1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since mankind started to sail, piracy at sea has existed, but although it dates back to the beginning of seafaring, it is not a concept which nowadays can be related only to former times in the pages on adventure novels or the stories about freebooters, buccaneers, corsairs and pirates. Contrary to popular belief, piracy still exists in different regions of the world and poses a considerable threat to maritime securityFootnote 1.
The temptation of a “business” which potentially makes the huge profits to be found in a merchant ship which has limited resources and training for their defence has led, during the last decades, to a reappearance of the problem of piracy, especially on those waters around states which have been marked with the label “weak” or “lawless”. In this sense, the existence of busy sea routes in the Gulf of Aden clearly fosters the emergence of piracy and heightens the potential profit considerably. The problem is made worse by the lack of information derived from incidents that are not reported, making it more difficult to quantify the general situation. The IMO, in a conservative estimate according to many expertsFootnote 2, considers that only one out of two incidents is officially checked.
The nature and objective of piracy in the past are very similar to piracy today. An historical analysis of the root causes of this threat reveals that the factors behind it remain the same: large sea spaces that challenge easy implementation of legal restraint, propitious geography, weak, lawless or indulgent states that provide sanctuaries, corrupt officials and political leaders who can benefit from and protect piracy, conflicts and economic disruption that open markets for stolen goods, and the ransoms paid for seafarers' lives. All these factors are present in Somalia today.
Piracy in Somalia is not a new phenomenon, it has been a growing problem for the past fifteen years, especially since the vacuum of authority after the collapse of the Siad Barre government in January 2001; but until the middle of the present decadeFootnote 3 the incidence of piracy was quite limited. In 2005, however, the incidenceFootnote 4 grew from less than five to 35. In 2006, it declined considerably to a mere 10 incidents, only to grow up again in 2007 to 31 pirate attacks. In 2008, the problem virtually exploded, going from being an irritation to a major global concern with an unprecedented rise in pirate attacksFootnote 5. Now navies from more than 20 states, mainly organized around three multinational taskforces, are patrolling Somalia's seas. So far in 2009, 163 attacks on ships have been carried out and 47 ships and their crews taken hostage. However, as well-publicized cases of pirates being released after capture have proved, legal constraints on the action of some states and confusion about the legal powers of others have been noticed. Naval or police action cannot provide any long-term solutions to piracy in Somalia. It is very difficult to deal with a law-and-order problem in a lawless country.
The loss suffered by national economies as a result of piracy is difficult to estimate. At first glance, the overall loss applicable to piracy seems small in relation to the total value of goods transported by sea. Clearly a company whose cargo is prevented from reaching its destination on time will lose money in addition to the cost of paying ransoms; so the damaging economic effect of piracy in the Somali region can be seen. The consequences are not limited only to companies whose vessels are hijacked; of wider concern is the growth of insurance premiumsFootnote 6 for ships that need to pass through the Gulf of Aden which is slowly being blocked as a viable shipping routeFootnote 7. If the cost of extra insurance becomes prohibitive, or the danger simply too great, shipping companies may avoid the Gulf of Aden and take the long route to Europe and North America around the Cape of Good HopeFootnote 8.
The effects of the pirate attacks may result in a bigger or smaller potential risk depending directly on the time used to perform their criminal act, taking into account that they carry out most of their acts on restricted or congested waters. Ships that remain unattended during and immediately after a pirate attack are more vulnerable to collisions. If the ship attacked were a VLCC sailing in the congested waters of the Gulf of AdenFootnote 9 and, as has happened through the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the ship remained unattended with the autopilot for about an hour, it could collide with another ship or run agroundFootnote 10. The serious potential consequences, derived from the fact that an oil tanker may sail with no crew on the bridge for some minutes during a pirate attack and therefore with no control, are evident. Apart from the consequences derived from the sea pollution, it could be possible that the fairway or channel in those areas would be blocked to sailing and fishing for some time. However, it is an unfortunate fact of life that many people never see the potential risks even though they are high. It has often been said that only when a serious maritime problem happens as a consequence of an act of piracy will governments assign the necessary resources to make sure that no more attacks will happen.
