Trieste and its territory: a contested borderland

In taking a constructivist approach to the idea of nationhood (Anderson 1983; Eley and Suny Reference Eley and Suny1996), scholars such as Roger Brubaker have suggested that modern states embraced a specific form of nationalism that is also known as ‘transborder nationalism’, aiming to nationalise a common ethnic community living outside its national borders. In a nineteenth-century multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic space such as the Habsburg Empire, Adriatic irredentism became an agent of transborder nationalism and a ‘movement to incorporate irredenta, that is, lands or people represented as unredeemed because stranded under alien rule’ (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996, 110). Thus, in a frontier city such as Trieste, Adriatic irredentists fuelled competing ideas of nationhood among the locals, ultimately inflaming social, political, and ethnic relations from the late nineteenth century (Reill Reference Reill2012, 1). In particular, on the eve of the First World War, Italian nationalist propaganda provided an increasingly ethnic and exclusive meaning to the idea of Trieste’s Italian identity by highlighting the dangerously backward nature of Slav civilisation and calling for its territorial incorporation inside the Italian state. Although the Versailles Settlement of 1919 recognised Italian sovereignty over Trieste and Istria, the government’s claims on Fiume and the Dalmatian region remained unfulfilled and were publicly used to feed the myth of the ‘mutilated victory’ (Sluga Reference Sluga2001, 6). Thus, Trieste became the guardian of the eastern border within public discourse as well as the ideal embodiment of past Italian influence across the Adriatic – not only during the inter-war years but also in the immediate post-war years. In line with Mussolini’s belief that ‘when ethnicity does not agree with geography … it is ethnicity that must move’ (Petacco Reference Petacco2005, 14), the Fascist regime pursued a strong policy of Italianisation on the Adriatic borderland that aimed to redraw its ethnic configuration while also publicly celebrating Trieste as the ‘città italianissima’.

On 25 July 1943, the fall of Mussolini’s regime immediately exposed the negative effects of twenty years of Fascism and produced a vortex of violence that local intellectual Carlo Schiffrer referred to as ‘the year zero of italianità’ (Pirjevec Reference Pirjevec2009, 38). The dissolution of Italian statehood transformed the northern Adriatic coast into a theatre of Nazi-Fascist and Titoist partisan violence and further isolated the Triestine territory from the rest of the nation (Ballinger Reference Ballinger2003, 21). Only on 21 May1945, after an uninterrupted series of diplomatic negotiations, did the Allied and Yugoslav governments establish the provisional division of the Triestine territory along the Morgan line. On 9 June 1945, the territorial partition was officially sanctioned with the Belgrade agreement and Yugoslav troops withdrew from the city, which was also occupied by the Allies. As I examine in the next section, the disputed sovereignty of Italy’s eastern border became central to the Italian government’s narrative of Trieste as an outpost of Italian nationhood at the southern point of the Iron Curtain, and it reinforced its nationalist representation in and outside the city.

The Trieste moment: Italians rally round the flag

During the Allied Military Government’s (AMG) occupation of Trieste, which lasted from June 1945 until the London Memorandum of 1954, centre-right political parties, émigrés and nationalist associations, as well as neo-Fascists, all advocated Trieste’s reincorporation inside national borders (Mapelli Reference Mapelli1987, 26). At this time, the views of this wide range of political actors largely converged both at local and national level. Nonetheless, liberal, Republican and Democrat representatives condemned the Fascist expropriation of the national myth of Trieste and reasserted a national rather than nationalistic meaning of the borders established after the First World War (La Voce Repubblicana, May 8, 1945). In contrast, Socialist and Communist leaders publicly supported the creation of an independent Trieste (Grassi Reference Grassi2009), as it would prevent Tito’s annexationist ambitions from being used as a ‘pretext for nationalist forces’ (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS, April–May, 1945). Not only Italians but also local Slovenes generally identified with the views of the local Communist or socialist party according to the strength of their pro- or anti-Titoist sentiments.Footnote ² Above all, conflicting political views inside the city mirrored a variety of local perceptions that diverged from the central government’s portrayal of the Trieste question according to ideological dichotomies of East vs. West and Communism vs. Democracy (Pupo Reference Pupo2007, 140).

