How do we become better human beings? To see the question is to see its importance. It is also to see its difficulty, for in order to answer it we must have both a conception of the human good as well as some idea about how it is brought into existence. Classical political philosophers since at least Aristotle have appealed to friendship in order to solve these interrelated problems. They view the relation between friends as a direct instantiation of the good both because it is immediately pleasurable and because it cultivates excellence through the development of human capacities.Footnote 1 To these psychic benefits are added political ones, for friendship facilitates personal development in a way that catalyzes moral virtue and builds bonds of trust and esteem among citizens.Footnote 2 Because it allows access to the direct delight of intimacy with others while providing the context in which we come to understand our ethical and political obligations, friendship emerges from the classical tradition as the highest and best human association.
It is against this backdrop that I wish to examine a novel but understudied theory of friendship: that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau was centrally concerned to reinvigorate human relationships grown tepid and passionless under the baneful influence of modern individualism, and his treatment of friendship is one of the many ways he sought to effect this broad objective. On this head, he writes frequently of friendship's emotional importance in his autobiographical works, praising himself—rather dubiously—as having been “born for friendship,” and claiming it to have been one of the “twin idols of [his] heart.”Footnote 3 He also puts several extended paeans to friendship in the mouths of the principal characters of his epistolary novel Julie, Footnote 4 providing them with ample space to wax eloquent about the indissoluble bonds uniting them. To these reminders of friendship's psychological rewards Rousseau adds intimations of its political relevance, for in Emile he calls it “the most sacred” of social exchanges and in the First Discourse he claims the loss of “sincere friendships” is inimical to social concord.Footnote 5
Despite the thematic importance Rousseau accorded to friendship, curiously little has been done to understand its character or function in his thought as a whole. Perhaps the lone exception on this head is Joseph Reisert's searching treatment of Rousseauan friendship, which finds “strongly traditional elements” in Rousseau's theory and argues the association between friends is “the sole relationship within which education to virtue can take place” in Rousseau's oeuvre.Footnote 6 Though certainly cognizant of some novel elements in Rousseau's teaching, Reisert emphasizes its connection to the classical tradition deriving from Aristotle by conceiving of Rousseauan friendship as an association between same selves devoted to the pursuit of virtue.Footnote 7
There are, however, good prima facie reasons to think Rousseau believed the classical theory of friendship required more radical revision than Reisert's reading suggests. For instance, he rejects the Aristotelean assumption of natural sociability founded on shared reason and, in so doing, rejects the basis upon which traditional accounts of friendship are built. In addition, his own understanding of friendship as a modification of pity is arguably unable to accommodate some of the more ambitious emotional and moral possibilities explored by the classical tradition: critics like Allan Bloom, Clifford Orwin, and Richard Boyd have all charged that Rousseauan pity is a poor basis for moral and social life because of its tendency to inspire moral resignation. To the degree friendship derives from pity and expresses its politically harmful tendencies, it may—far from expanding man's ethical horizons as in the classical tradition—instead serve to diminish them.Footnote 8
Such considerations are hardly dispositive,Footnote 9 but they help form the basis for the present reassessment of Rousseau's theory of friendship. In what follows, I argue that Rousseau's choice to ground his conception of friendship in pity differentiates it from classical theories in two important ways. First, it generates a compromised form of emotional intimacy between friends, since the form of identification embodied by pity necessarily introduces elements of both sameness and difference and thus precludes the comprehensive identification esteemed by the classical ideal. Second, it assigns to friendship a new primary end: for Rousseau, the chief role of friendship is not to catalyze moral virtue but rather to provide consolation in the face of suffering. Taken together, Rousseau's revisions of the classical tradition point toward a more modest understanding of the purpose of friendship in human life: far from emerging as the most rewarding of human associations, friendship instead plays a supplementary, supporting role in man's quest for comprehensive fulfillment.
I make this broad argument in four steps. First, I examine Rousseau's psychological theory of friendship in light of relevant competing conceptions (i.e., those of Aristotle, Cicero, and Montaigne), and show that his replacement of reason with pity at the ground of social identification points toward a novel understanding of friendship. This new conception conceives of friendship as an attenuated association whose characteristic activity is consolation in suffering rather than the pursuit of virtue. Second, I demonstrate how Rousseau's novelistic portrayals of friendship, most especially those found in Julie, disclose the emotional distance that is built into and even limits experiences of intimacy among friends. Third, I argue through analyses of Julie and Emile that Rousseauan friendship is designed to provide consolation rather than to inculcate virtue, and that effective moral guidance occurs in hierarchical associations that do not qualify as friendships on Rousseau's own understanding of the term. Finally, I conclude by briefly examining the political implications of my interpretation of Rousseauan friendship, arguing it is not without its merits but is nonetheless ultimately unpromising as a model for civic concord.
Two provisos, and I pass on. First, for expositional reasons I use the terms “pity” and “compassion” interchangeably. Such usage is common but not universally accepted, so it perhaps bears explicit mention. Second, Rousseau (much like us) uses the term “friendship” in both broad and narrow senses; the word sometimes comprehends any form of loving association (e.g., a pedagogic relationship is a “friendship” in this sense) and other times denotes a particular kind of loving association. Of special interest here is the latter, more specific meaning Rousseau gives to friendship, for it is on this register that he corrects the tradition that preceded him and discloses what he believes its true function to be.
Rousseauan Friendship: Revisiting and Revising the Classical Tradition
In approaching the question of friendship Rousseau inherits a distinguished literary tradition that derives primarily from Aristotle's extended discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics and runs, most notably, through Cicero's De amicitia and Montaigne's “Of Friendship.”Footnote 10 This tradition views human beings as naturally sociable by way of shared reason, and treats friendship in its highest form as a rational partnership dedicated to moral development. It gives to the relation between friends two central characteristics: (1) it views intimacy between friends as a product of a comprehensive similarity of character, and (2) it posits that the end of friendship is the pursuit of virtue. Because Rousseau amends the classical theory on both these counts, a brief look at how the most influential expositors of the tradition characterize friendship along these crucial dimensions will help bring the novelty of his theory of friendship into sharper relief.
