Political scientists have largely watched the aftermath of the financial crisis from the sidelines. If we stack up the number of books dedicated to explaining the causes and consequences of the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008, works by journalists and economists predominate. In this context, J. Kevin Corder's The Fed and The Credit Crisis is a particularly welcome addition to analyses of the onset and aftermath of the nation's recent financial crisis. Corder, also the author of Central Bank Autonomy: The Federal Reserve System in American Politics (1998), offers a unique perspective on both the failures of Federal Reserve policies that contributed to the onset of crisis and the policy responses of the Federal Reserve (the Fed) to contain the mess and fix a broken regulatory scheme.
The Fed and The Credit Crisis starts with a relatively innocuous set of questions: How did the Fed respond to the crisis and what are the implications of such actions for the future performance of the Fed? This opening framing of the book's motivating questions, however, masks what I take to be Corder's deeper interests in organizations and their capacity for learning and change. In short, the book explores the forces that promote organizational learning, with a particular focus on the challenges the Fed faced in responding to the financial crisis and in meeting new statutory demands from lawmakers. When does crisis produce meaningful policy and institutional change? And how sanguine should we be that the Fed will be able to fulfill its new—as well as its old and more familiar—missions in the aftermath of the worst recession since the 1930s? Corder's answers to these questions are necessarily speculative—since, as the author reminds us, “the process of learning is lengthy, contingent, and contested” (p. 147). Still, he offers us a framework for thinking about the Fed's past performance and speculating about its future, given the context in which it operates and the challenges that it faces.
Corder approaches his case study of the Fed by marching the reader competently and concisely through the multiple financial innovations and markets that ultimately contributed to the onset of crisis in 2007 and 2008. In each of four chapters—on subprime lending, housing finance, bank supervision, and systemic risk—he offers historically informed and typically balanced treatments of the Fed's role in building and perpetuating an increasingly unstable financial system over the past several decades. Corder makes plain the many forces that combined to limit the Fed's ability and willingness to see signs of instability in the run-up to the credit crisis. Some pressures came from lawmakers eager to push the Fed to widen access to housing markets. Other pressures came from an array of financial industries working to dissuade the Fed from aggressive regulation and supervision of their activities. Inside the Fed, conservatives' faith in market discipline also helped to shape the system's precrisis deregulatory stance, as the Fed typically favored allowing firms' own risk management to guide and temper financial innovation. The result, the author makes plain, was that the Fed was ultimately complicit in the governing and market failures that helped to bring on the Great Recession.
These are important chapters as they provide an essential backdrop for understanding the Fed's adoption of bold and unconventional policy tools during and after the crisis in order to rescue the financial system and to restore credit markets. Corder tackles these efforts in Chapter 6, with an exploration of the Fed's $2 trillion balance sheet that is still growing some five years later. He might have come to a stronger defense of the Fed in some places. (Is it really monetizing the debt? He might have explained the grounds on which the Fed today defends itself from its critics.) But overall, Corder captures well the complex political environment in which the Fed—so accustomed to its independence in the period of low inflation before the crisis—reacted so aggressively as the lender of last resort. He does a superb job in this chapter by laying bare the political and organizational challenges the system will face in the months and years to come as it seeks to unwind its balance sheet and tighten monetary policy.
The strengths of the book are several. First and foremost, the Fed has received relatively little attention from political scientists of late. This oversight of the system as a political institution is relatively new, as numerous scholars tackled questions about the Fed's role in managing the economy in the 1980s and early 1990s, including important contributions by Irwin Morris and by John Woolley. My guess is that the Great Moderation (the period of low inflation) that took root in the 1990s took the wind of the sail of scholars interested in studying the Fed. Corder's book, then, is a welcome jump start in a recently undertilled area.
Second, when scholars have analyzed the policy choices of the Fed, most attention has been focused on monetary policy, generally black-boxing the Fed's supervisory, regulatory, and consumer roles. Corder remedies this oversight, and in doing so raises important questions about the Fed's political and organizational capacity to address multiple missions. This is perhaps the greatest contribution of the book, as the author's approach forces us to consider the ways in which the new responsibilities of the Fed (grafted on it by the Dodd-Frank regulatory law in 2010) complicate its ability to focus on its core monetary policy function.
In this light, I wonder why the book does not explicitly address the challenge posed by the Fed's dual mandate, which was in place for decades before Dodd-Frank was enacted. Still, Corder raises what I see as some of the most critical questions about the Fed in the wake of the crisis. After all, how it manages its new missions directly affects its future success in forestalling or at least recognizing the onset of a future financial crisis.
Beyond the book's strengths, one might have wished for a stronger statement of its theoretical contribution. Corder seeks to marry theoretical insights from historical institutionalism (for example, the concept of institutional layering offered by Eric Schickler) with ideas from studies of crisis management (for example, Thomas Birkland's research on disaster and organizational learning). This strikes me as a fruitful approach for exploring the conditions under which agencies succeed or fail in the aftermath of crisis. The author might have pursued and applied this approach more thoroughly throughout the book. We get a hint in Chapter 7 about the challenges the Fed will face in learning from its mistakes and adopting its new missions. In particular, he notes that waning public attention increases the power of financial interests to influence the shape of new financial rules mandated by Dodd-Frank.
This struggle between what Corder calls private power and public scrutiny is intriguing and might have been developed in greater detail. Still, The Fed and the Credit Crisis offers an important and provocative perspective on past and future challenges facing the system. It deserves a careful reading by scholars interested in both the politics of central banking and the slow and contingent process of institutional change.
