For those seeking a historical perspective on the technocratic mentality that contributed to the post 9/11 surveillance state, Anne M. Kornhauser's provocative study of the rising twentieth century “administrative state” is required reading. Working within the period 1930–70, Kornhauser registers the reaction of liberal intellectuals concerned that the New Deal threatened fundamental democratic liberties in America. Scholars have long assayed both the right and left's reaction to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's domestic agenda, perhaps most successfully in Alan Brinkley's classic 1982 study, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression. Kornhauser's focus on liberal critics of the New Deal adds to our understanding of the uses and abuses of concentrated power within a democratic nation.
Briefly, the American administrative—or leviathan—state can be broadly defined as an organizational unit that empowers unelected experts over elected officials, that sidesteps judicial law for ad hoc rules, and that privileges the presidency (an office defined in recent decades by its access to power, public intellectuals, and expedient decision making) over a ponderous Congress. These are quintessentially “modern” concerns that extend beyond the United States, and Kornhauser correctly identifies the undemocratic undertone of statist liberalism as producing “a tentative and defensive public philosophy” (2) self-conscious of its bureaucratic authority.
In describing the historical circumstances that gave rise to the administrative state, Kornhauser emphasizes the Great Depression and the commensurate threat of fascism, both of which suggested the need for efficient executive power. Here, I believe, she could have made a stronger link between the progressives of the 1910s and the reformers of the 1930s. The former also crafted a governing philosophy that stressed a “science” of organization that pandered to the progressive faith in expertise. And if one were peering still deeper into the American past for antecedents, the old battles between Federalists and Jeffersonians, and between Whigs and Jacksonians trafficked in the language of elitism versus majoritarianism. Kornhauser did not set out to write such an expansive study, although a brief review of the American administrative state's roots would have provided a more compelling context in which to ground her work.
Debating the American State would also have been strengthened by a clearer delineation between liberal and conservative critics of the New Deal. Those leaning right shared liberal concerns for the rule of law, democratic procedures, and individual autonomy. What, therefore, distinguished “liberal anxieties,” as Kornhauser puts it, from conservative anxieties? Perhaps this is a matter of degree, although in itself it is worth exploring as a way to register the scale and intensity of opposition to the emergent administrative regime.
However, by concentrating on those liberals formerly supportive of expanding elite power, Kornhauser is able to underline the irony of their opposition. Many of these individuals had once looked upon Europe's tilt toward totalitarianism as something of a model for America. While the United States struggled to revitalize its economy, fascist and communist states appeared to be successfully experimenting with dictatorships. The virtue of authoritarianism was expediency. While the United States Congress debated and the Supreme Court deliberated, the gross national product (GNP) continued to slide. Amidst this less than stellar performance, a disenchanted public allowed Roosevelt the leeway to remake the presidency by radically extending executive power. In this sense, the making of the modern administrative state occurred, at least initially, with the consent of the governed.
Kornhauser argues persuasively that the continuation of the administrative state beyond the New Deal relied on an additional catastrophe: World War II. Early German military success made many Americans willing to forego civil liberties. Implied here was the belief that the efficiency of dictatorships would have to be matched by the quasi “dictatorship” of a democracy. Martial law in Hawaii and the internment of some 115,000 Japanese Americans were the products of such thinking. The conclusion of the war saw this philosophy applied to the war crimes tribunals that followed.
Kornhauser concludes with a discussion of a young John Rawls's effort in the 1950s to construct a viable consent-based argument predicated on social contract theory. What I found more interesting is her assertion that the failure of such theorizing played a role in the cultural upheaval of the 1960s, a decade in which many younger Americans raised critical questions about the administrative state: questions that continue to be asked in our own times by both the right (Tea Party movement) and left (Occupy Wall Street).