As Sabina Mihelj demonstrates, the Cold War ‘entailed not only an ideological confrontation between two different political visions but also a confrontation between two competing forms of nationalism’ (2012, 58). This ultimately perpetuated pre-existing anti-Slav stereotypes that emphasised the alleged violent and tribal nature of the Balkan ethnicities (Todorova Reference Todorova2009) which remained rooted in Italian local and national public opinion. Thus, nationalist ideas of Italian nationhood largely shaped by past imperial and racial categories symbolically portrayed Italy’s north-eastern border as a bulwark against Yugoslav Communism. Therefore, the majority of national and local public opinion opposed the idea of a free and independent Trieste and politically mobilised to reassert Italian sovereignty over the city and its hinterland. Following the signing of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and the formal creation of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), which included Trieste (Zone A) and northern Istria (Zone B),Footnote ³ Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi attempted to capitalise on this sentiment by publicly calling for a ‘passionate revolt against the unmerited fate of the Italian people and the loss of Trieste and Pola.’ De Gasperi’s impassioned speech against an ‘unjust peace’ promised never to abandon Trieste and its people, stating that ‘there are no borders able to break kinship’ (Difesa Adriatica, 18 September 1947). His words confirmed that Trieste, which Italian public opinion had rhetorically depicted as the ‘unredeemed’ city and a bastion of Italian civilisation, remained central to post-war notions of Italian nationhood. Scholars such as Maura Hametz (Reference Hametz2005) have demonstrated that Trieste played a unique role as an agent of national patriotism within public discourse in the immediate post-war years. From this perspective, the documentation of the Ufficio Zone di Confine (Office of Border Zones, hereafter, UZC) as well as the records of the American National Archives, further reveal the nature and scope of the Italian government’s strategy for the city and its surrounding territory, not only during the immediate post-war years but also after 1954.Footnote ⁴

During the early years of the Cold War the strenuous defence of Italian sovereignty over the Triestine territory also served Allied geopolitical goals in the Adriatic and, in the words of Angelo Ara and Claudio Magris, transformed Trieste into ‘the Berlin of the Adriatic’: a pawn in international politics and a crucible of ideological tension (Reference Ara and Magris2007, 168). Anticipating the Italian elections of April 1948 and hoping to strengthen Italian democracy against the Communist threat, the three Western powers issued the ‘Tripartite Declaration’ on 20 March 1948 (De Castro, 263). Their declaration of support for Italian sovereignty over Trieste and its territory was met with great enthusiasm, not only from neo-irredentist associations, but also public opinion. Indeed, mass demonstrations erupted throughout Italy, including a student parade in Palermo where a laurel wreath was placed at the foot of the monument of the fallen soldier (FBIS, 24 March 1948). Public opinion in Trieste portrayed popular responses to the Tripartite Declaration as a plebiscite of ‘italianità’, yet Italian hopes for the reintegration of the Julian city and its territory were dashed just three months later by the Soviet-Yugoslav rift (McDermott and Stibbe Reference McDermott and Stibbe2007, 22). Tito’s departure from the Soviet alliance signalled a decisive change in Allied attitudes towards both his regime and the Triestine problem, as it was seen as an invaluable opportunity to weaken the cohesion of the Communist bloc (Zuccari Reference Zuccari2008). US observers in Trieste noted that the return of the disputed territory to Italy was not definitively decided ‘so long as there remained a chance of bringing Tito into the Western camp or otherwise taking advantage of the Yugoslav situation’ (National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], RG 59, Subject Files, Baldwin Report, ‘Possible trend of USSR and Yugoslav Policy toward the Trieste Question,’ n.14, 30 December 1948, Box 9).

The prolonged diplomatic stalemate on the Triestine problem gave rise to numerous quarrels between the Italian authorities, the AMG, and the local Triestines, on issues such as Trieste University and assistance for incoming Istrian émigrés (Toninelli et al. Reference Toninelli, Cuderi, Dugulin, Mellinato and Vinci2004; Catalan et al. Reference Catalan, Mellinato, Pupo and Verginella2007). In particular, as Anna Millo (Reference Millo2011) effectively argues in her most recent book on Trieste, the deadlock over the disputed sovereignty of the FTT persuaded the Italian government to embrace a new aggressive strategy. First, it expanded the political agenda of the UZC. Second, it fomented an anti-Allied campaign that portrayed the AMG as the main obstacle to Trieste’s return to Italy (Spazzali Reference Spazzali2011, 12). Finally, it showed greater complacency toward local right-wing extremism. Indeed, in March 1952, on the fourth anniversary of the Tripartite Declaration, Triestines gathered in Piazza Unità to demand its implementation and expressed popular opposition to Allied rule, chanting ‘get out of Italy, get out, foreigner’ (Archivio Centrale dello Stato [ACS], Fondo Ministero Interni [MI], Partiti Politici, Schedario, 1944–1966, Divisione Affari Riservati, 1951–1953, Cat.O10, Jugoslavia, B.36). Concurrently, local right-wing extremist groups provoked incidents of public disorder as well as skirmishes between the local population and the Allied authorities, all of which resulted in 64 arrests and the wounding of 21 demonstrators (Millo Reference Millo2011, 112–116).

