1. Introduction
This paper aims to show that Hegel is correct, that individual rational judgment – of the kind required for rational justification, whether in cognition or morals (broadly construed)Footnote 1 – is socially and historically based, although the bases of rational judgment identified by Hegel are consistent with realism about the objects of knowledge and with strict objectivity about moral principles. My analysis is both systematic and historical. I begin with an analytical outline of my systematic analysis; I then provide an expository outline of my discussion.
My systematic analysis consists of two critical and seven constructive steps. The first critical step is to show that foundationalist theories of rational justification can neither solve nor avoid the Dilemma of the Criterion (§7).Footnote 2 The second critical step is to show that neither can standard coherence theories solve or avoid this Dilemma (§9.2). The first constructive step is to show that Hegel’s analysis of the possibility of constructive self-criticism solves the problem of vicious circularity (§9.1). The second is to highlight four aspects of the autonomy of rational judgment, namely:
1) The exercise of judgment is inherently one’s own exercise of one’s own capacity for judgment. (§6)
2) The exercise of judgment is structured normatively, not merely causally. (§6)
3) Only by exercising judgment do we act, rather than merely behave, because we base our actions on justifying reasons, rather than merely excusing or exculpating ourselves. (§6)
4) Reason as rational judgment suffices for identifying and justifying basic norms. (§8)
Step three is to show that the key point of Kant’s constructivist theory of justification in moral philosophy justifies this fourth aspect of autonomy by showing that sufficient justifying grounds for a proscribed action cannot be provided to all concerned (affected) parties. Conversely, sufficient justifying grounds for the omission of positive moral requirements cannot be provided to all concerned parties. In contrast, legitimate principles are ones for which sufficient justifying reasons can be given to all concerned parties (§8). Step four argues that Kant’s normative constructivism is fundamentally social because it focuses on whether sufficient justifying reasons for an action can be provided to all concerned parties; this requirement is the core point of Kant’s account of “respect for [moral] law” and of the Categorical Imperative always to treat others as ends in themselves and never merely as means (§8). Step five is to argue that Hegel adopted and further developed Kant’s constructivism by generalizing it to include theoretical (cognitive) norms as well as practical norms (§9.1), by emphasizing the fallibilism inherent in constructivist justification (§§9.1, 9.3) and by connecting this fallibilism with the social bases of rational justification. Step six is to argue that Hegel’s “Thesis of Mutual Recognition” is that we can only judge fully rationally if we recognize our own fallibility as rational judges, the judgmental competence of others, and our mutual interdependence for rational assessment of our own and others’ rational judgments. Moreover, this thesis counts as a genuine transcendental condition of fully rational judgment (§10).Footnote 3 The seventh and final systematic step is to argue that Hegel’s constructivist, fallibilist, social theory of rational justification is inherently an historical, pragmatic theory of rational justification, because the justification it provides is based on the present state of knowledge, because it is inevitably provisional, and because the list of relevant alternatives increases historically (§11).
The historical aspect of my analysis aims to show that Hegel developed precisely this kind of theory of rational justification in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), and in particular, that this kind of theory affords an adequate, proper, and illuminating account of Hegel’s “Thesis of Mutual Recognition” (§§2–5, 10). The contemporary significance of Hegel’s social, historical, and pragmatic theory of rational justification is highlighted, in conclusion, by contrasting it with the still-dominant, strong (as it were “atomistic”) individualism in analytical epistemology (§12).
Hegel’s genuine insights about rational judgment can be identified by considering an important regard in which Hegel is a transcendental philosopher. The coping stone of Kant’s transcendental Critique of Pure Reason is the “I think” which, for each of us, must be able to accompany any of my representations (or my experiences), so far as I can become self-consciously aware of them. If Hegel is a transcendental philosopher, then what and where is his counterpart to Kant’s analysis of the “I think,” and what might this have to do with mutual recognition? Hegel does provide a counterpart to Kant’s “I think” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, though it is not located where it is typically sought, and it is much more philosophically significant than has been recognized. Identifying Hegel’s counterpart to Kant’s “I think” reveals the core of Hegel’s account of rational judgment and its social basis, which includes Hegel’s most important insight regarding mutual recognition. This insight, in turn, is fundamental to Hegel’s theory of normative justification, for both cognitive and practical norms. Understanding this enables us also to understand Hegel’s account of individual rational autonomy and its social bases, and to understand why Hegel’s account is correct.
To establish these claims, I first examine Hegel’s account of “Self-Consciousness” in relation to Kant’s “I think” (§2). The key questions are clarified by considering the current state of debate about Hegel’s Thesis of Mutual Recognition (§3). I then argue that the proper approach to understanding Hegel’s account of mutual recognition lies in Kant’s observation that the “I think” is the “I judge” (§4). The importance of taking this approach is underscored by considering briefly Hegel’s individualist account of the “I think” in the Phenomenology (§5).Footnote 4 This poses the issue of what, if anything, links the “I think” to “mutual recognition” (§6). Reconsidering the relations between rational judgment, autonomy, and spontaneity reveals constructive dimensions of the fallibility of individual rational judgment (§7). These dimensions, in turn, reveal how individual rational judgment is possible only within the context of a community of rational judges (§8).Footnote 5 This result demonstrates that, and how, Hegel analyzes and defends the fundamental ways in which each of our individual consciousness of ourselves as rational judges requires and depends upon our recognizing other human beings as rational judges. This finding underscores fundamental, innovative, and philosophically decisive features of Hegel’s account of rational justification, because it shows how Hegel adopted Kant’s constructivist account of rational justification (§9) and why he was right to do so, for Hegel generalizes Kant’s constructivist account (§10). With these points in hand, we can then grasp Hegel’s genuine insights about mutual critical assessment (§11). Finally, Hegel’s insights about the social dimensions of rational judgment enable us to understand the historical dimensions of rational justification (§12). Hegel’s account thus “saves the phenomena” of rational assessment and justification, while avoiding obfuscating over-simplifications (§13).Footnote 6
2. Hegel’s “Self-Consciousness” and Kant’s “I Think”
At the beginning of “Self-Consciousness,” the second major section of the Phenomenology, Hegel states the thesis that no one of us can be self-conscious without also being consciously aware of other self-conscious human beings, in these terms:
There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. Only through this is there self-consciousness at all. … — Thus for us the concept of spirit is already on hand.Footnote 7
Hegel’s reference to “us,” for whom “the concept of spirit is already on hand,” denotes his readers, who observe Hegel’s presentation and internal critique of forms of consciousness in the Phenomenology. When introducing any form of consciousness, Hegel clues “us,” his readers, into the significance of a form of consciousness or its development, so that we can anticipate what is to come, and thus more easily understand and assess its advent, development, and critique.Footnote 8 Here, at the very end of the passage that introduces “Self-Consciousness,” Hegel clearly links the theme of mutual recognition to the advent of “spirit,” which consists, in part, in a recognitive community. That Hegel links these two themes is not surprising. Yet it is surprising that Hegel announces this link so early in the Phenomenology, because “Reason,” the third major section of Hegel’s book, intercedes between the second and fourth major sections, “Self-Consciousness” and “Spirit,” respectively. Where and how, then, does Hegel prove his Thesis of Mutual Recognition?
Most interpretations of Hegel’s Phenomenology seek Hegel’s account of mutual recognition directly within “Self-Consciousness.” Since the latter half of “Self-Consciousness” concerns “Stoicism,” “Skepticism,” and the “Unhappy Consciousness,” it appears that Hegel must justify the Thesis of Mutual Recognition in the first half of “Self-Consciousness,” in his infamous discussions of “The Battle unto Death” and “Lord and Bondsman.”Footnote 9 The “Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition” considered at this stage is this: Individual self-consciousness is possible only on the basis of one’s consciousness of other self-conscious human beings. The problem then is to find a phenomenological presentation, analysis, or argument in these two subsections that supports this Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition. Indirectly, such interpretations reinforce the seriousness with which we should take the organizationally surprising introduction (just noted) of this Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition so far in advance of “Spirit.” The problem is not that Hegel doesn’t espouse or support some such thesis. The problem is that it takes much more than his account in “Self-Consciousness” to articulate and to justify it.
