A book intended to deal with “the growth and development of Russian economic thought” (co-editors’ foreword) in order to “fully comprehend the current position of the Russian economy” should claim considerable interest. The peculiar features of Russia's economic and political development, especially the recurring failures of liberal ideology in Russia, cannot be understood without some knowledge of the “environmental determinants of intellectual progress” and their impact on the ensuing economic theory (Eagly Reference Eagly and Eagly1968). In particular, the student of Russian intellectual history would like to know why, in Russia, modernization occurred in a non-Western pattern, causing modification of many Western-born economic ideas, and postponing an emergence of liberal democratic order.
A reader interested in Russian economics will find this book thought-provoking and overall fulfilling its promises. Its eleven chronologically arranged studies (Chapters 2-12), by both Western and Russian scholars, examine the following: economic thought in Muscovy (Danila Raskov) and in the Age of Enlightenment (Leonid Shirokorad); ideas of Russian monetary reformers in the first sixty years of the nineteenth century (Alla Sheptun); the development of Russian academic economics in 1800-1861 (Joachim Zweynert); the analysis of the Russian school of Ethical Political Economy (Natalia Makasheva) and the economic ideas of Alexander Chayanov (William Coleman and Anna Taitslin); the views and experiences of Russian émigré economists Simon Kuznets, Jacob Marschak, and Wassily Leontief (Vincent Barnett) as well as Boris Brutzkus and Sergei Prokopovich (Shuichi Kojima); an assessment of Soviet economic debates during the late Stalin era (Michael Kaser) and in 1960-1990 (Pekka Sutela); and the development of economic ideas in post-Soviet Russia (Andrey Zaostrovtsev). The unifying theme of these studies, as the reviewer sees it, is the causes of the non-liberal nature of Russian economics. In the concluding chapter, the editors rightly associate these causes with the country's late development and the resultant “inextricable connection” of “economic ideas to matters of economic policy and to issues of governmental control” (p. 187).
A brief review cannot do justice to all the ideas in this volume, but some remarks on the main analyses seem necessary.
Though the co-editors admit in their introduction that they make “no claim for a comprehensive or complete coverage of all periods” (p. 2), the book, in this reviewer's opinion, is disproportionately focused on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries during which modified versions of many Western-born economic ideas were already developed in Russia. However, to comprehend why Russian economic thinking evolved rather differently than in the countries of Western Europe, one needs a detailed analysis of earlier periods of Russian economic and intellectual history to discover when and how the perpetual “conflict of the Western character of humane studies with the Russian reality” (Berlin Reference Berlin and Raeff1966, p. 6) began.
Unfortunately, only two of the essays are devoted to the earlier periods—essays that arrive at opposite conclusions about Russia's backwardness and its subsequent impact on the country's economic thinking. Thus, Danila Raskov in his essay on the development of economic thought in middle and late Muscovy (Ch. 2) minimizes the impact of Russia's underdevelopment on its intellectual tradition. Raskov discusses rather subtle views of Russian economists on ecclesiastic landownership, foreign trade, and money, and concludes that their approach “fitted into a shared European experience in the development of pre-economic thought, fluctuating between mercantilism and medieval ideas” (p. 21). In the reviewer's opinion, Raskov overstates similarities between the development of economic knowledge in backward, patrimonial Muscovy and the more advanced nations of the West while ignoring fundamental institutional differences between them. Unlike western societies, seventeenth-century Russia remained “a peripheral image of Oriental despotism” (Wittfogel Reference Wittfogel1957, p. 45), without privately owned land and without independent nobility supported by established social estates. Russia's regime was an unrestricted patrimonial autocracy; all its subjects, from highest to lowest, had to serve the crown, and all productive assets, land above all, were treated as belonging to the crown (Pipes Reference Pipes2005, pp. 11, 23). Not until1762 was the possession of land by nobility divorced from compulsory state service, and not until 1785 was a legal basis for absolute ownership of immovable assets by nobility created (Pipes Reference Pipes1994). Given the absence in Russia of Roman law, which emphasized private property and, in the seventeenth century, helped to “shape legal doctrines and institutions of capitalism, without which mercantilism would never emerge” (Rima Reference Rima2009, p. 29), Rackov's arguments in favor of mercantilist thinking in pre-Petrine Russia do not look very convincing.