Commenting on the Triestine events, American journalist Alexander Werth pronounced that due to its rooted Italian identity, Trieste was the ‘new Fiume’ in Italian public discourse and that only a popular vote could peacefully settle the problem (The Nation, 19 April 1952). However, Tito’s opposition to a plebiscite inside the Triestine territory and the friendly stance of the US towards Yugoslavia made such a solution unfeasible. In addition, American political interests in the Adriatic had become irreconcilable with Italy’s orthodox defence of its territorial claims over the Triestine territory. In such a context, the 1953 electoral defeat of the centrist coalition led by De Gasperi as well as the growing influence of the Italian Communist Party persuaded the United States to accelerate the resolution of the Triestine problem (NARA, RG 84, Records of Clare Boothe Luce 1955–1957, ‘Memorandum of conversation De Gasperi-Luce’, 22 June 1953, Box 1).

Meanwhile, the new Italian government led by Christian Democrat Giuseppe Pella decided to fully demonstrate its power in confrontation with its Yugoslav neighbour and almost brought Italy and Yugoslavia to the brink of war (Meyr Reference Meyr and Pupo2008, 38–43). As a consequence, on 8 October 1953 the American and British governments issued the Bipartite Declaration in which they proclaimed their willingness to transfer sovereignty of Zone A to Italy (Valdevit Reference Valdevit1994, 25). This announcement was anticipated by secret communications with Tito in which the Anglo-Americans confirmed the definitive partition of Zones A and B (NARA, RG 84, Records of Clare Boothe Luce 1953–1955, Trieste Vol. I, Action Plan, Top Secret, Telegram from Dulles to Tito on 6 October 1953, Box 1). In the meantime they continued to communicate its temporary status to Pella (NARA, RG 84, Records of Clare Boothe Luce 1953–1955, Trieste Vol. I, Action Plan, Top Secret, ‘Meeting Luce and Pella’, Telegram 7 October 1953, Box 1).

Although Italian public opinion celebrated the American and British Bipartite Declaration with jubilant mass demonstrations, the central government feared a possible coup by pro-Tito forces (ACS, Partiti Politici, Schedario, 1944–1966, Divisione Affari Riservati, 1951–1953, Cat.O10, Jugoslavia, Folder Jugoslavia situazione politica, Report of 5 October 1953, B.28) as well as American military disengagement from Trieste (ACS, MI, Divisione Affari Riservati, 1951–1953, Folder TLT, Notizie Politiche, ‘Secret Note to General Mesco’, 11 October 1953, B.73). Thus, eager to achieve significant success in foreign policy and reinforce popular consensus before forthcoming elections, Rome upheld its nationalist stance over Trieste and attempted to prove the AMG’s inability to guarantee local order and stability (NARA, RG 84, Records of Clare Boothe Luce 1953–1955, 8–16 October, Trieste Volume 4, Top Secret, Telegram 13 October 1953, Box 1). In a context of increasing social, ethnic, and political tension, the central government used both secret services and neo-Fascist paramilitary squads, sparking riots inside the city against the Allied police and provoking an uncontrolled escalation of violence that ultimately led to the deaths of six young protesters and the wounding of about 160.Footnote ⁵

Within public discourse the deaths of these young Triestines were commemorated as supreme acts of individual sacrifice and national patriotism and were politically used to mobilise the Italian public against the prolonged Allied military occupation of Trieste (Delbello Reference Delbello2003). Sections of the national press fiercely accused US President Eisenhower of favouring diplomatic relations with Tito’s totalitarian regime and nullifying his former promises of justice for Italy (Il Tempo, 9 November 1953). While publicly portraying the Italian army as powerless at Trieste’s gate, the narrative of both national and local public opinion ultimately reinforced popular feelings of enmity toward the Allies both in and outside the city.

Under pressure from the American administration, for which Trieste had become ‘a needless distraction’, the representatives of the United States and Great Britain signed the London Memorandum with Italian and Yugoslav ambassadors in 1954 (Rabel, 160). This agreement established the withdrawal of the Allied military troops from Zone A, its transfer to Italian administration, a minor territorial modification of the border, and a shared definition of minority rights by both the Yugoslav and Italian sides. Trieste’s return to Italy was celebrated as ‘a gift to the indefatigable efforts and indisputable faith in the homeland that virtuously defended the sacrifice of its martyrs’ (Il Pensiero Mazziniano, October–November 1954). While the central government rhetorically viewed Trieste’s reincorporation within national borders as the end of the historical trajectory of national unification, the local Italian population in Istria understood Trieste’s return to Italy as the death of traditional Adriatic irredentist dreams. From this point of view, 1954 effectively represented a watershed in the nationalist rhetoric over Italy’s eastern border and also marked a turning point in the shaping of ideas of nationhood from the perspective of Cold War Trieste. However, the government’s promises to deny Yugoslav sovereignty of Zone B fed the hopes of the Italians who continued to dream of a second ‘redemption’ for the Istrian region.

