No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 February 2006
Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. By Virginia Page Fortna. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 264p. $57.50 cloth, $19.95 paper.
At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. By Ronald Paris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 302p. $65.00 hardback, $23.99 paper.
The studies under review focus on the question of what happens once violence ends. As such, they illuminate an important segment of world politics that begins once the guns stop roaring. Though different in theoretical outlook, research orientation, and scientific contribution, the two studies supplement one another. The first, by Virginia Page Fortna, investigates the duration of cease-fires while the second, by Ronald Paris, probes the success of peacekeeping missions. Taken together, the factors both studies highlight and the conclusions they offer add to our growing knowledge on intra/interstate wars and peace in world politics.
The studies under review focus on the question of what happens once violence ends. As such, they illuminate an important segment of world politics that begins once the guns stop roaring. Though different in theoretical outlook, research orientation, and scientific contribution, the two studies supplement one another. The first, by Virginia Page Fortna, investigates the duration of cease-fires while the second, by Ronald Paris, probes the success of peacekeeping missions. Taken together, the factors both studies highlight and the conclusions they offer add to our growing knowledge on intra/interstate wars and peace in world politics.
The in-depth and comprehensive study by Fortna addresses three queries: 1) What situational factors affect the baseline prospects for peace? 2) How do these factors affect the content of cease-fire agreements? 3) How does the content of cease-fire agreements affect the durability of peace?
Peace Time is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on cooperation theory to explain why agreements affect the durability of peace. Chapter 2 spells out the research methods and a summary of the two case study dyads (Israel–Syria and India–Pakistan) selected for in-depth exploration. Chapters 3 and 4 address the “baseline prospects” for peace and the counterargument that agreements are epiphenomenal or spurious. Chapter 5 tests the central hypothesis, regarding stronger cease-fire agreements that yield a more stable peace. The last chapter discusses and evaluates the specific measures used in cease-fire agreements to help peace endure.
In empirical terms, the book covers half a century, from 1947 to 1997, using a cease-fire data set constructed by Fortna. This data set (involving dyads from 22 wars, presented in Appendix A, p. 217) is an important contribution to the field of war and peace studies as it brings together data collected by both the author and other databases (COW 3, MID, ICB, Polity III, and EUGene and the Maoz dyadic MID data set). From a methodological standpoint, the book combines a threefold path of inquiry: quantitative analysis–hazard rate (explained clearly on pp. 44–45 and 85), in-depth case studies, and what the author calls “large N qualitative” analysis. The use of these complementary research methods is a good example of the sound approach Fortna maintains for the collection and use of data at the operational level.
Peace Time explores two sets of factors (situational and peace-enhancing attempts) to explain the duration period between wars. Situational, or structural factors, over which the belligerents have little or no control, determine the baseline prospects for peace after war's end. Fortna's findings suggest that five baseline variables are particularly important: the decisiveness of the military victory, the cost of war, belligerents' history before the war, the stakes of the conflict, and whether the fighting dyad is contiguous. Elements that appear less important include the regime of the adversaries and territoriality as a core stake in the confrontation (pp. 8–9 and 112–13).
Deliberate attempts to enhance the durability of peace involve measures such as the separation of troops, the creation of demilitarised zones (DMZs), monitoring by international observers, guaranties by third parties, confidence-building measures, and dispute-resolution procedures. The findings highlight the effectiveness of DMZs and show that explicit guaranties by outsiders, peacekeeping measures, and monitoring by the international community help but that arms-control measures do not (pp. 9 and 209–10).
Ronald Paris's thorough investigation of post–civil war situations in which peacebuilding missions were established is guided by four research questions: 1) Does political liberalization or economic liberalization contribute to the resurgence of fighting? 2) Does the process of political or economic liberalization ameliorate domestic societal conditions that fuel violent conflict? 3) Does the process foster a movement toward peaceful reconciliation among the formerly warring parties? 4) Does the process exacerbate tensions within the society in a manner that endangers the prospects for a stable and lasting peace?