The inherent safety risks attendant on sailing through these restricted waters means that a VLCC oil tanker Master with a suitable disposition of lookouts and other crew men engaged with sailing responsibilities does not have available personnel to keep adequate security against a pirate attack.
From the beginning of 2008 most attacks have been taking place in the Gulf of Aden, a strategically important international waterway through which a third of the world's crude oil is carried. Over 23,000 vessels pass through this area each year, which in total represents approximately 7% of the world's maritime transport.
2. THE PIRATES' MODUS OPERANDI IN SOMALIA
From the analysis of many recognized cases of acts of piracy, we can examine the pirates' modus operandi in Somalia to hijack passing vessels and then demand ransoms for the vessels and the kidnapped crews.
Pirates operate by using small low-tech skiffs of twenty to sixty feet, made of wood or fibreglass with dual powerful outboard engines of up to 80 HP. A typical team would be 10 to 15 armed pirates in three skiffs fitted out with grappling hooks, aluminium ladders, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), automatic AK-47 assault rifles, knives, satellite phones and GPS. These boats are fast and manoeuvrable, but they lack the necessary range to attack the more lucrative targets. To overcome this constraint, pirates regularly make use of ‘mother ships’ from where the skiffs are launched in order to increase their range from the coast. These are generally fishing trawlers and smaller fishing boats that the pirates have previously captured near the shore and which are then used as a means of transport for attacks on the high seas. Pirates often hide among genuine fishing boats around fishing grounds and suddenly pursue passing ships. Use is generally made of deceptive tactics such as false GMDSS DSC distress alerts, distress calls on VHF channel 16 posing as fishermen, or carrying out dummy attacks to divert warships from the area of a real attack. The use of mother ships helps to explain how pirates have managed to increase their range so dramatically. Initial warnings to merchant vessels to stay at least 50 nautical miles away from the coast, later increased to at least 200 nautical miles, have now been replaced by warnings to stay at least 600 nautical miles off the coast of SomaliaFootnote 11. According to available reports, it is thought that the time taken from when the pirates are first seen to the moment a vessel is boarded is some fifteen to twenty minutes; if a naval ship cannot arrive on scene within this time, it will likely arrive too late to prevent the ship's hijacking. Such a short period of time helps to explain why even with international patrols in the area, ships are still captured. Little can be done to prevent pirates from overwhelming the ship once they are aboard without putting the vessel and the lives of the crew at risk. So in order to prevent an attack, a naval vessel would need to be close and have helicopters on immediate standby to be able to make a fast response to reach the scene of an attack; if such facilities are not available many more attacks could be successfulFootnote 12. Most attacks happen between 2200 and 0600 local time, particularly at dawn and at dusk when pirates take advantage of night to succeed in their attacks; this complicates a ship's self-defence and the ability of warships patrolling the area to respond effectively to reported attacks.
Vessels come under fire and are compelled to slow their speed while pirates climb aboard, take command of the ship and sail to an anchorage off a friendly coastal town. These anchorages are mainly in the northeast of Somalia in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and near towns along the eastern Somali coastline such as Haradheere, Garacad, Hobyo and especially Eyl. Guards are put aboard and ransomsFootnote 13 are then negotiated with the shipowner and their insurance company while crews and cargo are held for a long time. Unlike in other parts of the world where such attacks take place, and where it might be likely to kill or seriously wound merchant ship crewmembers, attacks carried out by Somali pirates rarely show a willingness to harm their hostages gratuitously in the course of their raids, since extracting ransom payments is their objective.
3. FACTORS BEHIND THE ACTS OF PIRACY IN SOMALIA
Where piracy is concerned, regional growth trends are always directly related to economic crises and inadequate legal security systems. Somalia is a recent example with a well-earned reputation as a failed state. When the Siad Barre regime was overthrown in the early 1990sFootnote 14 by the clan-based warlords, the state lost control of its own coastal waters, and the sporadic first phase of Somali piracy began. Trawlers from other countries were able to fish in Somali waters unhindered, jeopardising the livelihood of local fishermen and leading to violent disputesFootnote 15 that emerged as the country has lost its ability to patrol its waters. Local fishermen were more or less defenceless against the large foreign trawlers and increasingly turned to piracy to safeguard their own survivalFootnote 16.
