Understanding change represents a continuing challenge for institutional theorists. The fundamental logic of institutions is to create stability and predictability, yet we know that they do change. The most common explanation for institutional change has been that transformations within institutions are the products of exogenous shocks, a version of change seen most clearly within historical institutionalism. Such a description and explanation can find some empirical support but makes the world of institutions appear more unstable than our observations of them would have us believe. Thus, we need a more gradual understanding of change within institutions than that originally provided by historical institutional scholars.
It should be noted that other versions of institutionalism do not rely as much on exogenous shocks as the source of change as does historical institutionalism, the strand of thought within which the authors in this volume primarily function. For example, for rational choice scholars, change may come about more readily through the design and modification of the incentive structures, producing changes in the behavior of the members of the institution. And for those utilizing sociological perspectives, change comes about largely through endogenous processes, often having to do with the failure of the institution to match its performance with its own ideals.
Peter Hall's essay in this volume performs an important service in integrating the historical institutionalist perspective on change with those of the two other principal approaches. Hall demonstrates that there are important points of similarity among the approaches and that their insights generally are complementary rather than competitive. For example, the linkage of any single institution to others in its institutional field is important for maintaining stability, or for producing change, and this insight is shared by the historical institutionalists as well as by rational choice institutionalists.
The analysis presented by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen advances an understanding of endogenous change within the historical institutionalist framework. The categories of change—Layering, Displacement, Drift, Conversion—were developed in an earlier work (Wolfgang Streeck and Thelen, Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, 2005) but are developed more completely in this book. Most importantly, the theoretical chapters in this collection link those categories of institutional change both to dimensions of the surrounding political structure and to the behavior of individuals functioning within institutions.
The editors make these linkages between forms of institutional change and both institutional environmental and individual behaviors by developing several typologies. These typologies are based primarily on the levels of constraint within the political environment and within the institution itself. The links established between the forms and levels of constraint and the particular manner of transformation within the institution may not be as strong as desired, but this is still an interesting attempt to link the political environment (and in Hall's analysis, the institutional field) to institutional change.
Although this may be conceptual stretching, there do appear to be some similarities between the analysis of change here and the familiar Mary Douglas “group-grid” scheme. This scheme was developed for analyzing culture and society, but has been extended by Christopher Hood and others to the analysis of public organizations. Both of these typologies depend upon constraints on action for an individual or an institution/organization, and assume that opportunities for action will be shaped primarily by external forces.
The other significant contribution of this volume is that it links institutional analysis to individual behavior, using the same forms of typologies as used to characterize the styles of institutional change. Again, one must question the strength of the justification for the categories utilized. For example, I am not sure whether the category of “subversives” would be better suited to conversion than it is to layering as described in this volume. However, if we consider these hypotheses about the behavior of individuals, then an interesting starting point for further research is provided. And again, this typology has some similarities with that used by Douglas, with subversives perhaps appearing analogous to isolates.
In addition to Hall's essay, which is in essence the conclusion of the volume, there are five other chapters that in various ways attempt to apply the ideas on change developed in the introductory theoretical chapter. These chapters are interesting examinations of institutional transformation in their own right, and they cover a range of both developed and developing countries. That said, however, it is striking that these chapters generally disregard the interesting analytic scheme presented by the editors. Whereas the previous authors discuss many of the same issues as the introductory chapter, most of the authors in these chapters do so in their own terms, and thus the utility of the analytic scheme is not explored.
Adam Sheingate and Alan Jacobs consider institutional changes in the United States, focusing on two central government institutions—the Social Security program and the House of Representatives, respectively. Both of these authors document significant transformations within the institutions they are studying. Sheingate begins with some fundamental issues in the initial design of Social Security and considers the gradual adaptation of the program. Similarly, Jacobs uses changes in the internal rules of the House to explain changes in power within the institution, and also argues for the generic importance of rules in analyzing institutions and institutional change.
The health service program in Brazil has also undergone significant transformation, heading toward municipalization and universalism. As discussed by Tulia Falleti, these changes occurred gradually, rather than in response to political transformations of the regime, much like the gradual reforms discussed in the introductory chapters. But again, unfortunately these changes are related only tangentially to the analytic scheme proposed by the editors, although they might well have fit into the categories advanced in the introductory chapter.
The documentation of land ownership in Kenya provides the locus for examining another gradual transformation of an institution. Like the Social Security program documented by Sheingate, the initial design of the land ownership program provided the necessity for reform, and paradoxically, the success of that initial design produced the decline of the program. This analysis is related closely to the logics of gradual change contained in the introduction to this volume and demonstrates how internal, gradual changes minimize the significance of exogenous shocks. In this case, the capacity to adapt internally appeared to minimize the need for external sources for change.
Finally, Dan Slater examines institutions within Indonesia, discussing the important differences between those structures directly related to the authoritarian institutions of the Suharto regime and the more fundamental institutions of government. The discussion in this chapter focuses more clearly on agency than do most other studies of institutions, and presents the complexities associated with changing the institutions in an authoritarian regime.
In summary, this volume is an interesting and important extension of the growing body of literature on institutional change. The analytic chapters provide an enhanced understanding of the mechanisms of gradual change and the linkages among alternative conceptions of political institutions. Unfortunately, however, the authors of the more substantive chapters missed the opportunity to examine and expand the utility of the analytic scheme. Despite that, the substantive chapters do provide interesting interpretations of the institutional transformations they studied.
