Transatlantic historiography commonly gets enacted one way, whether tracing the transplanting of peoples or recording the migration of ideas. Occasionally scholars can discern exchanges and reciprocity, as intellectuals learn from one another, or as institutions seek to emulate what is admired across the ocean. The Weimar Century offers something special, a kind of triangulation: five German thinkers who reached maturity after the First World War find refuge in the United States, and then manage to project their political views back after the Second World War, mainly in the land of their birth. One was a Protestant (Carl J. Friedrich); one was a Catholic (Waldemar Gurian); and the other three were Jews (Ernst Fraenkel, Karl Loewenstein and Hans J. Morgenthau). In their homeland the Third Reich had aborted their hopes for a viable democracy. But America gave this quintet a chance to promote free institutions during the postwar occupation. It facilitated the exiles’ influence, even as the pressures of the incipient Cold War accelerated the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Atlantic alliance. Udi Greenberg's meaty book makes this triangulation quite fascinating, and thus adds further luster to the vibrant field of German intellectual history. The haven that the United States provided for these five scholars is nevertheless crucial to his story. The American fulcrum reduced the likelihood that Bonn would repeat the tragic fragility of Weimar.
The author nevertheless finds problematic the top-down tendency common to the political thought that he examines. His five subjects were, after all, mandarins. Yet Greenberg does not account for their justifiable fear of the masses during the interwar period, nor does he acknowledge that such elitism enjoys a respectable lineage – starting with Jefferson and Adams. Greenberg also criticizes at least four of his protagonists for a hostility to Communism that he deems excessive. His book is peppered with adjectives modifying “anti-Communism” such as “fierce” (59), “virulent” (95), “extreme” (122) and – inevitably – “paranoid” (167).
Yet only very rarely does The Weimar Century quote the actual language that would warrant the application of such adjectives. This failure is especially egregious when considering an important work like Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956), which Friedrich co-authored. In the first decade or so of the Cold War, when another world war was hardly unimaginable, and when Stalinism had installed itself in the heartland of Europe, the struggle to secure democratic institutions should not in retrospect be so easily disparaged. Of course not every effort to neutralize Soviet influence can be defended. For example, the West German judiciary banned the Communist Party in 1956, when it had no prospect whatsoever of gaining power peacefully. Thus Loewenstein's invocation of “militant democracy,” which entailed intolerance for groups who professed intolerance of the rules of representative government, was certainly misapplied (though the policy might have been worth trying three decades earlier against the Nazis). The notion of “militant democracy” also helped rationalize the round-up of suspected Axis saboteurs in Latin America during the Second World War, though Greenberg concedes that assorted caudillos hardly needed Loewenstein to fortify their impulse to violate elemental rights.
The profile of Morgenthau is something of an anomaly. Unlike the other four figures, he had little to do with postwar Germany. He did not return to live there (unlike Fraenkel, a socialist attorney). Nor did the University of Chicago political scientist devote himself to the revitalization of education and law there (unlike Friedrich, Gurian and Loewenstein). Though the origins of Morgenthau's fabled “realism” could indeed be traced to his studies and writings in the 1920s, The Weimar Century oddly enough neglects to mention Friedrich Meinecke's Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte, which was published in 1924. The line from Meinecke would have been easy to draw to Morgenthau's mantra that international affairs constitute the site of power and interests. That is why he refused to see the Cold War primarily in ideological terms (unlike Hannah Arendt, for example). As early as 1955, Greenberg reports, Morgenthau returned from a trip to South Vietnam to dismiss any claims that it had strategic value; and, from then on, he consistently opposed American military intervention in Indochina.
Such conspicuous dissent from so obsessive an ingredient of American statecraft distinguished him from the other émigrés. But The Weimar Century breaks off too soon. During the 1968 presidential campaign, for instance, Morgenthau advanced a case for favoring Richard Nixon, even though the Democrats’ Hubert Humphrey shared with Morgenthau a history in the liberal group Americans for Democratic Action. But he argued that the Republican nominee would peel away votes from George C. Wallace, who threatened to become “the American Hitler.” In a striking essay that was reprinted in Truth and Power (1970), Morgenthau discerned in the GOP a willingness to compete for “the potential fascist vote” (205), and thus the refugee intellectual surely intended to evoke the specter of Weimar.
