Nigeria has had a long history of military rule, with a series of military governments in power for much of its postindependence period. Despite transitioning to democracy nearly two decades ago, the country has not escaped the influence of its military past. In 1999, former General Olusegun Obasanjo won the presidency in a free and fair race, going on to serve two terms. Prior to this, Obasanjo had served as the head of a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1979. More recently, retired Major General Muhammadu Buhari secured the presidency in democratic elections in 2015, having presided over military rule in Nigeria from 1983 to 1985.

The Nigerian experience is not unique. Former military strongmen have successfully won democratic presidential elections in places such as Benin (General Mathieu Kerekou in 1996) and Bolivia (General Hugo Banzer in 1997). The participation of former autocrats in democratic politics generates questions, however, regarding the conditions under which we are likely to see it, as well as the factors that influence the likelihood such campaigns will be successful.

In Recycling Dictators in Latin American Elections, Brett J. Kyle seeks to answer these questions. Drawing from the experiences of Latin America, Kyle offers a theoretical framework for understanding when members of the old guard will compete in democratic elections and when they are likely to win them.

Kyle looks exclusively at presidential elections in new democracies once governed by military dictatorships, which he defines broadly as authoritarian regimes with a man in uniform at the helm. He argues that there are two central factors that predict the likelihood that former dictators will run for president: democratic continuity and uncertainty. Democratic continuity is a product of two elements. The first is the country’s experience with democracy prior to military rule, which includes time under democracy, the quality of democracy, and the presence of political parties. The second is the country’s military experience, which involves time under military rule, how the military treated existing parties, and what alternative they provided. Uncertainty takes into account whether the country was experiencing armed conflict around the time of the transition, the transition type, and whether transitional justice mechanisms were pursued. Kyle argues that countries with low levels of democratic continuity and high levels of uncertainty will see many “recycled dictators” run for office; those with high levels of democratic continuity and low levels of uncertainty, by contrast, will see few of them.

This logic helps to explain why Guatemala—which suffered extensive periods of military rule and was emerging from a long-lasting civil war at the time of the transition—has had 12 former dictators run for president. It also helps to explain why Uruguay—where well-organized political parties existed before the regime came to power and the military was able to secure an amnesty deal after the transition—has had only one.

Kyle evaluates his argument by looking at the frequency of recycled dictator candidacies in the 12 Latin American countries that endured extended periods of military rule and subsequently democratized. (To be clear, though he uses the term “recycled dictators,” this is somewhat misleading. He classifies individuals as such whether or not they held the leadership post during the period of military rule.) The 63 instances of former regime candidacies in this sample of countries conform to his expectations. He supplements this analysis with detailed and careful case studies from Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

The author also examines the conditions under which members of the old guard are likely to win presidential elections. He finds that although success is rare, it is far more likely in those countries with high levels of democratic continuity.

Kyle calls attention to the frequency with which new democracies see former autocrats compete in the electoral process, an important observation in the post—third wave of democratization era. The theoretical framework he proposes is compelling and intuitive, though the overuse of typologies in the early parts of the book detracts from its parsimony and blurs the central message. For example, Kyle offers categories of recycled dictators (p. 10), generates specific terms for the predicted presence of recycled dictator candidates (p. 28), and creates a typology of recycled dictator candidates (p. 58). Moreover, while he identifies nine components that underlie the two factors that influence the chance of a recycled dictator candidacy, he does not arbitrate their individual impact. The reader is left curious as to whether some matter more than others or whether they are equally important. Relatedly, some recycled dictators were military strongmen, others were civilians working in military governments, and others were military officers operating in nongovernmental roles while the regime was in power. Greater discussion would be desirable regarding whether these different pasts lead to differences in their patterns of participation in democratic politics.

These issues aside, the book generates numerous lines of potential research, many of which Kyle highlights in the concluding chapter. Perhaps most importantly, what are the consequences of recycling dictator candidacies for democratic politics? Does the reemergence of the old guard deteriorate the quality of democracy? Does it increase the chances of reversion to autocracy? The author suggests that the presence of former dictators on the ballot implies their “acceptance of the rules of the democratic game” (p. 3). Yet given that the majority of post—Cold War dictatorships feature regularly held multiparty elections, the agreement of former dictators to electoral competition should not lead us to assume that they value that it is free and fair.

This work is a timely contribution to the growing literature on the legacies of authoritarian rule for new democracies, and deeper ties to this literature warrant exploration. For example, Kyle finds that “regime heirs”—recycled dictators who run for office with the backing of a party with ties to the outgoing regime (p. 17)—are the most likely to win votes. This is consistent with research on the effects of authoritarian interludes on party systems in new democracies, which shows that where regimes create their own political party or ally with a traditional one, such parties are likely to be electorally successful following democratization (Erica Frantz and Barbara Geddes, “The Legacy of Dictatorship for Democratic Parties in Latin America,” Journal of Politics in Latin America, 8(1), 2016: 3–32). It is also consistent with research on authoritarian successor parties, which suggests that the resources such parties acquire under the ancien régime give them electoral advantages in the posttransition period (James Loxton, “Authoritarian Successor Parties,” Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 2015: 157–70).

Recycling Dictators clearly speaks to this line of research, and greater linkages to it would surely improve our understanding of the ways in which the broad range of authoritarian experiences work to influence democratic politics. Regardless, the author offers an insightful framework for thinking about the conditions under which we are likely to see former dictators run for and win office in today’s democracies.