Philosophically speaking, it seems as though the concept of experience is either loved and revered or loathed and despised. In Marianne Janack’s book, pragmatists, e.g., William James and John Dewey, as well as feminist theorists, e.g., Joan Scott, Donna Haraway, and Lorraine Code, represent those with warm sentiments toward experience. Anti-foundationalists, e.g., Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, and W. V. Quine, represent those with cold sentiments toward it. No matter how one may feel about experience, each side has both merits and shortcomings. In this text, Janack discusses both sides of the debate. Janack begins with an historical overview of the various meanings of experience. The book is divided up into two main parts, which are then followed by her account of experience. In part one, the “we” in her book, What We Mean By Experience, refers to philosophers of science and epistemologists who think that experience means either discourse or stimuli. Here, Janack addresses the anti-foundationalists’ disembodied, passive, and mechanistic view about experience. In part two, the “we” primarily refers to feminist theorists and epistemologists who think that the meaning of experience is somehow tied to identities (e.g., culturally, epistemologically, and categorically). Here the view about experience discussed is one that sees it as an embodied, active, organism. Moreover, the vocabulary of action and responsibility, and the concepts of linguistic performance and agency play an important part in our understanding of experience.
Finally, Janack’s account brings what is right about these two seemingly disparate strains of thought together to form a single, unified concept of experience. For Janack, experience means “the intertwining of the natural and the cultural, the biological and the discursive” (175). The natural and cultural unite on the feminist and pragmatist side. Analyses of how “history, economics, identity categories, and gender race hierarchies influence the organism-environment dyad” supplement this intertwining (175). The biological and discursive unite on the anti-foundationalist side. Reducing experience to stimuli recognizes that we are bodies connected to the world. Reducing experience to discourse pays homage to the ways we find the world meaningful. It recognizes how that meaning intertwines with social systems and grounds our connections with others (175). Experience means understanding ourselves “as organisms and agents with things to do, with goals and strivings, including the goal of understanding ourselves and our place in the world” (175).
While I find the whole book philosophically worthy, I particularly like her critique of anti-foundationalism. I think it is spot on and want to focus on that.
In chapter one, Janack explains how, over the course of the twentieth-century, the ascendancy of the linguistic turn and anti-foundationalism led to the demise of experience as a concept. As two types of anti-foundationalists emerged, she explains how the concept “experience” was bifurcated into “discourse” and “stimuli.”
Anti-foundationalists who favoured talk of discourse “were less concerned with problems of realism and objectivity” (21). The anti-foundationalism of Rorty eliminated experience altogether in favour of discourse. Experience just meant discourse. Anti-foundationalists who favoured talk of stimuli were happy “to treat experience as a purely psychological event” (21). For example, the anti-foundationalism of Quine reduced experience to stimuli. Experience just meant “the stimulus inputs to our sensory faculties” (16). The goal of this shift in understanding experience was to close the gap between theory and the world that resulted from displacing experience from the epistemological realm (21).
Chapter one ends by highlighting the problem with turning to the cognitive sciences for elucidation of human cognition. The main focus is on the naturalist epistemologist’s (e.g., Quine) assumption that proper accounts of human cognition will converge on or reduce to neuroscience, or some other appropriate “foundational” cognitive science (54). Methodological disagreements between the individual and social cognitive sciences reflect the tensions between the brain-centric approach of ourselves that sees us as mechanistic, information-processing machines, as disembodied computational brains, and one that sees us as “biological entities that are always already in a world, and actively engaged in activities” (65).
At the end of chapter two, Janack addresses the problem with the brain-centric approach. Her main criticism comes from Alva Noë, who argues that this approach “exclusively substitutes a ‘brain in a vat’ for Descartes’s disembodied mind” (64). As such, it represents only a partial picture of what and who we are. It fails to take into account that we are biological entities and systems, beings with consciousness, self-awareness, and self-understanding. We are alive, active organisms who interpret our experiences of the world. The brain is one essential part of us, not that which defines us.
Another problem with the brain-centric approach arises with Quine and Kuhn. They (purport to) provide empirical stories of how children acquire language. These stories are then offered as empirical evidence for the theory-dependence of experience (68). According to Janack, anti-foundationalists tell an unnatural story about how children actually learn language. Their accounts are not genuinely empirical nor are their approaches really naturalistic (69). The problem is that anti-foundationalists mistakenly assume a computational model of mind of the subject (70). The model fails to recognize how children, in fact, acquire language. For example, Quine’s story does not seem to have much support, if any, from child development studies. It is speculative rather than empirical and it is unclear whether he even used any empirical evidence (76-77). What constitutes Kuhn’s evidence is an almost successful computer programming experiment, which Janack notes is not a proper experiment. In the end, I think Janack succeeds in establishing the foundationless-ness of anti-foundationalism.
Janack presents a refreshing and necessary look at experience. This is an excellent book and a ‘must read’ for anyone interested in the topic. It might make a nice primary or supplementary text for any course that involves experience.