The “Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition” introduced early in the main section on “Self-Consciousness” is closely connected with Kantian notions about the “I think.” However, this Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition is Fichte’s, not Hegel’s. In fact, Hegel does not support this initial Fichtean Thesis of Mutual Recognition. Instead, Hegel takes Fichte’s view as a clue for developing a much more sophisticated and illuminating Thesis of Mutual Recognition of his own, one introduced only much later in the Phenomenology, at the very end of the major section on “Spirit,” in the transition to “Religion.” The “concept” of spirit announced at the beginning of “Self-Consciousness,” Hegel ultimately argues, is an extremely abstract and inadequate concept, though an important and suggestive one none the less. We can trace the significance and reasons for Hegel’s replacement for Fichte’s Thesis of Mutual Recognition if we begin with Kant’s “I think.” Kant’s “I think” is such an abstract concept, and when we think it, it is such an abstract thought, that it is extremely difficult to see how any transcendental or even quasi-transcendental argument could show that merely thinking the thought, “I think,” requires recognizing that one’s own self-consciousness as a thinker requires recognizing that other people also can and do think the “I think” for and about themselves.
The Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition is this:
Individual self-consciousness is only possible for human beings on the basis of our conscious awareness of other self-conscious persons.Footnote 10
A key problem with this thesis is that it is so broad. It appears implausible to suggest that we cannot be self-aware without being aware of other self-aware persons. Part of why it appears implausible is due to our Cartesian inheritance, according to which to be conscious at all involves being conscious that we are conscious, so that consciousness of whatever we may sense, imagine, or conceive automatically involves self-consciousness. In this regard it is important to note that, like Kant, Hegel distinguishes between consciousness and self-consciousness just as Leibniz distinguished between perception and apperception. Leibniz’s “perception” is bare sensory awareness, e.g., “hunger now,” “food there,” where these are to be understood as explicit formulations of the contents of mental states which themselves are not conceptually, linguistically, or otherwise explicitly articulated by the subject of those states. According to Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, the explicit propositional articulation of sensory states, in forms that could be expressed as “I am hungry now” or “Over there is some food I want,” is a further, complex intellectual achievement. This is not the place to examine in detail the merits of these two different views; though the distinction between mere sensory perception and explicit, conceptually structured apperception is defensible.Footnote 11 I hope nevertheless that indicating this key issue helps remove the appearance of utter implausibility from the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition.
3. The state of Debate about Hegel’s Analysis of Mutual Recognition
3.1.
Even if sound, this interpretive advice does little to specify the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition. One might suggest that, because it involves conceptually articulated forms of explicit awareness, apperception requires language in order to provide the conceptual repertoire apperception requires. Whatever may be the merits of this suggestion, arguing for it would require something like Wittgenstein’s critique of private language. Although this strategy may ultimately succeed,Footnote 12 it is plainly not the kind of analysis Hegel provides in “Self-Consciousness,” nor elsewhere in the Phenomenology.Footnote 13
3.2.
Another suggestion is that the relevant kind of “recognition” involves recognizing oneself as a person, a much more sophisticated kind of self-awareness than mere self-awareness of what one perceives. If one further argued that being aware of oneself as a person is required for being a person, one might then try to justify the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition by arguing that individual human beings cannot be aware of themselves as persons without being aware of other self-conscious persons. This specification of the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition is much closer to Fichte’s view.
If recognizing oneself as a person involves recognizing more than merely that one thinks; if it requires recognizing who one is and what one does as a person, then perhaps Hegel’s concern is not simply with Kant’s thin transcendental “I think,” but with richer notions of individual character or (in this sense) of “identity.” If so, then perhaps we could understand Hegel’s account of mutual recognition by appealing, e.g., to Aristotle’s account of friendship. According to Aristotle, we can achieve certain important kinds of self-knowledge only by witnessing our own kinds of character traits as they are exhibited by our closest friends, who typically share some of our important, defining character traits.Footnote 14 If this were Hegel’s point, it would be easy to see how the concrete recognition of one’s specific kind of character could well require mutual recognition, at least among intimate friends. A group of intimate friends, however, is far short of a society-wide recognitive community, and this kind of concrete self-recognition of one’s character is not obviously a transcendental issue admitting of transcendental proof, however construed. Though interesting, this way of enriching Hegel’s premise provides no key to Hegel’s analysis and defence of the initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition.
3.3.
The most cogent recent attempt to show that Hegel proves the thesis of mutual recognition within the first half of “Self-Consciousness” is Beiser’s.Footnote 15 His discussion provides a composite conspectus of Hegel’s analyses of mutual recognition in the dialectic of lord and bondsman, as Hegel develops this theme in the Nürnberger Propädeutik,Footnote 16 the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (chapters 4, 4A), and the 1830 Encyclopaedia, §§430–7.Footnote 17 My disagreement with Beiser — and with most interpretations of this issue in and section of Hegel’s Phenomenology — is twofold. I disagree about exactly how and where Hegel draws his ultimate conclusions about mutual recognition in the 1807 Phenomenology, and about exactly what conclusions Hegel draws. Beiser claims that
If the master recognizes the slave as a free being, then he also ceases to degrade himself to the level of his animal desires. He proves that he is rational because he recognizes that another person is an end in himself.Footnote 18
To support this claim, Beiser cites the final seven paragraphs of Hegel’s chapter.Footnote 19 Beiser then introduces the Rousseauian-Kantian theme that genuine rationality lies in self-legislating universally valid laws, ultimately claiming that “The master proves his freedom not by dominating this slave, … but by treating him as an equal.”Footnote 20
Though interesting, Beiser’s treatment of these two points is deficient. First, whilst appealing to notions about self-legislation is germane, so doing does not explain why self-legislation is necessary to achieve self-conscious. Second, the closing paragraphs of Hegel’s chapter 4A support, not Beiser’s interpretation but my own.Footnote 21 Hegel concludes his remarks about the lord by noting that the he achieves only “a one-sided and unequal recognition” because, in comparison to genuine mutual recognition, his “lacks the moment, that what the lord does to the other, he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he also does to the other.”Footnote 22 The remainder of Hegel’s chapter highlights the rather better results for the bondsman, though neither does Hegel credit the bondsman with achieving genuine recognition. Beiser is correct about the form Hegel’s argument takes at this point in the Encyclopaedia, though he does not ask why this premiss — or is it Hegel’s conclusion? — is absent from chapter 4B of the 1807 Phenomenology. Beiser likewise disregards the significance of the different contexts of Hegel’s analysis in the 1807 Phenomenology and the Encyclopaedia. One important contrast between them is that the Encyclopaedia is a lecture syllabus, to which condensed summaries are appropriate. More important is the fact that Hegel’s Encyclopaedia is written from the standpoint of Hegel’s philosophical system, which presupposes that philosophy provides genuine knowledge. As Hegel states in both editions of the Science of Logic,Footnote 23 the proof of this crucial presupposition of his philosophical system is provided solely by the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus the 1807 Phenomenology must demonstrate by justifying, inter alia, that free rational action requires Kantian self-legislation, or that mutual recognition is constitutive of our individual self-consciousness. Finally, Beiser does not consider why Hegel’s summary discussions of mutual recognition in the Nürnberger Propädeutik and in the Encyclopaedia turn directly to something called “universal self-consciousness” — Hegel’s label there for genuine mutual recognition within moral philosophy — whilst his most detailed analysis of mutual recognition in the 1807 Phenomenology does not lead directly to this (purported) result. Instead, individualist views of thought, reason, and action persist through the remainder of “Self-Consciousness,”Footnote 24 through the entirety of “Reason,” and are only implicitly replaced by social conceptions of thought, reason, and action at the beginning of “Spirit,” where these implicitly social conceptions of human individuals only become explicit (and purportedly justified) at the very end of “Spirit” in “Evil and Forgiveness,” after criticising internally another wide range of individualist views.Footnote 25 Beiser’s fine summary misses much of Hegel’s point due to insufficient attention to detail, both textual and philosophical. This is an inherent problem of synopses, especially of Hegel’s views, though more careful and thorough analysis can afford more cogent synopsis.Footnote 26
3.4.