Classical treatments of friendship emphasize the importance of similarity of character in catalyzing bonds between friends. Friends qua friends are drawn to each other through the apprehension of shared interests and tastes, and perfect friends hold so much in common that they are able to see in each other idealized versions of themselves. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle celebrates this kind of comprehensive identification as a guiding ideal, claiming friendship is all the more perfect as “both parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the same things” and that friends of the best kind are like second selves.Footnote 11 Cicero follows Aristotle on this point, making Laelius call friendship “an accord in all things” and say that “he who looks upon a true friend looks, as it were, upon a sort of image of himself.”Footnote 12 Montaigne also celebrates the profound similarity he shared with La Boétie in “Of Friendship,” albeit in a slightly different way. He uses the language of erotic fusion to characterize the best friendships: friends “mingle and unite one with the other in a blend so perfect that the seam which has joined them together is effaced and can never be found again.”Footnote 13 The ideal of friendship presupposes and in turn produces such profound similarity in moral disposition that friends may even lose their identities as discrete beings.
Of course, similarity of character by itself is hardly sufficient to produce perfect friendship, for it is easy to imagine that those who share vices (e.g., stubbornness or selfishness) would find it more rather than less difficult to bond as friends. Thus the tradition is also united in theorizing friendship in its highest sense as a rational partnership animated by a very specific shared commitment: love of virtue. On this score, Aristotle's analysis of friendship is once again foundational, for it treats the relation between friends as one that “stimulates noble actions,” encourages joint rational reflection, and catalyzes superior habits of thought and behavior.Footnote 14 Cicero follows Aristotle in linking friendship to the perfection of character, arguing the concern for virtue is so fundamental to friendship that only those who share a concern for moral development can be friends. He emphasizes in particular the role of practical virtue, claiming through Laelius that the civically oriented virtues of fairness, liberality, and self-control ground friendship more effectively than wisdom.Footnote 15 Montaigne joins his classical predecessors in linking friendship to the pursuit of human excellence, though in marked contrast to Cicero he gives pride of place to specifically intellectual or philosophic virtue. Rejecting as incomplete both the civic and the sexual association, Montaigne argues that “truth” is the “nurse of the sacred tie” connecting the best of friends, and that its shared pursuit—though unavailable to most—is nonetheless the highest and best thing two human beings can do together.Footnote 16 “Perfect” friendships are perfect because they provide the context in which the conditions for philosophic activity—candor, good faith, and intellectual seriousness—are best realized.
Friends are friends, then, not simply because they share certain character traits but rather because they see in one another qualities of soul that are endearing and ennobling, because they seek to strike out together in an ongoing and forward-looking process of moral improvement. Friendship thus understood has a fundamentally prospective or aspirational character—it “casts a bright ray of hope into the future” because it encourages friends to share in the process of becoming, to improve and perfect each other's characters, to mutually strive toward salutary common purposes.Footnote 17 Friends, whatever else they may do, undertake enterprises and seek good things together; their relation is thus defined by shared hopes.
Rousseau's theory of friendship seeks to correct the classical tradition along both these dimensions, though in order to see why he makes these corrections it is first necessary to note a more fundamental disagreement he has with the classical account of human association more generally. Where both Cicero and Montaigne follow Aristotle in believing human beings to be naturally social by virtue of common reason or logos, Rousseau begins the Discourse on Inequality by forcefully rejecting this assumption. Accusing the Peripatetics of wandering in circles and of assuming into existence the very things— “sociability” and “reason”—requiring explanation, Rousseau tunnels under Aristotle's account of social identification and, meditating on the “first and simplest principles” of the human soul, finds not a capacity for reason but rather a sentiment that allows human beings to identify sympathetically with unfortunate or suffering beings.Footnote 18 Rousseau speaks, of course, of pity, which he claims is “anterior to reason” and indeed at the very basis of social identification.
Replacing reason with pity at the ground of sociability leads Rousseau to seek to understand friendship as an expression of pity. This reinterpretation begins in the Second Discourse, where Rousseau holds that “all the social virtues” and “even friendship” can be understood as modifications of pity and goes on to define friendship as “constant pity fixed on a particular object.”Footnote 19 The intimate if enigmatic connection between pity and friendship is reiterated in Emile, where the desire for friendship is described as growing out of the adolescent subject's nascent sense of compassion.Footnote 20 Rousseau, then, is consistent in emphasizing the psychological importance of pity broadly as well as its special relevance for friendship. But what sort of friendship does pity make possible, and how (if at all) does Rousseau's retheorization affect the possibility of understanding friendship as did his classical predecessors? Rousseau's grounding of friendship in pity produces two important changes to the tradition's conception of the relation between friends as a rational partnership devoted to the pursuit of virtue. First, because pity presupposes both likeness and dissimilarity of character, Rousseau denies the possibility (and desirability) of comprehensive identification between friends celebrated by Aristotle and others. Second, since friendship is on Rousseau's accounting rooted in the capacity to identify especially well with suffering beings, its primary end in human life is not the pursuit of virtue but rather consolation in disappointment.
With respect to pity presupposing both likeness and difference, Rousseau's conception of friendship-as-pity prefigures Derrida's critique of the “narcissism” of traditional conceptions.Footnote 21 Thus to the degree friendship enacts the complex and somewhat paradoxical dynamics embodied by pity—and we shall soon see it does—it precludes the type of thoroughgoing similarity of character celebrated by the tradition. Now, insofar as pity presupposes some similarity of character or interest between the observer and the suffering being it is concordant with traditional accounts of friendship, and indeed Rousseau claims pity is felt more intensely for our semblables—beings who are similar to us in relevant respects—than for others.Footnote 22 This idea is more thoroughly articulated in Emile, where Rousseau posits that “one pities in others only those ills from which one does not feel oneself exempt.”Footnote 23 We are able to share in another's sadness only because we recognize that we too are subject to the ills that caused it. The sight of an afflicted other is especially moving if we recognize ourselves as susceptible to the sources of his suffering, if we identify with his plight and view it as something that might have been ours. The common vulnerability to the stings of life thus creates a universal community of mutual sympathy and consolation, but also makes possible particularly intimate associations centered upon the shared awareness of life's hardships. These associations are what Rousseau calls friendships. In viewing the apprehension of likeness or similitude as a necessary condition for pity and thus for friendship, then, Rousseau is at one with the tradition.