After London: reframing Italian nationhood

Following the signing of the 1954 London Memorandum the Christian Democratic-led coalition government undertook a more conciliatory approach toward Tito’s regime and progressively portrayed Italy’s eastern border as a bridge towards, rather than a wall against, the socialist world. Even though the new political relationship between Italy and Yugoslavia was oriented toward economic cooperation and social reconciliation between border communities, local ethno-political antagonism did not disappear from Trieste (The New York Times, 10 October 1954). Indeed, the territorial dispute over the ex-Zone B, which had only been provisionally but not formally settled, inflamed residual expressions of nationalism. The central government, aware that Trieste and its Istrian émigrés were by no means willing to recognise Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-Zone B at least in the short-term, granted significant financial contributions to a variety of associations with recreational, social, economic, cultural, or artistic goals (UZC, Sezione V, Busta 24, Vol.II, Folder Trieste Circolo della Cultura e delle Arti, ‘Contributions 1949-1984’). These grants, officially recorded as expenses for ‘propaganda d’italianità’, were entrusted to the personnel of the UZC, which took the name of ‘Ufficio Regioni’ (Office of Italian Regions) after 1954. However, unlike in the past, the activities of this office were oriented to the preservation of Italian culture and language in both Trieste and the territory under Yugoslav administration, rather than the reassertion of former territorial claims.

This change, which very much complemented the new Italian policy of ‘Adriatic friendship’ (Bucarelli Reference Bucarelli2008; Bucarelli, Micheletta, Monzali and Riccardi Reference Bucarelli, Micheletta, Monzali and Riccardi2016) as well as the new course of both national and local domestic politics (D’Amelio Reference D’Amelio2009), weakened past nationalist rhetoric about Italian nationhood and enhanced localised interpretations of the border’s identity. After 1954, these perspectives increasingly related to the central government’s ability to restore the economic well-being of the city, as demonstrated by a 1955 report from Giovanni Palamara, the local head of the Commissariato Generale del Governo Territorio di Trieste (CGGTT). Palamara wrote that people in Trieste were increasingly disappointed by the new Italian administration’s failure to stimulate the local economy and that their discontent affected their Italian sentiments (Archivio di Stato Trieste, AST, Fondo CGGTT, Pacco 2, Fasc. A, 3/14, Relazione Politica 1955, ‘Report from Palamara’, 15 November 1955). Indeed, the steady decline of Trieste’s port further marginalised the city from the Italian ‘economic miracle’, an issue that was promptly exploited by the anti-governmental opposition, whose political strength ‘directly related to citizens’ prosperity’(Grassi Reference Grassi2009, 27).

Nonetheless, the defence of the pre-war borders stretching to Istria remained significant among those sections of Triestine society that continued to think of those living across the demarcation line as uncivilised, atheistic ‘Slavo-Communists’ (Mihelj Reference Mihelj2012, 276–296). This stereotype, which recalled past views of a ‘civilised’ Western Europe and ‘barbaric’ East, fuelled political antagonism toward local Slovenes, who were portrayed as an extension of Tito’s Communism and heralds of Trieste’s eventual Balkanisation. Thus, when the Italian government proposed officially to extend the use of the Slovene language to judicial and administrative offices in Trieste in 1961, Triestines responded with mass demonstrations that degenerated into skirmishes between the local police and protesters, many of whom were affiliated to the local neo-Fascist party. The incidents, which lasted for four days and took place near local Slovene cultural institutions, exposed popular animosity towards a decision that was locally perceived as detrimental to the Italian identity of the city (Il Popolo, 7 February 1961). The Christian Democrat-led coalition government condemned the local incidents as an expression of a tiny and unrepresentative segment of the Triestine population and confirmed its commitment to the defence of Trieste’s ‘italianità’ by means of the London Memorandum (Archivio Generale del Comune di Trieste, ACT, Verbale Consiglio Comunale, Sessione Straordinaria, 6 February 1961). At the same time, however, the coalition also distanced itself from pre-1954 nationalist rhetoric and increasingly considered the progressive views of centre-left parties, which supported a policy of ‘active coexistence’ with Tito’s regime (Istituto Don Sturzo, ALS, Fondo Mario Scelba, Versamento I, Attivitá di Partito, B.21, fasc.165, 22 February 1962).

In 1963 broader political processes culminated in the creation of a centre-left coalition government which politically relied upon the support of Christian Democrats, Republicans, Social Democrats, and Socialists (Perfetti Reference Perfetti2011, 9–27). The gradual opening to the left was also transposed to an Italian form of what the West Germans later called ‘Ostpolitik’ and shaped the new strategy of the Christian Democrat Foreign Minister Aldo Moro (Garzia, Monzali and Bucarelli Reference Garzia, Monzali and Bucarelli2011, 12). Although the formal recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over the northern part of the Istrian region could have effectively enhanced the international prestige of the Italian government and greatly benefited bilateral relations, Rome also understood the political effect that any definitive renunciation of the ex-Zone B could have on its local popularity. Indeed, following the announcement of the formation and implementation of the new centre-left coalition in Trieste, hundreds of right-wing students and members of the neo-Fascist movement arranged a series of demonstrations in front of both the local headquarters of the Christian Democrats and the city council (Vezzà and Comelli Reference Vezzà and Comelli2013, 104).

