Alejandro Bárcenas opens his book by citing the Roman poet Terentianus's maxim, “According to the capabilities of the reader, books have their destiny” (1). In Machiavelli's Art of Politics, with a gifted hand Bárcenas guides his reader through the different destinies of Machiavelli, taking us through the most important questions in contemporary Machiavellian scholarship and the paradoxes and difficulties that are embedded in the richness of Machiavellian political philosophy.
Bárcenas enters this debate with a characterization of Machiavelli as an artist, a characterization Machiavelli gives himself in the beginning of the Prince. According to Bárcenas, part of Machiavelli's artistry is to “cultivate an aesthetic and historical sensibility” that opens “the conflicting forces within human nature” (48). For Bárcenas, Machiavelli is a unique figure who turns to the historical record as his primary source of truth, but in a more phenomenological manner than the Cambridge school suggests. Bárcenas's Machiavelli views history as a tableau of experience that when correctly discerned unveils the way to a vivere politico, a life of active citizenship committed to the common good brought about by the rule of good laws (14).
Bárcenas offers his own portrait in four steps: first he evaluates Machiavelli's engagement with ancient thought, emphasizing the role that Xenephon's Cyropaedia and Hiero play in teaching Machiavelli the true nature of political virtue. Rather than depicting psychological or moral struggle as the critical locus of political success or failure in ancient histories, Xenophon offers an account of “the phenomenology of politics based on the teachings of history” as the lens through which a true account of political art emerges (25). Next, Bárcenas considers Machiavelli's political formation from the perspective of the medieval period, and the influence that this period had upon his understanding of political leadership, particularly in the figure of St. Augustine of Hippo, another analyst of the importance of exemplars for political history. Bárcenas joins a growing number of commentators who note the influence of the African bishop on Machiavelli's political thought, and he contributes a deft comparison of the differing political horizons offered by the two thinkers. Bárcenas suggests that Machiavelli emerges from this encounter with Augustinian morality not with an “amoral” philosophy, as argued by Benedetto Croce, but with a morality of political leadership centered on the axiom that “love of the republic leads to goodness” (49).
Following these forays into Machiavelli's intellectual circumstances, Bárcenas confronts some of the major themes of Machiavellian scholarship, considering the role of Caesar in Machiavelli's political thought and the contested status of empire for the Florentine, as well as the convoluted relationship between the Prince and the Discourses, and perhaps most importantly, the centrality of the rule of law for Machiavelli. In this section Bárcenas is most skilled, marshaling the insights of twentieth-century interpreters in his assessment of Machiavellian themes. Through his artful identification of the driving insights of the Prince and the Discourses, the reader is left with a portrait that teaches us, if we are not already convinced, how much the modern era owes to the insights of Niccolò Machiavelli.
As a fitting conclusion to a book arguing for the significance of history to Machiavelli's philosophizing, Bárcenas ends with a review of three twentieth-century interpreters whose interest in the philosopher is accompanied by a concern for the political needs of their time: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Maurizio Viroli (Bárcenas reminds us that Strauss and Voegelin were both directly affected by the Holocaust; Viroli's concern for contemporary Italian political life is mentioned). Strauss is presented as a thinker who mistakenly identifies Machiavelli's political project with the inside of Plato's cave (70), while Voegelin is noted as a more nuanced interpreter who can discern the difference between the desire for order and the desire for domination. Viroli's Machiavelli similarly knows that “one could live without serving or dominating others, that one should be strong-minded in order to defend the common liberty” (Viroli quoted at p. 79).
Like Machiavelli at the end of the Prince, Bárcenas leaves us with a call to arms, an expressed hope that through the method of Machiavelli we can strive to form a free way of life by understanding the past and innovating upon it (82). At the end of the book are two appendices of selections from the Prince and the Discourses.
Bárcenas's contribution to Machiavelli scholarship is notable for its familiarity with twentieth-century political thought, an era that was filled with both freedom and darkness and, unsurprisingly for this reason, also filled with reflections on Machiavelli. Bárcenas examines not only the perspectives of Strauss, Voegelin, and Viroli, but also those of Ernst Cassirer, Hannah Arendt, José Ortega y Gasset, Isaiah Berlin, and Sheldon Wolin, among others. This fluent situating of Machiavelli in our current historical context is most welcome and instructive, as is the author's ability to constantly draw out what Wolin called “the pathos of Machiavelli.”
However, Bárcenas forgets this pathos at important moments of his argument, a fact that perhaps pushes his interpretation into the realm of something more optimistic than what Machiavelli offers. In what I hope will be his future research, it would be ideal if Bárcenas could contemplate further the relationship between Machiavelli's desire for freedom and his observation of the less than hopeful conditions for freedom in this world. Bárcenas reminds us that Machiavelli calls this planet “a broken world” in the Florentine Histories (citing V.1 at p. 3), an observation that complements Machiavelli's terse insight that men and women most fundamentally desire to acquire (Prince, chap. 3). The problem of earthly corruption is one that the philosopher is not certain even the best system can escape (Discourses III.1), and when it comes to a city that has already fallen to disorder “neither laws nor orders can be found that are enough to check a universal corruption” (Discourses I.18). By contrast, Bárcenas contends that for Machiavelli “when a philosopher is confronted by history, then thought is truly free from the external determination of some inaccessible agent” (7) and that the Florentine believes “there is always hope if we understand the scope of human actions and limit them” (8). However, it seems that for Machiavelli a fundamental problem of politics is that it is possible that nothing frees us from decay and decline despite our best efforts.
A similar occlusion of Machiavelli's darker thoughts can be found in Barcenas's hopeful claim that violence is a “last resort,” implicitly denying Strauss's account of the centrality of Machiavellian force, and explicitly rejecting Wolin's famous account of Machiavelli's “economy of violence” (65). Given Machiavelli's praise for Cesare Borgia's use and abuse of the strongman Remiro de Orco on the citizens of Romagna (Prince, chap. 7), and the institutionalized executions and exiles suggested in the Discourses (III.1), Bárcenas's optimistic claim requires more textual exposition, as it is on its face difficult to reconcile with parts of Machiavelli's text, particularly after Wolin's synthesis is rejected.