The most important cause is surely the extreme economic and social hardships suffered by the general population since the Ethiopian invasion in December 2006 (the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces was in January 2009), leaving most of them with no sources of income other than crime and creating a need to turn to piracy. Beginning as a law enforcement effort (starting by levying taxes and fines forcibly on fishing ships that pirates managed to board), the Somali piracy developed into a lucrative business for individuals and groups that attacked not only foreign fishing ships but also commercial vessels. So whatever the initial cause may have been it is clear that pirates are now motivated by the prospect of getting large sums of money by hijackings.
The rate of piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa has increased since 2005. This battle still continues, together with the power struggle between the warlords, which has now been extended to the sea. Warlords are using the power gap in Somalia for their own private attacks on ships, above all with the intention of demanding ransoms. Piracy has been a problem in Somali waters for at least fifteen years. However, the number of attempted attacks has risen over the last three years. The only period when piracy virtually vanished around Somalia was during the six months of rule by the Islamic Courts Union in the second half of 2006, which dealt with the problem effectively. That fact indicates that a functioning government in Somalia is capable of controlling piracyFootnote 17.
In 2007 a lot of piracy was focused on Eastern Somalia and Mogadishu port where, according to the UN monitoring group, port officials helped facilitate several attacks. The international community began to provide escort-protection for World Food Programme (WFP) related shipping to Somalia in November 2007, and this has provided a piracy deterrent factor along the Eastern coast of Somalia. In 2008 the most noticeable change was the shift in the main area of activity and most of the attacks took place in the Gulf of Aden which offers better hauls than Mogadishu. The consequence is that one of the most important trade routes in the world is now threatened by the chronic instability in Somalia. This shift in the pirates' operational area changes the focus in that attacks off the eastern coast of Somalia mainly affect the Somali population by hampering humanitarian aid, whereas attacks in the Gulf of Aden affect international shipping linking the Middle East and East Asia with Europe. As previously noted, the Gulf of Aden is a major shipping route with around 23,000 ships passing through each year carrying oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America.
The identity of the Somali pirates, their social structures, motives, etc. is not generally known. Their number is also unknown, but it has been increasing since the middle of the present decadeFootnote 18. Primarily they come from the Puntland region of Somalia and being reportedly fishermen and former militia members of the Somali warlords, there does not seem to be a unified organization with a clear command structure. Several of the pirate groups argue that fishermen have become pirates because their way of life has been destroyed by the illegal fishing and toxic waste dumpingFootnote 19 that has been ignored by foreign governments. They see, or have at least depicted, themselves as protectors, either of their local communities or of the local marine environment, adopting names such as “National Volunteer Coastguard”, “The Guards of Somali Marine Resources”, “Central Regional Coast Guard” or “Somali Coast Guard” to suggest that they are involved in a more legal occupation than piracy. They claim that they were forced to organize themselves to defend their sea waters after foreign nations started to fish illegally in Somali territorial waters; and consequently, that they are acting in a maritime security capacity or as an alternative livelihood. Pirates have the tendency to characterize their actions as an alternative livelihood or as a retribution for illegal international activities in Somali waters. They believe that they have every right and entitlement to attack illegal fishing vessels operating in their territorial waters as their fishing resources are being pillaged daily by international fishing vessels from Asia and Europe. Even though it seems they have kept at least most of the proceeds for their own benefit and this justification may disguise the opportunistic piracy of some, pirates have maintained that they are distributing the “tax” demanded for foreign vessels in the form of ransom in return for fishing rights more evenly. But what began as mere “maritime muggings” serving as the pirates' initial encouragement to their attacks, has evolved into multifaceted international organized crime (the pirates often allocate a portion of the ransom to their backers), which shows significant progress in the organization of Somali piracy. This fact reveals that nowadays we are no longer dealing with a group of impoverished Somali people; the highly significant degree of organization has infused the piracy network with an adaptive capacity which lets us state that after the sporadic first phase of Somali piracy in the early 1990s, which immediately followed the overthrow of Barre's regime by clan-based warlords, piracy has now entered an advanced phase.