Due to their threatening tone, the local police disbanded the protests and arrested some of the main agitators (UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 7, Vol. I, Folder elezioni provinciali e amminstrative, ‘Mazza to PCM’, 16 October 1963). In response to the arrests, patriotic and émigré associations published and distributed a pamphlet claiming that ‘Christian Democrats and Social Democrats forgot the interests of the nation in order to gain a few thousand votes from the local Slovenes.’ The pamphlet denounced this policy as a betrayal, because it forgave the crime of the‘foibe’ – the slaughter of thousands of Italians by Yugoslavian partisans during and after the Second World War and the casting of their bodies into chasms or foibe in the Karst region – and the forced emigration of 300,000 Italians from Yugoslavia (UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 7, Vol.I, Folder elezioni provinciali e amminstrative, flyer ‘Giunta Giovanile di Vigilanza Nazionale’, 19 Octobe 1963). The harsh tone and bitter accusations of the local protesters revealed the widespread hostility of the right wing in the Triestine population, which portrayed the political shift to the centre-left as a deadly threat to the city’s Italian identity (Trieste, September–October 1963).

Nonetheless, the Christian Democrat-led coalition government believed that the improvement of Italian-Yugoslav relations would allow ‘Trieste to return to its traditional role as an open frontier city’ (Archivio Lega Nazionale, ALN, Segreteria Speciale, Folder 1963/III, ‘Letter from Botteri to Muratti’, 8 October 1963). A wealthy Trieste would better serve the preservation of the Italian cultural and linguistic identity of the Adriatic border and, at the same time, would work as a barrier to Yugoslav Communism. Over time, the territorial reincorporation of the ex-Zone B had disappeared from the diplomatic agenda of the central government and, especially after 1963, any reference to this issue was increasingly perceived as a ‘needless element of contentiousness amid the Adriatic friendship’ (ACS, Carte Moro, PCM, 1963–1968, Busta 77, Sottofasc. Visita in Jugoslavia 8–12 November 1965, ‘Berio to Saragat’, 31 March 1964). As this statement proves, the Italian government had gradually embraced the idea of Trieste as an outpost of modernity and Western economic prosperity, which, contrary to former nationalist representations, would serve as a bridge towards rather than a wall against the East.

Thus, in 1965 the central government proposed a ‘package deal’ or global agreement in which Italy would receive significant compensation for renouncing its formal sovereignty over the ex-Zone B (Bucarelli 2011, 140). Despite this, the fickle nature of Triestine public opinion discouraged the Christian Democrat-led coalition government from proceeding further and persuaded it to postpone a definitive settlement, proving that local concerns were at times stronger than Italian strategic interests in the Adriatic (ACS, Carte Moro, PCM 1963–1968, Busta 77, Fasc. Visita ufficiale in Jugoslavia Presidente del Consiglio On. Prof. Aldo Moro 8–12 November 1965, ‘SIFAR Ufficio “S” Jugoslavia, note di politica interna ed estera e notizie militari’, 27 January 1965). Nevertheless, the idea that the Italian-Yugoslav border should be transformed into a point of ‘osmosis of different cultures and economies’ had gained significant ground by the mid-1960s. As summarised by the Triestine socialist Bruno Pincherle, segments of the public believed that ‘by metaphorically drawing this border with a pencil instead of a pen, the artificial frontier would dissolve into a space of brotherhood, equality, and freedom’ (ACT, Verbale Consiglio Comunale, ‘Allegato 5’, 11 June 1965).

Pincherle’s hopes for an open border depended heavily on the successful transformation of people’s attitudes and views.Footnote ⁶ While discussing the existence of a local strong resentment toward the Slovenes of the city with US officials, Trieste’s Mayor Mario Franzil stated that this minority was regarded ‘with the same degree of inbred racial contempt as are the Negroes in many areas of the deep South of the United States’ (NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964–1966, Box 2367, From AMCONSUL Trieste to Department of State, 9 December 1964). This statement offers an interesting insight into the complexity of the process of socio-political reconciliation in Trieste and also demonstrates the resilience of anti-Slovene sentiments. It also confirms the existence of ethno-political intolerance that centre-right political parties and associations exploited to oppose the Christian Democrats’ decision to appoint Dusan Hrescak, a Slovene Socialist with a Titoist past, as a local administrator. As in the past, popular protests escalated into skirmishes with the local police, during which 73 people were arrested (ACS, MI, Gabinetto, Fasc. Correnti, 1964–1966, B.79, Fasc. 12010/85, Attività dei partiti, ‘Telegram from Mazza to PCM’, 31 July 1965).

