This book, republished eight years after its first edition, still deserves to be read because it represents a good example of how the history of economics can be shaped and enriched by the passing of time. In 2004, the authors wrote a book to point out how macroeconomists failed to recognize the historical roots of one of their most important standard tools, i.e., rational expectations. Today, the same arguments help to cast light on the short-sightedness of economists accused of failing to predict the events of the recent financial crisis. The debate on the microfoundations of macroeconomics has indeed been revived by these events, calling for a fundamental rethinking of the models founded on rational expectations. The stories narrated in this volume reflect four decades (1950 to 1990) in which this hypothesis became the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics. If one browses through the literature of that period, the event of a systemic crisis was not even considered, and mainstream macroeconomists confined their analyses to models of stable equilibrium that were perturbed only by temporary shocks. Just a few years later, the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ has confirmed the key role played in forecasting strategies by the heterogeneity of decision rules, by heuristics and biases, or by the effect of framing and contexts. This process has given an added value to this volume, which shows that a better awareness of the origins of the concept of rational expectations would have had a positive effect on the research of the inherent causes of, and of the methods to prevent, the crisis.
The main thesis of the book is that there was no “real” rational expectations revolution, but a variegated and complex development that vanished when rational expectations became the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics. The seven chapters into which the volume is divided provide a full account of the many approaches that anticipated and followed the key event of this story, John Fraser Muth’s Reference Muth1961Econometrica paper, “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movement.”
Significantly, the first chapter of the book focuses on Oskar Morgenstern’s assessment of the concept of perfect foresight proposed by John Hicks in the 1930s, which probably represented the most pragmatic and direct anticipation of the contemporary criticisms of the far-fetched concept of rational expectations. Morgenstern’s brilliance emerges clearly from his critical assessment of the internal contradictions of the concept of perfect foresight: “Should complete foresight be an indispensable postulate for the erection of the theory of equilibrium, then, there results that wider paradox that the science has already posited the object that it is first to investigate; that, without this assumption, the object could not exist at all in the meaning specifically considered” (Morgenstern 1935, p. 175). The same chapter, however, points out that subsequent developments did not support Morgenstern’s criticism. On one hand, Keynes deviated from the problem of defining expectations theoretically by focusing on the “waves of optimism and pessimism” that determine the level of economic activity; on the other hand, game theory, focusing progressively on the Nash program, became “inconsistent with the world view expressed in the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”(Schotter Reference Schotter and Roy Weintraub1992, p. 109).
The following chapters give an historical portrait of the Hart Research Agenda, dating back to 1937, based on original, unpublished material on how the Columbia economist Albert Hart, trained in Chicago, paved the way for Boulding, Friedman, and Modigliani’s appraisal of a rational theory of expectations. Although the key historical role played by his 1940 book Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning was acknowledged by his followers, Hart clearly stressed the concept of flexibility more than that of stable states, which was bound to become the canonical interpretation of the principle of rational expectations. A few years later, when he became a United States Treasury consultant and a member of the Committee for Economic Development, Hart focused his attention on more practical aspects of economics and modified his ideas on the imperfection of foresight.
The main “antagonist” of this plot, Herbert Simon, entered the stage a decade later. In 1954, one year before publishing his famous paper on behavioral choice, he made known his view on rationality in the interdisciplinary journal Public Opinion Quarterly with an article entitled “Bandwagon and Underdog Effects and the Possibility of Elections Predictions,” in which he openly questioned Modigliani’s view that expectations could be self-validating. This work and his 1960s research period at Carnegie Tech Graduate School of Industrial Administration validate Simon’s later opinion that Muth’s article was “a reply to my doctrine of bounded rationality” (Simon Reference Simon1991, p. 271). This judgment is corroborated by the fact that Simon anticipated the term coined by Muth.
According to Michael Lovell, Jack Muth was not the first to develop the concept of rational expectations. He gave it a name, but the concept itself had been invoked by Herbert Simon in his 1956 certainty equivalence article and by Hans Theil in a related paper. Certainty equivalence is the proposition that you can, under certain restrictive conditions, including no non-negative constraints, find the optimal solution to a dynamic programming problem under uncertainty by solving a much simpler problem obtained by substituting point estimates for the probability distribution of possible future states of the world. By using the means of that distribution as certainty equivalents, you get the same set of optimal decisions as you would if you labored through the uncertainty problem. But in order to prove his theorem, Herb had to invoke the assumption that the expectation had certain stochastic properties, and these turn out to be the properties of rational expectations that became famous a few years later. So perhaps we should ask, why did the assumption of rational expectations not take hold sooner than it did since it was necessary to prove Simon’s famous theorem. Herb didn’t give it a name; and his explanation of the assumption he made was a little befuddled, but it was definitely there and it is definitely required for certainty equivalence to go through. (quoted in Hoover and Young Reference Hoover and Young2011, pp. 24–25)
The part of the book devoted to the precursors of the 1961 turning point extends to chapters 4 and 5, which illustrate the vivid and dense debate between John Muth and Edwin S. Mills in relation to the earlier work of Jan Tinbergen. Particular emphasis is given to the 1959 meeting of the Econometric Society, when Muth and Mills met each other for the first time. There, Muth’s presentation was discussed by Albert Hart, and Mills’s paper by Gerard Debreu. The recollection of conference attendees’ reactions provided in the book shows that both papers were considered nothing more than good technical exercises, but devoid of revolutionary content.
Thus, the main concern of the book is to provide an explanation of the great impact that rational expectations had on macroeconomics in the 1970s. Chapters 6 and 7 summarize the main filiations of this theory: the Chicago school endorsed by Patinkin and the monetarist counter-revolution of Lucas. What emerges from these pages is the drastic simplification given by these developments to the multifaceted features of the rational expectations hypothesis. The richness of the alternative approaches preceding Muth’s article, lucidly described here, were sacrificed to the need, on one hand, to spell the end of Keynesian theory, and, on the other hand, to focus macroeconomic models on systems of beliefs consistent with one another, on which mathematically tractableequilibria could be defined. An indirect but important contribution to this evolution, not highlighted in the book, probably came from game theory. In the 1970s, the mathematics of game theorists provided rational solutions to a set of problems otherwise undefined; as, for example, the famous Holmes–Moriarty parable from Morgenstern (1935, pp. 173–174). The endless chain of deductions can be stopped by the rational expectations equilibrium in which players adopt mixed strategies and flip a coin to decide. Unsurprisingly, this is not what emerges from the experimental research and it is hardly a paradox that the most devastating attack on rational expectations should come from empirical evidence collected in the laboratory. While there is no way to be sure that people act and predict rationally in everyday life (although many economists still argue otherwise), the refutation of this hypothesis in very simple and stylized experimental tasks has had important implications. Cognitive and behavioral economists have pointed out that irrational policies can fool people for more than a while and are not necessarily doomed to fail. What is more, as this book helps us to understand, to ground institutions on the rational expectations hypothesis is to make them unlikely to function well. Notwithstanding this, the hypothesis garnered attention and inspired research during a period in which it was taken for a solution to a problem rather than a “solution in search of a problem” (Preface, p. XI).
