Once upon a time, there was a world where global governance was a matter of states establishing international institutions. In time state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reflexively supported and/or contested the resulting authority formations, developed legitimation narratives, and engaged in counter-institutionalizations that might deepen or fragment the global governance landscape. Such might be the beginning of a new materialistFootnote 1 tale inspired by Michael Zürn's A Theory of Global Governance to which these elements are key.Footnote 2 But how would the story continue? What is the significance of these new materialisms for stories about global governance, such as Zürn's? This contribution argues that taking new materialist insights on board would require introducing at the very least three new materialist characters (market dispositives, minions, and mimes) into the story and making space in its plot for three processes (relational entanglings, infrastructurings, and sensings) through which they do politics.
In an effort to keep this argument from becoming an abstract ‘gobbledygook’ exercise in ‘armchair theorizing’, I make it with reference to global-internet-governance (as much as the space I have allows).Footnote 3 This contribution, however, is not only – or even mainly – about internet-governance specifically. The characters and the processes I introduce matter well beyond it albeit in contextually different incarnations and ways. Their absence in A Theory therefore signals not only the limits of this theory when it comes to a particularly central area of global governance. More fundamentally, it underscores that A Theory is ignoring aspects of politics fundamental for the governance issues it purports to grapple with. As I will return to in the conclusion, this is problematic not only analytically but also politically. Before getting there, however, I need to explain the import of including materialist characters and the political processes they engage in when theorizing on global governance.
Including materialist characters
The materialist characters I wish to introduce make things happen in new materialist accounts. They are shorthand representations of the actants in different families of materialism. The market dispositives I begin with have a central place in (post-)Marxian approaches, the minions in the materialism of the broad church of science and technology studies and the mimes in feminist traditions. Each of these materialist traditions is itself a complex composite and they of course overlap and connect. My characters may therefore emerge more as caricatures that accentuate some overarching features while leaving out the details. The intention with such caricaturing is to clarify the general arguments in favour of including them in theorizations on global governance.
Market dispositives
The first character I would like to introduce is the market dispositive. A dispositive in French is simply a regulatory measure. The term has been developed conceptually to grapple with the complex, shifting heterogeneous arrangements that do regulation. Dispositive refers to the composite of actors, institutions, and process, but also to objects and artefacts, that do governance.Footnote 4 As such they are located at the core of global governance. This is particularly clear in the context of internet governance. The opening chapter of a recent volume on the topic does not use the term dispositive but describes something very much like it when suggesting that: ‘Internet governance transcends traditional governmentcentric mechanisms like national statutes or intergovernmental treaties. Governance is collectively enacted by the design of technology, the policies of private companies, and the administrative …’.Footnote 5
Adding the qualifier ‘market’ to dispositive is a way of emphasizing the pervasiveness of (quasi-)market logics in the dispositives that are relevant to contemporary global governance. Companies play a crucial role. As Gillespie puts it, platforms are the ‘custodians of the internet’.Footnote 6 Companies are constantly enrolled in global governance also in other areas. Their presence is core to the (no longer) new quasi-religious worshipping of public–private-partnerships.Footnote 7 But beyond being about the presence of companies, the qualifier market is intended to capture to a form of governance that works through markets or quasi-market mechanisms. Competition, investment, supply and demand, profits, and efficiency become core are part of regulatory language and indeed turned into regulatory processes. An indication of this is that the trade-fair is competing with – and sometimes displacing – diplomatic exchange in global governance. This is obvious in contexts specifically geared to connecting public and private actors such as Davos.Footnote 8 More surprisingly is how pervasive the trade-fair form is also beyond them. The ITU yearly ‘AI for Good Summit’ for example bears striking similarity to trade-fairs such as ‘The Future of Enterprise Technology’.Footnote 9
Market dispositives are doubly material in character. As dispositives, they comprise the material – viz. the design of internet technology Musiani et al. refer to. As pervaded by the market form, they work through the material reinforcing its centrality and significance. Market processes are material in the sense that they organize the exchange of commodities. The things, ideas, services, processes, and people governed through the (quasi-)market therefore have to be turned into commodities – that is be commodifiedFootnote 10 – to be governable. Excluding market dispositives, A Theory is missing something fundamental about contemporary global governance.
