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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Jeffrey Record's analysis of the second war in Iraq, Dark Victory, is a scathing critique of the Bush administration's political doctrine of unilateralism and its hasty use of preemptive military force. Record, a former staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, argues that Iraq posed no threat to the United States and that the nation's entry into war was an unnecessarily drastic measure that damaged American interests in the long term. Influenced by neoconservative elements in his administration, Bush was led to fear that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) could ultimately end up in the hands of Osama bin Laden. Record carefully points out that the neoconservative position on Iraq and its possession on WMDs had more to do with a long-standing agenda to spread democracy to the Middle East than with safeguarding the United States against terrorism. The conclusion of the war has brought the administration no closer to achieving its implied or its stated objectives. Inadequate postconflict planning has led to an open-ended occupation. It has also created a situation in Iraq that is so unstable that it has only inspired terrorists to wage a new jihad against the American occupiers.
Record's strength in his analysis of the second Iraqi war lies in his efforts to do exactly what the Bush administration failed to do: situate the current conflict within the context of the events that have been transpiring in the region for the past twelve years. He opens by contending that Saddam Hussein's survival at the end of the 1991 Gulf War constituted a military defeat but also a political victory for his regime. America's mistakes in its Iraq policy began with its failure to support the post–1991 Iraqi revolts and continued with its perpetuation of the ineffective sanctions regime. While Record's criticism of these failings are well presented, he could have extended his argument even further to make the point that it is these same mistakes that created the atmosphere of distrust toward Americans that the Iraqis felt after their “liberation” in April 2003 and that is fueling the insurgency in Iraq today.
Aptly portraying the 2003 Iraq war as a sequel to the 1991 Gulf War, Record carefully demonstrates how the neoconservative officials in the first Bush administration who reemerged in the second were aiming to settle an old score and already working to build a case for war before the 11 September 2001 attacks. Saddam Hussein was not a traditional state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, for the administration to link the war on terror with a war against Iraq, it had to make the case that Iraqi WMDs could spread into the hands of terrorists—a concern that Record easily dismisses with the simple knowledge of how Saddam Hussein's regime operated. He would have been reluctant to deliver the “crown jewels” of his arsenal to terrorists he could not control. In fact, Saddam Hussein did not trust WMDs even to his own military, never mind bin Laden.
Record makes another valuable argument against the Bush administration when he delineates the differences between preemptive and preventive warfare. The former is fought when an attack is imminent based on incontrovertible evidence of threat. The latter is fought because there may be a threat in the future. A preventive war would have been harder for Bush to sell to his constituencies, so he marketed the conflict as preemptive war. Ironically, the United States in 2003 adopted Iraq's definition of preventive war as applied to Iran in the 1980s. Just as Iraq invaded Iran because Khomeini's revolution could have spread to Iraq's Shi

i, the United States argued for an invasion beause Iraq's weapons could have fallen into the wrong hands.
Record also does well to emphasize the significant difference that declaring a “war on al-Qaeda” as opposed to a “war on terror” could have had on the outcome of the conflict. For example, the label “terrorist” alienated the Shi

i of Iran who could have aided the United States in its fight against al-Qa

ida, a known anti-Shi

i group. The general nature of the Bush doctrine also allowed it to be misappropriated by other countries, allowing nations such as Israel, China, Russia, India, and the Philippines to ignore legitimate grievances of their respective Palestinian, Uighur, Chechnyan, Kashmiri, and Moro communities in the name of aiding the war on terror.
Dark Victory is an excellent outline of the United States' interest in Iraq and of its subsequent failure to develop viable plans for the area once its objectives had been acheived. The 2003 Iraq war was the culmination of the United States' failed twin-pillars policy of the 1970s, in which it relied on Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran to protect its interests in the Gulf. After the Iranian Revolution, the United States could rely only on Saudi Arabia as its regional surrogate in the Gulf. The 11 September attacks altered this relationship, as most of the highjackers were Saudi, and the United States felt increasing pressure to withdraw its troops from bases there. The 2003 war represented an American attempt to create a new “pillar” in Iraq and to intimidate its lost pillar, “Iran.” The war had little to do with Iraq's WMD “threat.” Rather, it represented a neoconservative effort to create an American base in the region. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia in May 2003 gave Osama bin Laden a concrete victory over the Americans, a result whose implication should have been examined in more detail by Record in his book, as it represented bin Laden's second victory after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.
While Record admits that the military aspect of the 2003 war was well planned, the reconstruction of Iraq was not. In post-Saddam-Hussein Iraq there were no contingencies for widespread looting, while at the same time U.S. troops closely guarded Iraqi oil facilities, giving the impression American interests were purely economic. In addition, the United States failed to realize that, while many Iraqis were content to see Saddam Hussein overthrown, they would not welcome an American occupation. Ironically, in the postwar chaos, some Iraqis have called for a dictator to bring security back to Iraq, a direct challenge to the stated U.S. goal of installing a liberal “elected” leader and undermining the whole neoconservative rationale for the war.
Record's analysis is a valuable addition to a plethora of works that emerged soon after the 2003 Iraq war was concluded. It carefully carries its reader to the inevitable conclusion that, that in the aftermath of the Iraq war, al-Qa

ida attacks in the Middle East have in fact increased. He successfully argues that the war in Iraq, launched in the name of terror, failed to weaken it. Instead, it has given rise to a new jihad and fueled the fire of anger in the Arab and Muslim world from which al-Qa

ida feeds.