However, pity presupposes not only likeness but also difference between the sufferer and the observer, and the emotional distance built into the pitying relation bounds the kind of emotional intimacy friends may enjoy. Suffering in another and suffering as another are very different things, and it is the disproportion between the two that makes Rousseauan pity such a rewarding psychic experience: pity is “sweet” because “in putting ourselves in the place of the one who suffers, we nevertheless feel the pleasure of not suffering as he does.”Footnote 24 The experience of compassion, then, is pleasant precisely because our identification with the suffering other is attenuated, and our happiness relies on the fact that the effort to more completely put “ourselves in [his] place” must fall short. We can never fully think or feel as another does, and our best efforts to do so have the paradoxical result of leading us back to ourselves. Thus we share in another's pain as much by choice as by necessity: we elect to “descend” to his condition because it is delightful to do so; our own lot is more bearable when measured against that of the less fortunate.Footnote 25 To the degree, then, the estrangement built into pity is reflected in the associations that emerge out of it, the relation between friends is necessarily attenuated.
Because pity makes possible only an incomplete kind of human connection, the Second Discourse's grounding of friendship in pity would seem to preclude the comprehensive kind of identification between friends celebrated by the classical tradition. However, both Joseph Reisert and Jonathan Marks deny the Second Discourse's claim that friendship is strongly informed by pity, arguing instead that Rousseauan friendship is rooted in “a more comprehensive attraction” grounded in shared “moral taste.”Footnote 26 Pity enables men to recognize each other as semblables only through the shared experience of suffering, but Marks approvingly cites Reisert's claim that this very specific kind of identification is only “one step on the road” toward friendship, and that pity and friendship are alike only insofar as they both “rest on the apprehension of similarities among men” and are “sentiments that draw us out of ourselves.”Footnote 27 On this view, pity enables only one among many forms of similarity that friends share, but it has no special role in creating the bonds of affection between them.
The effort to distance friendship from pity allows both Reisert and Marks to view Rousseauan friendship as a catalyst for more ambitious moral possibilities and, hence, as far closer to the classical ideal than appearances suggest. Marks, for instance, argues not only that friendship is not derivative of pity but also that it is an antidote to the moral “passivity” pity can encourage. Where pity encourages resignation and inaction in the face of life's inevitable difficulties, friendship encourages “an uplifting understanding of the world” that promotes virtuous action.Footnote 28 Reisert also finds in Rousseauan friendship a strong moralizing impetus, and on that basis argues that it more closely resembles the tradition deriving from Aristotle than it may seem. Claiming friendship is for Rousseau “the sole relationship within which education to virtue can take place” and that Rousseauan friends enjoy a comprehensive similarity of moral taste and feeling, Reisert concludes that “Rousseau's account of the friendship of decent people … resembles Aristotle's conception of complete friendship.”Footnote 29
Though Reisert and Marks both downplay the role of pity in order to imbue Rousseauan friendship with features that resemble the classical tradition, Rousseau himself puts special emphasis upon the identity of interests built into the act of shared suffering. In fact, Emile develops the Second Discourse's novel suggestion that friendship emerges out of the ability to identify with another's misfortune by more thoroughly explaining the psychological context in which the desire for friendship first develops:
Men are not naturally kings, or lords, or courtiers, or rich men. All are born naked and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life, to sorrows, ills, needs, and pains of every kind. Finally, all are condemned to death. This is what truly belongs to man. This is what no mortal is exempt from. Begin, therefore, by studying in human nature what is most inseparable from it, what best characterizes humanity.Footnote 30
Being human is hard, and the shared apprehension of life's difficulties is at the very basis of social identification. The first bonds that connect human beings lead us to view each other neither as competitors in a race for preeminence (as malignant amour-propre would have it) nor as aspirants to virtue (as the classical tradition holds) but rather as victims who require consolation and care. It is on the basis of this particular form of identification that both the capacity and desire for friendship emerge: once we are able to identify with the needfulness of others, we are prepared to meet them as fellow sufferers and, hence, as friends. This, of course, is not to deny that forms of similarity not underwritten by pity (e.g., aesthetic and moral taste) contribute to Rousseauan friendship. It is, rather, to follow Rousseau himself in emphasizing the initial conditions in which friendship comes to be: Rousseau views human association as a path-dependent phenomenon and commonly calls attention to the disproportionate impact that a relationship's beginning has on the course of its future development.Footnote 31 With this in mind, it is easy to see how significant it is that the conditions in which friendship emerges are characterized primarily by privation, for if bonds between friends are forged by the recognition of the other's misfortune then the centrality of consolation for friendship would become clear.
Rousseau discloses the connection between friendship and suffering even more directly in his epistolary novel Julie, where he has multiple characters identify not virtue but consolation as the chief function of friendship. “Are you not aware,” the novel's eponymous heroine asks her “inseparable” cousin Claire, “that the communion of hearts imbues sadness with a sweet and touching something that contentment does not know? And was friendship not specially given to the unhappy to relieve their woes and comfort their sorrows?”Footnote 32 Echoing Julie is the affably bumbling Englishman Edward Bomston, who gravely intones: “sadness and silence are the true language of friendship.”Footnote 33 Though Rousseau does not make these claims in his own voice they are nonetheless consistent with what he himself says about both the human condition and friendship's place within it. Across his philosophical and novelistic works, then, Rousseau consistently maintains there is a close connection between pity and friendship and points to consolation—not the pursuit of virtue—as the end of friendship. Thus without denying the presence of “traditional elements” in Rousseau's portrayals of friendship, it appears reasonable to deny their salience for his theory as a whole.