Pirate attacks initially focused on attacking ships along the eastern coast of Somalia putting the humanitarian aid coming from the World Food ProgrammeFootnote 20 at risk, but declining significantly when France (followed consecutively by Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, NATO Operation Allied Provider, and recently by the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta) began to provide escort-protection for sailing to WFP shipping to Somalia in November 2007. This may be the main reason why Somali pirates shifted their focus to the Gulf of Aden, where there is a high concentration of merchant ships in a constrained waterway providing better hunting areas, together with the fact that, in order to reduce the likelihood of an attack and under the instructions from the IMO, ships not bound for the Horn of Africa destinations have been navigating further and further from the coast shifting out to seaFootnote 21.
Now that international naval forces are patrolling the Gulf of Aden with some effectiveness (the number of successful hijackings has dropped even though the number of attempted attacks has not decreased), Somali pirates have shifted some of their focus back to the Indian Ocean, and are able to operate hundreds of nautical miles from the Somali coastline, often with the help and support of mother ships and their modus operandi that allows attacks on vessels such as large oil, container and fishing vessels.
The lessons learned from the negotiation of the bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the Straits of Malacca region highlighted several issues that could give a valuable input to parties seeking to establish similar programs in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia's coast, namely the importance of addressing local concerns over sovereignty, territorial water rights, and the presence of foreign military forces in regional watersFootnote 22, but as Somalia is a failed state, the regional countries are weak and their naval capabilities insufficient, the problem of piracy is much more difficult to solve.
Finally, owing to their distinctive modus operandi, the model of Somali pirates seems to be different to other regions such as the Straits of Malacca or Nigeria where ships are boarded either to take the vessel or its contents. This Somali piracy can be viewed as a form of maritime kidnapping because its only characteristic has been taking the target vessel's crew hostage in return for ransom payments. This is possible because the pirates have sanctuaries on land in Somalia and in its territorial waters where they can commit pirate attacks and conduct ransom negotiations, something which is less likely in other parts of the world. As a consequence, maritime security forces are challenged by use of the traditional engagement strategies and tactics.
4. HOW THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN TACKLED IN SOMALIA
4.1. Introduction
Contemporary piracy was not an urgent problem until the mid-1980s. Therefore, the definition of piracy, according to the agreements internationally accepted, has not recognised the scene existing in Somalia as they exclude the concept of attacks not taking place on the high seas and those sponsored or politically induced by a nation; these are not considered pirate attacksFootnote 23.
The lack of legal uniformity about a wider international concept of piracy is a problem that to a large extent negatively affects the measures tending to eradicate itFootnote 24. The study of the international law about piracy surpasses the content of this paper. Suffice to mention that an act of piracy, such as is proposed here following the definition adopted by the International Maritime BureauFootnote 25 (IMB) for statistical purposes (“an act of boarding or trying to board any ship with the intention of committing a robbery or any other criminal act and with the intention or aptitude to resort to force for such act”), can happen when a ship is docked at port, anchored or sailing, being in this last case in territorial seas of a nation or on the high seas.
The lack of resources of some coastal countries to fight piracy at sea has already been stated and this situation is understandable and acceptable; but what really exists until now and is unacceptable is the lack of any coordinated response on land. Pirates act on the seas with the only purpose to commit their illegal acts; but it is clear that they must land at the end of the day to dispose of their hauls and it is here where they are vulnerable. Up to now, the rules oriented to fight piracy and enacted by different countries are not dissuasive enough; firstly, they seem not to affect the local people they legislate for, and then it is a problem that does not affect them.
According to most experts the best deterrent factor against piracy in the Somali-Horn of Africa region would be a long-term government. However, there is a view that there is little prospect of an effective national government of SomaliaFootnote 26 in the foreseeable future capable of establishing the necessary policing methods to control and remove pirates from the country. In this section, we will make a general reference to the measures that the international community and private actors are now taking or proposing regarding piracy in this area of major concern.
