Sarah D. Shields’ book operates on two levels. The first is a straightforward political-historical narrative about the international and regional politics that led to the transfer of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) from the French Mandate of Syria to the Turkish Republic between 1936 and 1939. The second level addresses a more general issue: the effect of post World War I identity politics in creating new and intractable divisions in societies that are multiethnic, multireligious, and multilingual.
The political–historical narrative is written on the basis of archival and primary source material from the League of Nations archives in Geneva, France, Turkey, and Britain. The narrative indicates that the prospect of Syrian independence (promised in the 1936 Franco–Syrian Treaty) motivated Turkey to press its claims to the Sanjak. Turkey's interest in the Sanjak was strategic and economic. Ankara effectively linked its political ambitions to ethnicity—a principle legitimized by the League of Nations—and used this ethnic principle to press its territorial claim. The majority of the Sanjak's inhabitants, Ankara asserted, were Turks, and thus the Alexandretta region (which Atatürk named “Hatay”) should revert to Turkey if France was preparing to end its Mandate in Syria. As for the French authorities, they were of two minds. On the one hand, France did not wish to concede the principle that ethnic claims should allow redrawing of post World War I borders. There were, after all, comparable German claims to the Sudetenland and to Danzig. In contrast, France's overriding strategic concern in the Levant was to ensure that Turkey would not become an enemy. This argued for a policy of accommodation to and appeasement of Turkey. As for the hapless National Bloc government in Damascus, it had no sovereignty and therefore depended on France to defend Syria's territorial integrity. Damascus was relying on French goodwill to implement the terms of the yet unratified 1936 treaty. So the National Bloc was not in a position to challenge France (let alone Turkey) on the issue of Alexandretta. The Bloc leadership (most notably, Jamil Mardam Bey) was nonplussed by the sudden emergence of the Alexandretta issue and responded with confusion and hesitation. Yet Syrian public opinion (expressed by street rallies and articles in the press) vehemently opposed Turkish claims and insisted that the Sanjak should remain part of Syria. The National Bloc tried to propitiate these sentiments by promising to take action to safeguard the Sanjak, but in reality there was nothing it could do.
Shields’ political-historical narrative focuses most consistently on the unfolding of events in the Sanjak itself. Here, a multiethnic, multireligious, and multilingual population whose identity boundary markers (apart from religion) were not always clear suddenly had to define itself by declaring one exclusive identity for political purposes: principally Turk or Arab. Because of the dominance of Ankara-supported Kemalist operatives among the Turcophone population, “Turk” came to be equated with pro-Kemalist. Kurdish-speaking Muslims were pressured to define themselves as “Turks” or “Arabs” for electoral purposes. Ankara's political operatives pressed the Sanjak's Armenians to count themselves as “Turks” in this context, implying rewards if they did so and punishments if they did not. Arabic-speaking Alawis (Alevis) underwent similar arm-twisting: they were claimed as Turks by the Kemalists and as Arabs by the League of National Action led by the Alawi lawyer Zaki al-Arsuzi. Yet whilst the Sanjak's Turkish nationalists had the support of Ankara, the League of National Action was at odds with the cautious, vacillating, and ultimately powerless National Bloc leadership in Damascus. These kinds of inter- and intracommunal tensions intensified when France, seeking a resolution with Turkey, invited the League of Nations to register voters by ethnicity for elections to a Sanjak assembly. The registrations produced more tension and violence. France ultimately decided that its best interests required that Turks be recognized as the majority electorate in the Sanjak, even though the League of Nations registration process up to that point had produced only a Turkish plurality.
Shields’ account tells this story clearly and in detail, with Turkish and French perspectives dominating. They dominate partly because Turkey and France determined the outcome of the Alexandretta crisis and partly because French archival sources (along with reports from the League of Nations) are the most abundant on the issue. In her narrative, local Turkish operatives come across mostly as allies or agents of the Turkish government, who defined their interests and ambitions in tandem with those of Ankara. The presence of non-Kemalist Turcophones is referenced, but they appear to have been marginalized or brought into the nationalist fold by unrelenting peer pressure. This is where the book's title comes from: Kemalist headgear became a de rigueur symbol of Turkish male identity in the Sanjak during this period. Brawls could be sparked when opponents of Turkish claims showed up wearing fezzes or other non-Kemalist head coverings. Shields’ narrative portrays Arab nationalist activists (Zaki al-Arsuzi et al.) at a remove, reflecting her reliance on French sources to understand and to characterize Arabophones’ thoughts and motives. No Arabic sources are cited in the bibliography, which represents a puzzling lacuna. Although Syrian Arab archives are unavailable (and may not even be useful given the Damascus administration's powerlessness at that time), reports from contemporary Arabic newspapers could have added another dimension to the story.
At the beginning of this review I said that Shields’ book operates at two levels. Its framing arguments and conclusions about the introduction and impact of identity politics in the post World War I Middle East speak to a wider audience than do those (like the present reviewer) who focus on Syria and/or Turkey. Shields highlights the unsettling and destabilizing impact of the full-blown introduction and legitimization of identity politics after World War I. As the example of the Sanjak shows, by linking ethnicity to political claims the League of Nations (and its Mandatory executors) forced populations to make hard and fast, and sometimes arbitrary, choices among blurred, overlapping, and contingent identities and communal boundaries. These policies tore asunder the population of the Sanjak and led to civil strife and refugee flows. Indeed, on realizing that it could no longer manage a situation that it had helped to create, France walked away from the Sanjak, which became an integral part of Turkey in 1939. These circumstances recall the much better known British abandonment of Palestine in 1947 and 1948, in the wake of intercommunal violence that Britain's own policies had done so much to create and stoke.
Shields’ book will be of interest to students and scholars of colonialism and of national identity formation in the post World War I world. Her study of the Sanjak of Alexandretta offers an abundance of material for considering these issues comparatively. As a bonus the book is copiously illustrated with contemporary photographs and helpful maps. Not the least of its virtues is the telling and astonishing Kemalist iconography reproduced on the cover: the uniformed leader and Great Man of the 1930s poses against a backdrop of nationalist iconography whilst Hatay-as-a-woman submissively takes shelter under the leader's military cape.
