Edward Grant is an acknowledged authority on late medieval natural philosophy, and his new History of Natural Philosophy is, contrary to what one might expect from the subtitle, effectively an account of late medieval natural philosophy and its ancient forebears. He tells his readers that he has almost nothing to say about the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, yet he also has almost nothing to say about the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The treatment of the seventeenth century is breathtaking in its omissions. The cosmological system of Descartes, which was the cosmological system between the 1640s and the mid-1680s, and was defended by natural philosophers and mathematicians at the cutting edge of their disciplines up to the 1730s, is not even mentioned. Gassendi and Huygens do not merit a mention either, and Hooke is dealt with only in passing, on the microscope. Yet completely marginal medieval figures (as far as natural philosophy is concerned) – Macrobius, Calcidius, Martianus Capella, Isidore of Seville, pseudo-Bede and others – receive whole sections to themselves, which in some cases effectively tell us all that is known about them. Grant does not make any effort to engage developments after the fourteenth century in a serious way, and his discussion is wholly perfunctory. There is more detail in the earlier parts of the book, on ancient natural philosophy, but what is offered there is a very elementary exposition. Although Aristotle is treated in more detail, from a historiographical point of view, the exposition reads like a book for small children. ‘With hindsight’, Grant writes,
we can see that Aristotle was in error in much of what he had to say about the physical world. That is hardly surprising for someone who wrote more than twenty-three hundred years ago. But we cannot judge Aristotle's significance and impact on that basis, for we know, all too well, that much scientific knowledge that appeared in the nineteenth century, and even into the twentieth century, has been shown to be erroneous or misleading, or will be shown to be such (p. 50).
Despite his cavalier treatment of anything after 1400, the continuity of the medieval tradition in natural philosophy with early modern mechanics, astronomy and cosmology is central to Grant's thinking, and there seem to be two issues that motivate his account here. The first is his rejection of Andrew Cunningham's claim that natural philosophy was always about God. On the face of it, the claim is indeed false – one need only think of Aristotle's natural philosophy, which was explicitly defined as a separate domain from questions concerning God. Grant devotes a chapter to the relations between theology and natural philosophy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but there is an unstated assumption that the scholastics took up Aristotelian natural philosophy because of its intrinsic merits as a natural philosophy. I believe this is demonstrably mistaken: the history of scholasticism between Anselm and Aquinas shows very clearly that it is the role of abstractive knowledge in providing the philosophical foundations for Christian theology that makes it attractive to scholastics in the first instance. Appreciation of this point might have prompted him to take Cunningham's thesis in a less literal way, and to probe the extent to which medieval metaphysics and natural philosophy were in fact motivated by theological issues.
Grant's second thesis is that of the continuity between, on the one hand, apparent attempts to quantify phenomena in fourteenth-century natural philosophy in Paris and Oxford and, on the other, the kinematic theories of the early to mid-seventeenth century. The basic historiographic strategy is to translate various proportions into an elementary algebraic form in order to yield equations, and then to treat these as first attempts to develop a physical theory of changing velocities that will come to fruition in the seventeenth century. Such an approach, which can be traced back to Duhem's claims about impetus theory at the beginning of the last century, has been the subject of historiographical dispute since Anneliese Maier's essays of the 1940s, yet Grant simply ignores these disputes, in effect preferring genealogy to history. It is, I think, simply obvious to Grant that if we can construe impetus theory, for example, as a precursor to accounts in seventeenth-century mechanics, then it is a precursor: there are no problems ‘translating’ it into modern form, removing it from the context that confers meaning and significance on it, and assimilating it to an exercise in seventeenth-century mechanics. He just does not recognize historiographical issues, something clear right at the beginning of the book, when, in response to G. E. R. Lloyd's important distinction between the idea of bodies having natures and the idea of a domain of nature encompassing all natural phenomena, Grant shows complete incomprehension. Surely, he asks, ‘the Greeks must have been aware of nature, which was all around them and which was involved in everything they did’ (p. 1).
