This book is a great addition to the debate about the role of reputation in international affairs. Its central question might be phrased thus: When do countries alter their behavior in response to the reputation of other states? Its thrust is thus deeply behavioral. Specifically, Mark Crescenzi illuminates how the reputations of other countries influence how states decide whether to go to war and form alliances with them. He argues that states draw inferences not only from their direct interaction with a given state in the system but also from the interactions of that state with other states in the system. On the basis of these observations, states learn new information that they use to assess the credibility of the commitments of other states to keep the peace or keep an alliance commitment. Thus, in Of Friends and Foes, the word “reputation” is used in the sense of “trustworthiness” and “competence” (p. 20), and—consistent with much past research—is applied specifically to the security domain.
The early chapters (2 and 3) flesh out the theory along with some illustrations, drawing in particular on Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, as well as on the efforts of Britain after World War II to discern the intentions of the Soviets. The theory is sophisticated in that it incorporates multilevel thinking about state interrelationships in terms of which a state is a friend of an enemy of a given state, an enemy of an enemy, a friend of a friend, and so forth, and in considering how such relationships inform the degree to which states draw inferences from watching the behavior of a state vis-à-vis other states. The more the other state, or the proxy state, is similar to the state doing the observation, the more direct inferences the observing state will likely draw. The same applies to the issue of time: The closer an event, the greater weight the observing state will assign it in its assessment of the other state’s trustworthiness. In this sense, Crescenzi’s theory of reputation is highly contextual in its operationalization, which makes it a significant contribution to the empirical application of the concept of reputation.
The theory is put to quantitative tests with respect to two issues: a state’s decision to go to war (Chapter 4) and its decision to enter into alliances (Chapter 5). With respect to the latter, the question is whether a past history as a reliable partner makes states more attractive as alliance partners. This focus on the effect of reputation on cooperation is refreshing in the security literature. As Crescenzi notes, “the key to unlocking the mystery of reputation and its role in political interaction is to free it from the bonds of the deterrence frame” (p. 77). This chapter shows just how much reputations matter for states’ willingness to ally themselves with others, which is a finding that might tell us more about the less studied cooperative effects of reputation.
With respect to war, the focus of Chapter 4, the main inference of the theory is that conflict begets conflict, and, more specifically, that State “A” is more likely to fight State “B” if B has fought with A’s peer states. While one might argue that this is intuitive, one could also argue that it is counterintuitive in that states should be less likely to pick a fight with states that are known to be belligerent and could and would plausibly engage militarily. One thing the book does not touch on is whether the states have won or lost prior battles (presumably, states would be much more reluctant to threaten consistent winners than perpetual losers). This is partly because the argument is that war is always a bad outcome. That is, the book assumes that conflict is inferred to be a demonstration of incompetence, because if the state had been able to credibly signal its resolve or otherwise avert a conflict competently, then it would not have chosen to fight.
This, of course, begs the question of whether states ever gain from fighting. Certainly, there are plenty of theories about domestic benefits that leaders may reap from waging war and, to his credit, Crescenzi is careful about also considering domestic costs and benefits. Rightly so. For example, some argue that Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine because Russia’s economy was faltering and Putin needed the distraction and the accompanying rallying around the flag (see Justin Fox, “An Economic Explanation for Putin’s Recklessness,” Harvard Business Review, August 15, 2014). Furthermore, one might argue that conflict avoidance would be interpreted as incompetence. For example, Barack Obama’s failure to react decisively to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons after having clearly set a “red line” led to plenty of criticism, while Donald Trump was praised as competent after bombing Syrian targets in quick response to a similar incident.
The Syria example, of course, also leads to another important question, namely, whether it matters who is in charge. One of the biggest difficulties when discussing the reputation of states is that states are a construct, and in reality decisions are made by people, that is, leaders or elites. This always raises the question: To whom or what do reputations adhere? This is a question that Of Friends and Foes only touches on most briefly. The defense of this line is that at least some part of reputations stick to states even when leaders change, as in many cases decisions about war and alliances require the agreement of the government writ large, not simply one person. Regime change entirely, of course, might be another matter.
This defense, however, has the advantage of allowing the author to proceed with large-n state-level analysis of the problem, which has great benefit and is done remarkably well (even if I would have liked a slightly clearer explanation of what really counts as conflict, given that the book defers this very important question to the data source, but does not really discuss it in the text.) Still, the few case studies illustrate not only that this is about states as boxes; it is also about whether a person, such as the UK’s Frank Roberts stationed in Moscow after World War II, has certain experiences, and whether individuals have personal relationships with people to trust, such as George Kennan. These are all factors that may vary greatly from person to person, diplomat to diplomat, and leader to leader. Furthermore, as Crescenzi relates, Napoleon himself seems not to have understood his own reputation with Russia and that his promises of peace towards Russia were simply not credible in light of his betrayal of Spain. Thus, human error matters.
In addition, the Syria incident also raises another pressing question, that is, how the behavior of the Trump administration, in particular, fits with the theory set forth, a theory that takes some state continuity seriously. As we know, President Trump has done precisely what no one thought possible: pivot nearly entirely on North Korea, withdraw from the Iran agreement that was so carefully worked out with allies and committed to by the United States, and rip up other agreements entered into by the United States, from environment to trade. But perhaps the answer, too, comes from the Trump administration, because as Crescenzi might likely note, while Trump has certainly stirred up NATO and ruffled some feathers of allies, he has not walked away from the alliance. Furthermore, the book may get it right when it “privileges action over speech” (p. 97). Trump may be a perfect litmus test for this since the words and actions of his administration with respect to “friends and foes” often diverge. It still seems that at the end of the day, it is the action that matters most. Action is what states pay attention to, ultimately.
This book is thought provoking and a good read. Indeed, what often marks a good read is not the questions it answers but those it raises. In this case, the major contribution is to make us think beyond the traditional, narrow, security-deterrence framework concerning the concept of reputation as expressed as resolve, and—in the same breadth—to make us wonder just how much this broader conceptualization of reputation would transfer to other domains, like trade or the environment. Furthermore, how might it possibly even carry over to a more complicated model where reputation could be informed by inferences from one domain to another, such as how a reputation for trustworthiness in alliances might color a reputation for trustworthiness in environmental compliance or trade?
Finally, I was struck by the thoughts in the conclusions about how, particularly in security matters, misperceptions—which are essentially reputations gone wrong—can give rise to deadly actions. Gaps between reality and perception then raise the question of the conditions under which states get reputation right and when they might get it wrong, and why. And when can reputations that differ from reality be usefully and credibly constructed? Because of questions like these, Of Friends and Foes is a great addition to the literature on reputation.
