In Cartesian Psychophysics and the Whole Nature of Man, Richard F. Hassing presents a careful and ambitious treatment of the history, structure, and significance of the Cartesian human being after it has been, so to speak, reassembled from Descartes's far more famous treatments of its separable thinking and extended parts. This is the self (as opposed to soul) of the Sixth Meditation, the late Discourses, and most prominently for this work, The Passions of the Soul. Hassling's carefully argued book will be of great use to anyone attempting to wrap their arms around the whole of the Cartesian corpus, the mechanics of the Cartesian self, the history of neuroscience, and the implications of all of the above for human freedom and autonomy.
From the beginning of the book and throughout, Hassing offers accounts of the Aristotelian and Scholastic theories that Descartes's soul-body system pushes against. Descartes often uses the vocabulary of these earlier philosophies but sometimes changes the meanings of words as he employs them in his new and radically different context, so it is helpful to have this primer and orientation at the outset and to be reminded of it at key moments in the progression of the argument.
The jewel of this book, though, is Hassing's extremely careful treatment of Descartes's psychophysical model of the human being. All the arguments of the book lead to it or from it, somewhat like the pineal gland it describes. Hassing draws from all the relevant Cartesian sources, public works, and private correspondence, in order to put together a holistic view of the Cartesian self. Although it is impossible to give a decent brief of Descartes's elaborate model, I will recount a few key elements in order to give a sense of what Hassing's argument entails. Perhaps the first element is the most obvious for students of Descartes: the metaphysical crisis that follows from establishing that mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa) are different substances. We are still on familiar ground as we recall that Descartes addresses the mind-body problem by positing certain characteristics of the pineal gland, a tiny interface in the brain between body and soul.
The principles according to which the operations of the pineal gland can be understood are more sophisticated and less familiar. Here is where Hassing's careful account becomes particularly helpful (and where the following gloss will be woefully insufficient). In brief, one must see that the Cartesian brain is (1) malleable and (2) subject to inertia, but also (3) capable of being reshaped by habit and intention. The shapes of our brain cavities determine our thoughts and actions because they affect of the flow of the blood and animal spirits through them. Some of those shapes within our brains are ours at birth and others develop automatically, but others are alterable. It is by appealing to the possibility of altering the shapes of our brain cavities that Hassing links Descartes's psychophysics to a version of human autonomy compatible with the Cartesian mechanical model. This is also the basis of what Hassing calls Descartes's therapeutic project, which is to work with our “variable and historical nature” rather than our “general biological nature” to improve and correct human nature. This is the path to Cartesian mastery.
Throughout Cartesian Psychophysics, Hassing maintains that the goals of The Passions of the Soul are moral and therapeutic. Cartesian mastery in this context is self-mastery. Hassing argues that Descartes has a special interest in diagnosing and offering an alternative to the errors of judgment that lead men to engage in the atrocities of religious war. Descartes works through the implications of his new psychophysics for some of the oldest questions of moral philosophy: “what is within and what is beyond my power; between true and false goods” (157). Stoicism ceases to be a sufficient moral orientation when the promise of method expands the limits of our power. Pursuing scientific knowledge is essential to moral philosophy because it is only through science that we learn what truly is (and what is not) in our power and thus can distinguish true from false moral goods. So, while self-mastery is the goal, good science is its prerequisite.
For Hassing, the key to understanding the Cartesian project is what he calls “the master virtue-passion,” generosité. Quoting Descartes, Hassing offers this definition:
So I believe that true Generosity, which makes a man esteem himself as highly as he can legitimately esteem himself, consists in this: partly in his understanding that there is nothing which truly belongs to him but this free control of his volitions and no reason why he ought to be praised or blamed except that he uses it well or badly; and partly in his feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well, that is, never to lack the volition to undertake and execute all the things he judges to be best—which is to follow virtue perfectly. (166)
As Hassing unpacks this definition, he specifies four key elements. Generosity entails (1) self-sufficiency, (2) a godlike employment of free will, (3) firm and constant resolution, and (4) a reorientation and subordination of thumos. In order to know the true boundaries of self-sufficiency, one must be methodical, and honoring these boundaries sets the frame for the proper employment of free will. Understanding all of this clearly and habituating oneself to it (and thus reshaping one's brain cavities) supports one's resolve. Thus the first three elements of generosity are entirely in keeping with Descartes's psychophysical model.
But it is the fourth element—the reorientation of thumos—that Hassing emphasizes. The generous person realizes that “one cannot claim merit or worth by virtue of membership in a larger human community defined, say, by family, tribe, ethnicity, nationality, religion, ideology, party, etc. … Generosity, therefore, weakens the force of our attachments to the larger wholes in whose defense we would rise in anger against those whom we perceive to be harmful or scornful” (168). Generosity undermines conflict (and war) by detaching our thumos from those divisions and allegiances for which wars are fought, and by reattaching thumos to our individual selves, rightly and methodologically understood.
This is a dense, carefully argued, and finely focused book that draws material from throughout the Cartesian corpus and offers a persuasive holistic interpretation of a centrally important idea. It offers a chapter-by-chapter commentary on the salient sections of the Passions of the Soul, regular forays into background concepts from Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy, and a sustained argument about the centrality and meaning of “generosity” for the work. My only gentle criticism would be that these three threads are not always woven together as smoothly as one might like, but this is a minor problem for an extremely useful and thoughtful book. It should become required reading for anyone seriously interested in these matters.