4.2. The International Response
The international community has made several attempts to deal with the threat of piracy around Somalia and has responded by deploying warships to the Gulf of Aden and by providing protection for WFP vessels:
▪ Somalia has been continuously on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and during 2008 it adopted three resolutions on piracy in the Horn of Africa authorizing third party governments to conduct anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters and on land, but only with authorization from and in coordination with the TFGFootnote 27.
▪ Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), in operation since January 2009, was established by the Coalition of Maritime Forces with the sole mission of conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean; a role that had previously been carried out by CTF-150Footnote 28, which continues performing counterterrorism and other maritime security operations as it has done since 2001–2002. In August 2008, CTF-150 and partner forces agreed to the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) through a narrow corridor within the Gulf of Aden aimed at deterring attack and hijacking of ships seeking safe passage through the zone, serving as a dedicated, more secure transit zone for merchant vessels with the goal of lowering the success rate of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden transit zone.
▪ Other countries, outstandingly Russia, China and India have deployed naval forces to conduct anti-piracy operations in the regionFootnote 29. These units operate under their own command but they coordinate with other naval forces.
▪ In March 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed a Standing NATO Maritime Group force named “Operation Allied Protector”, to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa with the objective of “deterring, defending against and disrupting pirate activities” as they sail the regionFootnote 30.
▪ The European Union NAVFOR named “Operation ATALANTA”, its first naval operation task group deployedFootnote 31 under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy in operation since December 2008. According to the European Union Council Secretariat, it has the task of providing protection for WFP vessels and merchant vessels (a role had previously been carried out by CTF-150 and the NATO force “Operation Allied Provider” which was serving as a temporary protection force for WFP assistance shipments in the region), and it is authorized “to employ the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present”. To assist merchant traffic in the area around the Horn of Africa with the aim of providing the best possible support for merchant shipping, EU NAVFOR has also established an online centre known as Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) to record their ships' movements voluntarily and to receive updated threat information, detailing recent trends in pirate attacks and making recommendations to vessels transiting regional watersFootnote 32.
▪ The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden that was adopted in January 2009 among representatives of 17 regional governments in an IMO-sponsored meeting in Djibouti (the nine countries in the region have already signed it). There are three regional facilities which support the information shared by the partners of the agreementFootnote 33.
With CTF-151, EU Operation ATALANTA and NATO Operation Allied Protector, almost 50 warships are currently patrolling in the region.
4.3. Improving Security of Merchant Ships
Given the apparent failure of the littoral states (outstandingly Somalia) to guarantee security in this important international waterway, some shipping companiesFootnote 34 have increasingly been looking elsewhere for ways to enhance their security by taking measures to increase the self defence of their ships. Ships' crews have developed standardized countermeasuresFootnote 35 and better practices in their attempts to avoid and resist pirate attacks. The use of water cannons and fire hoses has increased even though this practice exposes the operating crewman to hostile fire and is considered to be dangerous. The industry has also introduced a certain number of sophisticated technical solutions in recent years such as SHIPLOCFootnote 36, SECURE-SHIPFootnote 37, the identity cardFootnote 38 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the alarm system demanded by the ISPS CodeFootnote 39, and the Long Range Acoustic DeviceFootnote 40 (LRAD) noise generator system, all of which are now achieving more relevance.
The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is discouraged by IMO and the IMB and it is not authorised by some coastal states because it may increase a dangerous situation onboard. Many merchant ship owners and operators and other maritime organisations as INTERTANKOFootnote 41 are also averse to arming merchant ships, for practical and financial reasons. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board is great. Furthermore, answering with light arms to the pirates armed with heavier weapons such as RPGs may not be effective due to insufficient firepower even if properly used by the crew. In some jurisdictions, killing a national person may have unforeseen consequences even for people who believe that they have acted in self-defence. Since merchant ship crews are not often trained in the use of weapons, they might not be able to use them very effectively in a fight against pirates and the level of violence associated with piracy off Somalia could raise and increase risks to all seafarers sailing in that region. If ship crews try to defend themselves with firearms and fail, the pirates are more likely kill some crew members.
