Visions of Freedom provides a comprehensive, informative account of relations between the governments of Cuba, the United States, South Africa and the Soviet Union over Angola from 1976 to 1991. It discusses the political and military-strategic dimensions of the war in Angola and its spillover effects on southern Africa. Angola's anti-colonial struggle against Portugal evolved into a much wider war that would involve South African and Cuban forces and several Angolan parties, and also the United States and the Soviet Union as backers of the respective sides. Cuban forces first defeated a South African invasion of Angola in 1976 and left Angola in 1991, hence the chronological start and end points of this book. Piero Gleijeses argues persuasively that Cuba's victory was impressive. The war ended with the complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and an agreed process that would soon lead to Namibia's independence from South Africa. Gleijeses notes that no small country had ever deployed such vast forces on a military mission so far from its homeland, and very few countries, large or small, had ever accomplished so much so decisively.
Elements of this complex story have been published elsewhere; I therefore highlight here those areas where Gleijeses confirms, sheds light on or extends the scholarly literature significantly. Gleijeses joins the scholarly chorus that has long shown that Cuba was not a ‘puppet’ of the Soviet Union in Angola, but his archival research brings out additional elements. He documents a strong and sustained disagreement between Cuban and Soviet military officials regarding the correct strategy in Angola, with Soviet insistence on training the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, FAPLA) to fight both the South Africans and the UNITA insurgency led by Jonas Savimbi, and Cuban insistence that FAPLA should focus on Savimbi's forces while Cuban forces would repel the South African military. The book vividly presents the sharp words exchanged between the Cubans and the Soviets in Angola.
Gleijeses painstakingly shows that Cuban forces could not have left Angola sooner because of the repeated South African attacks, raids and other military actions throughout the 1980s. He further demonstrates that President Fidel Castro at times took the initiative to propose drawing down some Cuban troops; Angola's government rebuffed him.
The book makes it clear that Cuba was a stronger supporter of the Angolan government than was the Soviet Union. In 1977 Cuban intervention rescued the Angolan government from a coup attempt that apparently had significant Soviet backing, and Cuba was ready to retain its troops in Angola, even at times contrary to Soviet requests for a faster drawdown.
The author also shows a remarkable lack of communication between key allies over an array of topics and time periods. In 1976 Cuba did not notify the Soviet Union in advance of its troop deployment to Angola. In 1984 Castro complained to President José Eduardo dos Santos, ‘you have almost never informed us beforehand’ (p. 239), regarding various key initiatives. In 1987 the top Soviet military commander in Angola ‘lied’ (p. 394) to the top Cuban military commander about a fundamental strategic military decision.
Gleijeses had access to 15,000 pages of documents from Cuban archives. He also carried out archival research with US, South African, and Soviet documents, among others, and held 150 interviews. Interestingly, his bibliography shows very few Cuban published sources because Cuban scholars had not had access to those materials.
There are, nevertheless, curious blind spots in what is assuredly an impressive book. For example, Gleijeses describes the key events between September and November 1976 as follows: ‘The evidence is clear … the South Africans invaded first, and the Cubans responded’ (p. 29). Yet his own Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (University of North Carolina Press, 2002, pp. 261, 265) tells a more complex account. By 2 September 1975, there were 29 Cuban military specialists in Angola, while other members of the Cuban military mission (planned for 430 members) sailed from Havana between 16 and 20 September to land between 5 and 11 October for service in Angola; they also carried 12,000 rifles and other supplies. This preceded the South African invasion on 14 October. Gleijeses is most likely correct that the South African invasion, building on previous lower-level South African and US involvement, was the decisive event, but the entire process is best characterised as escalation, during which each side sought to outbid the other. Cuba would eventually send 36,000 troops to repel this South African invasion successfully.
Then there is a foregone opportunity. In 1977, and again in 1978, Katangan exiles in Angola invaded Shaba province in Zaire and were defeated both times. Gleijeses shows, as have others, that Cuba strongly opposed the exile invasion of Shaba, sought to persuade the Angolan leadership against it, and did not participate in the invasion. It appears from his account that there was no link between those exiles and Cuba. Yet, at the time, President Castro commented publicly on the allegation that Cuba ‘could have supplied and reorganised the Katangan force in Angola as early as 1975’, saying, ‘There is some truth to this because, during the war in Angola, the Katangans fought on the side of the MPLA … and they fought alongside us on a few fronts [in] late 1975 and early 1976’ (Granma Weekly Review, 28 May 1978, p. 1, and 11 June 1978, p. 2). Gleijeses might have searched for documents to explain what exactly had been the Cuban role in the period before Shaba I and Shaba II.
Finally, there is the problem of sources. Cuba did not declassify its archives; it gave Gleijeses selective access. On the question of whether the Soviet Union funded the Cuban war effort in Angola, Gleijeses tells us (p. 521) that these are archival boxes he did not see. As the war neared an end, Cuba court-martialled and executed Division General Arnaldo Ochoa on various charges, including corruption, during his time in command of the Cuban armed forces in Angola. ‘I found no indication of Ochoa's corruption’, says Gleijeses (p. 494), less to exonerate Ochoa and more, laudably, to report on the limits to his otherwise unprecedented archival access. Marvellous as the documents for this book are, there is uncertainty about the scope of its definitiveness.
Gleijeses has written an engrossing narrative, and at times he seeks to demolish explanations he deems inaccurate. Thus, for example, the peace agreement signed in New York in December 1988 could not be explained by the US policies of ‘constructive engagement’ or ‘linkage’, or the diplomacy of long-serving Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, or the US elections, or the Gorbachev march toward détente. The explanations, rather, lie with Cuba's defeat of the South African military, along with militant protest by the African National Congress and the threat of widespread international sanctions. I agree. But he also explains Cuban foreign policy only in terms of ‘self-defence’ and ‘idealism’. I also agree that both of these elements matter to explain Cuban foreign policy, but especially now, in the winter of his life, let us also note a third explanation: Fidel Castro wanted to be a contender in international relations and wanted his homeland to be considered one of the world's major powers, which Cuba certainly was during the momentous years examined in this splendid book.
