Thank you, and thanks again from me, also, for the invitation today. This is a topic which is extremely topical and extremely important.

I will start from the same position that the prohibition on the use of force is a fundamental rule of international law and that there are limited exceptions to that rule, the right of self-defense being one which, in Article 51, is recognized as an inherent right.

On the question of whether self-defense can be used in defense against non-state actors, the UK's position on that is the clean answer is yes. And I could say that even back to 1837. Why 1837? Well, those who remember their days as international law students will recall that was the date of the Caroline incident, and it is worth recalling that the Caroline was a steamboat that had been commandeered by a group of American sympathizers with the Canadian rebellion against British rule at that time. In other words, a group of non-state actors. This is something that goes back deeper than Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

When can force be used against non-state actors? Well, again, I think it is worth repeating at the outset that the UK will only use armed force in self-defense where it is consistent to do so with international law, and Article 51 itself talks about the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, so it can be used in the individual—defense of the United Kingdom or in the defense of our friends and allies.

Like many other states, the longstanding United Kingdom view is that Article 51 does not require that a state passively awaits an attack, but includes the inherent right to use force in self-defense against an imminent armed attack. And like Katrina said, any use of force must, of course, be both necessary and proportionate to the threat, and a part of that assessment of necessity where an attack has not yet taken place is the attack must be imminent for states to take action. And no doubt we can get into the concept of imminence as we discuss issues further.

Dealing with non-state actors, the sort of group that we are dealing with here, Daesh, the ideal paradigm is to deal with terrorist groups through a law enforcement criminal justice paradigm, but that is not always possible, particularly where attacks are planned outside of our territory and where the host state is unable or unwilling to act, so that concept which we have heard about already from Ambassador Cooper. And lethal action, of course, will always be a last resort when there is not an option to defend against an attack and not a means to deter, disrupt, or otherwise prevent those plotting acts of terror.

Before turning to the specific situation of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, I, too, like Ambassador Cooper, would like to refer briefly to Resolution 1368 and 1373, because we are so close in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, those resolutions adopted by the Security Council recognized both that large-scale terrorist action could constitute an armed attack—that would give rise to the right of self-defense—and that force might, in certain circumstances, be used in self-defense against those who plan and perpetrate such attacks, and against those harboring them if that was necessary to avert further such terrorist attacks.

Turning now to the specific situation of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, where the UK has been taking action on the basis of self-defense, we have already had mention made to the letter from Iraq in September 2014, where Iraq sought additional international support and assistance for the specific purpose of fighting ISIL, setting out the background of the threat posed by ISIL, its gratitude for international help provided so far, and the need to respect Iraqi sovereignty. They made a request, of course, for assistance in the following terms: “It is for these reasons that we, in accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements, and with due regard for complete national sovereignty and the constitution, have requested the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds with our expressed consent. The aim of such strikes is to end the constant threat to Iraq, protect Iraq's citizens, and ultimately arm Iraq's forces and enable them to regain control of Iraq's borders.” And like Australia, my government was satisfied that that was consent from Iraq in those terms, in a clear and unequivocal way, providing a legal basis for the deployment of UK forces and military assets to take military action to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Iraq.

In addition, in 2014, we took the view that there was a solid basis of evidence on which to conclude that there was a direct link between the presence and activities of ISIL in Syria and the ongoing attacks on Iraq, and that the Assad regime was unwilling and/or unable to take action necessary to prevent ISIL's continuing attacks on Iraq.

Finally, I wanted to refer to the fact that the threat from ISIL continued to evolve from 2014, to the extent that it went beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria. And in August of 2015, the United Kingdom carried out a precision strike against Reyaad Khan, a British national, who was a member of Daesh, and that action was taken on the basis of both the collective self-defense of Iraq, on the basis of the threat that he posed through his actions and activities as a member of Daesh in relation to Iraq, but also on the basis of individual self-defense, due to the threat that he posed to the United Kingdom in planning and directing imminent armed attacks in the United Kingdom. And our Article 51 letter, in addition to the letter that was sent in 2014, in similar terms, legally at least, to the Australian letter, was followed up at the time of the Reyaad Khan precision strike with a letter indicating and notifying the Council that action had been taken on both of those legal bases, individual and collective self-defense.