The fate of Afghanistan's written history has been interconnected with the progression and regression of the Afghan state's ability to live with its past as much as with its present. Afghan historiography, in both the official and unofficial versions, has generally sought to “prove” or “disprove” the official versions of Afghanistan's evolving national narrative rather than be, in the words of Edward H. Carr, “a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past.”Footnote ¹ Despite unprecedented freedoms of expression and exposure to international methods of research, post-Taliban Afghanistan still seems far from coming to terms with its past. One particular trend continues to haunt the country as it tries to move forward in deconstructing or reinventing its history: official Afghan narratives continue to downplay or ignore the violent and divisive period commencing with the 1973 coup that ended the country's monarchical system.

An argument can be made that the coup set in motion the conditions that ensured the takeover of the government by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978, which led in turn to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union the following year. From 1978 to 2001, Afghan society paradoxically witnessed major upheavals leading to a country at war with itself and with its myriad cultural identities while simultaneously experiencing its greatest opportunity to write history independent of governmental control and free of established dogma. Afghan histories—mostly unscientific and biased—proliferated, authored by Afghans inside the country and those in the diaspora in Iran, Pakistan, and Western countries. Despite the overall low quality of these works, Afghans exercised the freedom to write about their country without fear of persecution and used the medium of historiography to legitimize and broadcast their country's national struggle or local, ethnic, or regional causes with a frequency never experienced before.

The new environment allowed later Afghan writers to revisit the past with a much more critical perspective. Muhammad ʿIsa Gharjistani's Kala Minarha dar Afghanistan, for example, reviewed in graphic detail Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman's atrocities in the latter decades of the 19th century, using published but seldom utilized sources while promoting a vision of national unity among various Afghan ethnic groups against the PDPA and its Soviet backers.Footnote ² In a similar framework of national unity, but from a very different perspective, the Afghan journalist Nabi Misdaq authored a book about Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747–72), dedicating it to Mullah Muhammad ʿUmar, the leader of the Taliban, “who like the great Ahmad Shah, has set himself the task of uniting Afghanistan.”Footnote ³ Many Afghan historians privileged themes related to local, ethnic, and regional causes, challenging not only the master narrative of Afghanistan's birth as a distinct political entity in 1747 but also the meaning of “Afghanistan” itself. Some argued that unlike “Turkistan,” “Hazaristan,” or “Barbaristan,” the term “Afghanistan” was ahistorical.Footnote ⁴ Counterarguments were made that the concept of “Afghanistan” as a distinct geographical space did not emerge in 1747 with Ahmad Shah Durrani but rather was first used in the 14th century.Footnote ⁵ The dialogue had begun.

Since the demise of the Taliban government in 2001, the framers of the modern state structure in Afghanistan have tried to shape how the country's history is written. The 2006 “Afghanistan Compact” called for respect of “the pluralistic culture, values and history of Afghanistan, based on Islam.”Footnote ⁶ The national development strategy from 2008 to 2013 states an objective to “create awareness and foster a sense of pride in the country's history, future, culture and achievements.”Footnote ⁷ Three aspects of the official Afghan plans to reshape the country's historical narrative stand out, namely, that this history should 1) showcase Afghanistan's pluralism, 2) be a source of pride for all Afghans, and 3) be seen through the lens of Islam. The last two points are not far removed from the undercurrent of unofficial Afghan historiography that has flourished since the late 1970s, but the concept of pluralism remains a challenge, requiring time for national healing and for historiographical maturity. Yet at least in terms of history textbooks for Afghan schools, the government seems to be pressing forward with its official plans for the country's historiography, though they will necessitate the elimination or rewriting of whole historical periods.

In early 2012, discussing the orientation of new history textbooks, Deputy Minister of Education Muhammad Asif Nang stated that history “should build and heal a generation, not destroy one” and that its function is to “reflect the truth and the honor of the country.” Thus, those historical incidents “that provoke old rivalries and enmities and destroy national unity shouldn't be included” in the new public school textbooks published by the Ministry of Education. “Empty pages are better than pages that are full of animosity,” he concluded.Footnote ⁸ The ministry's new emphasis is a reflection of Afghanistan's post-Taliban reality. Most of the country's political protagonists, including the communists, Islamists, warlords, drug traffickers, and other criminals, have managed to maintain, and often increase, their reach into the Afghan power structure. For these groups, discussing the past openly would lead to the passing of judgment on their behavior, which collectively has left hundreds of thousands of Afghans dead and many more injured and displaced. Afghanistan's post-conflict reconstruction did not include any reconciliation plan or accountability. On the contrary, the lower chamber of the parliament in 2007 passed a bill granting immunity to all Afghans accused of war crimes since the victory of the PDPA.Footnote ⁹

Not all Afghans seem to be accepting the calls to overlook almost four decades of history for the sake of unity. “Our children and young people should have full knowledge of what happened [in their country],” stated Ilay Irshad, a member of the Afghan parliament in response to the Ministry of Education's new guidelines. According to Irshad, the ministry had “no authority to brainwash people and keep them in the dark.” She added, “Thank God we have the media and our history books so that people will know their history.”

Coupled with international efforts to reintegrate many of the insurgents (collectively referred to as the Taliban), the expected departure of the bulk of foreign forces in 2013 and 2014 will likely result in yet another rewriting of the country's history textbooks by the Afghan government as well as direct pressure on scholars and historians to remove or minimize negative references about the Taliban. Notwithstanding the efforts of authorities to alter or downplay the history of the last four decades, the Afghan people have been greatly impacted by this period, and their understanding of themselves and their country's past has broadened and deepened. Perhaps more important, the scars left from these years cannot be removed from Afghanistan's historical annals while the country is facing the daunting task of trying to reconcile with the Taliban, already vilified and dehumanized by the last decade's policies.

Instead of trying to hide the country's history to “promote national unity,” Afghan histories need to look honestly and bravely at how the country has been formed, fostering a collective responsibility for the mistakes of the past, an acceptance of the boundaries of the present, and the capacity to move toward a difficult yet promising future. To take a hint from Massimo d'Azeglio: Afghanistan has been made; now it is time to make Afghans.