In the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” that seized the Middle East and North Africa (or MENA) region, this edited volume examines the changes that affected military actors vis-à-vis their economic and political standing. Businessmen in Arms features a number of country cases: Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Though these countries may share a common geographical region, the various authors reveal by means of historical and contemporary analysis that the economic and political place of military actors within them has varied over time and continues to fluctuate and develop. In some instances, the military has “devoured the state” (p. 237), given its institutional presence, while in others, governments try to “coup-proof” themselves through largesse and benefits that they grant to the military; in still other instances, the military receives patronage along regional and ethnic lines. One can add to these contexts the various gradations of strife and violence within the case countries, demonstrating that the Arab Spring allowed for both consolidation and fragmentation, depending on the country at hand.

The volume makes two principal contributions. First, while the ingredients of place are variable, a sense of place is nevertheless evident. In fact, the volume upends the conceit often found in civil—military relations literature that places the Western experience writ large on a pedestal. The considerable economic and political engagements pursued by MENA military actors are definitely not the sort found in the North American or Western European sphere. The various authors stress that militaries in the MENA region very much are the military industrial complexes, with additional economic penetrations into the resource, land, and construction sectors to boot. The seeking of profit and institutional power very often triumphs over the development and maintenance of war-fighting capabilities. This is a valuable lesson to hoist aboard when studying the MENA region.

The second contribution is in the policymaking vein. Putting aside the aforementioned Western orientations, much ink has been spilled since the end of the Cold War about how state strength is affected by the access to, and utilization of, economic and military resources (e.g., Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, 1996; Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 2007, 94–115). One arc in this large field concerns the economic advantages that globalization bestows upon state leaders, which make it more difficult to solidify state strength. Mick Moore offers this assessment: “As a result of late 20th century globalisation, fewer governments are funded by broad general taxation, and elites in poor countries face increased incentives to use their power for personal profit rather than the collective good.” This is an important recognition for policymaking because international state builders are “attempting to reconstruct weak and failing polities in the poorer parts of the world such that public authority is exercised dominantly through recognisably modern state apparatuses, overseen by civilian political leaders chosen through a democratic process, staffed by a distinct cadre of professional public servants, and buffered by a monolithic system of state law” (Moore, “Globalisation and Power in Weak States,” Third World Quarterly 32 [November 2011]: 1757–76).

Businessmen in Arms expands on this point by implying that when one looks at “elites,” one must broaden conceptions to include militaries in considering the MENA region. Indeed, many of the authors point to the economic and political advantages that military actors pursued as their respective countries shifted from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to neoliberally infused global engagement underscored by globalization. Given this volume’s extensive findings, external agencies looking to advance state strength in the MENA region would be well advised to consider the presence of the military in the larger affairs of national economic and political governance.

As for gaps in the volume, while Iraq is mentioned in several chapters, the country does not have its own chapter-length consideration. This country case would have been helpful for a few reasons. One is that Iraq could have been treated to a similar historical analysis, as were the other country cases. Second, the penetration of outside forces in the form of the U.S.-led intervention in 2003 would spark intriguing questions, such as the following: Did the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime completely remove the economic and political prominence of Iraqi military actors? In concert with the aforementioned policymaking issues, did the United States take into account this long-standing prominence in their statebuilding considerations? In what ways have the reformed Iraqi military actors returned to old practices, or have new dynamics developed? Third, given that the editors wished the volume to examine nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) where they have emerged (p. 15), an Iraq country case would have allowed for an exploration of many groups with regional, ethnic, religious, and terroristic credentials. Surprisingly, in the volume, NSAGs are especially present in the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni cases, though surprisingly not in the Pakistani one.

The matter of outside penetration might have been scrutinized in a more fulsome way too. By relying on outside actors for their aid and for their technological savvy, in what ways does this promote the proposition “that patronage is steadily supplanting professionalism” within the militaries of case countries (p. xiii)? How do these relationships permit militaries not to concentrate on national security tasks? Certainly, the volume does not ignore this matter entirely; it receives a particular mention in the forward (p. xii). As well, there are some hints in some country examinations (e.g., Jordan’s King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau). No doubt these relationships make real the economic and political power of military actors in the MENA region. Nevertheless, the different authors’ handling of this matter is inconsistent, despite the historical Cold War relationships and the more recent funding for counterterrorism efforts. This is also true despite the long-standing global dependency in arms manufacture and distribution between the developed and developing worlds (e.g., Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, 1992).

In sum, though Businessmen in Arms lacks complete considerations of Iraq and embedded global power dynamics and relationships, its individual country case analyses are quite rich and offer important insights for interested academics and policymakers alike. For these reasons, it is a valuable addition to the scholarly literature on this topic.