There is a certain charm to a good old-fashioned business history, the sort that assembles its narrative from annual reports and board minutes and unapologetically views events from the perspective of the executive suite. Combine this with the boosterism of local history and you have this meticulous and tendentious recounting of the corporate evolution of one industry in one midwestern city.
As business history, The Glass City is most concerned with the succession of chief officers and providing a genealogy of glass companies spawned from founders Edward Drummond Libbey, Michael Owens, and Edward Ford. At times the succession of corporate names reads like the begets of the Old Testament, but it is useful to have them so clearly lined up between one set of covers.
As local history, The Glass City captures well the iconic cultural importance of this industry to Toledo while exaggerating its economic role. Throughout the book the glass industry is extolled as the city's most important and leading industry, to the point that one might imagine that Toledo was a one-industry town like Akron (rubber) or Youngstown (steel). But glass, while important, was never actually a leading employer in the city. Through most of the city's history the automobile industry, especially parts production, employed twice the number of workers glass did. As the census of 1950 showed, when glass was king even Toledo's railroads had more local employees on their payrolls (17th Census, vol. 2, part 35, p. 451). And both motors and rails employed about ten times the number of African Americans as did the lily-white glass factories—the question why the color bar was unusually inflexible in glass is not considered in this book.
In one grand sense, Floyd gets the central story here backwards. Her subtitle, “Toledo and the Industry that Built It” is an apt shorthand for her conception of history: the captains of industry bestowed jobs, prestige, and growth upon the benighted city. Floyd never misses an opportunity to extol the vision, the generosity, and the energy of the glass companies’ leaders. Their genius not only built an industry but the city itself. “From their offices on the top floors of the building[s] on Madison Avenue…the corporate leaders of Toledo glass shaped the city's physical landscape, exercised control over huge aspects of its economy, and held sway over the decisions of its political leaders…they also brought prosperity and a path to the middle class to tens of thousands of other Toledoans” (p. 2). But a reverse reading of this dynamic is certainly more interesting if not more compelling. From a different perspective, the unique characteristics and position of the people, region, and social organization built the glass industry. How would this study have looked if the subtitle were changed to, “The Glass Industry and the City That Built It”?
The difference, of course would be that the people of the city, their social fabric and culture would be considered as actors and not subjects. Given Floyd's unblinking boardroom perspective, unions, politicians, agencies, civic organizations, and dissenters who oppose the plans of the glass barons are impediments to progress, when they are visible at all. Even the native peoples of the area who were hunted, massacred, and eventually evicted to western wastelands, were not groups acting in their own interests but are described here as the “Native American problem” that “Americans” faced. CIO unions that struck the glass plants in the 1940s, community activists who opposed the glass companies’ plans to bulldoze and appropriate their neighborhoods, mesothelioma victims suing for compensation, civil rights activists pushing for an end to the color bar in employment, all make their appearances only as problems that the glass leaders overcame.
The issue here is not one of balance or a sense that the little guy deserves a moment in the sun. Rather, the problem with the boardroom perspective is that it sidesteps some of the bigger pieces of the economic puzzle. For example, not until halfway through the book is the question of the glass firms’ longstanding monopolistic strategies mentioned (as “legal troubles” for the companies, of course). And it is these, presumably embarrassing actions because they are glossed over, that are among the most distinctive tales of the glass saga. The salience of the Federal Trade Commission's decade-long action against Owens-Illinois was not that it caused headaches for the company but that it underscored one of the key aspects of the organization of the glass industry, a monopolistic practice that was the centerpiece of Warren Scoville's brilliant study of the industry (Revolution in Glassmaking, Harvard University Press, 1948).
Scoville analyzed how the invention of the Owens automatic glass bottle blowing machine in the early twentieth century radically undermined the foundations of the industry by deskilling a product made by highly paid craftsmen and multiplying productivity. Libbey, Owens and the other glass executives chose not to exploit the machine themselves because they feared doing so would drive down the price of bottles and be self-defeating, at least in the short-term. Instead they followed a strategy of carefully licensing their technology so as to limit the number of machines in each line of bottles and upholding the craftsman's standard price. By licensing to only one producer in each bottle sector, they not only maximized the value of the license but were able to eventually use this power to manage prices, ration market share, and control the industry.
Floyd has written the most comprehensive study of the Toledo glass companies to date. But reading it is like fishing on a murky lake: Once in a while the reader sees a flash of scales a few feet down and can tell it is some sort of a big fish, but cannot see it long enough to decide what it is. Child labor was common in the glass industry? Libbey-Owens-Ford recouped the war profits its Japanese subsidiary accumulated during World War II? Bottle makers fought against environmentally-conscious deposit laws? Owens-Illinois’ had a subsidiary that built sugar plantations on Great Abaco Island in the Bahamas in the 1960s? Owens-Illinois knew about the dangers of asbestos in the 1940s but its spin-off, Owens-Corning expanded production into the 1970s? Glass corporations had timbering operations in Venezuela until a Toledo vice president was kidnapped and held for three years in the jungle by insurgents? In these pages all these fish jump but fall back under the surface as mere corporate problems to be overcome.
