC-68 was the Soviet Union’s first successful nuclear test in August 1949.Footnote 106 However, when the Policy Planning Staff completed and submitted the initial draft of the document on April 7, 1950, the international situation had undergone significant changes, the most important of which was the signing of the new Sino-Soviet treaty. Therefore, NSC-68 was not restricted to the original task of formulating countermeasures to the “development of Soviet nuclear forces.” Unlike the policy of containment proposed by Kennan in the early Cold War, which advocated selectively and strategically defending American interests, NSC-68 put forward a comprehensive, indiscriminate conceptualization of containment, that is, containing threats to US security interests on a regional basis, including through political, economic, and military means, but on a global scale. The document argued that “the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for a further incursion in this troubled area” and “present more than offsetting opportunities for Communist expansion,” and that “(t)here are … ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East.” In any case, “Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia … would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.” The United States therefore had to stop Soviet expansion and assume the mantle of defender of the “free world.” Faced with the Soviet Union’s strategic expansion, the United States had to comprehensively contain it, because “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”Footnote 107
Although the document did not directly address the Taiwan issue, the new strategy proposal laid the legal and logical foundation for the United States to change its policy toward Taiwan once again. This was because it now seemed that containing China was the same as containing the Soviet Union. Preventing the CCP from liberating Taiwan had therefore become an important part of denying Soviet capacity to stage attacks from the Pacific. On January 26, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to extend the validity of the “emergency operation plan” that had been formulated to prevent Taiwan from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union in the event of war to the end of 1951.Footnote 108 After the signing of the new Sino-Soviet treaty, facing an expansionist Soviet threat and increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, East Asia received the full attention of the White House. Truman regularly met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various military departments, and the Secretary of State and military leaders also regularly went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s operations command room to participate in situation analysis and countermeasure research.Footnote 109 The strategic importance of Taiwan to US security had become paramount for decision-makers, and various opinions on protecting Taiwan emerged.
Although it had also realized the importance of defending Taiwan, the State Department still insisted on finding a legitimate basis for any US intervention there. The first to offer a suggestion was John Foster Dulles, then a newly appointed State Department consultant. In a memorandum of May 18, 1950, Dulles pointed out that because the CCP controlled China, and because China had allied with the Soviet Union, the balance of world power had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. In response, the United States had to adopt a “tough stance” that “can show our confidence and determination” to stop the continued expansion of the Soviet Union. In the Far East, given that the United States had announced a position of non-interference in the Chinese Civil War, Dulles argued that the ownership of Taiwan could be determined by the negotiation of the peace treaty with Japan, while keeping it neutral until the conclusion of the negotiations, “neither allowing it to be occupied by the Communists nor allowing it to be used as a military base against mainland China.” The specific method proposed for achieving this was to send a US naval fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait.Footnote 110 Rusk further proposed a plan to “neutralize” Taiwan in a memorandum on May 30. In order to provide Taiwan with renewed military assistance and comprehensive protection, while at the same time avoiding direct conflict with the CCP, Rusk made two proposals: first, force Chiang Kai-shek to resign, stop all air strikes against the mainland, establish a new government, and place Taiwan under United Nations trusteeship; second, encourage and support General Sun Li-jen, who holds military power in Taiwan, to launch a coup, with the new regime then accepting US aid and advice.Footnote 111
The US military did not consider the issue to be as complicated as the Department of State had made it out to be. They advocated taking decisive measures immediately, even if that meant the direct participation of the US military in the defense of Taiwan. The most active proponent of this was Douglas A. MacArthur, the commander-in-chief of the US Far East Command. In a memorandum submitted on May 29, 1950, MacArthur put forward his famous view, “In the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Formosa is no less than an unsinkable aircraft carrier or submarine to the Communists.”Footnote 112 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, attached great importance to this document and immediately submitted it to the Secretary of Defense, adding a note, “The matters discussed in this document are of great significance, and I suggest bringing them to the President’s attention.” Johnson was somewhat cautious and instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 9 to express their opinion on whether or not the United States should go all out to protect Taiwan from falling into the hands of the PRC, “even if this may require the assistance of American troops to defend the island.”Footnote 113 A few days later, on June 14, MacArthur prepared a more detailed and forceful memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. MacArthur pointed out that Taiwan is an extremely important part of the US Far Eastern defense line from the Aleutian Islands to the Philippines. If war broke out, whether the United States could hold the defense line largely depended on whether Taiwan was in the hands of a friendly or neutral regime.Footnote 114 This document was submitted to the President, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending that the United States change its policy of non-intervention in Taiwan.Footnote 115
