The Dictionary of Scientific Biography was a great achievement, a resource no historian of science can now easily imagine being without. But its fourteen substantive volumes began to appear in 1970 – containing essays written years before – and its last volume came out in 1981, with two supplement volumes published in 1990. So it is naturally getting a bit long in the tooth, and it was a thoroughly good idea to revisit the enterprise and see what could be done to bring it up to date and to fix a few deficiencies. The American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), which sponsored both the original DSB and this eight-volume successor, The New Dictionary of Scientific Biography (NDSB), puts all of us in their debt.
The new editor-in-chief was Noretta Koertge, a philosopher of science retired from Indiana University, possibly best known for her edited volumes attacking ‘postmodernist myths about science’ (A House Built on Sand, Oxford, 1998) and feminist science studies (Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology, with C. L. Pinnick and R. F. Almeder, New Brunswick, NJ, 2003). She and her advisory committee had to decide what the new dictionary should do and how it should be done, and, while it was impossible to satisfy everyone, Koertge and her associates have done well.
First, they had to treat the recently deceased, and here the task was both relatively unproblematic and, on the whole, well realized. There are about five hundred new pieces on those who died after about 1950, and most of these are very competently done. Some high spots are Shawn Mullet's balanced essay – no easy task – on Edward Teller and Michael Neufeld's deft treatment of Wernher von Braun, both evidence of present-day unwillingness to sugarcoat the irredeemably acrid. David Kaiser's account of Richard Feynman is acute, accessible and even witty; Mary Jo Nye's entry on Linus Pauling is an elegant and sinuous tour through his chemistry, politics and personality; while there are some uncharitably sour notes in David Hull's piece on Stephen Jay Gould. Many of the other essays on the recently deceased understandably aim mainly for sober solidity, and generally achieve it, though some might question the prudence of having the entry on the climate scientist Charles Keeling written by his son, Andrew.
Second, the editors meant partly to remedy past neglect of non-Western practitioners and of women. And so we now, finally, have accounts of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway (from the seventeenth century), the physicist Laura Bassi and the astronomer Maria Winkelmann (from the eighteenth century), the popularizer Jane Marcet and the astronomer Caroline Herschel (whose lives spanned the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and the now much-celebrated nineteenth-century pioneer of computer science Ada Lovelace, while women scientists who died in the past half-century are now on a more level playing field.
Third, Koertge and her associates wisely decided to do a lot better by the human sciences and also more systematically to acknowledge the work of some philosophers, sociologists and historians writing about ‘the structure and development of science’. And so there are useful entries, for example, on the psychologists Leon Festinger, Stanley Milgram and Kurt Lewin (a notably fine essay by Mitchell Ash); the primatologist Dian Fossey; the cognitive psychologist Adam Tversky; the behaviourist B. F. Skinner; and the sexual science pioneer Alfred Kinsey. The deaths of the great anthropologists Clifford Geertz and Mary Douglas presumably occurred too late for their lives to be considered for inclusion, but once the in-principle decision to treat the human sciences had been made, there is no good reason I can think of for the continued omissions of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. (The prefatory ‘List of scientists by field’ contains categories for psychology, probability decision and game theory, ethology and animal behaviour, cognitive science and neuroscience, and science policy – no sociology, and anthropology only in its ‘physical’ variant. Is an unacknowledged point being made about science and its philosophical demarcation criteria?)
Among the metascientists, the philosophers get pride of place, though one could question selection standards that include the analytic philosopher David Lewis but not the important English neo-idealist Michael Oakeshott. There is no way to avoid controversy when treating the views of such figures as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Robert K. Merton, though I was sorry to see in the Merton essay bland repetition of the tired ‘science wars’ charge that sociologists of scientific knowledge were meaning to ‘challenge the intellectual authority of science’ (v, p. 125). There are no articles on Imre Lakatos or Paul Feyerabend, and, while there is a good update for Michael Polányi, there is still no room for Ludwik Fleck or Edgar Zilsel.
The new editors' most problematic decision was, as Koertge puts it, to ‘update some 225 of the original articles’ to ‘incorporate the very best recent scholarship in history of science studies … These Postscripts are intended to supplement, not supplant, the original articles’ (i, pp. xi–xii). The impulse to do this is praiseworthy, but the results are often puzzling, at both practical and programmatic levels. The exercise invites authors definitively to sort out what indeed counts as ‘the very best recent scholarship’, at just the point when interpretative adequacy, as opposed to factual accuracy, remains vigorously contested. Some authors achieve this ‘updating’ admirably, as, for example, William Newman's new section on Newton's ‘chymical theory’, while others weigh in on one side or the other of ongoing historiographic punch-ups (e.g. Michele Camerota on Redondi's and Biagioli's accounts of Galileo as, respectively, ‘heretic’ and ‘courtier’), and some hand out unannotated demerits for interpretative unsoundness, as when Michael Hunter cautions that Robert Boyle's utilitarian concerns are now well established while ‘claims that have been made for Boyle's involvement in broader, political objectives in his pursuit of science – not least in connection with his controversy with Thomas Hobbes – have been less convincing’ (i, p. 369).
In practice, however, it is hard to know how to use these Postscripts. Some are readable almost as self-contained essays; others really need to be juxtaposed with the original DSB pieces. It is physically demanding to shift around such a heavy mass of older and newer paper, to check the Supplements and Index, and then to find a surface large enough to lay older essays and Postscripts side by side. The publishers' website currently announces that all twenty-six volumes are now available, and searchable, ‘in eBook format as the Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography’, and that is very good news – at least for libraries better resourced than Harvard's, which still does not have this version. Indeed, I could only find it listed at eight North American libraries, to none of which I have electronic access. And so some of us still have to wait for the searchable electronic version, and to learn the terms of online access. That is when this prodigious project will really serve the scholarly community and when the ACLS will get a proper intellectual return on its investment.