Another way of arming a merchant ship is hiring armed security teams, provided by Private Security Companies (PSCs) (mostly British-based ones, although US firms are also getting in on the action) to ride on the ships. Despite the fact that armed security teams merely act as a deterrent to potential attackers, they have provoked a strong response from some littoral states. One problem with the rising numbers of PSCs providing their services in the region's waterways is that they are currently unregulated. While there is some effort among the better-established companies to self-regulate, this is only in its early stages. It is this lack of regulation which gives rise to uncertainty, given that there is no definition of their status in international law and it is not clear how the law of self defence should be applied in a hijacking scenario, i.e. any use of arms must be governed by clear rules of engagement and this is not always the case. Additionally a question arises regarding who authorises the use of force onboard and the control about the final decision makingFootnote 42. It is for these reasons that it seems necessary that international law clarifies the status of PSCs and the role of armed security teams to defend ships with clear rules of engagement in order to give legal support to their tasks onboard.
In this case, the IMO and the IMB also maintain their policy of not advocating the use of weapons onboard because they estimate that gun battles with pirates may increase risks and will only escalate the potential for violence. Nevertheless, starting from the evident fact that due to the large patrol areaFootnote 43 there are insufficient naval ships deployed in the zone to patrol it effectively, most regional states concerned with piracy at sea are in favour of this security measure, which is also encouraged by the US Navy. Thus voices have also been raised from military commandersFootnote 44 that suggest the convenience to call for armed security teams onboard ships. Some recommend hiring private armed security escortsFootnote 45 (in fact, the US PSC firm Blackwater Footnote 46 has just provided the services of a security escort ship carrying helicopters and armed guards to commercial ships sailing in the Gulf of Aden), and this is generating intense debate against putting this recommendation in practice, basing on the facts that, on the one hand there can be a breach of international lawFootnote 47 and on the other, the possibility that the armed intervention of these ships may be considered piracy in itself. Financial concerns may also discourage against arming merchant ships because hiring armed security teams might be more expensive than paying occasional ransoms. Owing to these additional costs, some companies could be pushed out of business given that the shipping industry is operating now on a thin margin in the global economic downturn, even though a discount in the insurance premium on the risk areas could be possible if the owner contracts an armed security team with a PSCFootnote 48.
Liability for fatal shootings aboard can be a complex legal matter that may lead to expensive lawsuits. Since many ports restrict vessels from having weapons onboard, commercial ships that often make calls at multiple ports along their operating routes could find it difficult to operate along certain routes. The permission to have armed personnel on ships depends on whether they are in national or international waters, although rules and regulations on this subject may vary in each country so ships have to obey the laws of the transiting country as well as the ones of the ship's flag state. Moreover, due to the novelty of PSCs protecting vessels many countries do not yet have effective laws.
Tuna trawler ships fishing on the high seas between Somalia and the Seychelles archipelago are now defenceless against pirate attacks, especially when they have nets deployed; thus, being easy targets, their flag states are taking measures to prevent Somali pirates. The approach followed to tackle this particular problem adopts different measures depending on their national law; for example, France put Marines aboard their fishing vessels to protect them, but Spanish law does not allow the military force to be used for protecting private property although recently their Defence Ministry has given permission to hire private security guards, armed with heavy weapons such as high powered rifles.
4.4. Convoys
There have also been proposals to convoy ships passing through the Gulf of Aden as more and more warships patrol the region, but it seems difficult to accomplish. Certainly, convoys escorted by warships is an option, although merchant ship operators may be reluctant to use them because it may require their ships to wait in a certain location for the next scheduled convoy, which can imply additional financial costs on ship owners. Furthermore, taking into account that one recommended countermeasure against piracy is the use of high speed to avoid being targeted by pirates, ships with higher speed capability will need to slow down to adapt to slower ones; an option that seems not to be the best for them. Additionally, a security tactic may be adapted by the pirates to attack different parts of a convoy at the same time to break or to separate weaker, slower or less manoeuvrable vessels from the formationFootnote 49.