The Hrescak case demonstrated that the defence of Trieste’s Italian identity not only remained politically significant to its residents, but it also furthered the preservation of ideas of Italian nationhood which stemmed from the city’s irredentist past. Thus, ‘a sense of sudden nationhood’ (Bergholz Reference Bergholz2013), which had apparently only lain dormant since 1954, resurfaced in Trieste and produced high levels of socio-political polarisation that exposed the complexity of the city’s frontier identity. Commenting on the Trieste events, Elio Apih, a leading local historian, argued that popular hostility toward the Slovene representative was the outcome of the complex relationship between Trieste’s patriotism and its frontier identity. Apih well understood that the dialectic of Cold War Trieste was directly related to the surviving legacy of aggressive Adriatic irredentism and had boosted local antagonism toward the Slovene minority (Trieste, May–June, 1965). So, after 1954, the government’s efforts to safeguard the region’s Italian heritage, while simultaneously facilitating the peaceful coexistence of different cultures in Trieste, were bound to contradict each other and generate frustration among the local Italian population.

The path to Osimo: a threat to irredentist ideas of Italian nationhood

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s these feelings of frustration and disillusionment towards the central government were further amplified by the chronic economic stagnation that characterised Trieste and its port, ultimately undermining the government’s efforts to depict the city as a centre of Western opulence and modernity (Fragiacomo Reference Fragiacomo2012, 178–193). Indeed, a comparative analysis of the port traffic shows a steady revenue increase for the ports of Fiume and Hamburg, which were favourably supported by advantageous tariffs and infrastructure, while Trieste’s traffic declined to the level of 1940 (ACS, Ufficio Consigliere Diplomatico, Fasc. 319, Busta 90, Trieste, Porto, 1963). So when the central government announced a new economic strategy for the Triestine port, known as the CIPE plan, which proposed the end of shipbuilding in San Marco and its conversion into a repair dock, not only the port workers but the entire city showed its firm opposition. In his correspondence to Rome, Trieste’s mayor Mario Franzil explained that, due to the city’s geopolitical location, the implementation of the CIPE plan threatened to further suffocate rather than save its port economy. With an ageing population, stagnant maritime traffic and comparatively low incomes, Trieste’s competitiveness would have been fatally compromised, to the great advantage of the Yugoslav Adriatic ports (UZC, Sezione IV Trieste, ‘Franzil to Moro’, 25 November 1965, Busta 12, Vol. I).

As a result, significant segments of the Italian local population feared the ‘Slavisation’ of the city, which they believed would lead to their increasing political and economic marginalisation. From this perspective, the government’s plan was locally viewed as a deadly threat to Trieste’s port economy and, above all, its Italian identity (ALN, Segreteria Riservata, ‘Le mirabolanti promesse del CIPE e le bugie democristiane ai danni di Trieste’, 1966). In October 1966, following months of political polemics and accusations against the central government, Trieste exploded in social and political turmoil. The violent demonstrations of 8 October represented the peak of protest against the CIPE plan, and were subsequently portrayed as the ‘dark days of the Triestine October’ (Archivio Audiovisivo del Movimento Operaio e Democratico [Rome], Trieste, 8 October 1966). On this day protesters threw bricks as they headed towards the Christian Democrat headquarters and the main office of the newspaper Il Piccolo, which they perceived as supportive of the government. Workers created barriers and confronted local authorities in a prolonged riot which, according to local Christian Democrat leader Sergio Coloni, was ‘premeditated and incited by communist agitators’ (Il Piccolo, 9 October 1966). The vandalism and violence resulted in 50 arrests and left 450 wounded (The New York Times, 9 October 1966). Such mass protests against the CIPE plan facilitated the resurgence of popular pro-independence sentiments in Trieste and also politically strengthened the independence movement that underscored the classic populist themes of an inefficient, degenerate and corrupt democracy (Spadaro Reference Spadaro1984, 119–147). These sentiments had long simmered in the city and further confirmed resentment of the central government for years of inaction and empty patriotic rhetoric. They were also expressed in ordinary conversations and jokes. For example, the answer to what the government would do with the San Marco facility when it stopped building ships, was: ‘they will make a tubular pipe from which politicians will proclaim that Trieste is dear to every Italian heart’ (The New York Times, 30 May 1965). Not only does this reveal the sense of marginalisation that pervaded the Italian community living in a borderland city such as Trieste, but it also offers invaluable insight into the divergent perspectives and mutual lack of understanding that characterised the political relationship between the city and Rome after 1945.