Rousseau's Novel Theory of Friendship
Though questions of friendship figure prominently in Rousseau's formal treatises and autobiographical works, Rousseau himself regarded his epistolary novel Julie as an important and even definitive statement of his theory. He reports in his Confessions that the work's thorough and varied depictions of the lives of friends are central both to its internal meaning and to his broader understanding of the phenomenon of friendship: Julie, according to Rousseau, is first and foremost an elegy to love and friendship, those “twin idols of [his] heart.” The thematic importance of friendship for Julie is evinced further by the fact that, as Rousseau began sketching his “plan” for what would become one of the best-selling books of the eighteenth century, the first letters he wrote were not between the two lovers but rather between two friends.Footnote 34 Thus though the serene transports of friendship are at times obscured by the Sturm und Drang of the romance, Rousseau himself persisted in believing Julie contained portraits of friendship that were, however imperfect, nonetheless salutary and worthy of close attention.Footnote 35
Among the scenes contained in the novel, perhaps none reveals the activity most characteristic of friendship more effectively than an event St. Preux describes to his friend Edward Bomston as a “morning spent in the English manner.”Footnote 36 This episode, which depicts St. Preux sharing a leisurely breakfast with his former lover Julie and her husband and children, would at first glance seem fairly unremarkable. Yet Reisert perceptively notes it is a limit experience in the kind of intimacy characteristic of friends, and that it contains importantly novel elements of Rousseau's teaching on friendship.Footnote 37 Rousseau himself signals the importance of this particular episode by having St. Preux react in an extraordinarily enthusiastic (even for him) way to the seemingly pedestrian morning. “But friendship, Milord, friendship!” he exclaims, “powerful and heavenly sentiment, what words are worthy of thee? … Oh God! How many things a clasped hand, a spirited look, a warm embrace, the sigh that follows it say.”Footnote 38 Something, it seems, has happened during this breakfast that has made St. Preux reflect upon the nature of friendship. Not only the substance but also the placement of St. Preux's exclamations underscores their importance: St. Preux begins the letter (the novel's longest) by recounting the details of his morning with Julie and Wolmar, thus suggesting its priority over the other matters he discusses. Perhaps more importantly, this letter is written late in the novel and by an increasingly self-aware St. Preux, who at the ripe age of thirty-one is finally beginning to comprehend the requirements of adult friendship. His mature reflections, born of hard and often humiliating experience, are among the novel's most serious, and are certainly worthy of close attention in the attempt to understand Rousseauan friendship.
Unsurprisingly, this discussion both invokes and inverts elements of the classical tradition. St. Preux—like Cicero and Montaigne—seeks to distinguish the affection he feels for friends from the “mediocre attachments” so common to social life.Footnote 39 However, the temperamental Swiss reforms the traditional conception by claiming true friendship reveals itself not through speech but rather through silence. Where Montaigne in particular emphasized the role of logos in effecting intimacy, the prolix St. Preux sees in the shared silence of friendship a way to combine the solitary satisfaction of “daydreaming” with the social pleasure of passing the time with like-minded persons. In downplaying the role of reason in the creation of sympathetic community, St. Preux is seeking to understand and be understood by others without needing recourse to the cold mediation of speech. Words, for all their usefulness, can be a kind of insult to genuine friends, for to use them presupposes they cannot understand other and more natural efforts to make one's needs and feelings known. The very need to resort to words thus implies the relation between I and thou is compromised.Footnote 40 Shared understandings, and the shared ways of perceiving and feeling on which they are built, are limited as much as they are empowered by language. They are all the deeper for their being understood by everyone without having to be explained by anyone.
If silence is the language of friendship, then it is well equipped to communicate the sentiment of pity. On this score, we see that the shared silence to which St. Preux refers is induced, ironically, by a revealing bit of speech: Wolmar brings conversation to a screeching halt by telling his wife not to envy kings their absolute power because “we have all long been your subjects.” The “we” in question is, of course, St. Preux and himself, and the subjection he mentions refers to Julie's having inspired intense feelings of love in both men. This remark seems insensitive, as it calls to mind St. Preux's failed efforts to wed Julie and forces the former lovers to revisit a past full of heartache. It is, however, precisely this shared remembrance of misfortune that serves as the affective basis for community among the three friends. Wolmar's remark, as St. Preux explains, did not offend or embarrass the former lovers so much as unite them all the more closely through the bonds of pity: he notes the “touching” and “tender” look Julie gave her husband, and goes on to claim that all three friends were “caught up in the same emotion.”Footnote 41 Friends qua friends suffer together.
Because Rousseauan pity presupposes similarity of character, it may be wondered how two men as different as the composed Wolmar and the mercurial St. Preux could make claims on each other's sympathy. Wolmar's use of the word “subject,” however, points to something the two men share and thus establishes the ground for mutual sympathy. To be a “subject” is to be an instrument of an external will and an agent of alien designs. It is to vacate one's powers of self-determination and to employ one's capacities with the aim of benefiting an outside other. Thus in becoming Julie's “subjects” Wolmar and St. Preux have ceded to her some portion of the capacity for free and rational self-creation. Such a concession is all the more costly for those who, like St. Preux and Wolmar, view detachment from the world and its tumults as a condition of their freedom. Their relation to Julie, however, embeds them in and subjects them to the influence of the social world and its potentially corrupting structures. The transformation of identity Wolmar and St. Preux have undergone in order to love and be loved by Julie is therefore fraught with danger, and the happiness they consequently enjoy is fragile. The two men are united, then, by a shared awareness of the costs and risks of intimacy as well as a shared willingness to pay those costs and run those risks.
Yet if a shared awareness of the transformative impact of love unites Wolmar and St. Preux, then different degrees of success with love itself place necessary limits on that union. Indeed, Wolmar's efforts to empathize with St. Preux are and must be incomplete, for underneath the shared awareness of love's power is the knowledge that St. Preux has suffered deeply for that awareness while Wolmar has benefited from it. The “living eye” sees he has been spared the pains of frustrated love while St. Preux suffers under them every day. Thus Wolmar makes himself St. Preux's superior in the very act of claiming an equality with him, for though both have suffered for Julie there can be no question as to who has suffered more. Wolmar is Julie's “subject” but he is also her husband; the process of subjection is therefore reciprocal and even empowering for him. St. Preux, on the other hand, is caught in a nonreciprocal and disempowering form of dependence, for though he loves Julie fate has forced him to cede to Wolmar the much-desired dual standing of lover/beloved. It is therefore possible for Wolmar to imagine the difficulty of being Julie's subject without also being her husband, but the extent of his identification is necessarily limited (and indeed even sweetened) by an awareness of the fact that he himself does not suffer such bad luck. Wolmar's comment thus simultaneously assuages and magnifies St. Preux's unhappiness, for while it shows him others identify with his suffering it also magnifies that suffering by forcing him to recall a disappointing past and face a hopeless present. Wolmar's remark thus reflects the complex and somewhat paradoxical interplay of conceptual opposites embodied by pity.