Minions
A second new materialist character deeply involved in global governance is what, with Pignarre and Stengers (Reference Pignarre and Stengers2011) we may term the minion. They borrow the term minions from the movie Despicable Me because the little yellow figures there so well capture the central importance for governance of the mundane work, done by seemingly insignificant characters, from below, at the micro-level. These characters are often part of dispositives, however, those working with them in science and technology studies prefer to disentangle them from the complex dispositives of which they may be a part and instead focus on the work they do independently. Minions are often mundane artefacts. In the context of the internet, typical minions whose centrality for governance have been amply discussed include the protocol, the cable, the screen, the indicator, the algorithm, or the cloud-server. Other areas of global governance would obviously have different characters.
To see the centrality of minions as characters doing global governance, considering the debates ranging around the role of algorithms is a helpful example. Algorithms do all manner of things in relation to internet-governance. They block or allow access to sites and servers. They analyse information flows and distribute them. They participate in political decisions as they trigger (re-)actions to information.Footnote 11 Their significance is steadily growing. The speed and quantities of information to be handled in the age of big data make resort to automated processes, that is, processes where algorithms do the work, increasingly common. Well beyond areas – such as for example, High Frequency TradingFootnote 12 – where the centrality of algorithms for governance is inescapably obvious, debates rage about what constitutes governance in a context where ‘law is code and code is law’.Footnote 13 How can we think about basic questions such as ethics, accountability and responsibility when algorithms govern?Footnote 14
These questions would seem to merit a place in any contemporary discussion of global governance and not only the ones concerning the internet. However, raising them presupposes making place for the minions that make them pertinent. A Theory does not. I assume that this is not because Zürn thinks that global governance has remained untouched by digitization (although his book has surprisingly little to say on the topic). Rather, his theory simply does not accommodate them.
Mimes
Finally, a third cherished materialist character of feminist pedigree – the body – is centrally involved in global governance of the internet and beyond. One way of insisting that material aspects of the body remain in focus is to think of them as mimes. It underlines that, as with Pierrot-the-mime, embodiment (not text/language) is what is significant about their presence. Looking at global-internet-governance gives an idea of why including bodies may be important.
Digital technologies imbricate the body deeply in the online realm. We are hybrid, cyborg beings born of computers.Footnote 15 This imbrication is transforming bodies by distributing and dividing them and by connecting them to the feedforward rationalities emerging from the data we generate in online interactions.Footnote 16 There is a politics of the body at stake on the internet. Our biometric ‘data-doubles’ are both objects of internet-governance and subjects doing it. Our bodies are enrolled in the creation of phenotypic others and subject to the governing effects of these types.Footnote 17
This imbrication of bodies in global governance is not only taking place in the realm of the digital. Rather, it is enrolled in and subjected to governance far more generally. Enloe's discussion of the gendered and racial politics of Carmen Miranda's body is a classical International Relations statement of the point.Footnote 18 Reaching further back, Stoler's account of how Dutch and French imperialism in Asia rested on a micro-politics of race, gender, and sexuality shows the import of a politics and policing of the body for imperial rule.Footnote 19 Making space for the body, the mime, as a character in stories about the global rule and governance is clearly crucial well beyond the internet. If bodies such as Miranda's or the Dutch imperial subject do politics – if they assemble and dissent as Butler puts it we need stories acknowledging their presence.Footnote 20 We need stories that are useful for reflecting on what ‘governance’ and ‘citizen action’ engaging in it mean, not only ‘in the time of the Network’Footnote 21 but more generally. Indeed, such stories are particularly important as they are a safeguard against the illusion of disembodied politics, including the fetishization of technology and technological solutions.Footnote 22 A Theory unfortunately does not contribute a single word or concept to such a story but rather silences it.
Markets, minions, and mimes are not only cherished characters of different strands of new materialism. They have a role in contemporary global governance. More emphatically: they do global governance. However, they have no place in A Theory. Including them would require a thorough recasting. Worse still, to parse their significance for A Theory would require focussing on the processes through which they come to matter. A change in the central plot and storyline of A Theory seems called for.