Although Trieste’s historical past, its cultural heritage and its geopolitical location in the early years of the Cold War had made Trieste the hallmark of national patriotism and anti-Communism, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 revived Italian fears of Soviet aggression. In consequence, Tito’s regime became an invaluable buffer to contain Moscow’s expansionist goals towards Eastern Europe (Il Piccolo, 26 October 1968). From Italy’s perspective a permanent state border would consolidate Yugoslav political stability and further strengthen Italian security on the eastern border (ACS, PCM, Ufficio Consigliere Diplomatico, Busta 66, Fasc .6, ‘Trabalza to Fanfani’, 9 May 1968). In addition, by 1970 public discourse regarding Zone B had crystallised around two irreconcilable positions. On the one hand, centre-left political parties and associations advocated the formal resolution of a senseless dispute whose terms had been informally resolved in 1954 and had created the most open border in Cold War Europe (Il Popolo, 1 December 1970); on the other, centre-right political parties and associations reasserted claims to formal territorial rights over northern Istria and stressed the negative effects of a definitive border that would physically separate Italians across the Adriatic (Il Secolo d’Italia, 1 December 1970).

In this context, the announcement of Tito’s diplomatic visit of 1970 and rumours of secret negotiations to definitively settle the border dispute prompted vehement protests by neo-irredentist formations. Centre-right associations, political parties, and émigré associations portrayed Tito’s visit as an offence to the memory of the victims of the ‘foibe’, a claim that reiterated the image of ‘Slavs’ as inherently brutal and vividly displayed the resilience of revanchist nationalism (ALN, Folder 1970/1, Segreteria Luglio-Dicembre 1970, ‘Press Release from Federazione Nazionale Arditi e Combattenti’, 10 November 1970). In Trieste, popular demonstrations against Tito’s planned visit were attended by approximately 2,000 people and escalated into episodes of urban violence during which neo-Fascists targeted both members of the Slovene minority and leftist organisations (ACS, MI, Gabinetto, Fasc, Corrrenti, B.102, Fasc.12010/85, Trieste e Provincia Attività dei Partiti, ‘Telegram to Gabinetto’, 8 December 1970). Following these events, progressive Triestines responded to the appeal of local centre-left parties and associations by holding a counter-demonstration that was attended by 15,000 people (Il Lavoratore, 24 December 1970).

In the context of the progressive democratisation of Triestine society and international détente, large fringes of the local Italian community in Trieste increasingly understood the London Memorandum as a permanent rather than provisional agreement. In the words of Triestine poet Umberto Saba, for some the London Memorandum had served as an antidote to ethnic passion in a frontier region where ‘patriotism, nationalism, and racism are related like health, neurosis, and craziness’(Trieste, 1971). Therefore, in the early 1970s, the transformation of the demarcation line between Trieste and the ex-Zone B into a state border appeared a mere matter of time. The historical compromise between Communists and Christian Democrats in national politics as well as widespread political concerns about possible Yugoslav political-military instability after Tito’s death further accelerated the final settlement of the border dispute (ACS, MI, Schedario Fascicoli classificati, partiti-movimenti politici 1971–1975, Faldone 3, Fasc. 160.P.187, PCI Trieste, ‘Report from Local Prefect’, 7 March 1975). Above all, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided the ideal context within which the Italian government could legitimise the recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-Zone B as both a consequence of the unchangeable nature of Europe’s post-war borders and an example of Italy’s major contribution to international peace (Garzia 2011, 104).

So, in a speech on 4 October 1975, Italian Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor presented the Osimo Treaty, the final agreement on Italy’s eastern border. Rumor described the treaty as an opportunity to restore Trieste’s traditional role as a crossroads between people and cultures, a statement that well summarised the Italian government’s change in perspective from the early years of the Cold War, when Trieste was publicly portrayed as an outpost of Italian nationhood in the Adriatic (Il Popolo, 4 October 1975). Although Rumor claimed that the Treaty with Yugoslavia was ‘painful yet unavoidable’, he stated that Osimo formally recognised the definitive return of Trieste to Italy, included a favourable border adjustment, and ended any residual issues with Yugoslavia (FBIS, 4 October 1975). The Treaty also opened the door to new agreements on the creation of a free trade zone, a more efficient use of Adriatic resources, and an improvement in the mobility of people and goods through the Italian-Yugoslav border (Udina Reference Udina1979).