Indeed, the dramatic context of Wolmar's remark suggests its immediate emotional effect would be to reinforce rather than ameliorate St. Preux's feelings of isolation and inferiority, for when he claims to be Julie's subject he is surrounded by countless reminders of his own power. He has no need to assert that power explicitly, for the setting in which he makes his remark—in his well-run estate, surrounded by his well-behaved children and doted on by his ravishing wife—says everything for him. Thus though Wolmar's comment about subjection establishes a sympathetic connection between himself and St. Preux, the dramatic setting in which the remark is made weakens that connection. It is therefore unsurprising that though St. Preux describes his morning with Julie and her husband in an enthusiastic tone, the letter as a whole shows Wolmar's comment deeply wounded his pride. In fact, he confesses the sight of his former lover raising another man's children induced in him an “indolence” the immediate cause of which was the seeming lack of attention that Julie and Wolmar paid to their children.Footnote 42 He is uneasy, or so he says, because he is concerned by Julie's apparent lack of maternal solicitude. But this is subterfuge, and it is not difficult to guess that St. Preux is upset because, having just been reminded of his romantic interest in Julie and of everything he has suffered for its sake, he now must look upon the children his former lover bore another man. Such a humbling experience could well dispose anyone to resentment and petty faultfinding, so it is unsurprising to find the touchy St. Preux, who has just suffered a dreadful blow to his amour-propre, looking for flaws in Wolmar and Julie's domestic procedures.
The “morning spent in the English manner” thus depicts in narrative action the deep conceptual affinity between friendship and pity established in both the Second Discourse and Emile by (1) highlighting the distinctive and central role that consolation plays in the activity of friendship and (2) underscoring the emotional separation that exists between friends united primarily through the sentiment of pity and the experiences of suffering that attend it. Taken together, these summary considerations reveal an attempt on Rousseau's behalf to reinterpret the function of friendship in human life, and help to point up the distance between his conception of friendship and the classical tradition.
Bad Education: Moral Learning and the Virtue of Friendship
Rousseau's emphasis on the importance of consolation certainly distinguishes his view of friendship from classical conceptions, but it does not preclude the possibility of Rousseauan friends helping each other become more virtuous. Indeed, because consolation might prove useful as one among many techniques friends deploy in order to inspire each other to reach for ever-greater moral heights, it may appear Reisert is correct to say Rousseauan friendship remains “traditional” at least insofar as it is an association in which human beings raise each other to virtue. Yet a revisitation of Rousseau's novelistic portrayals of what friends do as friends shows that, for all their sensitivity, they are distinguished not by their ability to catalyze moral learning but rather by their tendency to recreate the conditions under which ethical failure is inevitable. They exhort each other to virtue without knowing what it is or how it best expresses itself in common life. Thus their intercourse proves to be a study in unintended consequences: the counsel les belles âmes offer one another, while always well intentioned and often perceptive, nonetheless proves ineffective and sometimes quite destructive. Thus they perpetuate and even magnify the sense of moral confusion they seek to resolve.
If Rousseauan friends were effective stewards of one another's moral development then they should show gradual improvement under one another's tutelage. Julie, however, shows precisely the opposite: when the omniscient Wolmar weds Julie in Part III, he inherits a moral community in complete disarray. His new wife has suffered a nasty bout with smallpox, has endured at least one vicious beating (and an equally vicious shaming) from her despotic father, and continues to grieve the death of her mother and her forced separation from St. Preux. This physical and emotional exhaustion results in moral exhaustion. She continues to carry on an illicit correspondence she had promised to break off, and strongly considers resuming a secret relationship with her former lover. “Nature, O sweet nature,” a resigned Julie exclaims in inviting St. Preux to reprise his previous role, “take back all thy rights! I abjure the heartless virtues that obliterate thee.”Footnote 43 A disconsolate and desperate St. Preux heartily commends his lover's resolution: “why should we alone … subscribe with childlike simplicity to illusory virtues that everyone talks about and no one practices?” After all, examples of adultery “are not scandalous; they cannot even be criticized, and all the honorable people here [in Paris] would chuckle at the man who out of respect for marriage resisted his heart's penchant.”Footnote 44 St. Preux's time in Paris has compromised both his resolve to do the right thing and his understanding of what that right thing is, and his transparently self-serving appeal to Parisian moeurs reveals just how far he and Julie have fallen. We must ask: how did it get to this point?
While the exhaustion afflicting the two lovers is partially a product of a necessarily difficult situation, it is clear their friends do not make matters easier. Neither Bomston nor Claire exhibit a satisfactory awareness of what the good is or of how to effect it in their friends' lives, and absent this awareness they magnify the very problems they seek to alleviate. Bomston, the putative sage of the group, proves a zealous but injudicious advocate of St. Preux's best interests. By the time he intercedes on St. Preux's behalf—first to propose the marriage to Julie and then to assist his friend after Julie's father rejected that proposal—we have good reason to question the extent of his self-knowledge and moral vision.Footnote 45 Bomston's limitations show themselves in the way he looks to rehabilitate his friend: following his separation from Julie, Bomston takes a wounded St. Preux to Paris and sets him up with a generous annuity. Any reader of Rousseau knows the City of Light is the last place a depressed and vulnerable St. Preux needs to go, and the effects on his weary soul are predictably destructive: after repeatedly expressing concern about the kind of person he is becoming in Paris, St. Preux's moral decline is consummated by his solicitation of a prostitute. The choice to bring his morally exhausted friend to a city distinguished for its capacity to corrupt reflects Bomston's incomplete understanding of how to best help, and this lack of knowledge has direct and serious consequences for St. Preux's moral fate. Bomston does not understand the conditions under which St. Preux might be rehabilitated, and his ignorance leads him to put his friend in an environment that, in the context of Rousseau's moral universe, is singularly destructive to moral health.
