The glue across the 13 chapters (including introduction) in this edited volume is the attention to English. English is often associated as the language of globalization: It is an official language of almost every major international organization (e.g., p. 248). It is the dominant language of technology and the knowledge economy (p. 39). It is the native language of 322 million people globally (p. 247)—and it is the second/additional language for upwards of another 1 billion (p. 2). In sum, a focus on English is warranted and timely. In this volume, the contributors collectively tackle two related questions: Is it fair and/or accurate to consider English a global lingua franca? And if so, what are the socioeconomic implications of knowing the language—if there are any—especially when we focus on the developing countries?

Language Policy and Political Economy is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the role of the state in an English-dominated, globalized world system. The second part shifts from the theoretical discussions to the empirics: Europe (Chapter 5), the Greater Mekong Subregion (Chapter 6), South Korea (Chapter 7), South Africa (Chapter 8), and Karnataka, India (Chapter 9). The final part examines whether English—despite its use as a language of wider communication—warrants being considered a global lingua franca.

The strength of this volume is its concept. These chapters call attention to the multiple purposes—and sometimes limiting functions—of English. First, it is a marker of a distinct linguistic—not to be conflated with cultural (see pp. 56–59)—identity. This identity matters in how it shapes political agendas. But when it comes to the interests of major financial and monetary institutions—all well represented by English-speaking countries—what this amounts to is some semblance of linguistic imperialism. Second, it is a mechanism for socioeconomic mobility. This is why we see some semblance of an “English fever” from South Africa to South Korea. However, there is a limit: Teaching the language in schools (supply) does little when the demand (jobs requiring English proficiency) is largely absent, as is the case in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Third, it is a mode for promoting global justice. Proficiency in a common language has benefits. Directly, it breaks down the boundaries between ethnic and nationalist groups, and indirectly, it can be used to strengthen organizations aiming to advance normatively desirable, at-large interests. Yet for English to serve such purposes, the global population is required to be proficient in the language—an insurmountable task when dialect standardization is absent, proficiency is hard to measure, and resources are inequitably distributed.

While the contributors do an excellent job of highlighting the multiple purposes of English, what is often absent, especially in the first part, is the question: to whom? As a language, English requires a relationship. A Mexican and a Chinese in Texas may see English as a lingua franca—a language of communication between the two immigrant communities. However, the same Mexican may not hold English with the same regard when interacting with a white Anglo-Saxon American. Just as the purpose of English can change depending on the individual with whom one interacts, the logic also applies when we shift the analysis to the country level. English is bound to represent something different in Europe (where it is the mother tongue of one of the larger states) than in South Africa (where it was the colonial language and associated with one particular race) or in South Korea (where English was never a colonizing language). Without identifying the proper scope conditions, we risk—as this volume does—violating unit homogeneity. Comparing apples to oranges in this way can be problematic when making causal inferences.

Theoretically, Language Policy gives us some reason to question English teaching in the classrooms. In poor/developing countries, the lack of quality education can actually result in wastage. Here, we see an inherently vicious cycle: When a country’s population can speak English, the country’s economy expands. And when it expands, the country’s education system will improve. But, of course, if the education system is lacking in the first place, a country is not likely to have a large English-proficient population. This is a well-taken point. However, this is not an English-specific point. In many chapters, whenever English is mentioned alongside low-quality education, we can drop the word “English” without losing the larger meaning. For example, in the first paragraph of his introduction, Thomas Ricento writes that “access to quality English-medium education in low-income countries is mostly restricted to those with sufficient means to pay for it” (italicized for emphasis). Related, in some parts, we can replace “English” with another important skill—for example, math—and the resulting changes would convey a comparable message. Laurence Wright writes: “Where schools manage to achieve and sustain effective education in English and in an African language throughout the school years, the social rewards will be substantial in terms of mobility, access to tertiary education, and available employment opportunities” (p. 200). We can rewrite that sentence as “Where schools manage to achieve and sustain education in math and in an African language.” While poorly taught English is a problem, the two examples highlight that it is not the problem. Instead, it is symptomatic of a much larger one: a delinquent education system. By focusing only on English classes versus a class—any class—where an important skill is taught, the volume is perhaps too quick to blame English for the limited upward social mobility.

Empirically, the contributors do an excellent job of calling attention to the global reach of English and, to some extent, the economic limits of the language. The case studies were picked to demonstrate this point. While this may be true in many countries in postcolonial sub-Sahara African and Asia, it is striking that one normatively important case is never mentioned: Singapore. At independence in 1965, Singapore was in no better position economically or socially than many of the other postcolonial states. Unemployment and inflation rates were high; annual income was only about $500. Lee Kuan Yew’s government had to wrestle among three major races—Chinese, Malay, and Indian—and note that each race spoke a smattering of “dialects.” On top of this was English, a colonial language that was spoken by only one-fifth of the population. The fact that Singapore has transitioned From Third World to First—incidentally the title of a Lee Kuan Yew’s biography (2000)—suggests that teaching English in a poor country can be important. And when it is does well (supply), the demand for English skills will follow. This direction of causality is largely absent in the volume.

These comments notwithstanding, Language Policy and Political Economy makes a substantive contribution. It tackles a normatively important phenomenon. The conceptual, theoretical, and empirical comments it generates is evidence of such.