A number of recent commentators have realized that Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition extends through at least the end of Hegel’s analysis of “Reason,” and that his analysis of “Evil and its Forgiveness” is crucial to his account of mutual recognition.Footnote 27 However, these commentators do not link Hegel’s account of mutual recognition to his contention that consciousness of others is a transcendental condition of individual self-consciousness. Ludwig Siep rightly (1998) stresses the importance of Hegel’s account of recognition for his theory of justification of practical norms, though without noting its importance for Hegel’s theory of rational justification as such. All the commentaries present composite accounts of Hegel’s account of mutual recognition, without recognizing that Hegel’s Phenomenology must provide self-sufficient proofs of his main theses in order to justify the standpoint of “Absolute Knowing” and thereby to justify the standpoint of Hegel’s Science of Logic. The present analysis aims to remedy these shortcomings.
4. Hegel’s Phenomenology and Kant’s “I Think”
Prospects for a successful Hegelian analysis lie in recalling Kant’s view that to think is to judge (KdrV B398). Might it be possible to prove transcendentally that judging that “I judge” requires judging — and thus recognizing — that, in order rationally to judge that “I judge,” each of us must recognize — that is, rightly judge — that other people likewise judge correctly and rationally about themselves, “I judge”? An affirmative answer can be found if we recall that Kant’s transcendental proofs involve regressive demonstrationsFootnote 28 and that Hegel’s phenomenological dialectic adopts and extends this important feature of Kant’s strategy.Footnote 29 This strategy I shall develop in the remainder.
To focus this richer point about rational judgment and intersubjectivity, note first where and how in the Phenomenology Hegel justifies conclusions pertaining to Kant’s “I think” as a necessary, transcendental condition for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience.Footnote 30 One key conclusion for which Hegel argues in “Consciousness” is drawn at the end of “Force and Understanding” (chapter 3), namely that we can be conscious of objects only if we are self-conscious.Footnote 31 At the beginning of “Self-Consciousness” (chapter 4), Hegel asserts his thesis that human self-consciousness requires for its possibility our consciousness of objects other than ourselves.Footnote 32 By the end of the final subsection of “Self-Consciousness,” “Unhappy Consciousness” (chapter 4B), Hegel contends that the Unhappy Consciousness rejects entirely the original claim of Fichtean Self-Consciousness, that it self-sufficiently constitutes the entire world we experience.Footnote 33 Rejecting this thesis, within the context of Hegel’s reductio ad absurdum argument, justifies inferring, by disjunctive syllogism, that we can be self-conscious only if we are conscious of independently existing objects.Footnote 34 Hegel’s argument for this conclusion is an argument for mental content externalism.Footnote 35 In this way, Hegel’s two lines of analysis jointly restate and purport to vindicate the conclusion of Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism,” that we can be self-aware only if we are in fact aware of and have a least some empirical knowledge about the natural world in which we live. To this very significant extent, Hegel’s Phenomenology is concerned with Kant’s issues about transcendental self-consciousness, expressed by the “I think.”Footnote 36
5. What Links the “I Think” and the Thesis of Mutual Recognition?
Hegel’s conclusions about the “I think” in “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” (§4) are individualist; they neither claim nor imply anything about intersubjectivity being a condition for individual self-consciousness.Footnote 37 Thus they do not answer questions about the advent of collective or social spirit, about the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition, nor about any social or historical conditions of individual self-consciousness. To what extent — and if so, how — does Hegel seek to demonstrate that the “I judge” is possible for each of us only insofar as it is also possible, and one recognizes it is possible, for other members, indeed for all mature members, of one’s community? No such presentation, analysis, or argument can be found in “Lord and Bondsman,” nor even in the entirety of Hegel’s analysis of “Self-Consciousness.”Footnote 38
Examining Hegel’s text shows that he does not argue in “Self-Consciousness” for the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition. Though initially focused on mutual recognition, Hegel’s analysis in “Lord and Bondsman” allows this issue to fall by the side, other than to demonstrate that genuine mutual recognition is impossible between superior and subordinate. The structure of Hegel’s text ought to alert us to his intention not to prove here that bare individual self-consciousness is possible only on the basis of our consciousness (or “recognition”) of other self-conscious people. First, it is very hard to imagine how such a portentous thesis could be demonstrated in only a few short pages. Second, it is even harder to find an argument in defence of this thesis within the few short pages Hegel devotes to “Lord and Bondsman.” Third, Hegel introduces the initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition as a bald assertion.Footnote 39 This should alert us to the fact that Hegel thereby introduces a key thesis — a “certainty” (Gewißheit) — of one of his opponents, in order to subject that thesis and its intended use to internal critique. Here Hegel’s opponent is Fichte, who upholds two theses, the Initial Thesis of Mutual Recognition and the “Self-Sufficiency Thesis,” that individual self-consciousness is completely self-sufficient, in the sense that it suffices to account for the entirety of anyone’s conscious experience, symbolized by Fichte’s “I = I.” Hegel’s main critical points in “The Battle unto Death” and “Lord and Bondsman” are that these two theses are incompatible, and that the latter, the “Self-Sufficiency Thesis,” is false.Footnote 40
Nevertheless, Hegel does espouse a Thesis of Mutual Recognition. It is crucial to notice that Hegel continues to discuss this issue throughout the Phenomenology.Footnote 41 After disappearing from “Lord and Bondsman,” the issue of mutual recognition (though not the term) first reappears in “Unhappy Consciousness” (chapter 4Bc). The recognition considered there is a highly asymmetrical, putative recognition of the “changeable” unhappy consciousness of the devoutly religious (Augustinian) individual by the “unchangeable” (God), which is projected by that devout individual.Footnote 42 In the Phenomenology, Hegel first mentions a genuine case of mutual recognition at the beginning of “Immediate Spirit” (chapter 6): the mutual recognition between sister and brother, namely Antigone and Polynices.Footnote 43 However, Hegel expressly indicates that theirs is an undeveloped, literally immature form of mutual recognition. The first fully developed form of mutual recognition in the Phenomenology occurs at the very end of “Spirit,” in the last subsection of Hegel’s discussion of “Conscience,” in “Evil and Forgiveness” (chapter 6Cc). At this juncture, two moral judges finally recognize that they are equally fallible and equally competent to judge individual behaviour, regardless of who acts and who observers, and that they require each other’s assessment in order to scrutinize and thereby to assess and to justify their own judgment on any particular matter.Footnote 44 What are Hegel’s philosophical grounds for this conclusion?
6. Rational Judgment, Autonomy, and Spontaneity
The self-conscious “I think” that matters most to philosophy is the “I judge” that is central to rational thought and action in any of its forms. Only a strong sense of “I judge” which involves critical assessment makes possible thought and reasoning, as contrasted with mere vocables, rhetoric, propaganda, or rote following of protocols. Conversely, anyone who can or does engage in genuine inquiry and debate instantiates (more or less adequately) this strong sense of the term. Kant’s analysis aimed to uncover the transcendental conditions which make self-conscious experience humanly possible. Though Hegel shares that concern (above, §4), his focus in the Phenomenology is primarily on the kind of self-conscious judgment required to understand, to appreciate, and to assess the point of, e.g., Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” or his “Refutation of Idealism” or any other piece of substantial philosophical reasoning. In this important regard, a critique of philosophical self-consciousness is central to Hegel’s Phenomenology.Footnote 45
Hegel’s Phenomenology concerns centrally the proper understanding of rationally justified and justificatory judgment. To judge rationally is not merely to decide. To judge rationally is to make whatever judgment is best warranted in view of all available relevant considerations, including evidence; counter-evidence; relevant principles of inference; relevant (as contrasted to irrelevant or less relevant) analogies with other examples, cases, or domains and alternative accounts or assessments of the issue, whether historical, contemporaneous, or possible (though no one has yet advocated it). To judge rationally is to assume responsibility for the warrant or justificatory status of one’s conclusions. To assume responsibility for making judgments and for making any and every particular judgment — all of which are intrinsically one’s own judgments — is to exercise autonomy in at least two senses. First, judgment is autonomous because one forms one’s own judgment, rather than merely adopting anyone else’s judgment, advice, or recommendation (much less, command). Second, judgment is autonomous because it is guided by the normative considerations of appropriate assessment and use both of evidence and of principles of reasoning. If judgment as a physiological or psychological process is in some way causal, nevertheless it counts as judgment only insofar as it responds to such normative considerations, rather than merely to its causal antecedents as such. Judgment is a response to, not merely an effect of, its proper evidentiary and inferential antecedents. If justificatory processes turn out to be causal, they are justificatory not because they are causal but because they satisfy sufficient normative constraints — defining or at least including proper functioning, proper inference, and proper assessment — to provide inter alia rational justification. For this reason, Kant held that reason, rational judgment (a pleonasm), is spontaneous. This point merits closer consideration.