Claire, too, fails to provide helpful moral counsel either to Julie or to St. Preux. Though Lisa Disch thoughtfully argues that Claire's loving friendship proves superior to Wolmar's distant sangfroid, it must be admitted that Claire—like Bomston—does not know the good or how to best effect it in her friends' lives.Footnote 46 To be sure, she occasionally provides thoughtful and even searching advice, but she imprudently puts herself in the difficult position of serving as a sounding board for both her cousin and her friend, and her indiscreetness ultimately harms the very friends she seeks to assist. Her incomplete grasp upon the principles of human character show themselves most readily when she advises St. Preux to terminate his correspondence with Julie: “the sacrifice you have made to Julie's honor by leaving the country is a token to me of the one you will make to her peace of mind by breaking off a pointless relationship.”Footnote 47 This is sound counsel. Yet, she undoes her own work in her very next letter by implying that Julie's mother wishes to see St. Preux and Julie married:
This tender mother … is beginning to understand thanks to everything she sees how greatly your two hearts surpass the common rule, and how much your love bears the natural character of sympathy that neither time nor human efforts could ever destroy. She who has such need of comfort would gladly comfort her daughter if propriety did not hold her back. … She forgot herself yesterday to the point of saying in her presence, perhaps somewhat indiscreetly, “Ah if it were only up to me.”Footnote 48
If Julie's mother is guilty of indiscretion in telling the truth to her aggrieved daughter then Claire is doubly guilty for communicating the story to the desperate St. Preux, who is all too willing to believe in any possibility that keeps him connected to his lover and all too eager to interpret any gesture of sympathy from Julie's family as evidence of a willingness to accept him as a son-in-law. Claire's telling St. Preux that he has gained the favor of Julie's mother, of course, has the effect of encouraging him to believe in precisely the possibility of which she sought to disabuse him. How can St. Preux be expected to follow Claire's advice and forget Julie when Claire herself continues to remind him of her?
Rousseau, in his editorial capacity, cannot resist calling attention to Claire's failure to understand the impact her letter will have on the desperately credulous St. Preux. “Claire,” he says, “are you less indiscreet here? Is this the last time you will be?”Footnote 49 Rousseau thus notes in his own voice that Claire's mistake is not an isolated error in judgment, but rather a reflection of her general habit of saying things she should keep to herself. Claire's failure to understand what St. Preux is (and is not) in a condition to hear multiplies rather than reduces the difficulties he faces in attempting to honor his responsibility to Julie. The first half of the novel thus presents us with a picture of friends who love virtue but who clearly lack the necessary knowledge to give effective expression to their moral energy. Left to their own clumsy devices, they lead each other in circles rather than forward. It will take the appearance of an authoritative moral guide—the puppet master Wolmar—to provide some semblance of moral order.
Moral Marionettes: Equality, Hierarchy, and Ethical Learning
The moral incapacity of Rousseauan friends is reflected not only by their inability to independently create conditions conducive to moral growth, but also by their need of a strong moral guide. In an important letter to St. Preux, Julie speaks to the need for an authoritative figure by sounding a familiar Rousseauan theme, namely, the fragility of human happiness. “One strays for a single moment in life, deviates by a single step from the straight path. At once an ineluctable slope drags him down to his ruin.”Footnote 50 Because friends lack the judgment to protect each other from this sad fate, the search for virtue remains unsuccessful until Wolmar appears to guide it. His emergence is key for the moral stability of the entire group, for he is the only figure in the novel with the knowledge required of an effective moral counselor. Wolmar gives form to matter; he reinvigorates and then redirects the will to be good, which had exhausted itself in the culture of moral failure that les belles âmes had created. He does so by claiming control both of his new wife and her friends, because he knows the entire social context in which his wife exists must be shaped anew if she is to be cured of her self-destructive attraction to St. Preux. The inseparables are knotted together so closely that the sickness of one is inevitably the sickness of all.
Thus Wolmar, as Claire explains to St. Preux early in Book IV, seeks to rehabilitate not only his wife but his wife's friends as well: “Monsieur de Wolmar wishes to see you,” she tells her world-weary friend. “He goes farther, he means to cure you, and says that neither Julie, nor he, nor you, nor I, can be perfectly happy failing that.” The health of the entire group depends on St. Preux's return and rehabilitation. With her invitation to return to Clarens, however, Claire enters a note of circumspection about Wolmar's plan. “Although I expect much from his wisdom and more from your virtue, I do not know how this undertaking will turn out.”Footnote 51 Though this is not the last time Claire will challenge Wolmar's new power over the group, Wolmar is undoubtedly more successful in his efforts to rehabilitate St. Preux and his wife than Claire or Bomston was.Footnote 52 His foresight, knowledge of human nature, and capacity for environmental manipulation make him an excellent manager of the domestic economy at Clarens and an effective steward of the group's interests. Under Wolmar's paternalistic authority St. Preux reports some decisive progress in his quest to understand himself and his illness. Explaining the circumstances under which he and Julie were able to resist the temptation they posed to each other, St. Preux tells Bomston that “the scene at Meillerie was the crisis of my folly and my ills,” but adds that “Monsieur de Wolmar's explanations have entirely reassured me as to my heart's true condition. This too frail heart is cured insofar as it can be.” Though St. Preux pronounces himself cured several times in the novel, we see here a reasonable circumspection not present in previous self-diagnoses: he does not say he is cured simply but that he is cured “insofar as [he] can be.” St. Preux's new measure is owing to “Monsieur de Wolmar's explanations,” which have given him the strength to resist “the terror of being constantly besieged by crime.” He feels himself “the child of the house” and, finding his place within the harmonious whole that Wolmar has constructed at Clarens, reports that it is in a child's capacity that his “heart is gradually coming into unison with theirs.”Footnote 53 St. Preux's voluntary submission to Wolmar has given him peace, unity, and moral fortitude. If it has not made him “perfectly happy,” then it has reduced his suffering considerably by showing him his place within the whole. Paradoxically, it is in his role as the “child” of Clarens that St. Preux begins to learn the requirements of adult friendship. Before being taken in by Wolmar, St. Preux was undoubtedly a “high maintenance” friend: he dwelled constantly upon the fact of his own misfortune and his attempts to provide consolation inevitably led him back to a consideration of his own pain. It is only under Wolmar's careful guidance that St. Preux is able to dissuade Bomston from a dishonorable marriage and thus give active expression to the sentiments of friendship he eulogizes throughout the novel.