International public opinion praised Italy for making a great sacrifice in order to consolidate Yugoslav geopolitical stability and interpreted the agreement as ‘a worthy example of genuine statesmanship to resolve international problems with patience, goodwill, and a pinch of political courage’ (The New York Times, 9 October 1975). The leftist press in Italy welcomed the agreement as ‘proof of political realism which healed a wound of the Fascist war, advanced security and cooperation in Europe, and weakened the petty nationalism of right-wing propaganda’ (Rinascita, 10 October 1975). By contrast, the Italian right attacked the Treaty and depicted it as the outcome of American and Soviet pressure on the Italian government (L’Italiano, 9 October 1975). Neo-Fascist representatives echoed these arguments, and labeled Osimo as ‘an ignominy that was used to remove a bureaucratic burden from Moro’s agenda’ (Il Secolo d’Italia, 5 October 1975).

Most important, whereas the London agreements of 1954 had boosted popular enthusiasm both inside and outside Trieste, Osimo was much less publicised in national public opinion (Picariello Reference Picariello1996), indicating the decreased appeal of romanticised ideas of Italian nationhood. Instead, in Trieste, the émigré associations received the Treaty with a mixture of anger and resignation and portrayed it as ‘dirty business’ (Difesa Adriatica, 24 September 1975). Although progressive segments of Triestine public opinion described Osimo as ‘an agreement that unifies rather than divides people across the Adriatic frontier’ (Il Piccolo, 11 November 1975), its most conservative segments largely criticised it as being ‘avoidable, unnecessary and useless’ because it dashed the legitimate aspirations of the émigrés, violated the Helsinki spirit and the unchangeable nature of post-war borders, and economically damaged Trieste (Bologna Reference Bologna2001, 115). For the émigrés especially, the signing of Osimo transformed the national government from a ‘mother into a wicked stepmother, deserving now and forever only the contempt of the Istrian community and Redipuglia’s dead’ (Archivio Unione Istriani, AUI, Miscellaneous, Folder Corrispondenza con personalità del governo 1973–1976, ‘President of an Istrian association to Moro’, 10 October 1975). This quote further demonstrates the endurance of nationalist ideas of Italian nationhood among the Istrians of the Italian Adriatic community, who experienced a unique form of exile from what they perceived as their ‘native’ homeland, Zone B. It also elucidates the émigrés’ efforts to win public support by referring to the sacrifice of many Italians who died in the First World War, an experience which, rhetorically celebrated as the end point of the national ‘Risorgimento’, invariably remained the cornerstone of Italian nationhood in twentieth-century Italy.

Triestine supporters of Osimo provided an alternative political explanation of its meaning by depicting the treaty as the final step of the historical and political process that led to the recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty of Zone B of the former Free Territory of Trieste. In their view, Zone B had already been lost after the London Memorandum of 1954 and its formal renunciation would finally remove the ghosts of past nationalism (Belci Reference Belci1989, 192). Indeed, for the Christian Democrat elites, the Yugoslav administration in Zone B ‘was alterable neither with force nor with negotiation’ (Aldo Moro, Senato della Repubblica, VII Legislatura, 23 February 1977). Therefore, Osimo offered Trieste an outstanding opportunity to play a pivotal role in the Danubian economy (Rinascita, 17 December 1976). As demonstrated above, the emotional reasoning of the neo-irredentist associations strongly clashed with the pragmatism of the central government (Il Popolo, 10 November 1975). In Trieste Osimo also led to unexpected political consequences that fostered an unparalleled revival of sentiments of local identity and municipal feelings within the population (Ara and Magris, 181–186). From this perspective, the victory of the local protest movement ‘Lista per Trieste’ (List for Trieste, LPT) (Giuricin Reference Giuricin2006) in the municipal elections and the strength of its economic arguments against Osimo represented not only a strong response to national ‘partitocracy’ but also a reawakening of civic consciousness for a city that ‘was not nationalist but still Italian under a secularly-oriented majority’ (Cecovini Reference Cecovini1985, 71). Thus, the LPT became the political voice of the diverse Italian, cosmopolitan, and municipal identities that coexisted in Trieste and its political success responded to years of ineffective state administration that created a significant fracture between the Triestine people and the central state (Lanzardo Reference Lanzardo2000, 20). Most important, divergent understandings of the meaning of Osimo from the perspective of the centre and the periphery of the nation marked the last chapter of the legacy of the ‘mutilated victory’ which ironically became a mutilated defeat, this time by means of diplomacy and politics rather than war and violence.Footnote ⁷

Notes on contributor

Fabio Capano is currently an independent scholar, working in an administrative role at the American University, Washington DC. He received his PhD in Modern Europe from West Virginia University in August 2014 and is researching national patriotism and state-led politics of identity in Cold-War borderlands. His interests include the study of Adriatic irredentism, nationalism and political violence in modern Italy, comparative Fascisms, and regime transition in twentieth-century Europe. His publications include “Resisting Détente: the Associative Network and the Osimo Treaties”, in Italy, Yugoslavia, and International Politics in the Age of Détente, edited by M. Bucarelli , L. Micheletta, L. Monzali and L. Riccardi (Bern: Peter Lang, 2016).