Kant famously emphasized the spontaneity of human thought, and Hegel followed suit. Kant contends that freedom is a rational idea that is constitutive — indeed definitive — of our conceiving of ourselves as agents.Footnote 46 Only rational spontaneity enables us to appeal to principles of inference and to make rational judgments, both of which are normative because each rational subject considers for him- or herself whether available procedures, evidence, and principles of inference warrant a judgment or conclusion. In the theoretical domain of knowledge, having adequate evidence, proof, or (in sum) justification, requires taking that evidence, proof, or justification to be adequate; in the practical domain of deliberation and action, having adequate grounds for action requires taking those grounds to be adequate. Thus Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis,” that no inclination is a motive unless and until it is incorporated into an agent’s maxim by being judged to be at least permissible,Footnote 47 is an instance of the more general principle (and third aspect) of autonomous judgment identified here. We act only insofar as we take ourselves to have reasons, even in cases of acting on desires, where we must (ex hypothesi) take those desires as — by judging them to be — appropriate and adequate grounds of action. Otherwise we abdicate rational considerations and absent ourselves from what Sellars calls “the space of reasons”Footnote 48 and merely behave. In that case, to borrow McDowell’s terms, we provide ourselves only excuses and exculpations, but not reasons or justifications, for acting or believing as we do.Footnote 49 Kant’s conception of rational spontaneity opposes empiricist accounts of beliefs and desires as merely causal products of environmental stimuli, and it opposes empiricist accounts of action, according to which we act on whatever desires are (literally) “strongest.” We think and act rationally only insofar as we judge the merits of whatever case is before us.Footnote 50
7. Individual Rational Judgment and the Community of Rational Judges
What, if anything, links individual rational judgment, so understood, to a community of rational judges? To begin to answer this question recall that Kant still worked with a traditional dichotomy, familiar to Descartes, Locke, and Hume, between “historical” (i.e. empirical) and “rational” knowledge.Footnote 51 Historical knowledge (historia) derives from sensory and memorial data, whilst rational knowledge (scientia) is inferentially based on rational first principles. Kant thus retained the ancient Greek model of “science” as the rigorous deduction of conclusions from first principles. This model requires any “science” to be a “system.” This model of rational knowledge, of science as scientia, runs through Kant’s Critical system; it is central to his transcendental idealism and to his attempt to provide a priori metaphysical foundations for natural science.Footnote 52
The key justificatory model involved both in historical and in rational knowledge, as traditionally understood, is foundationalist: both kinds of knowledge involve justifying conclusions by deriving them unilaterally from basic foundations. In the case of historical knowledge, these foundations are empirical data (however conceived). In the case of rational knowledge, these foundations are self-evident or otherwise rationally certified first principles. The “foundationalist” point of either model is that justification flows from “basic” foundations to other, “derived” claims, not vice versa. This is the case regardless of whether justificatory “basing relations” are strictly deductive, or involve other kinds of rules of inference or (in the case of empirical data) weaker forms of “basing relations.”
However, both of these foundationalist models of justification were exposed by Sextus Empiricus to be hopelessly dogmatic and question-begging (petitio principii), because neither kind of justificatory foundation can offer any justification to those who fundamentally doubt or dispute those foundations, whatever derivation or “basing” relations are used or the very foundationalist model of justification itself. In the face of such fundamental disagreement, how can proper criteria of justification be established? In principle, no foundationalist theory can answer this question, precisely because it understands justification solely in terms of derivation of conclusions from first premises of one kind or another. In principle, foundationalism preaches to the (nearly) converted, and commits a petitio principii against those who dissent; it cannot justify its criteria of truth or of justification.Footnote 53 This is one key implication of Sextus Empiricus’s Dilemma of the Criterion:
[I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning.Footnote 54
Regardless of whether the privileged set of foundations are empirical or rational, so long as “foundations” for knowledge are sought, controversy about those foundations, their associated “basing relations,” and the foundationalist model itself is inevitable, whilst in principle the foundationalist model of justification can offer nothing to settle such disputes because it analyzes justification solely in terms of derivation from some privileged set of foundations.Footnote 55
This Dilemma is the central methodological problem addressed by Hegel’s Phenomenology; he restates it in the very middle of his Introduction to the Phenomenology.Footnote 56 One of Hegel’s great epistemological insights is to realize that, first, this Dilemma is a genuine philosophical problem; second, it disposes of foundationalist models of justification, and so disposes of the two traditional models of knowledge (scientia and historia); although third, this Dilemma does not ultimately justify skepticism about ordinary, scientific, nor even philosophical knowledge.Footnote 57 Hegel’s conclusion, instead, is that the Dilemma of the Criterion underscores the importance of Kant’s account of the autonomy of rational judgment (above §5), and more importantly, Kant’s constructivist account of the identification and justification of rational principles (§8). Hegel’s solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion is summarised in §9.
8. Kant’s Constructivist Account of Rational Justification
The constructivist character of Kant’s account of justification introduces a fourth dimension of autonomy central to rational judgment. Kant’s constructivism about cognitive principles is suggested at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason in the “Doctrine of Method,” where he recognizes that the proper inventory of our cognitive capacities must and can only be a collective undertaking, in which we scrutinize our own and others’ results.Footnote 58 Kant’s constructivism about practical principles is built into his universalization test of the Categorical Imperative, in ways highlighted recently by Onora O’Neill,Footnote 59 though they were also identified, adopted, and adapted by Hegel.Footnote 60 The label “constructivism” now runs riot in moral theory. Kant’s constructivism is unique and, I submit, uniquely powerful. Unfortunately, it remains largely unfamiliar, despite O’Neill’s outstanding work on it. I first summarize some key points of Kant’s constructivist approach to identifying and justifying practical norms (in this §), before indicating how Hegel extends Kant’s model to account for rational justification in general (§9).