The main thesis in this interesting work is that while the liberal peace theory serves as the most common (and indeed normative) starting point for peace builders who seek to establish order and stability, the preferable solution is “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (IBL). The IBL strategy, spelled out by the author, highlights the importance of slow incremental changes in the political and economic spheres, and the need to establish a viable structural setting in failed states to ensure that peace and stability will endure while the peace-building mission operates and long after it leaves.
At War's End is divided into three parts: First, Chapters 1 and 2 examine the peace-building record, problems and solutions via the prism of a “Wilsonian” approach. In probing the relationship among liberalization, institution building, and peace in countries that have just emerged from civil conflict, Paris contributes to the growing literature on the liberal peace thesis. He brings together contemporary scholarship and links it to early philosophical thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith versus Thomas Hobbes (pp. 46–51), especially considering the existence of viable functioning states and failed states, characterized by virtual anarchy. Second, Chapters 3–8 introduce the methodology and case studies. Third, Chapters 9–11 investigate the shortcomings of rapid liberalization as a peace-building strategy in the 1990s and introduce a new approach: IBL. Its key elements include waiting until conditions are ripe for elections, designing electoral systems that reward moderation, promoting good civil society, controlling hate speech, adopting conflict-reducing economic policies, and in total—rebuilding effective state institutions (p. 188). After discussing three main critiques of the IBL strategy (endless mission, excessive costs, and cultural-dependency dangers), Paris mentions the need to establish a “new central international agency” (inside or outside the existing structure of the United Nations) that would be dedicated to postconflict peace building. To be effective, this agency should act as a “world policeman” without really being one.
Paris investigates all major missions formally approved by the UN Security Council from 1989 to 1998. The findings regarding these 14 cases, in total, show mixed results: Two missions were a clear success (Namibia and Croatia), two were an obvious failure (e.g., Angola and Rwanda), and the remaining operations fell under these two extremes (p. 151). Viewed from an objective standpoint, such a record is hardly a meaningful distribution of success/failure cases to support/reject the liberal peace theory. More than anything else, it calls for additional research, more precise operationalization of concepts and thresholds (levels of success, indexes of political/economic liberalization), and the introduction of control variables (similar to Fortna's “baseline” elements, characterizing the diverse group of post–civil war cases). In the absence of all these, the value of the theoretical generalizations derived from the study is somewhat subjective.
Indeed, the two studies differ in their theoretical outlook, research orientation, and main contribution to the study of world politics. Fortna combines realist and institutional aspects and addresses a broad range of variables that can help forward the goal of constructing a comprehensive picture on a core puzzle: how to prevent renewed violence once war ends. The distinct theories that relate to this puzzle are overviewed, hypotheses are spelled out, the operational basis for testing them is clearly outlined, and the findings are analyzed in a systematic manner. The choice of a multiapproach in theory (realist and institutional) and a three-mode methodology (quantitative, case study, and “large N qualitative”) enhances the operational level and provides the reader with an interesting, sound, and clear analysis. Yet while Fortna does so much, she fails to provide a comprehensive picture of all the elements together. The grand debate of power politics versus institutionalism remains open, and a broad theoretical-paradigmatic statement is missing in the conclusions on cease-fires and peacetime in world politics.
In addressing core research questions on the processes of liberalization, democratization, and marketization and on reliable remedies for intrastate violence, Paris provides the reader with an in-depth comparative analysis on more than a decade of peace-building operations. The narrative and analysis of the 11 distinct cases cover a wide range of events and are informative and interesting. The three cases of Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone (and even more so the remarks regarding peace building after the conquests in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003) add to the contemporary nature of the analysis but, to use the author's own term, this exploration is carried out “in more provisional terms, because of their relative recentness” (p. 9).
The absence of a detailed model, systematic operationalization of all variables, an introduction of controls to account for diversity among cases, and a clear delineation for success/failure of peace missions limits the explanatory value of the study's conclusions. While its broad empirical scope and descriptive detail represent important contributions, its theoretical and policy implications are much less convincing.