The culture wars of the last few decades have produced many an intense battle. Among the most heated in recent years has been the issue of marriage and, specifically, how it is defined in law. Advocates of same-sex marriage, of course, have been pressing for an expansion of the definition, while defenders of traditional marriage have sought explicit legal reinforcement of the heterosexual and monogamous character of the union. Political scientist Tamara Metz has entered the fray with a surprising proposal. Though clearly sympathetic to the aspirations of the first camp, she argues that both sides in the marriage debate are mistaken, for both assume that the state should “establish” marriage, that is, define, confer, and regulate it. Untying the Knot argues the opposite. Marriage, like religion, should be disestablished in part to avoid precisely the contentiousness that the public debates have occasioned.
Metz notes that American jurisprudence in the area of marriage law has been curiously inarticulate about the reasons justifying the establishment of marriage. Courts from the nineteenth century to the present have affirmed the value of marriage as an institution, identified a fundamental right to marry, recognized the state's duty to protect that right, and, most recently, expanded the definition to include homosexual couples. But, for all of this, they have not provided an argument for why the state has authority over marriage in the first place. Metz finds a similar lacuna in liberal and feminist thinkers, such as Locke, Mill, and Okin, whose larger political and social vision she shares. Untying the Knot is, in fact, an exercise in liberal political theory, and its central contention is that the state exceeds its highly circumscribed authority when it becomes entangled with the meaning of marriage (as distinct from its material dimensions).
Marriage, as Metz describes it, is a “formal, comprehensive social institution” that “relies on and reproduces complex accounts of the connections between individual and community; public and private; belief and behavior; and sexuate, social, and political self-understanding” (86). Because marriage implicates such profound and basic beliefs and because it alters the behavior of its participants in light of those beliefs, the public authority that confers the marital status enjoys tremendous power. “Extralegal norms and related pressures and expectations, comprehensive moral and cultural doctrines, and their unique power to train behavior and belief all become available to the state in its association with social institutions such as marriage” (97). For Metz, this is precisely why marriage should be disestablished. To do otherwise violates the cardinal principles of political liberalism: state neutrality, individual autonomy, and equality. To define and regulate marriage in a socially diverse polity will inevitably involve the state in enforcing disputed social norms that impinge on the freedom of citizens “to live according to their own design” (115).
While marriage as a cultural status should be left to civil society, the state, according to Metz, should retain an interest in its material side, that is, in the concrete goods it attends to, like the care of children or an ailing spouse. Such activities are legitimate public welfare concerns, but Metz argues that they can be secured through another, less controversial route, namely, through the creation of an alternative legal category, the “intimate caregiving union status” (133). The ICGU status—conferred, regulated, and, if need be, dissolved by the state—would accommodate a much wider circle of “intimate caregiving” settings than the current regime of marriage and family law admits. It would function as a protection against the myriad risks that accompany relationships of dependence in which the labor expended by the caregiver is unremunerated. In Metz's scheme, such social insurance would be provided by the state through a range of policies, potentially including direct government subsidies, workplace leave arrangements, and equitable property division (upon dissolution).
Untying the Knot stakes out a unique and provocative position vis-à-vis other theorists and partisans on the marriage question, and its central contention that liberalism cannot sustain established marriage is plausible. (Once state neutrality regarding comprehensive doctrines is affirmed, it becomes difficult to recognize a substantive view of any social institution.) But Metz's positive argument that marriage should be abolished as a legal category is not. Metz notes that any case for justifying established marriage must be “true to the two primary players in the arrangement: marriage and the liberal state” (8). The same, in fairness, would have to hold for disestablishment, but here her argument fails on at least one count: it is not true to marriage. Though Metz later contends that defining marriage is an “impossible task” (128), her case in fact hinges on a definition of marriage as a “formal, comprehensive social institution” (85). Even when Metz elaborates on this definition, her account remains frustratingly abstract. Membership in other kinds of social institutions, such as the military, arguably fulfills the same formal criteria. It is not clear, in the end, what marriage is for Metz. Oddly, for a theorist who urges us to take sex and gender seriously, Metz does not mention the body in her definition. Nor does she engage longstanding, powerful accounts of marriage as an organic, one-flesh union that is procreative in kind.
The same abstractness attends her appeal to equality. One of Metz's clear intentions is to dethrone traditional marriage in the interest of “enhancing equality between and within intimate associations” (12) on the presumption that members of other kinds of associations, such as homosexual couplings, are “similarly situated” (33). But this requires an argument, one that wrestles with the counterclaim that heterosexual marriage is normative because it conforms to the evident complementarity of the male and female bodies, which bear a design for unity and generativity. No such argument is forthcoming, a fact that undermines the force of Metz's appeal to equality and her largely implicit critique of “heterosexist marriage” (33).
A final observation deserves mention. Untying the Knot is instructive largely because it points up the deficiencies of liberalism, not marriage. One of these deficiencies is its inconsistency, evident in the illiberal effects of Metz's proposal. Established marriage, she argues, “risks violating the type of neutrality necessary for the state to secure liberty and equality in a diverse polity such as ours” (115). Yet the abolition of legal marriage and substitution of Huxleyan “intimate caregiving units” (13) in its stead hardly qualifies as neutral. To radically privatize marriage, as Metz does, allowing—as a matter of principle—any assemblage of human beings to call themselves “married” changes the experience and meaning of marriage for everyone. De facto, it enshrines as a matter of state policy the view that marriage has no objective meaning. If this is what liberal political principles entail, perhaps the adequacy of liberalism as a public philosophy, not marriage as a legal institution, requires reconsideration.