Instead of consent, Kant’s theory of normative justification relies on possible consistency of human maxims or forms of outer action. Kant’s basic criterion of right action, along with its various instances, is neither indicative nor hypothetical; it is modal. The modality of Kant’s basic criterion is nicely formulated by O’Neill:
When we think that others cannot adopt, a fortiori cannot consent to, some principle we cannot offer them reasons for doing so.Footnote 61
“Adopt” here means, to be able to follow consistently that same principle in thought or action. This is an issue of capacity and ability, not a psychological claim about what someone can or cannot bring him- or herself to believe. The key requirement built into Kant’s universalization test is that one be able to supply to all relevant others sufficient justifying reasons for acting or thinking as one proposes to do on the very same occasion on which one proposes so to act or to think; this is Kant’s sine qua non for what can or cannot be “adopted” consistently. Hence the possibility of adopting a principle differs fundamentally from “accepting” one, in the common philosophical senses of “believe,” “endorse” or “agree to,” which are central to contractarian and contractualist analyses.Footnote 62 The key thought O’Neill here identifies is the central point of Kant’s universalization test. Kant’s test rules out any maxim that cannot possibly be adopted by others; it is not concerned with whether they might adopt the same kind of maxim. Numerical (rather than generic) identity of the shared maxim is central to Kant’s test; he says expressly that it is your own maxim which is to be universalized.Footnote 63 What we can or cannot consistently adopt as a maxim is constrained by the form of thinking or behaviour or its guiding principle (maxim), by basic facts about our finite form of rational agency and by basic features of our worldly context of action. This latter information is brought into Kant’s universalization test by using the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives, namely, “Who wills the end, wills also (necessarily, if he accords with reason) the sole means which are in his power.”Footnote 64
Though minimal, Kant’s test directly rules out maxims of coercion, deception, fraud, and exploitation. In principle, such maxims preclude offering to relevant others — especially victims — reasons sufficient to justify their following those maxims (or the courses of action they guide) in thought or action.Footnote 65 This is signalled by the lack of the very possibility of consent, which serves as a criterion of illegitimacy (though it is not constitutive of illegitimacy). Consent itself, whether implicit, explicit, or hypothetical, plays no role in Kant’s test, nor in Kant’s justifying the results of his test. Kant’s test uses the possibility of consent to signal the crucial justificatory possibility of providing sufficient justifying reasons to all concerned parties. Obviating the very possibility of consent on anyone’s part obviates the very possibility of offering sufficient justifying reasons to all concerned parties as possible bases of their own thoughts or actions. Because any maxim’s (or any course of action’s) passing his universalization test requires that sufficient justifying reasons for that maxim or action can be given to all concerned parties, Kant’s constructivism embodies at its core equal respect for all persons as free rational agents; that is, as agents who can determine what to think or to do by rationally assessing the merits of the case. Ruling out maxims which fail to pass this universalization test establishes the minimum necessary conditions for resolving the problems of conflict that generated the central concern of Modern natural law with establishing normative standards to govern public life, despite deep disagreements among various groups about the substance and conduct of a good or pious life.Footnote 66
Kant’s justificatory strategy is constructivist because it makes no appeal to any antecedent source or kind of normative authority. Thus Kant’s constructivist justification of practical principles at its core embodies the autonomy of reason as being the necessary and sufficient basis for identifying, justifying, and thereby genuinely establishing legitimate norms. This is the fourth key dimension of the autonomy of rational judgment: Kant’s justificatory strategy appeals only to a fundamental principle of rational justification, that justifying a principle, policy, belief, institution, or action requires that its proponent can provide sufficient justifying reasons to all other concerned parties, such that these parties can consistently adopt and follow the very same proposal in thought or action. Therefore, at its core Kant’s constructivist justification of practical principles is fundamentally social; it is fundamentally intersubjective because it addresses all concerned parties.Footnote 67 The nerve of Kant’s strategy is to show that this modal capacity to provide justifying reasons to all relevant others is a very stringent requirement. One great advantage of Kant’s minimalist strategy of justification is that it avoids familiar problems regarding agreement or acceptance, whether implicit, explicit, or hypothetical.Footnote 68
On the basis of this modal principle Kant develops a powerful kind of constructivism in normative theory, not in the sense popularized by Rawls (Reference Rawls1971) but in the sense explicated by O’Neill.Footnote 69 Kant’s constructivism articulates the content of a natural law theory, though it moots the issues of ontology (moral realism) and motivation that confront natural law theories. Kant’s constructivism justifies the objectivity and legitimacy of practical, action-guiding principles without appeal to moral facts, whether natural or non-natural. Kant’s constructivist principle addresses neither a particular society with its norms (communitarianism), nor an “overlapping consensus” of a pluralistic society (Rawls), nor the multitude of voices aspiring to communicate in accord with the requirements of an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas), nor a plurality of potential contractors (e.g., Gauthier or Scanlon).Footnote 70 These latter considerations are important, but are secondary to the basic framework principles of justice identified and justified by Kant’s constructivism, which articulates the most basic rational principle of human thought and action as such. The principles required for legitimate contract cannot themselves be established by contract, because (as Hume recognized, T 331–2) any such contract presupposes those principles. Conversely, requiring consent to establish basic norms too easily allows for negligence or back-sliding through refusal to consent, including refusal to acknowledge relevant considerations and obligations.Footnote 71 Kant’s constructivism establishes key norms to which we are committed, whether we like it or not, by our rational requirements to act in justified ways, together with the limits of our very finite form of human agency.Footnote 72 According to Kant, there is no public use of reason without this constructivist principles, which uniquely avoids presupposing any particular authority, whether ideological, religious, socio-historical, textual, or personal.
Saying that Kant’s constructivism does not appeal to moral facts may invite a misunderstanding. Unlike most contemporary “constructivist” programmes, Kant’s constructivism is not committed to generating or “constructing” the entire moral domain by appeal solely to non-moral facts and principles. Facts about human finitude, such as our liability to injury, coercion, or deceit, are empirical facts. They are partially constitutive of our finite form of rational agency. They are morally relevant facts because as agents there is so much we can and either should or should not do to produce, avoid, exploit, avert, or minister to them. The point of departure of Kant’s constructivism is not the alleged rights of others, but rather our own obligations towards others (and ourselves), given that each of us is a free, rational, and finite agent living in mutual proximity on a finite surface. Ab initio this version of constructivism moves within the moral domain because restricting ourselves to those principles for which we can provide all relevant parties with sufficient justifying reasons is as much a principle of morals as it is a principle of rational justification per se. It is a (broadly) moral principle because it requires us to act only on those principles that can be rationally justified, and because it requires us to respect ourselves and all other persons as rational agents, as agents who can understand, develop, assess, and act on rationally justified principles because we recognize and understand their justificatory grounds.
Kant primarily formulates “respect” as respect for the moral law.Footnote 73 Respect for the moral law is constituted by recognizing the Categorical Imperative as the fundamental moral principle and following what the Categorical Imperative requires because it is the fundamental principle of morals. Kant’s Categorical Imperative is the fundamental principle of morals because it provides the fundamental criterial procedure for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate types of action by distinguishing among prohibited, permissible, and obligatory types of action. To use Kant’s Categorical Imperative and to follow its dictates requires using the constructivist method analyzed here for identifying and justifying legitimate maxims. Kant is emphatic that only insofar as we use the Categorical Imperative and follow its dictates can and do we treat each and every person as an end in him- or herself, and not merely as a means only. Doing this requires that we think and act only on the basis of justifiable, and indeed rationally justified, principles. A necessary criterion, the sine qua non, of rationally justifiable or justified principles is that only for such principles can we offer all concerned parties sufficient justifying reasons to think or act as we do or propose to do.
Kant also speaks of respect for persons, not just for the moral law; this is central to his formulation of the Humanity Imperative, “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”Footnote 74 Hence on Kant’s view it is proper to speak of respect for persons, although he insists that human beings merit respect as persons only due to their “personality,”Footnote 75 that is, their capacity to perform their duties by using and following the requirements of the Categorical Imperative.Footnote 76
Kant’s Categorical Imperative is a principle of reason. To use the Categorical Imperative requires that we each exercise our own capacity for rational judgment. For reasons just summarized (in this §), exercising our capacity for rational judgment requires constructive self-criticism and mutual critical assessment. That Kant regarded the exercise of our individual capacity for rational judgment as a social phenomenon is clearly stated in his essays, “What It Is to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” and “What is Enlightenment?,”Footnote 77 and it is clearly embedded in the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant indicates that establishing a proper inventory of our rational and cognitive capacities is a collective undertaking involving everyone’s assessment of everyone’s results in this endeavour.Footnote 78
9. Hegel’s Generalization of Kant’s Constructivist Model of Justification
Just as Hegel realized that Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis” instantiates a basic feature of rational judgment as such (above, §7), he also realized that Kant’s constructivism about practical principles holds indeed for the justification of all rational principles, including cognitive principles — and thus also, inter alia, principles of empirical evidence and principles governing externalist factors in epistemic justification.Footnote 79 Only Kant’s and Hegel’s constructivist approach to rational justification can resolve Sextus’s Dilemma of the Criterion.Footnote 80 Sextus’s Dilemma holds against asymmetric, as it were “linear,” theories of justification, that work from first premises down to particular conclusions (scientia and historia). Against “coherentist,” “circular,” or “dialectical” theories of justification, Sextus’s Dilemma raises the trope of vicious circularity. However, this horn of the Dilemma is defeated, and is shown to be merely a trope, by Hegel’s account of the possibility of constructive self- and mutual criticism. Mutual criticism is discussed later in this section (§9.3); I begin by briefly summarizing Hegel’s sophisticated account of the possibility of self-criticism (§9.1).Footnote 81
9.1.