5. Maritime Security Patrol Areas
As seen previously, in August 2008, CTF 150 established a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden to serve as a dedicated, more secure transit zone for merchant vessels and EU NAVFOR has also established an online centre known as Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA). Certainly, following a standard route should make it easier for international forces in the area to monitor shipping and respond to distress calls, but the naval units are probably not sufficient at this moment and therefore a standard route could potentially offer an easier target for pirates with shorter transit distances between targets. Another risk is that pirates change their modus operandi from ransoms to for example the use of phantom ships Footnote 50. These problems could arise if there is insufficient international presence.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Pirate attacks seem to be most prevalent in countries with emerging economies, large stretches of remote coastal areas, and ongoing political insurgencies. This is the case in Somalia where piracy is directly tied to the failure of the Somali state. Endeavours to fight and punish piracy as a crime are frequently fruitless in areas where there are legal vacuums and lack of political stability. Only by confronting the root causes, including state instability, country poverty, the fight against illegal fishing and the unsettling of pirate sanctuaries may offer a way to stop piracy in Somalia; however, naval presence may reduce the severity of the problem.
From the analysis of the Somalia pirates' modus operandi we can infer the consequence that since the 1980s, more sophisticated forms of piracy have been developed. Increasingly, from 2005, piracy in the Somalia-Horn of Africa region has become very serious where ships have been hijacked and ransoms demanded for the return of the vessel and kidnapped crew. As international responses to protect shipping were successful in one area and the risks outweighed the rewards, the Somali pirates adapted their tactics accordingly and continued to ply their illegal trade. Thus, when warships acted as a deterrent factor by escorting ships carrying humanitarian aid to Mogadishu in 2007, pirates moved their operations to the Gulf of Aden. Later, as effective international efforts grew to protect shipping around this area, some pirates have shifted their operations to the high seas of the western Indian Ocean to avoid the international warships.
Taking into account that there are incidents where there has been a serious risk of provoking a human and environmental catastrophe, particularly when as a consequence of an attack the ship has been kept unattended on the bridge for a considerable time while sailing in restricted, busy waters, it has becomes necessary for the marine industry to change its traditional reactive attitude. There is a need to give priority to preventative measures to eradicate piracy. The smaller crew numbers found aboard most ships (approx 15–20 compared to 40–45 in former times) also favour pirate attacks by making an anti-piracy guard service difficult. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or confined waters may also have the additional task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance with the consequent prolonged training. Companies should ensure that security watches are enhanced if their ship is in waters or ports where there is a high prevalence of attacks.
The international community has sent several warships to the Somalia area. According to the last IMB report this action, combined with ships’ Masters adhering to recommended advice and carrying out robust anti-piracy precautionary measures, is resulting in a drop of the number of successful hijackings in the Gulf of Aden, even though the number of attempted attacks has not decreased. This reason drives the hiring of armed security teams to protect ships and their crews in these pirate-infested waters. Such action seems a feasible option for the owners although there are concerns about the role of PSCs from both legal and transparency viewpoints that require clarification.
In summary, while those measures have had some successes, they are substantially directed to treating one of the factors, piracy (depicted by many authors as one symptom and a product of the instability in the country) rather than against the root cause of the instability (the absence of an effective government). So, independent of any other anti-piracy measures which could help, the most effective deterrent initiative against piracy would be to intensify efforts to achieve a political solution inside Somalia to bring about peace, stability and law enforcement. Otherwise pirates will be likely to continue to find sanctuary in Somalia and have too many incentives without enough deterrence to carry out attacks. In short, as history has taught us from time immemorial, the battle against piracy will be won only by determined action on land. Pirates have always needed access to sanctuary on land (they need to have access to a market in order to transfer the value and a secure place where they can conduct the negotiations without interruption) because, as historians recognize, piracy is a land-based crime which is evident at sea; so the decisive factor is what happens on land.