Writing materialist processes
Including materialist characters in A Theory is one thing. Making the work they do in global governance visible in theory is another. It requires telling a story that includes it. One can tell such a story by showing how they are part of the kinds of processes that are at the core of A Theory.Footnote 23 However, such inclusion requires not only adding a material element to these processes but radically revising the assumptions underpinning them. Bastardizing feminist slogans: ‘it is not enough to add the material and stir’. To illustrate this point, I will show that writing materialist processes into A Theory requires revising its assumptions about what agency means, where politics is located and how it is reflexively engaged. It requires allowing for respectively relational entanglings, infrastructurings, and sensings.
Relational entanglings
It does matter that materialist characters are material. To acknowledge their place in doing global governance we need a way to account for material agency. Two moves in new materialist theorizing have been particularly central in creating such acknowledgement: focus on relational processes and the emphasis on socio-material entanglingsFootnote 24 in these.
Relational process ontology is obviously not exclusively new materialist.Footnote 25 However, for most materialist approaches it is particularly central.Footnote 26 It opens for a conceptualization of agency that accords a symmetrical place to social and materialist characters. Rather than connecting agency to intentions, relational ontologies connect it to doings, to the effects a character (or actant) has on relational processes. Agency on this account only makes sense in a dynamic relational context, such as a field, a network, an assemblage, an agencement, or a self-organizing process.Footnote 27 It is because they fashion, produce, enact, translate, or perform these relational processes that characters matter. Some theorists (e.g. Bourdieu) place a re- in front of these formulations to gesture towards the repetitive stickiness of relational processes. Others prefer to accentuate their serendipitous, open character (e.g. Connolly). Either way, the point is that thinking relationally makes it possible to see the active agency of the materialist characters (the mime, the minion, and the body) in global governance. Even if they do not have such intentions, trade-fairs, algorithms, and bodies engage in global internet-governance in the sense of actively (re-)enacting it.
Second, and directly related to this, adopting a relational process ontology also alters the conceptualization of the characters. They cease to be unitary singulars with given interests or essential characteristics that are at the origin of their agency. Instead, Mol's point that the body is multiple could be writ large to capture the status of socio-materially entangled characters more generally.Footnote 28 Moreover, their status is therefore unstable. Characters may shift status depending on the context and time. Things have a ‘social life’ and a ‘cultural biography’.Footnote 29 They are co-produced and emerging in the governance relations they are part of. The recovery of concepts such as the Leibnizean monad, Spinozean affects, or Tardean mimetics in (new) materialism reflects the interest in how to better theorize this kind of subject and the forms associated with it.
Writing this relationally entangled, processual agency into A Theory requires a revision and decentring of both agency and actor. Focussing on the ‘network forms of governance’ as Barnett suggests in his contribution to the symposium is a step in this direction. It breaks up the formal unity of the actors that do most work in A Theory. However, to see the agency of new materialist characters requires going further and conceptualizing these networks as socio-materially entangled and dynamic. For example, commercially generated encryption standards perform work governing the circulation of images of bodies and hence the production of a racialized, gendered corporeal politics. This work slides out of focus lest network forms of governance be re-conceptualized so as to make space for shifting socio-material entanglings.
Infrastructurings
Second, and along similar lines, the processes through which materialist actors do politics are located elsewhere than in the public arena of political debate at the core A Theory. Pace Deitelhoff and Daase such processes may not be the most salient for the making of global governance.Footnote 30 Rather, focussing on them tends to perpetuate the misrecognition of political processes located elsewhere. One such elsewhere is the infrastructure.
Infrastructures, the way they are infrastructuring politics and the infrapolitics surrounding these processes have indeed come to occupy a core place in debates about digitization and internet-governance.Footnote 31 More generally, across the social sciences and the humanities, we are witnessing what amounts to a ‘turn’ to ‘infrastructuralism’.Footnote 32 As an introductory chapter on internet-governance puts it, to understand internet-governance we need to move from thinking about governance of infrastructures to governance by infrastructure.Footnote 33 This focus on infrastructurings is closely connected to an awareness of the deeply political ‘invisible work’ done by infrastructures and a related interest in opening this work to analysis, showing it and engaging with it.Footnote 34 In internet governance this includes focussing on the work done by encryption standards, cables, and ITPs.Footnote 35 The politics of this mundane and boring work is easy to overlook, especially as it does not follow an orderly, overarching logic. Rather, it tends to be disjointed and messy if not outright failing.Footnote 36 The ‘snarls’ of breakdowns, failures, disruptions, and discontinuities are the sounds of infrastructurings.Footnote 37
Although A Theory is unaffected by the turn to infrastructuralism, writing infrastructural processes into it would be possible. For example, by ‘politicizing’ – which as Zürn puts it involves ‘making political what was unpolitical by bringing it into politics’.Footnote 38 New materialist scholars have worked with analogous ideas focussing on making things ‘public’ or ‘international’.Footnote 39 However, making room for it in A Theory in would require ridding ‘politicizing’ and ‘making political’ of their formal political connotations and associating them with infrastructures.