A careful textual analysis reveals that in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel analyzes our consciousness of an object into six main aspects. Hegel distinguishes the object itself from our conception of the object itself. Likewise, he distinguishes between ourselves as actual cognitive subjects in our actual cognitive engagements from our self-conception as engaged cognitive subjects. More importantly, Hegel analyzes our experience of an object, and likewise our experience of ourselves as cognitive subjects, as resulting from our use of these conceptions in attempting to know their “objects.” This is to say, our experience of the object results from our use of our conception of the object in attempting to know the object itself. Likewise, our self-experience as knowers results from our use of our cognitive self-conception in attempting to know ourselves in our cognitive engagements.
Consider this table of the basic aspects Hegel distinguishes:
On Hegel’s analysis, our experience of the object (B) is structured both through our conception of the object (A) and through the object itself (C). Likewise our experience of ourselves as knowers (2) is structured both through our cognitive self-conception (1) and our actual cognitive constitution and engagement (3). Hegel’s analysis directly implies that, on the one hand, we have no aconceptual empirical knowledge, and likewise no aconceptual self-knowledge.Footnote 82 It also directly implies that neither are we trapped within our conceptual schemes! Put positively, our experience of the object (B) can only correspond with the object itself (C) if our conception of the object (A) also corresponds with the object itself (C). Likewise, our cognitive self-experience (2) corresponds with our actual cognitive constitution and engagement (3) only if our cognitive self-conception (1) also corresponds with them (3). Put negatively and critically, insofar as our conception of the object (A) or likewise our cognitive self-conception (1) fail to correspond with their “objects” (C, 3), we can detect and correct this lack of correspondence, though only through sustained and concerted attempts to comprehend our “objects” (C, 3) through use of our conceptions (A, 1) in our experience of those objects (B, 2). Such attempts can inform us whether and how our conceptions (A, 1) can and must be revised in order to improve their correspondence with their “objects” (C, 3).
Moreover, our conception of the object (A) and our cognitive self-conception (1) must mutually correspond, in the sense that we conceive of the object (A) in ways that can be known in accord with our cognitive self-conception (1), and our cognitive self-conception (1) is of a cognitive subject who can know such objects as we conceive them (A). These conceptions must not merely be consistent, but must positively support each other. Likewise our experience of the object (B) and our cognitive self-experience (2) must support each other. Finally, our conception of the object (A) must be such that it renders our cognitive self-experience (2) intelligible, and our cognitive self-conception (1) must render our experience of the object (B) intelligible. In sum, these four aspects (A, B, 1, 2) must mutually correspond and mutually support each other in the sense that they ground or justify each other. However, those four aspects can only do this insofar as our conceptions (A) and (1) correspond to their objects (C) and (3). At the broad level of the critical examination of key conceptions of human empirical knowledge, where different conceptions (or models) of the objects of empirical knowledge require different conceptions (or models) of empirical knowledge, this complex of correspondences is a sufficient criterion of the truth, and also the justification, of an epistemology.
In sum, the key to Hegel’s reply to the trope of circularity is to show that, because we are capable of constructive self-criticism, when assessing or reassessing any piece of justificatory reasoning, by reviewing its basic evidence, principles of inference, and its use of each of these, we can revise, replace, or reaffirm as need be any component and any link among components within the justificatory reasoning in question.Footnote 83 Because self-criticism and constructive mutual assessment are both fallible and — fortunately — corrigible, Hegel’s account of rational justification is fundamentally fallibilist. Wisely, Hegel realized that fallibilism about justification is consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge, and with objectivity about practical principles.Footnote 84
9.2.
It is important to understand why Hegel’s criterion for the truth and the rational justification of a philosophical theory is not a version of any standard coherence theory of justification. Coherence theories of justification have long been suspect of failing to link their criterion of truth, “coherence,” with the truth of the objects of any maximally coherent theory, without simply equating truth with coherence. One reason for this is that, like foundationalist theories, coherence theories are internalist theories of justification, according to which any justifying ground, any relevant principles of justification and justifying links among them, must be ones of which the theorist is aware. It’s worth briefly considering this point in connection with some central characteristics of nineteenth- and twentieth-century coherence theories.
Nineteenth-century coherence theories of justification were conceived and written in what was later called the material mode of speech, and included experiences along with statements and principles among which coherence was to be sought. One persistent problem with such views is that, in the attempt to distinguish coherence from foundationalist theories of justification, coherence theorists tended to treat “experiences” in ways that made their relations to objective states of affairs — i.e., to the relevant empirical truth-makers — puzzling, if not incomprehensible.
In the early twentieth century coherence theories were reformulated in the formal mode of speech, so that “experiences” dropped out of account in favour of protocol statements and coherence often became no more than logical consistency. This exacerbated the internalist difficulties of coherence theories because — as von Juhos pointed outFootnote 85 — any coherent system of statements can include the statements “This system of statements is the maximally coherent one and is thus true,” or “This system of protocol statements is issued by scientists of our cultural circle and is thus the only relevant one.” When relevant sets of protocol statements was restricted to, e.g., “scientists of our cultural circle,” the Dilemma of the Criterion was directly if unwittingly reinstated. Nor was it recognized when something tantamount to “cultural circles” was re-instantiated by van Fraassen’s stress on philosophical “stances.”Footnote 86 I do not dismiss the relevance of considerations about “cultural circles” or “stances,” but it must be said that Hegel is the philosophical past master of their analysis and assessment. Analytical philosophy has impoverished itself greatly by neglecting Hegel’s profound and still-revolutionary achievements in epistemology.Footnote 87
A key advantage of Hegel’s theory of justification is that it is a mixed internalist-externalist view.Footnote 88 Two externalist elements in Hegel’s theory of justification are reliabilism about sensory awareness, in conjunction with a direct (rather than representational or “indirect”) theory of perception. Significantly, Hegel realized that these two theses need merely be true, they do not need to be known to be true, in order for them to contribute justificatorily to our empirical knowledge. (Like Kant, Hegel rejected the “K-K thesis,” the strongly internalist thesis that in order to know that x, one must know that one knows that x.) Within his justificatory argument for his mixed, internalist-externalist theory of cognitive justification, Hegel develops a genuinely transcendental proof of (not “from”) mental content externalism, the thesis that some of our mental contents can be specified only by reference to extra-mental objects in our environment. Indeed, Hegel had two such arguments which may be mentioned briefly. One of them Hegel developed in his early essays, where he argues that we cannot be self-conscious unless we inhabit a natural world that provides us a sufficient minimum degree of identifiable similarities and differences among the contents of our sensations and (analogously) among the spatio-temporal objects of our awareness.Footnote 89 As mentioned earlier, in the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel argues against Fichte’s “Self-Sufficiency Thesis,” the thesis that individual human self-consciousness suffices to explain (indeed, “transcendentally”) the entire contents of human experience. Hegel argues against this thesis regressively, by internal critique, throughout the “Self-Consciousness” section, to the conclusion that human self-consciousness is not at all self-sufficient in this way, so that (by disjunctive syllogism) human self-consciousness is possible only on the basis of our consciousness of an “external” natural world. Both of these are transcendental proofs of mental content externalism.Footnote 90
None of the available coherence theories of justification provide proof of mental content externalism, and indeed, it is very hard to understand how coherence of whatever kind — Davidson’s semantics notwithstandingFootnote 91 — could prove mental content externalism. In this regard, though Hegel’s theory of epistemic justification involves coherentist elements, it is not a coherence theory of justification. Furthermore, available coherence theories of justification do not attempt to respond to the Dilemma of the Criterion, they do not attempt to analyze the very possibility of self-criticism, and they do not provide sufficient procedures or criteria for distinguishing between vicious circularity and constructive criticism and revision to identify positive increases in the “truth content” of the most coherent account available for the topic under consideration, as contrasted with mere change in our systems of beliefs. Indeed, available coherence theories analyze coherence as the nature of justification and as the criterion of truth, without providing much of an account of how the favoured form of coherence is to be identified or established. Neither do they analyze the social dimensions of cognitive justification.
