Both books under review aim at the same twofold purpose, that is, understanding the particular nature of European foreign policy— or policies, as we shall see—and, in order to do so, rejuvenating foreign policy analysis (FPA) as a tool. Because of its state centeredness and because of its heavy reliance on the rational actor approach, foreign policy analysis fails to grasp the distinctiveness of the foreign policies of European states. Due to the “fragmented nature of agency at the EU level” (White, p. 39), this particular nature lies in the unique policy-making process, both “complex and cooperative,” as Ben Tonra puts it (Manners and Whitman, pp. 238 and 244), or “complex and multi-leveled,” as Brian White underlines, referring to Michael Smith's notion of “negotiated order” (p. 55).

This negotiated order has transformed the foreign policy process in all members of the European Community/Union, to varying degrees according to countries and according to policy area—whether commercial foreign policy, which pertains to Community matters dealt with in the first pillar, or Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which are policies of the second pillar of the Union. A process of Europeanization is taking place, defined as “a transformation in the ways in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectations” (Tonra in Manners and Whitman, pp. 225 and 245). It is this transformation and its consequences on the very character of the European foreign policy process and on the very nature of foreign policy within the Community/Union that the authors of these two books want to understand. Reasons and dynamics of changes are examined, as well as the construction of identities through socialization. In other words, all authors incorporate into the FPA framework ideas and ideals, identities, norms, and expectations.

At the same time, both books nicely complement each other—and should be read together—as they are looking at European foreign policies from different perspectives. Resorting to a comparative approach, Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman, and their coauthors analyze the foreign policy changes, processes, and actions of all 15 members, that is, the way foreign policies are being Europeanized and the way actors from different countries interact with one another within networks. White, on the other hand, looks at a variety of forms of action, Community policies and Union policies—putting them each time into context, studying the actors, the capabilities, and instruments as well as at the output— and at their interconnection, which goes well beyond mere interactions between the first and the second pillars.

As clear-cut as the distinction between Community and Union policies is in White's book, or as simple as the country-based analysis is in the case of Manners and Whitman's collection, both books actually shed a light on the complexities and subtleties of Community/Union policies. They manage, first, to understand the particular nature of foreign policymaking in Europe; second, to redefine foreign policy in the European framework in the wake of the breakdown between domestic and foreign affairs, between the inside and the outside; and third, to demonstrate the workings of Europeanization and of what White calls “Brusselization.” Far from distinguishing between national foreign policies and European ones, these two studies show how interconnections develop within transnational and transgovernmental networks. As Manners and Whitman nicely put it, borrowing from the “NATO-EU” vocabulary, national and European foreign policies are “separable but not separate” (p. 13). Not only does White underscore that both first and second pillars are interconnected, but he also stresses the futility of intergovernmentalism—agreeing in this with Helen Wallace, for instance (quoted on p. 78)—and he goes so far as to coin the notion of Brusselization. Even if the European Commission “creeps into” foreign policy, Brusselization does not mean communautarization but, rather, that “Brussels-based actors and institutions are increasingly dominating both foreign-policy making and policy implementation” (p. 100). Europeanization, however, does not proceed indifferently in all 15 member states; smaller states are more affected than bigger ones, as the collection edited by Manners and Whitman shows. If put in a caption, Manners and Whitman's book details well the socialization process through which the 15 members go, while White's book shows well the connection between the various forms of foreign policies.

However, these two books fail to incorporate several related evolutions. First, by its own standards, Manners and Whitman's book does not capture the process of convergence that has characterized the foreign policies of the major states in Europe; some convergence in the political cultures of Great Britain, France, and Germany has taken place since the midnineties. Whereas formerly these three countries did invoke so-called national interests to justify their relative inaction as Yugoslavia broke up, France has “atlanticized” itself and Germany has “militarized” itself, while Great Britain was “Europeanized'” in the past few years. This has happened in spite of the fact that France's ruling elites have shown a high degree of resistance toward Europeanization, especially in the wake of cohabitation, the devastating consequences of which the chapter on France, in Manners and Whitman's collection, underestimates and in spite also of a possible retreat of Europeanization in Gerhard Schroeder's Germany, which the chapter on Germany does not address. How to account for this and how to account for the differences between smaller and bigger states in terms of Europeanization? (Are smaller states more permeable to Europeanization because of expected gains, as hinted in the book, or should one add to this explanation other variables, such as the small size of decision-making communities, etc.?) It is possible that the American administrations' behavior and policies have played a role here, sidelining Europeans, from Dayton to Rambouillet, from Kosovo to the war against terrorism.

This failure points at a second one, common this time to both books. The authors aim at renewing FPA, and White explicitly leaves aside structural explanations that, he rightly contends, do not take agency into account. Yet leaving structural accounts aside amounts, on the one hand, to looking at the European Union as a contained system: What about the role of the United States, which is hardly mentioned and could yet explain the convergence mentioned above? On the other hand, relying too much on FPA without drawing on structural accounts overlooks what I call “internal foreign policy,” meaning that European foreign policy is as much about the internal dynamics of the union as it is about relations with the world outside the EU. Certainly, special relationships are looked at in the collection of Manners and Whitman, yet to give an example, the Franco-German team is hardly dealt with, and the author does not recognize the deep changes it has undergone as a result of transformations in the structural makeup of the Union. In a bigger union of free-floating, issue-oriented coalitions, tandems, such as the Franco-German one, lose their relevance.

Last but not least, both books may be overrating the degree of Europeanization that European foreign policies are undergoing, maybe because a paradoxical evolution is taking place. On the one hand, political cultures are converging, as stated above, while on the other hand, outcomes in the security area are disappointing, as White, among others, rightly claims. Certainly, the European Union has been endowed with an ESDP, with institutional instruments and even military ones. Yet it amounts to very little in terms of capacity—as European governments do not increase their spending—and to nothing so far as efficient decision making is concerned. In other words, although a rapprochement in political cultures and intentions may be necessary to promote a European policy, it is not yet sufficient: Decision-making mechanisms are failing here. While White recognizes this, he suggests that only a communautarized ESDP could make up for it. Other solutions do exist, such as leadership that characterizes alliances, like NATO. Yet the Union is a mechanism of diffusion of power that prevents leadership. To that extent, it may be overly optimistic to speak of “national foreign policies” as “residual foreign policies,” as Manners and Whitman do (p. 270). But whatever these shortcomings are, both books do indeed stimulate discussion, both on the very nature of European foreign policies and on the instruments to analyze them.