As Judith Shklar has shown, the distinctive social world depicted in Julie is hardly the only context in which the emergence of “figures of authority” proves necessary for ethical growth.Footnote 54 Indeed, the education described in Emile also requires the existence of an authoritative moral guide who can negotiate the many hidden pitfalls in Rousseau's moral universe. Reisert, however, does not view this as evidence that friends do not learn from each other, arguing instead that the relationship between Emile and his tutor is a qualified kind of friendship. Though insofar as Rousseau—much as we do—uses the term “friendship” in both wide and narrow senses, such a suggestion is perfectly plausible, it is nonetheless important to note that it is not Rousseau the author, but Jean-Jacques the tutor, who insists on referring to Emile as his “friend.” It is also worth noting that Rousseau makes Emile call Jean-Jacques “master” or “father” rather than “friend,” thus suggesting the two are cognizing their relationship very differently or perhaps even that Jean-Jacques's choice to call Emile “friend” is a tactic he utilizes in order to further ingratiate himself into his pupil's confidences.Footnote 55 Whatever the reason may be, it is very difficult to see how the relationship Jean-Jacques the tutor insists on calling a friendship satisfies Rousseau the author's definition of the term:
Attachment can exist without being returned, but friendship never can. It is an exchange or contract like others, but it is the most sacred of all. The word friend has no correlative other than itself. Any man who is not his friend's friend is most assuredly a cheat, for it is only in returning or feigning to return friendship that one can obtain it.Footnote 56
Friendship is an “exchange” or “contract,” and as such is a voluntary association into which rational persons freely select. Friends do not hold each other hostage or employ deceptive tactics in order to win affection and regard. Indeed, one who only pretends to return the honest good will and concern characteristic of friendship is a “cheat” rather than a true friend. Friendship, then, is not something imposed on us or that we are tricked into, but rather something that requires our free and reasonably informed consent.
Friendship is also a reciprocal association, which means friends must share the pleasures and burdens in a roughly equal way. This does not mean friends must be equal along every dimension of life, for Rousseau's own examples show friends may have different aims and excellences: Bomston's immense personal fortune does not undermine his friendship with St. Preux, nor does Claire's jealousy of Julie's superior beauty and magnetism prevent genuine love and affection. It would, however, be quite unusual for the overall distribution of excellences between friends to be systematically inegalitarian, since the mutual respect necessary for friendship is satisfied only where both friends are capable of giving to and receiving from each other.Footnote 57 One who needs little or nothing from others might be a benefactor, but he cannot be a friend on Rousseau's understanding of the term. Thus though friends may possess distinct excellences, those excellences must be distributed in at least a roughly egalitarian way.
When, however, we look at Emile's relationship with his tutor, we see an association that fails to satisfy both the conditions of voluntariness and reciprocity. These conditions begin to hold when Emile reaches sexual maturity, for it is at this “critical moment” that it becomes necessary to recognize him not as a child but as a friend and an equal: “He is still your disciple but he is no longer your pupil. He is your friend, he is a man. From now on treat him as such.”Footnote 58 Emile now shares with his species and his tutor that desire that will give him access to distinctively human pleasures. After its birth, all the aspects of his being are active: he possesses will, judgment, reason, and a libido, and it is by way of these possessions that he acquires the right to decide how to live his own life. The first decision he must make as “a man” is whether or not to continue living under his tutor's watchful eye.
Jean-Jacques recognizes Emile's new moral status and knows his own authority must be explicitly authorized by his pupil in order to be legitimate. To force an adult Emile to continue in an education he believes to be onerous is to deny him the use of the very capacities he is now entitled to employ, and if Emile is to make an informed decision about whether to stay under Jean-Jacques's tutelage he must know the truth about how he has been raised. Jean-Jacques therefore discloses to his pupil the unique nature of his education, for part of what it is to be respected as a friend and equal is to be dealt with honestly. Indeed, if complete candor were ever called for, it would be in a situation in which a presumptive equal asks another to consent to be governed by him. Yet Jean-Jacques continues to interfere with the exercise of the very freedom Rousseau himself has insisted Emile is entitled to employ, for when he comes to ask his pupil to remain under his tutelage he utilizes all his old tactics. The omniscient tutor manipulates all the circumstances around the choice situation in order to elicit Emile's consent and punctuates his harangue with a guilt trip worthy of the Dominican Order: “You are my property, my child, my work. It is from your happiness that I expect my own. If you frustrate my hopes you are robbing me of twenty years of my life, and you are causing the unhappiness of my old age.”Footnote 59 Jean-Jacques is laying it on thick. We might expect such manipulative talk from Julie's father, but is this the way one deals with a friend?
I submit it is not, and for reasons Rousseau himself recognized. First, the tutor's mode of address—my property, my child, my work—is not only inegalitarian but demeaningly proprietary. The choice to address Emile in this way is clearly calculated to remind the boy of his continued need to depend on the tutor, to make him feel like a child at the very moment he is to choose like a man. To be sure, the tutor does what he does because he desires what is best for his Emile, for he (rightly) suspects his pupil lacks the wherewithal to preserve his fragile happiness and that he will make destructive choices if left to his own devices. Such a lack of faith might itself reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with the spirit of friendship—especially if we select our friends not only because we respect their right to choose but also their ability to choose rightly—but the point here is less about the validity of Jean-Jacques's concerns than about the underhanded way in which he resolves them. The manipulative measures he takes, coupled with the sense of distrust that motivates them, seem manifestly inconsistent with the honesty Rousseau himself claims friends owe each other.