Sensings
Finally, in A Theory political processes are anchored in articulated motivations and carefully crafted strategies. They are rational and reasonable. Zürn dissociates his theory from the assumed and taken for granted. Authority is both ‘epistemic’ and ‘reflexive’ in that it ‘is typically not internalized but allows scrutiny of the exercise of authority at any time’.Footnote 40 While this version of politics as a matter of reasoned reflexive strategizing is comforting, it marginalizes materialist characters. Writing about the processes through which they make politics requires giving up the comforts of reason and acknowledging the role also of sensings, or what Johns terms sensory economies.Footnote 41
To claim that the reflected, reasoned arguments of algorithms or bodies matter for global governance would be bizarre. To say that their sensings are significant is not. On the contrary, algorithms record anomalies and make up digital security subjects by sensing them not by reasoning about them. Analogously, a wide array of sensors registering geo-location but also sight, sounds, temperatures, blood pressures, or chemicals are involved in global governance. They are built into the cameras managing people at borders, the technologies used to control the cargo of ships entering a harbour, or the fitbit watches that have become pervasive in the government of bodies.Footnote 42 The politics of these sensors is not reasonably strategizing. Even when their sensing is reflexive, it is reflexivity of the kind Zürn distances himself from. Our data-eating/data-emitting bodies constantly (reflexively) absorb, accommodate, and adjust to data that is itself constantly (reflexively) absorbing, accommodating, and adjusting to our bodily transformations.Footnote 43 However, the reflexive here involves no conscious scrutiny. On the contrary, it is reflexivity of the other, automatic kind.
Writing materialist processes into A Theory requires more than minor re-touches to the story line. It involves writing about relational entanglements that diffuse and decentre the notion of agency and anchor it in doings rather than intentionality. It also implicates writing about a decentring of politics from the public political debate to mundane, messy, and failing infrastructurings. Finally, it requires writing sensings into a story that can no longer revolve exclusively around reasoned strategies. These changes are rather fundamental. They not only complicate the story of A Theory but multiply the lines this story needs to follow.
Conclusion
Locating materialist characters and processes in A Theory has far-reaching consequences. Instead of the familiar states, international institutions, and NGOs, it leaves us with a motley cast comprising also market dispositives, minions, and mimes. Instead of a plot focussed on the interaction of these characters, in a readily recognizable political sphere/debate where each actor reflexively elaborates and scrutinizes their own strategies, we find ourselves grappling with their socio-material relational entanglings, their imbrication in mundane and failing infrastructurings, and their inarticulate sensings. This amounts to more than adding a missing word (or even paragraph) to the story. Fundamental alterations to casting and story line are called for. Zürn will probably balk at the suggestion. Let me nonetheless insist.
Re-casting A Theory and rewriting its plot is of import analytically. It is a way of ensuring that it does not misconstrue global governance and contribute to the obfuscation of the power in it. More importantly, it matters politically. It may help us address Keohane's justified concern in this issue with the ‘current political predicament’ of illiberalism in Global Governance. If material actors and process play a crucial role, as this contribution suggests they do, understanding them, and possibly engaging them and turning them into companions – or oddkin as Haraway would sayFootnote 44 – matters more than a little. It makes space for imaginative constructive political strategies of a kind definitely called for in what Zürn rightly terms the hard times of global governance. Such materialist strategies would necessarily reflect the import of contextualization and plurality and hence ‘the problem of a one world’.Footnote 45 They would strip A Theory of its grandiose ‘A’. However, if a title change (along with a recasting and a rewriting) could make A Theory live up to its own analytical and political ambitions, may it be worth considering?
Acknowledgements
Special thanks are due to two very helpful reviewers for their efforts to improve this manuscript, to Jonas Tallberg and Orfeo Fioretos for pulling this together, and to Michael Zürn for writing the book we are all debating.