The so-called method of “reflective equilibrium” suggested by Goodman and popularized by RawlsFootnote 92 is not a method, because it can do little or nothing to guide different philosophers to the same equilibrium between principles and intuitions (even if they share substantially the same sets of each),Footnote 93 because intuitions are not sufficiently well-ordered to ground stable equilibriaFootnote 94 and because there are deeply and apparently irreconcilable “intuitions” (if that is indeed what they are) among (schools of) philosophers.Footnote 95 Reflective equilibrium can scarcely avoid (sub-) cultural or historicist relativism; indeed, it may instead be a source (if not a version) of it.Footnote 96
If we insist on classifying Hegel’s theory of rational justification in familiar terms, the closest fit would be Haack’s “Foundherentism,” which includes a direct (not representational) theory of perception based in the proper functioning of our neuro-psychology of perception, a mixed internalist-externalist theory, and “a better understanding of the difference between legitimate mutual support and vicious circularity.”Footnote 97 Yet Hegel greatly augments Haack’s Foundherentism with his transcendental proofs of mental content externalism, his solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion via his account of the possibility of constructive self-criticism, and his superior analysis of the social and historical dimensions of rational justification.Footnote 98
9.3.
The same fallibilism built into Hegel’s explication of the possibility of constructive self-criticism is built into Kant’s constructivist strategy for rational justification. Because constructivist rational justification is fallibilist, it dispenses with the illicit tendency to unilateral judgment embedded in foundationalist models of justification, especially those models involving infalliblist pretensions to certainty. Infallibilist models of justification consistently fail to provide adequate resources to distinguish grasping the truth and thereby being certain of it, from being only apparently (if vividly) “certain” of something and only thus thinking it (unwarrantedly) to be true and self-evident.Footnote 99
Precisely because constructivist rational justification is fallibilist, it underscores that to judge rationally is to judge matters thus:
To the best of my present abilities, understanding, and information, this conclusion is justified for the following reasons and in the following regards — what do you think?
Because rational judgment is fallible, and because it involves our own (“perspectival,” as it were) assessment of the relevant evidence, principles, and the interrelations among these, rational judgment is also fundamentally social. We are each responsible for the critical assessment of our own and of others’ rational judgments. Genuine rational judgment requires constructive self-critical and mutually critical assessment of each and everyone’s judgment. Any consensus thereby reached is and remains justified — and remains justificatory of conclusions based on it — because it identifies the very best available principles, evidence, and conclusions, and because it always remains open to ongoing and future critical reassessment.
9.4.
Mutual criticism facilitates self-criticism and renders it a social phenomenon by facilitating the identification of discrepancies between our conceptions of our knowledge and the objects of our knowledge (1, A; above §8.1), between our experience of the objects we know and our experience of our own cognitive constitution and activities (2, B), and between our conceptions of knowledge and its objects (1, 2) and our experiences of our own cognitive activities which generate our experience of our objects (A, B). The essential social dimension of constructive self-criticism can be seen, briefly, in two considerations. First, the norms and principles involved in any judgment have implications far beyond the present context, and indeed far beyond the purview of any individual person. Consequently, the scrutiny of those norms and principles falls to parties other than oneself. Indeed, those norms and principles have the content they do and are justified to whatever extent they are only through their critical scrutiny by all concerned parties, presently, historically, and in the future. Second, due to our fallibility any particular judgment anyone makes is justified only to the extent that the judge does his or her utmost to exercise mature judgment on that occasion and to the extent that one’s judgment survives critical scrutiny by all concerned parties. Because mature judgment is socially based, so is rational justification.Footnote 100
10. Mutual Critical Assessment in Hegel’s Analysis of “Evil and Forgiveness”
This is precisely the point reached by the two moral judges Hegel considers in “Evil and Forgiveness” (PhdG, chapter 6Cc). This subsection concludes Hegel’s analysis of “Conscience,” in which Hegel criticizes the practical version of Fichte’s “Self-Sufficiency Thesis,” that individual conscience suffices, unto itself, to determine through its conviction what is right as such for all.Footnote 101 This thesis is completely individualist. In the concluding subsection of Hegel’s analysis, an agent and an observer dispute who has proper, genuine authority to judge the agent’s behaviour. After struggling over this issue in various ways which reveal that each of their original judgments narrowly considered only selected aspects of the action and situation, these two moral judges finally (in the penultimate paragraph) each rescind his presumption of the sufficiency and the supremacy of his own antecedent convictions and standpoint. They recognize that they are both equally fallible and equally competent to judge particular acts and that they each require each other’s assessment in order to scrutinize and thereby to assess and to justify their own judgment about any particular act.Footnote 102 (This is the breaking of the hard heart’s presumed self-sufficiency.) With this insight, the two judges become reconciled to each other and to the fundamentally social dimensions of genuine rational judgment.
Expressly, this is the first instance of genuine mutual recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.Footnote 103 Moreover, Hegel also indicates that this achievement is the advent of “absolute spirit”:
The word of reconciliation [between the two judges] is the extant spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself as universal essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself as the absolute individuality existing in itself — a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit.Footnote 104
The “universal essence” Hegel mentions here is the knowledge, principles, practices, and context of action (both social and natural) shared in common among the members of a social group. All of this is required, and understanding of all this is required, in order rationally to judge that “I judge” and not merely to utter the words “I judge,” thereby merely feigning rationality. Thus the rich philosophical significance of Hegel’s own Thesis of Mutual Recognition may be formulated thus:
For anyone genuinely to judge rationally that she or he is a rational judge requires (i) recognizing one’s own rational fallibility, (ii) judging that others are likewise genuine rational judges, (iii) that we are equally capable of and responsible for assessing rationally our own and each other’s judgments, and (iv) that we require each other’s assessment of our own judgments in order to scrutinise and thereby maximally to refine and to justify rationally our own judgments.
This rich and philosophically crucial form of self-consciousness requires the analogous consciousness of others, that we are all mutually interdependent for our capacity of rational judgment, our abilities to judge rationally, and our exercise of rational judgment. This requirement is transcendental, for unless we recognize our critical interdependence as fallible rational judges we cannot judge fully rationally, because unless we acknowledge and affirm our judgmental interdependence, we will seriously misunderstand, misuse, and overestimate our own individual rational, though fallible and limited, powers of judgment. Thus recognizing our own fallibility and our mutual interdependence as rational judges is a key constitutive factor in our being fully rational, fully autonomous rational judges. Only by recognizing our judgmental interdependence can we each link our human fallibility and limited knowledge constructively to our equally human corrigibility, our ability to learn, especially from constructive criticism. Therefore, fully rational justification requires us to seek out and actively engage with the critical assessments of others.
Hegel addresses this issue in connection with “forgiveness” to stress that our recognition of our common fallibility and our mutual interdependence for constructive assessment and corrigibility requires acknowledging and accepting the crucial roles of charity, tolerance, patience, and literal forgiveness in our mutual assessment of our rational judgments and those of others, to acknowledge that oversights, whether our own or others’, are endemic to the human condition and as such are not grounds for blame or condemnation of anyone’s errors.Footnote 105 Mutual forgiveness is required for our mutual reconciliation within the human community of knowers, which is required for each of us to be as rationally cognizant as we can. Hegel’s Thesis of Mutual Recognition involves mutually achieved recognition, not of our individual virtues of character (à la Aristotle on friendship) but of our shared fallible and corrigible rational competence.Footnote 106
Directly following this crucial result, Hegel emphasizes four points in his concluding paragraph of “Evil and Forgiveness” which are especially important here. First, he insists that “absolute spirit” is introduced into the body of the Phenomenology of Spirit here (as quoted just above from Hegel’s penultimate paragraph) once this collective, social basis of individual thought and action is achieved.Footnote 107 Second, he claims this is the basis of consciousness;Footnote 108 that is, of our awareness of phenomena other than ourselves. Third, this social basis of consciousness is not yet explicit for the observed consciousness.Footnote 109 Finally, this collective social self is “God manifest in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowledge.”Footnote 110 These last two points set up the theme for Hegel’s discussion of religion, how religion facilitates the human community’s becoming self-conscious by becoming conscious of itself as and within the community of knowers, including both theoretical and practical knowledge within its natural, social, and historical contexts.