Contrary to Rackov's viewpoint, Leonid Shirokorad's expertly written essay on the Russian Age of Reason and Enlightenment (Ch. 3) explains how Russia's backwardness prevented Peter the Great's many westernization efforts from taking root in the country. Shirokorad demonstrates that the eighteenth century was marked by a radical change in attitude from a stress on liberal elements of economic and political development in the first seventy years of the century to an attack on freedom and the ideas of the French Revolution in its last quarter. He rightly concludes that, in the Russia of the Age of Reason, autocracy and serfdom formed the main obstacle to progressive thought, thus accounting for the relative weakness of liberal political and economic opinion in the next century.
Joachim Zweynert (Ch. 5) and Alla Sheptun (Ch. 4) deal with the impact of Russia's historical backwardness on economic thought in nineteenth century Russia. Zweynert, in his insightful essay on the conflict between “reason and historicity” in Russia's academic political economy of the time, rightly highlights an evident methodological eclecticism in the theoretical views of Russian scholars, which attempt “to integrate historicist ideas into the classical canon” to fit Russia's historical matrix, apparently “mixing it all up” (pp. 65-66). Conversely, Alla Sheptun, in her essay on key monetary reformers in the initial stage of Russian industrialization—Michail Speransky, Nicholai Mordvinov, and Nicholai Bunge—stresses that all of them were liberal reformers who believed that late industrialization necessitated massive government participation. As a result, she labels well-known historicist and protectionist Nikolai Bunge as an “architect of liberal reforms” who, at the same time, “was sure of his belief in the leading role of the state in the national economy” (p. 54). Nevertheless, Sheptun highlights a very important feature of liberal reforms in Imperial Russia, namely their association with the internal policies of the tsarist government. Nicholai Bunge, like many reformers of his time, understood that strong state power was required to implement greatly needed changes in Russia, but the only form of governance Russia knew was a monarchy. It is essential to stress here that the reformers’ belief in the role of the state in the development process does not imply their support for the despotism and reaction of the tsarist government (Leontovitsch Reference Leontovitsch1957).
In her essay on the Russian school of “ethical political economy” (Ch. 6), Natalia Makasheva adds to this picture of methodological eclecticism of Russian economics. In particular, Makasheva offers an interesting treatment of an original attempt of Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky (1865-1919), the key representative of this school, to combine methodological holism of ethical approach to socialism with hedonistic calculus, which he considered useful for an efficient collectivist economy. Calling Tugan-Baranovsky a “marginalist socialist,” Makasheva demonstrates that Tugan's analysis was in line with Pigovian welfare economics, but with more emphasis on ethics as the basis of economic discourse (p. 86). William Coleman and Anna Taitslin's study (Ch. 7) provides an excellent account of contradictory views of agrarian economist Alexander Chayanov (1888-1937), theoretician of the Organization and Production School, who as a neo-Populist viewed peasantry as undifferentiated category and continued during the 1920s to defend decentralized peasant agriculture.
The next four studies, on the whole, contrast the brilliant achievements of émigré economics (Chapters 8 and 9) with the analytical poverty and helplessness of Soviet economic scholarship (Chapters 10 and 11). The last chapter (Ch. 12) takes us back to the notion of Russia's backwardness as a key cause of the continued absence of many values and assumptions that nourished the European liberal tradition.
In conclusion, this volume is an important work that should stimulate a deeper interest in history of Russian economic thought, which still exemplifies a confrontation between the nation's long-standing tradition of autocracy and continuing attempts of Russia's liberal-oriented intellectuals to implement values of the Western world in this country.