It is, of course, fair to wonder whether respect always entails perfect honesty. Bomston and St. Preux—friends if there ever were any—intercede on behalf of one another without explicit permission, and Rousseau appears to think of the presence of such behavior as the mark of an especially distinguished kind of friendship. It is rash, then, to conclude that Jean-Jacques's unsolicited interventions are somehow necessarily at odds with the requirements of adult friendship. It is, however, essential to remember that St. Preux and Bomston are both engaged in such behavior. They intercede on each other's behalf because both lack self-command; it is, in fact, this common character deficiency that opens the emotional space in which the bonds of their friendship are strengthened. Far from disproving the rule, then, St. Preux and Bomston's example instead confirms it, for they show us that unrequested interventions must be mutual in order to be consistent with the requirements of Rousseauan friendship. One sees immediately that this mutuality fails to obtain between Jean-Jacques and Emile. The pupil simply does not have occasion to assist the self-sufficient and quasi-divine tutor, who is needed by others without ever needing others himself. The student-teacher relationship is in Rousseau many, and many beautiful, things, but it is not a friendship in the strict sense.
Conclusions: Friendship and Politics
Though friendship has a long and distinguished history in the history of political thought, and though Rousseau is undoubtedly a canonical political thinker, very little work has been done to understand Rousseau's treatment of friendship. The work that does exist obscures the originality of his conception and moors him to a classical tradition he sought to correct as much as to follow. Far from cleaving to the traditional understanding of friendship as a catalyst of ethical perfection between same selves, Rousseau instead emphasizes the contrast between remedial pedagogic relationships, which can inculcate virtue because they are hierarchical, and friendship proper, which fails to inculcate virtue because it is not. These central findings are significant in their own right, for they not only draw attention to an interesting and neglected aspect of Rousseau's thinking but also reveal an original and somewhat subversive interpretation of it. Yet because my interpretation raises questions both about friendship's ability to catalyze comprehensive intimacy and inculcate virtue—matters central to Rousseau's broader social and political concerns—it may be helpful to conclude by touching upon Rousseau's understanding of the relationship between friendship and politics.
On this head, I should like to suggest that Rousseau's theory of friendship is for at least two reasons unpromising as a template for civic concord. The first is that Rousseau's portraits of friendship emphasize features of human connection that would seem especially problematic in the context of his own political project. Where Rousseau's ideal political society requires thick community founded upon an egalitarian ethos, Rousseau's theory of friendship-as-pity shows the association between friends to be an attenuated and even hierarchical relation in which a fortunate observer consoles a suffering other. The distancing, inegalitarian features built into the experience of pity strain emotional bonds between friends even as they make those bonds possible, and to the degree civic connection is grounded in compassion, we should expect to see the same troubling dynamics at work between citizens. The point deserves special emphasis because many influential interpreters of Rousseau have claimed that his theory of political identification is based on compassion: John Charvet calls pity “the solution to the social problem,” Allan Bloom “the glue binding men together,” and Martha Nussbaum “the basis for … democratic-egalitarian thinking.”Footnote 60 The present analysis problematizes that line of interpretation, for it points up the difficulty of making a sentiment so deeply imbued with inegalitarian elements the psychological basis for egalitarian fraternity.
There is still another reason to wonder about the political effectiveness of Rousseauan friendship, namely, its manifest inability to inculcate virtue. Though Joseph Reisert and Jonathan Marks have both emphasized the moralizing potential of friendship, we have seen that the problems on this head are both cognitive and conative: Rousseau's friends not only lack the wisdom—both practical and theoretical—required to serve as effective moral counselors for one another, but are also united through a pessimistic view of the moral world that emphasizes the limits of the human condition and the ineliminability of suffering.Footnote 61 The spirit of resignation that helps unite friends, as both Rousseau and his critics have noted, can be politically destructive: Clifford Orwin and Richard Boyd have both argued that the melancholy ethos attached to Rousseauan compassion promotes ethical fatalism, and Rousseau himself worries in the Preface to Narcisse that “so many reflections on the weakness of our nature” might be so dispiriting as to “turn us away from generous undertakings.”Footnote 62
It is therefore unsurprising that Rousseau's citizens, far from displaying the gloominess and spirit of inaction so often exhibited by his friends, instead exhibit the moral enthusiasm and active, engaged habits of mind that help them fulfill their moral and civic duties. One of the most telling examples Rousseau provides on this score is found in The Letter to D'Alembert, where Rousseau opposes the institution of a theater in Republican Geneva because he believes it would inculcate the very moral passivity so prevalent in his own models of friendship: the “afflicting images of servitude” required by dramatic performance induce in theatergoers a “gloomy” mentality that, in its turn, inspires narcissism and habits of “inaction.”Footnote 63 Such habits are uniquely inappropriate for the citizens of a free republic, who must be enthusiastic and active in the discharge of their civic obligations. Thus Rousseau rejects the dour self-absorption of the theater in favor of public events—balls, festivals, and civic competitions—designed to promote cheerful fraternization among citizens. Of these events, the various forms of public competition appear to be especially important in catalyzing civic virtue, for they provide strong incentives for citizens to develop and display those forms of individual excellence that best facilitate social concord.
Though the preceding analysis points up the political limitations and potential dangers of Rousseauan friendship, it is necessary to acknowledge that its effects on the polity need not be entirely damaging. On this score, it is easy to imagine how the spirit of inaction and the resigned, almost tragic view of the social world exhibited by Rousseau's friends could actually play a salutary preventive role in a political society, restraining some of the nastier expressions of self-love and helping prevent healthy amour-propre from sliding into delusional forms of antisociability—forms that range from the disillusioned drift of the bourgeois to the domineering cruelty of the tyrant.Footnote 64 The somewhat resigned spirit of Rousseauan friendship might also help counteract the impulsiveness many critics associate with both democratic decision-making generally and Rousseau's political philosophy in particular, for it expresses an ethos that encourages circumspection about the human capacity to eliminate contingency and counsels inaction in the face of uncertainty.Footnote 65 Such a worldview, though not unproblematic, is also not without its advantages, for it facilitates a generalized awareness of the human susceptibility to error and, in so doing, provides reminders about the limits of political action. Insofar, then, as Rousseau's theory of friendship facilitates a spirit of restraint, it may also provide some resources for responding to a criticism of his political thought dating back to Burke, namely, that it encourages rash, radical, and detrimental forms of political change.
That being said, it is difficult to view Rousseau's retheorization of friendship as anything other than a significant diminution of its emotional and political power. Indeed, Rousseau consigns what was once viewed as the highest and best human relationship to the margins of man's moral life, and shows that, however well it helps us cope with our dividedness, it nonetheless cannot return us to wholeness.