The State Department had previously opposed sending weapons to Taiwan, but its stance had now changed. On March 7, 1950, Acheson informed the Pentagon that it was permitted to sell weapons to Taiwan, excluding medium and heavy tanks and jet aircraft.Footnote 116 On April 26, Rusk requested that the Secretary of State pay attention to the suggestions of American diplomats stationed in Hong Kong and Taiwan, all of whom were reporting that the United States should take measures to preserve the Taiwanese regime and its remaining military forces as a counterbalance to the socialist camp’s military power in Southeast Asia.Footnote 117 On May 25, the State Department and the Department of Defense held a joint meeting and decided the American government should adopt three measures. First, it would license the export of military equipment from the United States to the Nationalist government. Second, it would accelerate the supply of $125 million in military supplies under the 1948 China Aid Act. Third, it would make every effort to accelerate the delivery of the equipment needed for Taiwan’s defense.Footnote 118 In addition, on June 14, Rusk also secretly met with senior officials of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), urging them to use all remaining funds from the 1948 China Aid Act for Taiwan within ninety days.Footnote 119
As mentioned earlier, for the United States to change its policy towards Taiwan as well as protect and assist Taiwan, all while maintaining America’s “reputation” and its publicly declared stance of non-intervention in the Chinese Civil War, it was necessary to “neutralize” Taiwan. The only way the Americans could think of to achieve this was to remove Chiang Kai-shek and establish a new regime that would accept American proposals and international trusteeship. As early as May 1949, when the KMT’s defeat on the mainland was apparent, the State Department planned to support General Sun Li-jen in replacing Chiang. Subsequently, especially during the tense moments before the planned PLA attack on Taiwan, the United States considered various plans for replacing the Taiwanese regime, even Chiang’s forced exile. It was now Chiang who had to make concessions. On June 15, MacArthur received a top-secret message from Chiang through an intermediary saying he would “Accept the supreme command of the United States in all areas, and I (Chiang) hope that General MacArthur will take on this responsibility.” He further expressed a willingness to “place himself and his people under the command of General MacArthur.” Nevertheless, the State Department remained uneasy about Chiang. On June 23, Rusk spoke with former Ambassador Hu Shih at the Plaza Hotel in New York, encouraging him to initiate a movement for a free alliance and for China to replace Chiang and the KMT. Although he was rebuffed, Rusk still shared the idea of a coup with Acheson, who agreed to bring it up with Truman.Footnote 120
Two days later, the Korean War broke out. The United States decided to implement a comprehensive defense strategy across all Eurasia, beginning with the Taiwan Strait. On the evening of June 25, 1950, Truman held meeting after meeting with key members of the Cabinet and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Blair House to discuss countermeasures. The military, based on MacArthur’s advice, initially proposed the idea of “using force to protect Taiwan,” but Truman preferred the State Department’s proposal to isolate the mainland from Taiwan and to “neutralize” the island. The meeting decided that the United States would provide comprehensive assistance and support to South Korea, and that the order would be given to the US Navy and Air Force to strike North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel after the United Nations Security Council made a resolution on the afternoon of June 27. Before that, the Seventh Fleet was ordered to enter the Taiwan Strait under MacArthur’s command and to prevent an attack on Taiwan while also blocking Taiwan from attacking the mainland. To “lay the groundwork” for actions in the Taiwan Strait, the President of the United States issued a statement indicating that Taiwan’s status would be determined by the United Nations or a peace treaty with Japan, to “prove that our actions are legitimate.” Given the Soviet Union’s veto power, the President’s statement had to be made before Security Council. The question of how to deal with Chiang Kai-shek was tabled.Footnote 121
On the morning of June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait.Footnote 122 In early July, the CCP Central Committee, based on the sudden changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula, decided to establish the Northeast Border Defense Army, reassigning Su Yu as the commander and political commissar of the new army.Footnote 123 This meant that the campaign to take Taiwan had been removed from the agenda. On August 26, Zhou Enlai officially announced at the Northeast Border Defense Army Preparation Work Conference, “Postpone the liberation of Taiwan.”Footnote 124 The CCP only re-issued the slogan, “We must liberate Taiwan,” in 1954, a year after the end of the Korean War.Footnote 125
Conclusion
After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, in order to safeguard the Soviet Union’s strategic interests in the Far East and maintain its access to the Pacific Ocean and military bases, Stalin decided to give the green light to Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea. At the same time, in order to prevent a Sino-American rapprochement, Stalin also sought to keep the CCP from taking Taiwan, now that this had the tacit consent of the United States. As a result, the Soviet Union ended its indirect support for the liberation of Taiwan, pausing the delivery of all naval and air force equipment intended for that purpose. Despite this, with the consecration of the alliance between China and the Soviet Union, the United States also completely changed its own posture towards the Taiwan issue from non-interference in China’s Civil War to a policy of keeping the island from falling into the hands of the socialist camp. All that Stalin and Truman needed was a legitimate pretext for these changes in their orientation towards the Taiwan question. The outbreak of the Korean War provided them with such a pretext. Therefore, the deeper reason why the CCP did not attack Taiwan at this time was the negotiation and signature of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.