The religious overtones of Hegel’s analysis of “forgiveness” are deliberate, though they do not portend any ultimate shift away from the human community to any transcendent religious deity. Though Hegel was Christian, he was not a theist; if there is a first principle of Hegel’s metaphysics, it is: Posit no transcendent entities.Footnote 111 Hegel’s book is a phenomenology of spirit, of spirit’s advent and development. One key task Hegel faces in “Religion” (chapter 7) is to demonstrate that a thorough phenomenology of religion ultimately sustains, justifies, and makes explicit for the observed form of religious consciousness the thesis already stated (and just quoted) in the final paragraphs of “Evil and Forgiveness” that in principle God = Spirit = the mutually recognitive human community, where this thesis is actualized by our recognitive community becoming adequately self-knowing through Hegel’s philosophical system (and its manifold historical and empirical bases). In this regard, an important structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is that the “consciousness,” so to speak, of spirit — its cognizance of phenomena other than itself — is examined in the first six chapters, “Consciousness” through “Spirit.” “Religion” then examines the development of spirit’s “self-consciousness.” Spirit’s consciousness and self-consciousness are then integrated, so that spirit becomes both in and for itself, in “Absolute Knowing” (chapter 8). Hegel’s examination of religion is consistent with and ultimately supports the present analysis.Footnote 112
11. Mutual Critical Assessment and the Historical Dimensions of Rational Justification
Above (§6) I indicated that one of Hegel’s prime concerns in the Phenomenology is with understanding the kind of “I judge” required to appreciate and to assess, e.g., Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism.” Obviously, assessing this or any other piece of important reasoning requires substantive training in the relevant issues. Yet such training does not suffice to assess the reasoning in question. Assessment requires autonomous judgment about the merits of the case made in and by that piece of reasoning. For reasons identified herein, Hegel recognized, adopted, and extended Kant’s insights into both the autonomy and the intersubjective bases of genuine rational judgment. Because reason is autonomous in the four ways identified above (§§6, 8), and in order to address Sextus’s Dilemma, the justification of any substantive view requires and must be based on the thorough, constructive internal critique of all relevant opposed views so far as we can determine them, whether historical, contemporary, or possible. This is built into Hegel’s concept and method of “determinate negation.”Footnote 113 Because the list of relevant alternative views can always be extended, in part by devising new variants on previous accounts and in part by doing so when confronting new kinds of circumstances, rational justification is fallibilist and inherently provisional. Consequently, rational justification is fundamentally historical, because it is provisional and because the list of relevant alternatives and information expands historically.
12. Conclusion
Hegel’s broad, central insights into the character and requirements of rational judgment are very far from philosophical commonplaces, as are Hegel’s sophisticated views about how productive self-criticism and mutual critical assessment are possible and why they are central to rational justification. Sextus’s Dilemma of the Criterion has received scant philosophical attention, and recent attempts to solve it consistently oversimplify it.Footnote 114 That we often engage in constructive mutual criticism is nothing new. Neither is it news that instead we often thwart it. Yet what we achieve by such activity and how we achieve it are far from obvious, nor is much if any account of it given in most theories of justification.Footnote 115 If the present analysis is correct, we can and ought to engage in constructive self- and mutual criticism because only in this way can we achieve genuine rational justification, and only in this way can we thus aspire to or achieve it.
It is significant to show that, and how, we can achieve rational justification through self-criticism and mutual critical assessment. However, I have argued for a stronger thesis by arguing that the Dilemma of the Criterion is a problem that must be addressed by any tenable theory of rational justification for non-formal domains and by arguing that, uniquely, Hegel’s theory of rational justification solves this Dilemma. Because rational justification involves using various grounds of justification, we must be able to distinguish genuine and relevant from false or irrelevant justificatory grounds. So doing requires solving the Dilemma of the Criterion. If Hegel’s theory of rational justification solves this problem, and indeed uniquely solves it, then Hegel is right that we can achieve genuine rational justification only by engaging in the kinds of self-criticism and mutual critical assessment central to his theory of rational justification.
It may be helpful to note that my analysis does not reduce the method nor the substance of Hegel’s Phenomenology to a theory of judgment. Instead, my analysis provides an internal critique of individualism with regard to rational justification and rational judgment. Once the social factors in individual rational judgment and justification identified herein are accepted, there can be no further objections against introducing the further social and historical dimensions involved in human knowledge, both empirical and philosophical, for without Bildung there can be no fully rational, nor any maximally justified, judgment.Footnote 116
If philosophers took Hegel’s theory of rational justification seriously and developed it further, it might be shown that Hegel identified a genera of theory covering various specific theories of rational justification. This would still entail that Hegel’s achievement is extremely important, because in the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel sought to establish the proper outlines of a tenable theory of human knowledge, including a tenable theory of rational justification, whilst expressly leaving many specifics to various parts of his philosophical system.Footnote 117 Hegel’s philosophical system expressly requires the Phenomenology as its sole “justification,” “proof,” and “deduction,” in part because his system is justifiable only if Hegel’s Phenomenology succeeds, inter alia, in refuting or dissolving philosophical skepticism by solving the Dilemma of the Criterion and by showing that philosophical knowledge is possible because it can be fully rationally justified. In this important regard, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit remains the crucial, scientific “first part” of his philosophical system, even if he later decided that the Phenomenology does not constitute a proper (first) part within his system of philosophical knowledge.Footnote 118
The intricacy of these issues requires caution, keeping our philosophical theories of rational judgment and justification as simple as possible. Yet the crucial importance of these issues requires us to be mindful of Einstein’s important corollary to Ockham’s razor: “Everything must be made as simple as possible, but not any simpler.”Footnote 119 Standard analyses of rational judgment and justification have failed to be mindful of both cautions. This is reflected in theory by philosophers’ continuing resistance to recognizing the social and historical dimensions of rational justification and in practice by the still far too common conflation of rational justification with defending one’s view come what may.Footnote 120
Consider in this regard Paul Teller’s statement of a modest version of “epistemic contextualism,” the thesis that what requires justification depends in part on what questions are raised. About this view Teller states:
The pursuit of knowledge is a deeply social enterprise; and many of us accept, in the spirit of reliabilism, that we are better off, if, on the whole, we do not brush aside the contrary opinions of those we acknowledge as worthy interlocutors.Footnote 121
Teller suggests this modest contextualist view for the sake of discussion, noting that
… to go this far is already to accord some weight to both the opinions and the values of many of our peers even though nothing rationally compels us to do so.Footnote 122
The notion that “nothing rationally compels us” to accord any weight to the opinions and values of our peers reflects the individualism which still dominates contemporary epistemology, even in the face of growing, if grudging, recognition that our human pursuit of knowledge is in fact a social enterprise. Moreover, Teller’s guarded acknowledgement of “those we acknowledge as worthy interlocutors” and, perhaps more broadly, to “many of our peers” is symptomatic of another characteristic of most of philosophy in the twentieth century of whatever stripe: the unfortunate tendency to divide into what the logical positivists called “cultural circles,”Footnote 123 a phenomenon evident again in both the title and the substance of Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist manifesto, The Empirical Stance (2002).Footnote 124 Retreating into groups of like-minded thinkers has too often involved retreating from serious engagement with considered dissent by able and informed interlocutors. In view of these unfortunate phenomena, philosophers ought to reconsider carefully the incisive alternative account of rational justification developed by Kant and especially Hegel.Footnote 125