Truman’s “timely” announcement of the undetermined status of Taiwan and the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait were merely the straws that broke the camel’s back for the CCP’s attack plans. The real beneficiary was the KMT regime, then completely out of favor in Washington and teetering on the brink of collapse. The original intention of the United States was to take Taiwan from Chiang Kai-shek, but with the expansion and escalation of the Korean War, the United States had to protect Taiwan as it was, under Chiang’s rule. As John Lewis Gaddis wrote, “The Truman administration fell into the predicament it had been trying to avoid—being tied to the Chiang Kai-shek regime.”Footnote 126
It was in China and the Soviet Union’s mutual interest to form an alliance. They had common security and strategic concerns as well as shared visions of economic development. At the same time, the two countries had conflicting national interests, including the issues of Lüshun, Dalian, and the Changchun Railway. In the process of making the alliance, both sides strove to achieve their own maximalist objectives. If Stalin refused to make concessions, would the CCP really turn to the United States? This is unlikely. Nonetheless, Stalin would not risk it. In fact, this was a psychological contest between the two sides, just like the confrontation between Mao and Stalin on the issue of China’s troop deployment in the early days of the Korean War. An alliance with the Soviet Union and the liberation of Taiwan turned out to be mutually contradictory goals for the CCP. In the end, Mao had to settle for just the former.
When the Soviet Union and the United States simultaneously changed their policies toward Taiwan, the opportunity for the CCP to take Taiwan by force prior to the outbreak of the Korean War disappeared. Faced with the KMT’s naval and air superiority, if the CCP did not ally with the Soviet Union, it would be unable to attack Taiwan in the short term. If it allied with Moscow in order to obtain Soviet aid, it would inevitably cause the United States to change its position and adopt a policy of protecting Taiwan. If the United States abandoned Taiwan once and for all, the Soviet Union would become worried about the possibility of China’s departure from the socialist camp. If the United States aided Taiwan, the Soviet Union would instead be worried about a direct conflict and wider war. Under no circumstances would it support the CCP’s liberation of Taiwan. In the context of the early Cold War in East Asia, the question of launching an attack on Taiwan had become a gordian knot.
In sum, before June 1950, the Taiwan issue had already become the internationalized predicament that it would remain throughout the rest of the Cold War and into today. What prevented the CCP from liberating Taiwan was not the Korean War or the arrival of the Seventh Fleet, but the fact that the Taiwan issue had become absorbed into the scope of the Cold War. With the outbreak of the Korean War, no one any longer regarded an armed attack on Taiwan as merely an extension of China’s Civil War. As a result, the Taiwan issue has two sides: the issue of national reunification is, of course, China’s internal affair, but were military conflict to break out in the Taiwan Strait, it would become a matter of regional and international security. In 1958, a few years later, when the shelling of Kinmen triggered the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao acknowledged that, “Although the liberation of Taiwan and the coastal islands occupied by Chiang belong to our domestic affairs, they have actually become a complex and serious international struggle.”Footnote 127
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